KINGDOMWORKS STUDIOS, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company v. KINGDOM STUDIOS, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and KINGDOM INC., a Pennsylvania corporation
CASE NO. 19-14238-CV-MARTINEZ/MAYNARD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
November 19, 2021
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PARTIES’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a trademark infringement action between three companies all using some form of the word “KINGDOM” in their names. For ease of reference, I will refer throughout this report to Plaintiff KingdomWorks Studios, LLC as “Plaintiff” or “KingdomWorks,” to Defendant Kingdom Studios, LLC (which subsequently changed its name to Kingdom Story Company, LLC) as “KS,” and to Defendant Kingdom, Inc. as “Kingdom, Inc.”
Plaintiff is an independent film maker, multimedia production studio and publisher that creates, finances, produces and distributes motion pictures, DVDs, videos and books throughout the United States. Plaintiff has used the mark KINGDOMWORKS STUDIOS on videos, films, online content and books since 2012. Plaintiff‘s videos, films, online content and books are primarily geared towards the Christian community.
In 2018, Plaintiff federally registered the mark KINGDOMWORKS STUDIOS with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO“). That same year, Jon and Andy Erwin
KS defends its actions by reference to a Trademark License Agreement (the “License Agreement“) it entered during that time period with Kingdom, Inc., which has been using the mark KINGDOM to sell products and services to the Christian community since 1982. Kingdom, Inc. federally registered the mark KINGDOM in 2005. Kingdom, Inc.‘s federally registered mark covers more than 150 different products and services, including video and multimedia production services, audio production services, DVDs, videos, cassette tapes, and books with religious and secular theme relating to education, business and self-help.
All three parties have filed motions for summary judgment in this case. As the first and longest user of a mark containing the word “KINGDOM,” Kingdom, Inc. argues that its mark has priority and it is actually Plaintiff, not Kingdom, Inc. or KS, that is the infringing entity. Plaintiff responds that Kingdom, Inc.‘s mark does not have priority in the film making industry because Kingdom, Inc. does not make movies, but primarily sells church supplies, audio/video equipment, and audio/video services through its catalogue and website. Plaintiff therefore asserts that it has priority in the film making industry and KS has infringed on its mark. KS replies that it obtained
The motions for summary judgment were referred to me for report and recommendation by the Honorable Jose E. Martinez. DE 144. On October 21, 2021, I heard oral argument of counsel for all parties. I have carefully considered the relevant filings, evidence of record, and oral arguments. For the following reasons, I recommend that KS’ Motion for Summary Judgment (on Plaintiff‘s Claims), DE 193, be GRANTED, Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (on Kingdom, Inc.‘s Counterclaims), DE 221, be GRANTED, and Kingdom, Inc.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (on Kingdom, Inc.‘s Counterclaims), DE 182, be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff‘s Use of the KINGDOMWORKS STUDIOS Mark
KingdomWorks was formed in 2010 by Jeremy Wiles, DE 230 at 14, ¶8, and has continually used the mark KINGDOMWORKS STUDIOS in connection with its goods and services in commerce since at least January 1, 2012. DE 230 at 6, ¶2.1 On November 28, 2017, Mr. Wiles applied for federal registration of the KINDGOMWORKS STUDIOS mark. The application was published for third parties to oppose during the opposition period. DE 230 at 6-7, ¶3. Neither of the Defendants nor anyone else opposed Mr. Wiles’ application. DE 7 at 6, ¶16; DE 17 at 4, ¶16; DE 19 at 3, ¶16. On July 10, 2018, the application was granted. KingdomWorks
To date, KingdomWorks has used the KINGDOMWORKS STUDIOS mark on films released in theaters, churches and online, as well as on DVDs and online streaming platforms. The primary audience for KingdomWorks’ films and videos is the Christian community. DE 230 at 18, ¶3.
B. Defendant Kingdom, Inc.‘s Use of the KINGDOM Mark
Kingdom, Inc. is a Pennsylvania corporation that has sold products and services to churches, religious organizations and individuals under its KINGDOM trademark since 1982. DE 230 at 7, ¶5; DE 230 at 11, ¶28; DE 230 at 2, ¶3; DE 230 at 12, ¶1; DE 230 at 14, ¶¶5; DE 230 at 2, ¶2. Kingdom, Inc.‘s products and services are sold throughout the United States by means of its catalogues and website, www.kingdom.com. DE 230 at 11, ¶28; DE 230 at 2, ¶3; DE 230 at 12, ¶1. Kingdom, Inc. offers over 10,000 types of goods and services for sale, DE 230 at 7, ¶7, including video production services, audio production services, DVDs, videos, cassette tapes, and books. Kingdom, Inc.‘s president is John R. Berguson.
