Kingman v. FinnertyKingman v. Finnerty
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Michels, Petrella, Baime (per curiam)
The order of the Law Division awarding applicant Denis J. Corbett, Esq. an additional counsel fee of $2,587.73, for
We are also satisfied that the amended contingent fee schedule contained in
In McMullen the Supreme Court held that “[t]here is no question but that [
In holding
Finally, we find no merit to plaintiffs’ contention that the rule impairs the obligation of contingent fee contracts made and partly performed prior to January 31, 1972. Apart from the fact that, as noted above, it has long been recognized that attorneys’ fee arrangements are subject to judicial scrutiny, “every contract is made subject to the implied condition that its fulfillment may be frustrated by a proper exercise of the police power.” Veix v. Seneca B. & L. Ass‘n, 126 N.J.L. 314, 320 (E. & A. 1940); see also Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 198, 41 S.Ct. 465 [466], 65 L.Ed. 877 (1921). The stated rule is fully applicable to fee contracts between an attorney and his client. Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170, 40 S.Ct. 474, 476, 64 L.Ed. 843 (1920).
Moreover, the lack of substance in the contention that the retroactive application of
R. 1:21-7 impairs the obligation of contract is underscored by the fact that any attorney who believes that the rule operates unfairly as to him may proceed, underR. 1:21-7(f) , to seek court approval of a fee in an amount greater than that permitted byR. 1:21-7(c) . [McMullen v. Conforti & Eisele, 67 N.J. at 418-419 (quoting Amer. Trial Lawyers Assoc. v. N.J.Supreme Ct., 126 N.J. Super. 577, 593 (App.Div. 1974))].
The obvious purpose of
In Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515 the Supreme Court listed the steps utilized in deciding whether a statute is subject to retroactive application. The final inquiry which must be made is:
... will retroactive application result in “manifest injustice” to a party adversely affected by such an application of the statute? The essence of this inquiry is whether the affected party relied, to his or her prejudice, on the law that is now to be changed as a result of the retroactive application of the statute, and whether the consequences of this reliance are so deleterious and irrevocable that it would be unfair to apply the statute retroactively. [Id. at 523-524].
The same final inquiry must be made in determining whether to apply a court rule retroactively. In many cases filed before January 16, 1984 the effected party, the public, may have relied to their prejudice on former
Accordingly, the counsel fee order under review is affirmed.