*1 438 value, sixty
October, ($60) offense was exceeded dollars was (the 1959 date committed), four charged to have contradict state offered no evidence to Appellant’s he was in the admission that remanding
testimony, erred during State of Tennessee such limitation custody him to for extradition. period prior filing an accusa- the- and that he removed Ex by appellant Reliance is had state, automobile from sufficient was 146, Tex.Cr.R., parte Williams, 333 S.W.2d proof demanding state was in the 351, 327 parte Ryan, Ex 168 on the date the offense was committed. re- 596, S.W.2d in which custody extradition manding relators to further observe that the testi We offered reversed, relators were where the mony alone, was in the they evidence that were not require not in the that he was al- were crimes state on the date the state demanding at the time the offense was leged to been committed have Ex alleged been committed. was offered probative evidence of value Norris, 193; 68, 225 S.W.2d same. rebut the the state to 293, parte Hatfield, 235 S. 591; Ackton, W. Ex parte also of- 164 Tex.Cr. Ryan was In the 548, R. identity, was 86. fered on the issue the state. rebutted is affirmed. cases as the two do not deem Opinion approved by the court. testi- appellant by his own controlling, as present that he was mony admitted re- in July, Tennessee
State of from automobile mortgaged
moved
state. warrant state’s
While the extradition the demand for Lloyd KINGHAM, Appellant, Harold alleged com offense was based * * * October, day of mitted “on the law, 1959,” state, under Texas Texas, Appellee. The STATE prove date but could bound such Nos. 36332. before, on, committed the offense was alleged, long the date the date after of Texas. presentment was anterior Dec. 1963. and not barred limitation. indictment Rehearing Denied Feb. 1964. 459; Made Branch’s Ann.P.C.2d Sec. ley 165 Tex.Cr.R. 307 S.W.2d must assume that of Ten- proof
nessee, in the absence of
contrary, is the same as our state. the state
Proof offered corpus hearing period
habeas prosecution commencing
limitation against appellant
the crime Tennessee, property
the laws of where the *2 penalty
charges, the Court of 45 assessed days’ jail confinement Unlawfully Pistol, of Carrying and a fine days’ jail confinement $100.00 take Life. offense of Serious Threat to appeals both us with Since are before Facts, dispose one Statement of we shall opinion. the two cases in one appellant belonging A truck had been involved in and had an accident been towed to the Chevrolet Bud Moore Company. After informed having been towing there was a charge $22.50 pay that he have his truck appellant ment charge, the went get his truck. lot, arriving appellant at the
told Hughes, William Lawrence body shop, he had charge of the come for truck. told him The towing charge was a of $22.50. appellant going pay insisted he was not charge. The then reached compartment into car glove produced pistol which he held close to the Hughes, stomach Mr. who could see the cartridges go- and said “I am up it or else.” take threw hands told he had (both Donald Thom- cases), W. Callahan argue odds and that he would with 36,332 Houston, (on D. only), White “Yes, replied to which I will damn sure use them.” he understood the to mean he Briscoe, Houston, Atty., Frank Dist. Carl get would he would shoot him. Dally, E. Brough F. Frank James Puckett, Jr., Attys., Asst. Dist. placed pistol The then in his B. and Leon pocket. Hughes a passing po- whistled at car, stopped. lice gave pistol employee to an who started to McDonald, judge. premises. leave the The officer was told Hughes’ employees one charged with offense employee lant’s had the pistol stopped “Unlawfully Carrying a Pistol” in Cause employee and recovered the 36,331. He was also “A No. with Threat life of a Human testifying in his own be- half, to Inflict Serious Bodily taking pistol admitted from the Being” 36,332. compartment glove in Cause of-his No. car By agreement, charges both payment were tried at his truck without the of tow- plea ing charge. time before the Court He denied he intended to harm guilty. Upon finding guilty on both position he comes exception.
There
bills of
are no formal
exception
terms of Article
V.A.P.C.
There are
bills
within the
no informal
per
: “A
threat that
provides
This article
merit discussion. The evidence
*3
him
protect
to
any
merely
son will
act
amply
judgment
sufficient to sustain the
do
self,
unlawfully
prevent
some
commission of
the
as to
or to
the
another,
come with
by
does not
carrying
also suffi- unlawful act
a
The evidence is
Appellant
chapter”.
meaning
in
of this
cient to
for
the
sustain the Court’s
is
to
the
the evidence
the offense of a
Threat to take
contends that
to
life
show
either
of Human
or to Inflict Serious
threat
serious
inflict se
Bodily
Being.
take the life of Mr.
to
Court,
facts,
have al
bodily injury
evidence
trying the
heard the
rious
him. We
ap
spoken
ready
resolved this contention
concluded that
the words
pellant.
contends,
Appellant
the
the
in the alterna
manner used indicated that
tive,
seriously
right
prevent the
lant
threat
to shoot
that he had the
to
intended the
by
by
stated
Mr.
complainant,
the
if the condition
unlawful
retention of his truck
position, appel
support
the
hav- Hughes.
was not met. The officers
To
State,
upon Spencer
could
intervened before
lant cites and relies
v.
the
do
carry
change
not
mat-
out
threat does
P.C.
in
While
truck
right
had
have her
to
error in the action
find no
first,
witness, in at
prosecuting
loaded
appellant’s mo
overruling
in
the trial court
loading
to
of his truck
tempting
secure the
and his motion for new
for continuance
tion
first,
logically
doing
be
an
cannot
be
36,331,
case wherein
trial in Cause No.
bring it within
unlawful act which would
unlawfully
charged with
car
1267, supra. Spencer’s
the terms of Article
mo-,
the reason that the
rying
State,
case, supra,
overruled. Tullos
is
is not sufficient as
for a continuance
majority Spencer v. State to take threatening seriously conviction for bodily injury
the life inflict serious MORRISON, Judge. be reversed.
Petitioner, of the Texas De an inmate *4 partment Corrections, application alleging this Court in 1950 conviction virtue of which he was confined void because at the time of his trial, indigent; he was that he asked the appoint represent court to counsel to refused; request the court parte J. D. HOPE. and that he was forced to trial without No. 36634. counsel and was sentenced to 50 opinion (Ex Hope, In our 154 Tex. Texas. Cr.R. 171) we denied the writ, Jan. concluded but with this express
observation: “We the view that court, possible, the trial grant where request indigent of an accused any felony counsel in case.” Since the opinion, rendition the above Supreme Court of the United has States held in Wainwright, Gideon v. 372 U.S. 9 L.Ed.2d all S.Ct. indigent accused those are entitled under process due clause the Federal Con- counsel at their trials. stitution to Follow- Gideon, petitioner decision in again applied this Court for writ of habeas corpus, relying upon Gideon. Moore,
ordered the Honorable David C. Judge develop the 124 District to Judicial petitioner’s the facts connection with allegations. learning Judge disqualified peti- Moore was hear such tion, Joseph the Honorable ordered Gladney, Judge of the 4th District Judicial petition in place Judge to hear the petition heard, Such Moore. represented by counsel, petitioner, has es- on the tablished that court’s docket in the handwriting Judge originally petitioner in tried but who is now de- ceased, appears notation, “De- requested appoint fendant Court to counsel represent Court’s refusal