OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kenneth King brings this action against defendants the Town of Wallkill (the “Town”), an incorporated municipality and: (1) Robert Henneman, the Town’s former acting police chief; (2) Thomas Nosworthy, the Town’s former supervisor; (3) John Beairsto, another former acting Town police chief; (4) Robert Hertman, the Town’s present police chief; and (5) John Ward, present supervisor of the Town. (Complt.1ffl 1-7.) Henneman, Nosworthy, Beairsto, Hertman and Ward are named in their individual capacities (collectively the “individual defendants”). (Id.) Plaintiff, a former Town police officer, seeks compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys’ fees, claiming that defendants: (1) violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 293-96, by failing reasonably to accommodate his disability by providing him with light-duty assignments and terminating his N.Y. Gen. MuN. Law § 207-c benefits; (2) violated the ADA and the NYHRL by retaliating against him because of his complaints; and (3) violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by taking his property without just compensation, a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 (Id. ¶¶ 55-60.) Defendants counterclaim for $100,000 because they allege that plaintiff received from the Town disability benefits to which he was not entitled. (Answer ¶¶ 67-74.)
Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 dismissing counts one and two of plaintiffs Complaint and granting recovery on their counterclaim. Defendants also move for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims against the individual defendants, contending that individuals are not subject to liability under the ADA and the NYHRL. For the reasons set forth herein, we grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and dismiss count one of plaintiffs Complaint. We deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to count two of the Complaint. We grant individual defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims pursuant to the ADA, but deny it with respect to plaintiffs NYHRL retaliation claim. With respect to the Town’s counterclaim, we grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to liability, but deny that motion as to damages.
BACKGROUND
The Town hired plaintiff as a police officer in December 1989. (PL Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) On June 19, 1995, plaintiff was injured in a line-of-duty automobile accident when the patrol car that he was driving first struck a deer that had run into the road and then collided with a
Plaintiffs pain did not relent and he continued to seek medical treatment from a variety of chiropractors and physicians through 1997. These doctors stated that he was disabled from regular police duties, but that he could perform light desk duties that did not require bending or lifting. (Id. ¶¶ 17-20.) In March 1997, Dr. Mary Godesky, an orthopedic surgeon, completed a questionnaire based on her December 1996 examination of plaintiff and set forth the duties that plaintiff could and could not perform. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24, Ex. M.) Based on his review of this questionnaire and plaintiffs medical records, then-police chief Jon Hansen directed plaintiff to report on April 28, 1997 for a light-duty assignment. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff did not, however, begin this light-duty assignment, and in June 1997 filed an application for disability retirement that was denied in February 1998. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28.)
Plaintiff continued to undergo diagnostic and treatment procedures including MRI scans. He ultimately was referred to Dr. John Mitamura, an orthopedic surgeon, in November 1997. (Id. ¶ 33.) Dr. Mitamura diagnosed plaintiff with spinal instability in December 1997 and attempted to treat this condition with braces because plaintiff did not want surgery or injections. (Id. ¶ 34.) Subsequently, Dr. Michael Miller, an orthopedic surgeon, performed an independent medical examination of plaintiff, diagnosed him with L-5/S-1 degenerative disc disease in September 1998 and stated plaintiff was a candidate for spinal fusion surgery. (Id. ¶41.) Thereafter, in September 1999, Dr. Mitamura performed back surgery on plaintiff, specifically a laminectomy and fusion at L-5/S-1. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2; Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Exs. AA, DD.) At that time, Dr. Mitamura instructed plaintiff not to return to work for eighteen to twenty-four months after the surgery. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2.)
While he was out of work, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Miller several times at the request of the Triad Group, the Town’s third-party workers’ compensation administrator.
(Id.
¶ 3.) On April 18, 2000, Dr. Miller concluded that plaintiff had a “temporary total disability” that was “permanent.”
(Id.;
Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. DD.) Dr. Miller clarified this inconsistency in a supplemental report dated May 3, 2000,
3
in which he noted that plaintiff was not capable of working on April 18, 2000 because of his back injury, which rendered him totally disabled at that time.
4
(Defs.