In 2005, Kingdom, Inc. federally registered the mark KINGDOM for over 150 goods and services in U.S. Trademark Registration No. 3,034,139 (“Mark ‘139“). DE 230 at 2, ¶3. DE 230 at 7, ¶6; DE 230 at 14, ¶6.4 The Class 9 goods of Mark ‘139 for KINGDOM include prerecorded audiocassettes, compact discs and videotapes featuring religious and secular themes relating to education, business and self-help. DE 230 at 2-3, ¶4. The Class 16 goods of Mark ‘139 for KINGDOM include “books with religious and secular themes relating to education, business and self-help.” DE 230 at 3, ¶6. The Class 35 services of Mark ‘139 for KINGDOM are directed to electronic, telephone and mail order retail services for a variety of products and services, including prerecorded audiocassettes, compact discs and videotapes featuring religious and secular themes relating to education, business and self-help. Id. at ¶ 5. The Class 41 services of Mark ‘139 for KINGDOM include “audio production services,” “video production services,” “video recording and production service,” “3D animation,” “post production service,” “production and presentation of audio/video presentations,” and “production of television programs.” DE 185-10.
Kingdom, Inc.‘s primary customers are churches and pastors. Kingdom, Inc. has a customer base that includes over 350,000 churches in the United States. DE 186-2 at 1.
C. Defendant KS’ Use of the KINGDOM STUDIOS and KINGDOM STORY COMPANY Marks
Defendant KS is an entertainment content company formed by the Erwin Brothers that makes feature films for release in theaters. The Erwin Brothers are known for their very successful film I Can Only Imagine. DE 230 at 13, ¶1. After the release of I Can Only Imagine in 2018, the Erwin Brothers decided to create a new entertainment company. To determine the availability of
On May 15, 2018, the USPTO issued an Official Office Action to KS advising of a refusal to register the mark KINGDOM STUDIOS based on the existence of Plaintiff‘s KINGDOMWORKS STUDIOS mark. DE 226 at ¶71; DE 7-4. Around six months later, on November 13, 2018, Plaintiff‘s attorney also sent a cease-and-desist letter to KS regarding their use of the name “KINGDOM STUDIOS.” DE 225 at ¶74. On January 9, 2019, the USPTO issued a Supplemental Office Action to KS refusing KS’ registration of its applied-for mark of KINGDOM STUDIOS based on a likelihood of confusion with Plaintiff‘s mark under
On February 25, 2019, KS entered the License Agreement with Kingdom, Inc. for use of the mark KINGDOM. DE 195-5. Plaintiff‘s founder, Jeremy Wiles, met with Jon Erwin in February 2019 to discuss Plaintiff‘s request that KS not use the word “KINGDOM” in its name. DE 230 at 17, ¶¶27; DE 230 at 18, ¶¶2; DE 226 at ¶75. During that meeting, Erwin advised Wiles of the License Agreement with Kingdom, Inc. DE 226 at ¶76. In March 2019, the Erwin Brothers announced their new company, KINGDOM STUDIOS, at a National Religious Broadcasters trade show. DE 230 at 17, ¶26; DE 226 at ¶¶¶77, 78. KS also entered an agreement with Lionsgate Entertainment Corporation (“Lionsgate“) for the marketing, advertising and promotion of the film I Still Believe. The Lionsgate Agreement required KS to promote the launch of KINGDOM
On February 1, 2019, KS applied to register the mark KINGDOM STORY COMPANY with the USPTO. DE 230 at 13, ¶4. On October 15, 2019, the Erwin Brothers formally changed the name of their company from “KINGDOM STUDIOS” to “KINGDOM STORY COMPANY.” DE 230 at 17, ¶28. On January 3, 2020, KS and Kingdom, Inc. agreed to an Addendum to the License Agreement, which amended a section granting KS rights to use the KINGDOM mark with the term “STUDIOS” as allowed under the original License Agreement and adding the term “STORY.” DE 195-6.
The first trailer for I Still Believe was released in or about Fall 2019. DE 230 at 16, ¶21. The actual movie was released on March 13, 2020, “the weekend the coronavirus took out every movie theater in the world.” DE 230 at 16, ¶22. I Still Believe was nominated for the People‘s Choice Award for Drama of the Year. Id. at ¶ 23.
D. The Claims, Counterclaims and Motions for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff‘s operative Complaint seeks relief for (1) federal trademark infringement under
Defendants each assert several counterclaims against Plaintiff KingdomWorks. Defendant KS seeks declaratory judgments that it has not infringed Plaintiff‘s mark or engaged in unfair competition and false designation of origin. DE 17; Tr. at 11. KS also seeks relief against Plaintiff for dilution under Florida law and asserts an “alternative” claim of federal trademark infringement. Id. Defendant Kingdom, Inc. seeks relief for federal trademark infringement under
Each party has filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant KS seeks summary judgment “on all counts” in Plaintiff‘s Complaint. DE 193.6 Defendant Kingdom, Inc. seeks summary judgment on its counterclaims of infringement and unfair competition against Plaintiff. DE 182. Plaintiff also seeks summary judgment on Kingdom, Inc.‘s counterclaims of infringement and unfair competition. DE 221.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party‘s favor. See Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2016); Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). The Court does not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations. Furcron, 843 F.3d at 1304; Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007). If a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must deny summary judgment. Skop, 485 F.3d at 1140.
