10 S.E.2d 832 | Ga. | 1940
Alleged failure of county board of education to formulate rules and regulations for employees in the county school system, "so that they shall serve during good behavior and efficient service, and so that they shall not be discharged without notice being given to them, charges preferred, and opportunity to be heard," as provided in section 3 of the act of 1937 (Ga. Laws, 1937, p. 879), is not sufficient cause for court to upset a judgment of the board removing a teacher on one of the grounds stated in the statute, where the teacher was given written notice of charges, and appeared at the hearing in person and by counsel.
The allegations of the petition attacking the hearing and order of removal appear in paragraphs 7 through 19, and are as follows: "7. That petitioner did answer, on June 20, 1939, charges preferred, and request of Board of Education set of rules of said hearing, and was informed there were no set of rules so governing said hearing. 8. That said petitioner states the hearing was not fair and impartial, was biased and unfair in every particular, and contrary to law; therefore void and without standing. 9. That the charges preferred by Mr. Jere A. Wells, superintendent, were so brought to the attention of the board by Mr. Wells, but after the hearing petitioner and counsel for petitioner were requested to remove from the room, but Mr. Wells remained in the room during the decision of the board members who were present, and in that *778 respect he helped to answer further questions of the board members, which was not fair and impartial and brought influence to bear upon them. 10. That the hearing was not a fair and impartial hearing, inasmuch as there is no power to issue subpoenas so that witnesses can be made to attend the hearing and give evidence, but they came by to see Mr. Wells, at their convenience, and were not questioned by opposing counsel. 11. That petitioner was not inefficient in the true and due performance of her duties as principal of Thomasville School, as charged in the letter sent her by Mr. Jere A. Wells, superintendent of Fulton County Board of Education, but on the contrary was most efficient in that she was never asked to turn over books or make reports that were not turned over or made as requested. 12. That petitioner had made all reports and turned them in, and accounted for all funds so requested to collect. 13. That petitioner was requested by Mr. Wells, superintendent of the Board of Education, to collect fees in nickels, dimes, quarters, etc., and to give receipts for same, and to turn it into the office when the amount was in sufficient volume to justify turning it in, and petitioner did collect 5-10-25 cents and kept said funds in a container, and when she was to bring the container into the office it was taken from her without her knowledge and consent, as per affidavit attached and marked `Exhibit B.' 14. That petitioner has gone before the board with a formal request to give her back the $29.80 of her salary that was deducted by said board under protest and held in escrow, which was the amount of fees collected in installments of 5-10-15-20-25 cents at a time, and was kept in her possession and was taken from her against her wishes, knowledge, and control, as per affidavit quoted in paragraph 13, marked `Exhibit B.' 15. That petitioner was acting at the will and direction of Mr. Wells . . in the performance of her duties as principal and at his instance and request by collecting said fees, and she was not aware of the amount involved until a final audit of her records was made. 16. The civil-service act further provides that teachers coming within its purview `shall not be discharged without notice being given to them of the charges preferred, and an opportunity to be heard.' Petitioner alleges that charges were preferred, but her hearing was not fair and impartial; it was illegal and contrary to law; no rules were made by the board, which is one of the powers granted under the act . . as quoted *779 in paragraph 3, the findings thereof [sic] in nullity and void. 17. Petitioner alleges that her hearing was not fair and impartial, as she had the janitor at the hearing and the board wanted to question him, and they replied no questions. 18. Petitioner alleges that all reports are properly filed with the board, and no requests were made upon her during the term for any reports. 19. Petitioner alleges that all money has been turned in that was due, and the board deducted $29.80 out of her pay to cover the money held by her for the Board of Education of Fulton County, which was taken from her without her knowledge and consent."
Section 1 of the act of 1937 provides that "In all counties of this State which have a population in excess of 200,000 under the last or any future census of the United States, all teachers and other employees employed by the board of education of such counties shall serve during good behavior and efficient service under such rules and regulations as may be established by the board of education." Section 2 provides that all teachers, supervisors, principals, and other employees of such county boards of education, who shall have been on the effective date of the act (July 1, 1937) or thereafter employed for a period of three years "shall be automatically reappointed by the county board of education, and no person shall be discharged from such position or refused reappointment, except for disability, inefficiency, insubordination, or moral turpitude." Section 3 provides that "The boards of education of such counties shall adopt such rules and regulations for the persons who are under this act placed under civil service, including those employed in the future, so that they shall serve during good behavior and efficient service, and so that they shall not be discharged without notice being given to them, charges preferred, and opportunity to be heard. No employee shall be discriminated against for the exercise of any constitutional right." The purport of this act is to make the tenure of teachers and other employees of school systems in counties having a population of 200,000 or more, who have been employed therein for a period of three years, continuous from year to year, unless removed "for disability, inefficiency, insubordination or moral turpitude." It is, as this court has already stated, designed "to protect competent and qualified teachers of the public schools of the counties in the security of their positions, thus accomplishing the dual object of security of the *780
teachers in their positions and benefit to the public resulting from placing the tenure of positions on demonstrated qualification and merit." Long v. Wells,
The only allegation above set out which is discussed or in any wise mentioned in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff is that having to do with the failure of the board to adopt certain rules and regulations. It is proper to assume that all other points are abandoned. Since the argument is that the board had no jurisdiction or power to remove the plaintiff, because of its failure to adopt rules and regulations as required by the act, no approval of the rule as above stated need be made here, except in so far as permits recourse to the courts where the board acts beyond its power and jurisdiction. Counsel for plaintiff is clear upon the point that section 3 of the act requires the board to make rules and regulations; but on the question of what character of rules and regulations the board is required to make, and how the failure to so act affected the rights of plaintiff, no definite answer is given. Not one rule that should have been adopted is suggested. Counsel makes reference indiscriminately to rules and regulations "as would govern the employment and conduct of all teachers," and also to rules and regulations "governing said hearing." It will be *781
observed that the promulgation of rules and regulations by the board of education is provided for in both sections 1 and 3 of the act. Counsel for plaintiff cites in support of his argument only section 3. This, no doubt, is due to the fact that the provisions of section 1 are clearly permissive. We deem it not amiss, however, to consider both sections. Under section 1, teachers and other employees of the board of education of a county with more than 200,000 population "serve during good behavior and efficient service, under such rules and regulations as may be established by the board of education." This provision authorizes the board to promulgate rules and regulations fixing the duties of its employees, and providing the method and manner of their performance, and otherwise establishing a standard of conduct adjudged by them to be essential to efficiency and good behavior. See Long v. Wells, supra; Backie v. Cromwell School Dist.,
The rules and regulations to be adopted under the provisions of section 3 are to be such as will insure the continued service of employees falling under the act, "during good behavior and efficient service, and so that they shall not be discharged without notice being given to them, charges preferred, and opportunity to be heard." The substantial effect of this provision is to prevent the removal of any employee by the board except on the grounds stated in the act, and then only after notice of the charge and opportunity to be heard in defense. See generally: Board of Education of Richmond County v. Young, supra; Brewer v. Johnson,
The additional relief sought, to require the board to return to the plaintiff a sum retained from salary earned before her discharge, for an alleged shortage in her accounts, is not mentioned or otherwise discussed in the brief of her counsel. In so far as her right to this relief is not governed adversely to her by what is said *783 above, it is treated as abandoned, and no specific ruling in reference thereto need be made.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