Thereafter, Henneman sent plaintiff a letter dated October 10, 2000 referencing the August 2000 report and directing plaintiff to report to work on October 30, 2000. (PI. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4; Defs. Rule 56.1Stmt., Ex. LL.) That letter informed plaintiff that he would “be assigned light duty consistent with Dr. Miller’s report” and that his refusal to appear would be grounds for the termination or discontinuance of the full salary and benefits that he had been collecting pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 207-c(l). 5 (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 9 & Ex. LL.)
Prior to returning to work, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Mitamura, his personal physician. (PI. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 6.) Dr. Mitamura drafted a note to the Town describing the physical restrictions caused by plaintiffs disability, which included restrictions on foot patrol, motor vehicle operation, apprehension of suspects, participation in criminal investigations and sitting for more than fifteen minutes at a time. (Id. ¶ 6; Defs. Rule 56.1Stmt., Ex. NN.) Dr. Mitamura’s letter also stated that plaintiff could perform only light duties for at most two to four hours per day. (Id.) Plaintiffs counsel then drafted a letter to Nosworthy dated October 26, 2000, apprising him of Dr. Mitamura’s findings and requesting an administrative appeal, pursuant to the police collective bargaining аgreement (the “CBA”), of Henneman’s decision ordering plaintiff back to work pursuant to N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 207-c(3). 6 (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. MM.)
Thereafter, plaintiffs counsel sent to the Town’s attorneys a letter dated November 10, 2000 objecting to Henneman’s failure to respond to plaintiffs inquiries about his duties, the significance of plaintiffs continued medication use and the number of hours that he was required to work.
(Id.
¶ 13 & Ex. 17.) In response, Henneman sent to plaintiff a letter dated November 17, 2000 stating the Town’s intention to terminate plaintiffs § 207-c benefits retroactive to October 30, 2000 for failure to perform light duty as directed and advising plaintiff of his right to appeal pursuant to the CBA. (PI. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13; Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. QQ.) Subsequently, hearings were held on the matter and on October 17, 2001 hearing officer Earle Warren Zaidins issued a decision concluding that plaintiff had refused to perform light duty as required by § 207-c and recommending that the Town terminate plaintiffs benefits in accordance with that statute and the CBA. (PI. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13; Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. PP.) On October 29, 2001, Nosworthy adopted hearing officer Zaidins’s recommendations and concluded that plaintiff had forfeited his § 207-c benefits by failing to perform light police duty, such as desk work, that remained within his physical abilities.
8
(Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. YY.) In the intervening time between the hearings and
Shortly after hearing officer Zaidins issued his decision and recommendation, Dr. Miller conducted an independent medical examination at the request of the Triad Group in November 2001 and concluded that plaintiff had a “permanent partial disability” from his injuries. 9 (PI. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff subsequently had his state workers’ compensation case reopened and obtained an order directing the Town to resume his compensation payments in February 2002. (Id. ¶ 16.)
In February 2002, plaintiffs counsel sent a letter to Hertman, the newly installed police chief, and requested permission for plaintiff to return to light duty. (Id. ¶ 18.) The Town rejected this request in March 2002, stating in a letter by counsel that “Hertman carefully reviewed the Department’s personnel needs and determined that the Department does not have an available light-duty assignment for [plaintiff]. In fact, the Department does not currently have any police officers assigned to light-duty police work.” (Id. ¶ 19; Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. BBB.) Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) shortly thereafter, and received a right to sue letter from that agency in August 2002. (PI. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20.)
In October 2002, Ward informed plaintiff that he had been out of work for one year and the Town intended to terminate his employment in accordance with N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 71
10
following a hearing on the matter.
(Id.
¶ 21.) A hearing was subsequently held before Ward, who then terminated plaintiffs employment on December 9, 2002 because “there is no duty assignment for a police officer in the Police Department that satisfies the limitations on your abilities articulated by you.”
(Id.
¶ 22; Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. DDD.) Plaintiff had asked for a permanent light-duty position.
(Id.
¶ 80.) He thought that they existed, and identified two other officers, Dennis Lohr and Joe Perone, who had been assigned light-duty positions.
(Id.)