“The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when only one party files a motion. ‘Cross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.’ Thus, a court must consider each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose
When a motion for summary judgment is presented to the court, it opens the entire record for consideration, and the Court may enter judgment in favor of the nonmoving party on any grounds apparent in the record, even where there is no formal cross motion. See Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1204 (11th Cir. 1999).
ANALYSIS
Under the Lanham Act, a party is liable for trademark infringement if, without consent, he “use[s] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services” which “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive.”
Both Defendants argue that Kingdom, Inc. has priority and Plaintiff cannot establish trademark infringement or unfair competition against KS because of the License Agreement
I. Priority of Use
Kingdom, Inc. owns Mark ‘139 for the mark KINGDOM. Kingdom, Inc. applied for registration on March 10, 2003, claiming first use of this mark in 1982. DE 185-10. Mark ‘139 was issued on December 27, 2005. Id. Kingdom, Inc‘s mark is “incontestable” pursuant to
Plaintiff owns Mark ‘487 for the mark KINGDOMWORKS STUDIOS. DE 7-2. Plaintiff‘s mark “consists of standard characters without claim to any particular font style, size or color.” Id. Plaintiff applied for registration on November 29, 2017, claiming first use on January 1, 2010, and first use in commerce on January 1, 2012. Plaintiff‘s application was granted on July 10, 2018.
The first to use a mark on a product or service in a particular market has priority and is considered the “senior user” for purposes of determining trademark protection. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Junior Food Stores of W. Fla. v. Junior Food Stores, Inc., 226 So. 2d 393, 396 (Fla. 1969)). According to the two registrations, Kingdom, Inc. began using the mark KINGDOM approximately 28 years before Plaintiff began using the mark KINGDOMWORKS STUDIOS; Kingdom, Inc. applied for registration approximately 14 years before Plaintiff; and Kingdom, Inc. obtained federal trademark protection approximately 13 years before Plaintiff‘s application was granted. Thus, from the face of the registrations, Kingdom, Inc. appears to be the senior user.
Despite this chronology, Plaintiff says Kingdom, Inc. lacks priority for two reasons. First, Plaintiff argues that the scope of trademark protection is limited to goods and services on which the mark is actually used, and Kingdom, Inc. has not actually used its mark to produce movies. Plaintiff further contends that, even if Kingdom, Inc. has made a few films, its involvement in these films was sporadic, de minimus, largely decades old, and/or did not bear the KINGDOM mark since Kingdom, Inc. was not listed in the credits of the movies it produced.
I am not persuaded by Plaintiff‘s arguments. First, a comparison of Marks ‘139 and ‘487 shows that the marks largely include the same services. Both registrations cover services relating to video production, post-production, and book publishing. Compare DE 185-10 with DE 7-2. The Lanham Act,
A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register provided by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner‘s ownership of the mark, and of the owner‘s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations stated in the certificate.
Plaintiff argues that because Kingdom, Inc.‘s registration does not include the words “FILM,” “MOVIES,” and “STUDIO,” the protection of Kingdom, Inc.‘s registered mark does not extend to film and movie productions. I need not determine whether a distinction exists between videos, films and movies, however, because the undisputed evidence shows that Kingdom, Inc. has produced all three since 1985. Plaintiff says Kingdom, Inc. is a church supply company that
Kingdom, Inc. started its production department (known over time as Kingdom Productions and Kingdom Media Services) in 1985. DE 186-2 at 1; DE 185-2 at 3. The production department has been in continuous operation since that time. DE 186-2 at 1. Kingdom, Inc. has produced full length movies, how-to series, documentaries, devotional series, commercials, music videos, films of live events and seminars and television programs. DE 186-2 at 1; DE 185-3;7 DE
Regardless, Kingdom, Inc. received national recognition for its production department‘s work. In 1997, Kingdom, Inc.‘s production department received a national award for producing a film about life flight helicopters. DE 185-3 at 19-20. It also received a national award for producing a series about heart transplants and innovative operations in a hospital. Id. at 21. Kingdom, Inc. also marketed its audio/video production services at the annual National Religious Broadcasters Convention every year from 2005 to 2016. DE 186-2 at 4. Kingdom, Inc. was listed under “Audio/Video Productions” in the annual convention program book, had the largest booth in this industry, and typically had six to eight booth spaces at the convention, more than most other exhibitors there. Id.
