Betty KING, d/b/a P.D.Q. PAWNSHOP, a/k/a KING‘S IDEAL PAWNSHOP v. W. D. YOUNTS, Chief of Police in and for the City of North Little Rock, Arkansas
82-156
Supreme Court of Arkansas
December 20, 1982
Rehearing denied January 17, 1983.
91 Ark. 91 | 643 S.W.2d 542
Jim Hamilton, City Atty., for appellee.
ROBERT H. DUDLEY, Justice. Appellant, the owner of P.D.Q. Pawnshop in North Little Rock, filed suit in chancery court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the enforcement against her of Act 87 of 1981, codified as
The trial court in its decree recited that it had considered the matter on the pleadings, the testimony and evidence presented, the briefs and the argument of counsel. It found that pawnbrokers are included in Act 87 of 1981 and North Little Rock Ordinance No. 5369, that the business operation conducted by appellant is within the purview of the act and ordinance and that appellant must follow the requirements of the act. The trial court denied appellant‘s request for a permanent injunction, and it is from this order appellant appeals. Jurisdiction is in this Court pursuant to Rule 29 (1) (c).
The burden was on appellant to bring up a record sufficient to show that the trial court was wrong. Armbrust v. Henry, 263 Ark. 98, 562 S.W.2d 598 (1978);
In Armbrust v. Henry, supra, we emphasized that an appellate court must presume that the missing testimony in a record on appeal supports the finding of the lower court. See also, Phillips v. Arkansas Real Estate Com‘n., 244 Ark. 577, 426 S.W.2d 412 (1968). Without the benefit of the evidence from which the trial court made its findings, an affirmance of the trial court is imperative.
Affirmed.
JOHN I. PURTLE, Justice, dissenting. I do not feel that the record was insufficient to decide this case. This was obviously a test case brought before us to clarify the laws as presently exist in regard to precious metals dealers. The majority merely skirts the issues and forces additional litigation to decide what should properly be decided now. The pleadings and other material in the record expose the issues sufficiently to allow us to understand and decide the underlying controversy.
The appellant operates as a pawnbroker as defined in
The statute in question here is
No person including a pawnbroker shall engage in the business of buying . . . precious metals . . . for the purpose of reselling the same . . . without first obtaining a license . . .
Similar language appears in the contested city ordinance, North Little Rock Ordinance No. 5369. The language is designed to regulate persons in the business of buying precious metals for resale. These persons had not specifically been regulated by the state prior to the enactment of this legislation. The phrase “including a pawnbroker” would seem to me to mean that any pawnbrokers who enter into the business of buying and reselling precious metals would have
I would, therefore, reverse and remand this case for a proper order allowing appellant to continue in her business of pawnbroking without coming under this particular regulation until such time as she decides to engage in the business of buying and reselling precious metals.