Perone had worked on light-duty assignment in the evidence room for approximately two years, although plaintiff has acknowledged that Perone’s benefits and employment also did not continue indefinitely and he no longer works for the Town. Plaintiff also has admitted that he is not aware of any police officer who ever received a permanent light-duty
We also note that plaintiff has filed multiple applications for disability retirement benefits. His first application, for performance of duty disability retirement benefits in June 1997, was denied because plaintiff did not prove that he was permanently incapacitated. (Id. ¶ 33; Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. P.) His second application, for accidental disability benefits, was withdrawn in September 2000. (PI. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 34.) Both applications were submitted prior to the filing of the EEOC complaint and the present action. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff filed his third application in February 2003, seeking disability retirement benefits because, as stated on the application form, “I am unable to perform my full duties as a police officer and my employer has refused to allow me to return to duty on a ‘light-duty’ basis or reasonably accommodate my disability.” (Id. ¶ 37.)
An amendment to the CBA, effective April 2002, resulted in a pay increase for the police officers that was retroactive to January 1, 1999. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff was affiliated with the Town during the time period covered by the pay increase and he learned of the raise through his police union representative. (Id.) Plaintiff then contacted April Shuback, the Town employee responsible for payroll and employee benefits, and confirmed that a check for the retroactive amounts due had been issued to him by the Town. (Id.) Shuback did not, however, givе plaintiff his check; instead, she gave it to Ward at Ward’s direction. (Id. ¶ 24.) Ward then refused to give the check to plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently received a federal tax W-2 form in the amount of $7,500.58, an amount that included the gross retroactive raise amount of $6,326.40. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.)
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment may be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See
Fed. R. Crv. P. 56(c). The burden rests on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
II. ADA and NYHRL Discrimination Claims
Defendants first contend that the Court should grant their motion for sum
A. Whether Plaintiff is a “Qualifíed Individual with a Disability”
Defendants first argue that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because he is physically unable to perform the essential duties of a police officer and therefore is not a “qualified individual with a disability” under either statute. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 5.) Plaintiff claims in response that there is a genuine issue of material fact about plaintiffs medical condition and ability to perform any police work, including light-duty assignments. (PI. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 10-12.)
To be a “qualified individual,” plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to perform the essential functions of a police officer in the Town, with or without reasonable accommodation.
See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8);
Querry v. Messar,
We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether plaintiff was a qualified employee at the time of his termination. The record in this case is far from clear about the essential functions of the position of a police officer in the Town. 13 The CBA does not contain a job description (PI. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. 18) and if a formal written job description exists, neither of the parties has seen fit to cite or provide it for the Court’s review. Moreover, defendants have not cited testimonial evidence to support the contention that certain enumerated physical abilities are absolutely essential for performance of the position of Town of Wallkill police officer. Finally, the record is devoid of medical evidence contemporaneous with plaintiffs post-October 2001 requests for a return to light duty that might shed light on his capabilities; indeed, the most recent medical reports therein, dated April and May 2001, emphasize in a conclusory manner plaintiffs inability to work as a police officer, but do not link specifically plaintiffs disabilities with enumerated physical requirements of law enforcement work. See supra note 9. Accordingly, resolving all inferences in favor of plaintiff, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the second element of the ADA and NYHRL analysis. 14
Defendants next contend that plaintiffs request for a light-duty assignment is not reasonable because plaintiff seeks that assignment on a permanent basis and granting that request would require defendants to create a new position, an obligation not imposed by the ADA or the NYHRL. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 8-9.) Plaintiff, relying primarily on
Howell v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
Reassignment of a disabled employee to a vacant light-duty position is well established as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
See, e.g., Kees v. Wallenstein,
We conclude that plaintiffs request for a permanent light-duty assignment fails as a matter of law because the record clearly demonstrates that these positions do not exist in the Town’s police department. Ward testified at his deposition that the police department has no established permanent or temporary light-duty positions and does not intend to have them
Plaintiffs reliance on
Howell
is misplaced because that case is distinguishable. (Pl. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 8.) In that case, the disabled plaintiff claimed that his employer violated the ADA by not assigning him to a permanent light-duty position.