In addition to filmed content released on VHS or DVD, Kingdom, Inc. has also produced two full length documentary films released in theaters. DE 186-2 at 3. In or around 2001, Kingdom, Inc. produced People of Honor, a 110-minute documentary film about World War II
By comparison, Plaintiff has provided evidence of only one full length feature film — Genesis Paradise Lost — produced by Plaintiff and released in theaters. Genesis Paradise Lost is an animated documentary about the creation story released in theaters in 2017. DE 224-3 at 2; DE 224-4 at 7; DE 185-11 at 10-18. Plaintiff provided much the same production services for Genesis Paradise Lost as Kingdom, Inc. provided for People of Honor and The Austin Disaster — i.e., Plaintiff was involved in scripting, conceptualization, pre-production planning, filming and the strategy behind distribution of the film. Id. Plaintiff has not produced any other full length feature films released in theaters. Plaintiff has produced two short films (each less than fifteen minutes) — Test of Fire and Sing a Little Louder. Test of Fire is a short political video about voting one‘s values released in 2012 during election season. It was shown on Fox News, in churches, and
Having reviewed both companies’ movie making and film production pedigrees, there is no genuine dispute in the record that Kingdom, Inc. actually used its mark in commerce in connection with movie, film and video production services before Plaintiff did. Plaintiff‘s assertion that Kingdom, Inc‘s use is de minimus is not supported by the evidence. Indeed, Kingdom, Inc. has worked on more full-length productions released in theaters than Plaintiff has. Nor does it matter that Kingdom, Inc. did not create its own content for the movies it produced.
Alternatively, even if Kingdom, Inc. never produced a single movie released in theaters, it would still have priority under the “natural expansion” doctrine. Under the natural expansion doctrine, a trademark owner enjoys protection over goods and services on which the mark has been used, as well as those related goods and services that live within the realm of the natural expansion of its business. Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2001). Courts use the “source or sponsorship test,” which provides protection to a trademark owner, for any product the buying public might reasonably think came from the same source. Id. Since films are often released both in theaters and on video, the buying public could reasonably believe movies and videos came from the same source. I do not find a material issue of fact in dispute as to whether films produced on video and films released in theaters are reasonably attributable to the same source. Movie production services are therefore within the realm of natural expansion of Kingdom, Inc.‘s trademark for its media production business. See Drew Estate Holding Co., LLC v. Fantasia Distribution, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (finding that hookah and molasses tobacco were within the realm of natural expansion of trademark for cigar company); see also E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Int‘l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985)
In sum, whether under the language of its trademark registration, the common law or the natural expansion doctrine, Kingdom, Inc. is the senior user and has priority in this case.
II. KS’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff‘s Claims (DE 193)
Having concluded that Kingdom, Inc. is the senior user and its mark has priority, I next consider whether Kingdom, Inc.‘s licensee, KS, also has prior rights by virtue of the License Agreement. KS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s claims because Kingdom, Inc. possesses an incontestable registration under
The License Agreement grants KS the right to use the KINGDOM mark in connection with:
pre-recorded dvds and cds featuring music, television series, movies and films; downloadable music sound recording and video recording featuring music, television series, movies and films; video production and production of audio recording services; multi-media entertainment services in the nature of recording, production and post production services in the field of films, movies, television, and music; production of movies and videos for the Internet; entertainment services, namely the provision of continuing programs and movies featuring content delivered via the Internet and cable television; provision of non-downloadable films, movies and television programs via a video on demand service; and film distribution.
DE 195-5 at 2 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff‘s sole argument against KS’ position is the assertion that Kingdom, Inc. “never established prior trademark rights in the movie industry and that the license is therefore a sham and an insufficient shelter for KS to escape plaintiff‘s claims.” DE 225 at 3.25 As previously discussed, Plaintiff‘s assertion in this regard is not supported by the evidence. Kingdom, Inc. is the senior user and has priority. In the License Agreement, Kingdom, Inc. grants KS the right to use the KINGDOM mark on its movies, films, and video production services. This language is sufficiently inclusive to cover the rights, products and services at issue in this litigation. As Kingdom, Inc.‘s licensee, KS benefits from Kingdom, Inc.‘s prior exclusive right to use Mark ‘139. Because KS is in privity with Kingdom, Inc. through the License Agreement, Plaintiff‘s claims against KS for trademark infringement and unfair competition must fail. See 578539 B.C. Ltd. v. Kortz, 2015 WL 12670488, *15 (C.D. Cal. April 10, 2015) (recognizing that a licensee or assignee in privity with senior user may assert senior user‘s priority rights and seek cancellation of junior user‘s mark); Diarama Trading Co., Inc. v. J. Walter Thompson U.S.A., Inc., 2005 WL 2148925, *9-11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (permitting defendants who were in privity with a prior user of plaintiff‘s registered marks to assert a cancellation counterclaim based on the third party senior user‘s rights and granting summary judgment on that counterclaim), aff‘d, 194 Fed. Appx. 81 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2006) (unpub.). Plaintiff cannot establish trademark infringement or unfair
III. Plaintiff‘s and Kingdom, Inc.‘s Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on Kingdom, Inc.‘s Counterclaims (DE 221 and DE 182)
Having recommended that KS’ motion for summary judgment be granted as to Plaintiff‘s claims, the only issue remaining before me relates to Kingdom, Inc.‘s counterclaims for trademark infringement and unfair competition. Kingdom, Inc. has countersued Plaintiff for infringement of its registered mark under
Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all three of Kingdom, Inc.‘s counterclaims because Kingdom, Inc. “cannot meet the threshold requirement” of demonstrating “a protectable right that is relevant to this case which, in essence, is a dispute between two cinematic filmmakers.” DE 221 at 6. Plaintiff argues further that its mark and Kingdom, Inc.‘s mark are not likely to be confused. DE 221 at 6-15. Kingdom, Inc. counters that Plaintiff‘s summary judgment motion should be denied because it is clear that Plaintiff infringed upon Kingdom, Inc‘s valid mark in a way that is likely to cause confusion among consumers. DE 183.
