182 Ill. 256 | Ill. | 1899
delivered the opinion of the court:
The truth of the averments' of the answer was not challenged by replication, but the cause was submitted to the court for decision upon bill and answer. The answer was, therefore, to be accepted as true. Pankey v. Baum, 51 Ill. 88; Fordyce v. Shriver, 115 id. 530; County of Cook v. Great Western Railroad Co. 119 id. 218:
It appears indisputably from the facts set forth in or by the answer, the transaction here sought to be invalidated was entered into and executed in actual good faith and without any desire to defraud creditors. If, however, its legal effect was to work a fraud on the rights of the appellant as a creditor, it will be deemed fraudulent as an inference of law, without regard to the motives which prompted it. Lawson v. Funk, 108 Ill. 502.
The contention of appellant is, the transfer by a debtor of his property to a corporation necessarily hinders and delays the creditor in the collection of his debts, and is in all instances a fraud, in legal contemplation. Adjudged cases are cited as in support of this position. We have examined these cases, and while such transactions were condemned in the instances then under consideration, we do not understand it is to be deduced from them that it is a fixed rule of law that the formation of a corporation by the debtor, and the conveyance of all his property to the corporation, though made in actual good faith, is conclusively presumed to be fraudulent as a matter of law. One of such cases (Bennett v. Minott, 28 Ore. 339,) held, to quote from the opinion: “When a debtor, for the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors, organizes a corporation and transfers to it all his assets, he himself being the owner o£ practically all the corporate stock, and continuing the business the same after as before the incorporation, using the proceeds for his own benefit, equity will set aside such transfer at the instance of creditors, notwithstanding the incorporation is valid, and the corporate stock subscribed by the debtor is subject to sale under execution.” And in another (Kellogg v. Bank, 58 Kan. 43,) it was said: “A fraud maybe perpetrated by an insolvent merchant through the instrumentality of a corporation organized and controlled by himself, to which he transfers the bulk of his property, as well as by a transfer to an individual; and where it appéars that this has been done for the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors, and enabling the debtor to retain the management and control of his property and of depriving his creditors of an opportunity to collect their dues, and when such insolvent retains substantially all the stock in the corporation and no innocent person contributes any substantial sum to its assets, the court, in sustaining attachments levied on the property and directing the sale thereof to satisfy the claims of creditors, is warranted in treating the whole transaction as a sham.” Expressions of the court in First Nat. Bank v. Trebein, (Ohio,) 52 N. E. Rep. 834, (the case most relied on,) give some support to the view entertained by counsel for appellant, but in that case it was said: “The formation of the corporation in no way facilitated the transaction of his (the debtor’s) milling business and that connected with it. Nothing was added to his capital, unless we regard the few hundred dollars that may have been paid for the four shares of stock taken by the other members of his family such an addition. Evidently an addition to capital was not the controlling object. * * * The only purpose the creation of the corporation and the conveyance to it subserved was to hinder creditors in levying upon the property and selling it on execution at law; and it is this hinder anee the law will not permit, and, when ascertained in a proper proceeding, requires the conveyance to be set aside and the property administered for the benefit of all the creditors of the fraudulent grantors. * * * We are clearly satisfied that the conveyance by Trebein of his property to the corporation was made to hinder and delay creditors, and should have been so declared by the court.”
It is believed that in each of the cases relied upon some circumstance of fraudulent intent, as the reservation of a trust in favor of the debtor, the design to create and administer the corporation for the mere purpose of enabling the debtor to conduct his business under the guise of a corporation and escape, even temporarily, his creditors, or some improper disposition or manipulation of the stock interest of the debtor to the injury of his creditors, or other like consideration, determined the action of the court. Certainly, if such a conveyance be made with the consent and approval of all of the creditors it would be valid. If, as here, entered into after notice to all the creditors and with the consent and approval of the greater number of them, as being the most desirable method of conserving the interests of all without any purpose or design of defrauding any creditor, and the debtor retains the open ownership of a stock interest based upon the value of the property conveyed, and equally open, as was such property, to seizure and sale on execution against the debtor as was the transferred property, the transaction cannot be deemed fraudulent, either in fact or as a matter of law.
It is urged the transaction is fraudulent in law, for the reason, if effectual, it prevents appellant, as a creditor, from seizing the property which the debtor owned and conveyed to the corporation, and forces the appellant to levy upon and sell the stock interests of the debtor instead. The appellant had no lien upon the property, nor any right to demand the debtor should refrain from making any disposition of the same which his judgment and discretion, fairly and justly exercised, would dictate as proper and advisable in view of the rights and interests of his creditors and the situation and circumstances of his estate, provided the result of such action on the part of the debtor should leave the proceeds of the transaction still subject to the process provided by law for the collection of judgments. The law has no universal rule that a mere change of the property into a stock interest in a corporation must be denounced a fraud in legal contemplation though it may be clearly, seen it is not so in fact. The operations of a debtor in dealing with his property may so change its character as to make it more inconvenient to levy upon and sell the same under execution without subjecting the debtor, as matter of law or fact, to the charge he has fraudulently hindered and delayed his creditors in the collection of their debts. Pledging the stock to Ainsworth to secure the money advanced by the latter was not a fraudulent act. The debtor had the right to borrow money wherewith to discharge his bona fide indebtedness and to secure the party loaning the money by the assignment of his shares of stock.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is correct and is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.