III. ADA and NYHRL Retaliation Claims
Defendants next contend that plaintiffs retaliation claims should be dismissed because he cannot establish a prima facie case under the ADA or the NYHRL. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 13-14.) Plaintiff argues in response that the record reflects the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his retaliation claim because his benefits and employment were terminated after he engaged in the protected activities of requesting light duty and filing an EEOC complaint. (PI. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 17.)
Under the ADA and the NYHRL, “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, [the plaintiff] must show that: (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the ADA; (2) the employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against him; and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.”
Treglia v. Town of Manlius,
We conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiffs retaliation claim, and we deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the second count of the Complaint. Defendants’ arguments are limited to whether plaintiff has met the
de minimis
evidentiary showing,
see, e.g., Treglia,
IV. Individual Defendants’ Liability Under the ADA and the NYHRL
Defendants, contending that the ADA and the NYHRL do not provide for causes of action against individual, non-employer defendants, also move for summary judgment dismissing the ADA and NYHRL claims against the individual defendants. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 17.) Plaintiff does not contest defendants’ ADA arguments, but does argue in response that persons who actually participate in discriminatory conduct may be held individu
A. Individual Defendants’ Liability Under the ADA
We first turn to individual defendants’ liability under the ADA. It is well settled that an individual may not be held personally liable under the ADA.
See, e.g., Menes v. CUNY Univ. of N.Y.,
B. Individual Defendants’ Liability Under the NYHRL
We next turn to the issue of individual defendants’ liability under the NYHRL. Defendants, relying on
Trovato v. Air Express Int’l,
We note at the outset our agreement with defendants’ assertion that plaintiffs claims against the individual defendants present issues of New York state law that are by no means crystal clear. The confusion arises from
Patrowich,
wherein the New York Court of Appeals held that “[a] corporate employee, though he has a title as an officer and is the manager or supervisor of a corporate division, is not individually subject to suit with respect to discrimination based on age or sex under New York’s Human Rights law.”
Patro-wich
did not, however, discuss the import of N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(6), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so.” Several years later, the district court in the age discrimination case
Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co.,
The New York state courts have not uniformly accepted the Second Circuit’s interpretation of state law in
Tomka,
and the two New York Appellate Divisions located within the Southern District of New York have in fact reached divergent conclusions on this issue.
Compare Steadman v. Sinclair,
Nevertheless, the majority of the other federal district courts in New York considering the issue have elected to follow the lead of the Second Circuit in
Tomka
and apply its rule of “actual participation” to hold individual defendants personally hable under the NYHRL for discriminatory conduct via § 296(6).
See, e.g., Perks v. Town of Huntington,
The relevant statutory framework provides an appropriate starting point
for
our
Accordingly, we turn to the facts of the present case in order to determine which of the named defendants actually participated in the actions giving rise to plaintiffs claims of retaliation. See supra Part III. With respect to plaintiffs protected activities, namely his inquiries about the nature of his October 2000 light duty and subsequent requests to be placed on light duty, filed prior to his EEOC complaint, we note that plaintiffs inquiries were directed to and handled by Henne-man, Beairsto and Hertman. Henneman participated in the adverse employment action by signing and sending the letter stating the Town’s intention to terminate plaintiffs N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law '§ 207-c benefits constitute protected activities. Nosworthy engaged in adverse action by adopting hearing officer Zaidins’s recommendations and terminating plaintiffs benefits. Finally, Ward actually terminated plaintiffs employment pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 71. We conclude, therefore, that the record reveals evidence of active participation by all five named individual defendants and deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs NYHRL claims against them.
Y. Defendants’ Counterclaim, to Recoup Wrongfully Received Benefíts
Defendants also move for summary judgment on the Town’s counterclaim. Relying primarily on
County of Westchester v. Sheehan,
We begin with a review of
Sheehan,
which is the controlling case on the liability issue. In that case, the plaintiff-county paid § 207-c benefits to the defendant, a corrections officer who had been punched by a former inmate in the parking lot of a diner over an hour prior to the officer’s reporting to work.