A. Federal Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition
As set forth above, to prevail on a claim of trademark infringement, a claimant must show (1) claimant‘s mark has priority; (2) defendant used claimant‘s mark in commerce; and (3) defendant‘s mark is likely to cause consumer confusion. Frehling Enterprises, 192 F.3d at 1335. Similarly, for false designation of origin under
Here, for reasons discussed above, Kingdom, Inc. has established that it is the senior user with priority of right to incontestable KINGDOM Mark ‘139, which has been in continuous, national use for nearly four decades. Thus, to establish that it is in fact Plaintiff who has infringed on Kingdom, Inc.‘s mark as set forth in Kingdom, Inc.‘s counterclaims, Kingdom, Inc. must demonstrate a likelihood of confusion between Kingdom, Inc.‘s senior Mark ‘139 and Plaintiff‘s junior Mark ‘487. Consequently, in this section I focus on determining if a genuine issue of likely confusion exists between these two marks.
To determine if likelihood of confusion exists, seven individual factors are considered: (1) the type/strength of the asserted mark; (2) the similarity of the marks; (3) the similarity of the products and services the marks represent; (4) the similarity of the parties’ retail outlets (trade channels) and customers; (5) the similarity of the parties’ advertising media; (6) the alleged infringer‘s intent; and (7) actual confusion. Aronowitz v. Health-Chem Corp., 513 F.3d 1229, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Tana v. Dantanna‘s, 611 F.3d 767, 774-75 (11th Cir. 2010). A court
Although likelihood of confusion is generally a question of fact, Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 839 n.16 (11th Cir. 1983), the issue may be decided as a matter of law if no genuine disputes of material fact exist. Tana, 611 F.3d at 775 n. 7 (recognizing that the Eleventh Circuit “has routinely ‘weighed’ the likelihood-of-confusion factors on summary judgment“); Alliance Metals, Inc., of Atlanta v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895, 907 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Although likelihood of confusion generally is a question of fact, it may be decided as a matter of law.“).
I will address each factor in turn before evaluating the “overall balance” of factors.
1. Strength of Mark
The first factor considers the strength or distinctiveness of the claimant‘s mark. Sovereign Mil. Hospitaller Ord. of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes & of Malta v. Fla. Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign Ord. of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, The Ecumenical Ord., 809 F.3d 1171, 1182 (11th Cir. 2015) (hereinafter, Sovereign Military). It is the second most important factor in the seven-factor analysis. Id. The strength or inherent distinctiveness of a trademark is determined by viewing the trademark as a whole, including any generic, descriptive,
A mark‘s strength is assessed in two ways. Sovereign Military, 809 F.3d at 1182. First, the mark is classified into one of four categories of distinctiveness (1) ‘fanciful’ or ‘arbitrary,’ (2) ‘suggestive,’ (3) ‘descriptive,’ and (4) ‘generic.‘” Royal Palm Properties, LLC v. Pink Palm Properties, LLC, 950 F.3d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 2020); Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007). A fanciful or arbitrary mark “bears no logical relationship to the product or service it is used to represent” and is therefore the most distinctive. Welding, 509 F.3d at 1357. A suggestive mark “refers to some characteristic of the goods, but requires a leap of the imagination to get from the mark to the product.” Id. at 1357-58. A descriptive mark “identifies a characteristic or quality of the service or product.” Id. at 1358. And a generic mark, which is not entitled to trademark protection, is simply “a mark that suggests the basic nature of the product or service.” Tana, 611 F.3d at 774.