We conclude that under Sheehan, plaintiff is obligated to repay the Town for those § 207-c benefits that he improperly collected from the time that he refused to perform light-duty work on October 30, 2000 until supervisor Nosworthy adopted the recommendations of hearing officer Zaidins on October 29, 2001 and concluded that plaintiff had forfeited his § 207-c benefits. Plaintiff, like the corrections officer in Sheehan, received benefits to which he was not entitled because of his refusal to perform light-duty work as assigned, an obligation that is a precondition to the receipt of § 207-c benefits. Accordingly, the public policy of the state of New York, as enunciated in Sheehan requires that he repay the Town those monies that were improperly paid to him. 23 We therefore grant defendants’ summary judgment motion as to liability on their counterclaim.
With respect to the amount of damages, defendants first claim that plaintiff owes
In support of their counterclaim and the amount of claimed damages, defendants cite only a letter dated July 29, 2002 from the Town’s attorney John O’Reilly to plaintiffs attorney Dana Rudikoff. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 15; Defs. Reply Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 14, both citing Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. CCC.) In this letter, O’Reilly responded to a previous letter sent by plaintiffs counsel with respect to plaintiffs claim that the Town owed him back pay pursuant to the April 2002 retroactive pay increase. O’Reilly asserted that the Town is entitled to recoup the § 207-e benefits that it paid to plaintiff after October 30, 2000. (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. CCC at 1.) In that letter, the Town’s attorney provided an itemized list of benefits 24 received by plaintiff after Oe-tober 30, 2000 and asserted that plaintiff owes the Town a total of $49,504.49 before certain reductions that were proposed in contemplation of settlement. 25 (Id. at 1-2.) The letter does not include appended exhibits supрorting the figures in the itemized list.
It is well settled that “only admissible evidence need be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment” and that “[t]he principles governing admissibility of evidence do not change on a motion for summary judgment.”
Raskin v. Wyatt Co.,
We conclude that the letter relied upon by the Town is inadmissible hearsay because it is an “out-of-court statement ... offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted”
26
and not subject to any of the exceptions set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Even if considered a public record of the Town for purposes of the FED. R. EVID. 803(8) public records exception, the letter was prepared in contemplation of the present litigation and therefore remains inadmissible.
See, e.g., United States v. Stone,
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
Plainly prеpared in anticipation of this litigation, the letter does not have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” comparable to the 803 and 804 hearsay exceptions. Moreover, the damage figures contained in the letter are not “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.”
Id.
Provision of and citation to the actual records from which the figures in the letter are derived would be both more probative and would not require unreasonable efforts by defendants.
Cf. Freedman v. Value Health, Inc.,
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, we grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and dismiss count one of plaintiffs Complaint. We deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to count two of the Complaint. We grant individual defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to the ADA, but deny it as it relates to the NYHRL. With respect to the Town’s counterclaim, we grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to liability, but deny that motion as to damages.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367. It is undisputed that plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies and that this matter is' properly before this Court. (Complt. ¶ 10; Answer ¶ 10.)
.The 1995 accident was not plaintiffs first line-of-duty injury. In June 1991, plaintiff sustained neck, back and right-side injuries after a suspect rammed plaintiffs police car during a pursuit. (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) As а result of the 1991 accident, plaintiff was out of work from June 28 until September 4 of that year. (Id.) He also applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 207-c, see infra notes 5-6, in February 1992. (Id. ¶ 2.) As a result of continuing shoulder and neck pain, plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure on his right shoulder in November 1994. (Id. ¶ 3.) He also applied again for § 207-c benefits in November 1994, but the police chief at that time denied his application. (Id. ¶¶ 3-5.)
. Dr. Miller also issued a supplemental report on April 26, 2000 that addressed the impact of plaintiff’s shoulder injury sustained in 1991. See supra note 2. (PL Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 3; Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. EE.) He noted that the pre-existing shoulder injury created a mild, but permanent disability that rendered plaintiff's “overall disability ... materially and substantially greater.” (Id.)
.