The two strongest types of marks—arbitrary and suggestive—are “inherently distinctive because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product and are generally entitled to trademark protection.” Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1335 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). For example, the term “Kodak” is arbitrary as it relates to cameras because it has nothing to do with taking photographs, and the term “penguin” is suggestive as a mark for refrigerators because it raises in the mind a suggestion of the Artic or cold environment. Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (5th Cir. 1980). In contrast, a descriptive mark describes “a particular characteristic or quality of” of the product or service. Reinalt-Thomas Corp. v. Mavis Tire Supply, LLC, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ga. 2019).
Such marks are not inherently distinctive. For example, “Vision Center” is descriptive in reference to a place where one purchases eyeglasses, or “EVERREADY” with reference to batteries or light bulbs. Soweco, 617 F.2d at 1183-84. A descriptive mark can, however, “become sufficiently distinctive to enjoy trademark protection by acquiring secondary meaning.” Tana, 611 F.3d at 774. A descriptive mark acquires “secondary meaning when the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.” Id. (citing Welding, 509 F.3d at 1358).
In this case it is undisputed that Mark ‘139 is incontestable under the Lanham Act,
In my view, the KINGDOM mark falls somewhere between suggestive and descriptive. The parties agree that “[b]oth secular and non-secular dictionaries define ‘kingdom’ to mean, among other things, the ‘sovereignty’ or ‘kingship’ of God.” DE 230 at 15, ¶ 16. This is consistent with the Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of “kingdom” as “the eternal kingship of God” or “the realm in which God‘s will is fulfilled.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “kingdom,” available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/kingdom. Here, the mark KINGDOM could be
After considering the mark‘s classification, courts “then consider the degree to which third parties make use of the mark.” Sovereign Military, 809 F.3d at 1182 (quoting Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1336). “The less that third parties use the mark, the stronger it is, and the more protection it deserves.” Id. Plaintiff challenges the strength of the KINGDOM mark by pointing to evidence of extensive third-party use of the word “KINGDOM” in marks relating to faith-based goods and services in the entertainment industry. The record contains undisputed evidence of at least 30 different users of the term “KINGDOM” in the faith-based entertainment industry, including but not limited to the following companies: Kingdom Entertainment (independent faith-based film, television, and book distributor); Kingdom Reign Entertainment (a boutique entertainment company that creates, produces, writes, pitches, and develops television show concepts for major networks from pre to post-production); Kingdom Sight Studios (a studio company that creates faith-based films); Kingdom Media Studios (provides faith-based media services); Kingdom Palace Productions (family-friendly focused entertainment company); Kingdom (American television series); Kingdom First Solutions (sells church management software); Kingdom Sound
I agree with Plaintiff that the above unrefuted evidence of hundreds of other users of the term “KINGDOM” in the faith-based and/or entertainment industry means that Kingdom, Inc. operates in a “crowded field” with widespread third-party use, which diminishes the mark‘s strength. See Homes & Land, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (in case challenging a magazine‘s use of a similar mark, 18 uses of a similar mark in other publications, coupled with “primary websites” using similar words, constituted “widespread third-party use” and weighed against the mark‘s strength); see also McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 11:85 (5th ed. 2017) (“In a crowded field of look-alike marks, each member of the crowd is relatively weak in its ability to prevent use by others in the crowd.“). Thus, I find that third-party use of similar marks has diminished the strength of the KINGDOM mark such that this factor weighs against a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
2. Similarity of the Marks
This second factor requires me “to compare the plaintiff‘s marks with the defendant‘s marks and measure their similarity.” Sovereign Military, 809 F.3d at 1186. “The greater the similarity, the greater the likelihood of confusion.” Fla. Int‘l Univ., 830 F.3d at 1260. The marks
Similarity is “not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” FCOA, LLC v. Foremost Title & Escrow Services, LLC, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1390 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (quoting Sovereign Military, 809 F.3d at 1187). “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Moreover, the test is not whether most consumers would be confused by the marks’ similarity, but whether “an appreciable number” of consumers would be confused. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 979 n.22 (11th Cir. 1983).
Here, both marks use the base word “KINGDOM” and the intended meaning of both marks is to use the term in a religious or faith-based context. The marks are not identical, however. See,
3. Similarity of the Products and Services the Marks Represent
The third factor, similarity of services, “requires a determination as to whether the products [or services] are the kind that the public attributes to a single source, not whether or not the purchasing public can readily distinguish between the products of the respective parties.” Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1338. The test is not whether the services can be readily distinguished, but rather whether the services “are so related in the minds of consumers that they get the sense that a single producer is likely to” offer both services. Id. at 1338. “The greater the similarity between the products and services the greater the likelihood of confusion.” Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Cycles USA, Inc., 765 F.2d 1502, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff argues that “[w]hile Defendant [Kingdom, Inc.] has, at times, advertised the capability to provide technical services such as audio and video editing, these services are of a very different character than the film and movie products written, scripted, casted, directed, produced, distributed and sold by Plaintiff.” DE 221 at 10. As previously discussed in the section on priority of use, I disagree. Plaintiff attempts to create a distinction where none exists. A review of the evidence shows that both Plaintiff and Kingdom, Inc. have used their marks to sell substantially similar products and services in the United States. More specifically, Kingdom, Inc. has produced evidence of numerous video products and services involving its video production department, which has been in continuous operation since 1985. DE 186 at 7-8, ¶¶ 67-68, 70-75. Kingdom, Inc.‘s productions range from religiously themed videos and movie trailers to multi-part devotional series and recorded live seminars. Id. Notably, Kingdom, Inc. produced two full length films – “People of Honor” and “The Austin Disaster of 1911: A Chronicle of Human Character”
4. Similarity of the Parties’ Customers and Retail Outlets
The fourth factor considers “where, how, and to whom the parties’ products are sold.” Fla. Int‘l Univ., 830 F.3d at 1261. “Dissimilarities between the retail outlets for and the predominant customers of plaintiff‘s and defendant‘s goods lessen the possibility of confusion.” Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1339. Notably, the parties do not have to be in direct competition to cause a likelihood of confusion. Id. Similarly, “[t]he parties’ outlets and customer bases need not be identical, but some degree of overlap should be present.” Id.
Although the parties’ video production customers are similar in that both Kingdom, Inc. and Plaintiff cater to the Christian religious market, I note that Plaintiff‘s customers are generally film watchers whom Plaintiff wants to purchase, download and/or otherwise view Plaintiff‘s cinematographic content, while Kingdom, Inc.‘s video production customers are generally content creators who come to Kingdom Inc. to produce their work. Thus, the “customers” of these two entities are slightly different in that regard. However, Plaintiff‘s Conquer Series DVD set, Workbook and Leader Guide have been sold to 40,000 churches. Kingdom, Inc.‘s numerous self help DVDs, videos and books have been sold to 350,000 churches. That presents a significant degree of overlap which weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
In terms of trade channels, Kingdom, Inc. sells its products and services through its catalogues and on its website, www.kingdom.com. Plaintiff sells its products online through soulrefiner.com (a streaming platform owned by its founder Jeremy Wiles) and on its website, www.kingdomworksstudios.com. Both parties have released one or two movies “in theaters” but
5. Similarity of Advertising Media
This fifth factor “compares the parties’ advertisements and the audiences they reach.” Sovereign Military, 809 F.3d at 1188. The parties’ advertisements need not be identical to cause confusion; instead, “the standard is whether there is likely to be significant enough overlap in the audience of the advertisements that a possibility of confusion could result.” Fla. Int‘l, 830 F.3d at 1262.
Here, this factor weighs neither for nor against either party. It is neutral. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the advertising media of the two marks is so different as to weigh in Plaintiff‘s favor. As Plaintiff acknowledges, both Kingdom, Inc. and Plaintiff attended and advertised at the same annual National Religious Broadcasters Conference. DE 222 at 7, ¶¶ 49, 51. Consistent with most businesses these days, both parties have a solid online presence and both advertise their products and services at www.kingdomworks.com and www.kingdom.com, respectively.
6. Plaintiff‘s Intent
This sixth factor asks if the alleged infringer “adopted its mark with the intent of deriving benefit from the reputation of the” infringed mark‘s owner. Sovereign Military, 809 F.3d at 1188. This factor “alone may be enough to justify the inference that there is confusing similarity.” Fla. Int‘l, 830 F.3d at 1263. In examining intent, I must determine whether the alleged infringer “had a conscious intent to capitalize on the [opposing party‘s] business reputation, was intentionally blind, or otherwise manifested improper intent” when using its mark. Custom Mfg., 508 F.3d at 648.
Here, I find no evidence of mal-intent on Plaintiff‘s part. There is zero indication that Plaintiff adopted the KingdomWorks Studios mark to capitalize off Defendant Kingdom‘s goodwill. There is no indication that either Plaintiff or its founder, Jeremy Wiles, was aware or had heard of Kingdom, Inc. when it adopted its KINGDOMWORKS mark. Importantly, “the absence of such evidence does not avoid a ruling of likelihood of confusion.” J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald‘s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This factor is neutral in my analysis.
7. Actual Confusion
Evidence of actual confusion is the most significant of the seven factors. Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1340 (“It is undisputed that evidence of actual confusion is the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion.“); see also Caliber Auto. Liquidators, Inc., 605 F.3d at 936 (of all the factors in the likelihood of confusion analysis, this seventh factor of actual confusion is “the most weighty consideration.“). Conversely, a lack of evidence of actual confusion weighs heavily against a finding of likelihood of confusion. “If consumers have been exposed to two allegedly similar trademarks in the marketplace for an
Here, Kingdom, Inc., which has the burden of proof on its counterclaims, offers no evidence of actual confusion in the public about its mark versus Plaintiff‘s mark. This lack of evidence is telling because the marks have co-existed in the Christian video and film production industry for almost a decade. Kingdom, Inc. has used its mark on various films and videos sold to 350,000 churches since the 1980s. Plaintiff has used its mark in commerce since 2012, most notably on the Conquer Series DVD set and accompanying workbooks sold to 40,000 churches. Despite this use in the same or similar market, Kingdom, Inc. was unable to locate a single instance of actual confusion in the public between the two companies. DE 230 at 12 (Kingdom, Inc. agreeing to the following: “After diligent search of its company records as required by this Court‘s Order on Plaintiff‘s Motion to Compel, Defendant Kingdom Inc. stated that it did not have
Instead of proffering evidence of actual confusion, Kingdom, Inc. relies exclusively on Plaintiff‘s proof of actual confusion between Plaintiff and KS when KS was using the mark Kingdom Studios. In opposing KS’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff provided the names of 32 people who communicated with Plaintiff after the release of KS’ movie I Can Only Imagine “in a state of confusion regarding Plaintiff‘s identity and its mistaken association with” KS. DE 225 at 14. Plaintiff provides evidence of that confusion in the record at DE 195-35. Plaintiff contends that the similarity between the KingdomWorks Studios mark and the Kingdom Studios mark caused that actual confusion. Plaintiff further contends that the massive advertising and marketing done by KS in partnership with movie-making giant Lionsgate “somewhat eclipsed Plaintiff‘s identity in the market,” and caused “reverse confusion” in the entertainment industry and among Christian movie-goers. DE 225 at 14-15.
Kingdom, Inc.‘s attempt to rely on confusion between Plaintiff and KS to show confusion between Kingdom, Inc. and Plaintiff is unavailing. Evidence of actual confusion between the marks used by Plaintiff and KS does not demonstrate actual confusion between the marks used by Plaintiff and Kingdom, Inc. In fact, just the opposite is true. The fact that job seekers, screenwriters and investors contacted Plaintiff believing Plaintiff to be KS after the release of KS’ film I Can Only Imagine, while no one has ever contacted Plaintiff or Kingdom, Inc. with confusion between their respective companies is persuasive evidence that, while there may have been actual confusion between KingdomWorks Studios and Kingdom Studios, there was never any actual confusion between KingdomWorks and Kingdom, Inc. The lack of actual confusion
8. Overall Balance
Here, most of the applicable factors weigh against a finding of likelihood of confusion between Kingdom, Inc.‘s mark and Plaintiff‘s mark, including the two factors the Eleventh Circuit has deemed most important – strength of the mark and actual confusion. Kingdom, Inc.‘s mark operates in a crowded field with many others using some form of the word Kingdom on faith based and/or entertainment products, goods or services. That crowded field operates to diminish the strength of the KINGDOM mark. In addition, there is no evidence of actual consumer confusion between Plaintiff and Kingdom, Inc. although they have provided similar products and services to the faith-based community for almost ten years. For summary judgment purposes, the question is whether on the record presented, no reasonable jury could return a verdict for Kingdom, Inc. on Kingdom, Inc‘s counterclaims. See DE 182 at 5 (basing its request for “summary judgment o[n] infringement, unfair competition, and cancellation” on the likelihood of confusion between KINGDOMWORKS and KINGDOM). I answer that question affirmatively, given the balance of the factors, particularly the two most important. I conclude that Kingdom Inc. has not met its burden. Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment on Kingdom, Inc.‘s counterclaims (DE 221) should be granted, and Kingdom, Inc.‘s motion for summary judgment on Kingdom, Inc.‘s counterclaims (DE 182) should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons, I respectfully recommend that:
- Defendant Kingdom, Inc.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment, DE 182, be DENIED;
Defendant KS’ Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff, DE 193, be GRANTED; and - Plaintiff‘s Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Kingdom, Inc., DE 221, be GRANTED.
- As a result, I recommend that final judgment be entered in favor of both Defendants and against Plaintiff on all of Plaintiff‘s seven affirmative claims for relief (Counts I through VII of Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint, DE 7), that final judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Kingdom, Inc. on all of Kingdom, Inc.‘s three counterclaims against Plaintiff (Counts I through III of Kingdom Inc.‘s Counterclaims, DE 19), that final judgment be entered in favor of KS and against Plaintiff on the first two of KS’ four counterclaims against Plaintiff for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and no unfair competition under federal law (KS’ Counterclaims Counts I and II, DE 17), and that counts III and IV of KS’ Counterclaims be dismissed.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with U.S. District Judge Jose E. Martinez. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and Recommendation and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation. See
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida, this 19th day of November, 2021.
SHANIEK M. MAYNARD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