Plaintiff also was examined by Dr. John Robbins, a neurosurgeon, several times be
. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 207-c(l) provides in relevant part:
Any ... member of a police force of any county, city of less than one million population, town or village ... who is injured in the performance of his duties or who is taken sick as a result of the performance of his duties so as to necessitate medical or other lawful remedial treatment shall be paid by the municipality by which he is employed the full amount of his regular salary or wages until his disability arising therefrom has ceased, and, in addition such municipality shall be liable for all medical treatment and hospital care necessitated by reason of such injury or illness.
. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 207-c(3) provides:
If such a policeman is not eligible for or is not granted such accidental disability retirement allowance or retirement for disability incurred in performance of duty allowance or similar accidental disability pension and is nevertheless, in the opinion of such health authorities or physician, unable to perform his regular duties as a result of such injury or sickness but is able, in their opinion, to perform specified types of light police duty, payment of the full amount of regular salary or wages, as provided by subdivision one of this section,shall be discontinued with respect to such policeman if he shall refuse to perform such light police duty if the same is available and offered to him, provided, however, that such light duty shall be consistent with his status as a policeman and shall enable him to continue to be entitled to his regular salary or wages, including increases thereof and fringe benefits, to which he would have been entitled if he were able to perform his regular duties.
. We note that October 30, the day before Halloween, is known informally by the police as “mischief night” because of its customarily high volume of law enforcement activity. (PL Rule 56.1 Stmt ¶ 5.)
. The record reveals that plaintiff did not seek further judicial review of this determination via a C.P.L.R. Article 78 proceeding. The Town’s counterclaim for the § 207-c benefits paid after plaintiff refused to perform light duty, as amended by the Rule 26(a) disclosure, asserts that plaintiff owes it $47,275.82 plus interest, although defendants have increased that sum to $49,504.49 and $49,171.22 in their moving and reply Memo-randa, respectively. (PL Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 31; Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 15; Defs. Reply Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 14.) See also infra Part V.
. Earlier in 2001, plaintiff had been examined by Drs. Robbins and Mitarnura. In April 2001, Dr. Mitarnura again diagnosed plaintiff with spinal instability and wrote that plaintiff "is not able to perform[] his occupation as a police officer” and that "he has reached his maximum level of improvement following his lumbar spine surgery.” (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 68.) In May 2001, Dr. Robbins examined plaintiff and concluded that "he is still unable to return to work as a police officer. I feel this would expose him to increased risk given the potential for altercation or other impact or heavy lifting or straining.” (Id. ¶ 69.)
. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 71 provides in relevant part:
Where an employee has been separated from the service by reason of a disability resulting from occupational injury ... as defined in the workmen's compensation law, he or she shall be entitled to a leave of absence for at least one year, unless his or her disability is of such a nature as to permanently incapacitate him or her for the performance of the duties of his or her position.
. Plaintiff made these acknowledgments and admissions at his deposition. (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. EEE at 179-80.)
. This element is consistent with the ADA’s definitions section, which provides in relevant part:
The term "qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
. Defendants argue that plaintiff was physically impaired in his ability to sit, walk and run and therefore could not perform the essential functions of a police officer. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 7.) In support of their contention, they cite several cases, including
Champ v. Balt. County,
. Defendants also cite plaintiffs three separate applications for disability retirement in support of their argument that he is not a qualified employee under the ADA. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 6.) As plaintiff argues correctly, however, his applications for disability retirement do not necessarily preclude him from establishing a prima facie case under the ADA. (Pl. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 13.) A plaintiff who has filed for disability retirement must introduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the claims of total disability made in his retirement applications are not altogether inconsistent with his claims that reasonable accommodations would allow him to perform the essential functions of the police officer position.
See Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,
. Ward did not, however, foreclose the possibility of a pregnant female officer being assigned light-duty tasks. (PL Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. 9 at 22.)
. Plaintiff, pointing to the lack of a written light-duty policy, the light-duty assignments of Officers Lohr and Perone, and the indefinite nature of the initial order from Henneman mandating his return to light-duty work in October 2000, claims that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the existence of permanent light-duty positions in the Town's police department. (Pl. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 8.) We disagree with plaintiff's strained reading of the record. As he himself admitted at his deposition, Lohr’s light-duty assignment was only temporary, Perone was terminated and no Town police officer has ever received a permanent light-duty position. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
. Accordingly, we need not reach the mеrits of defendants' proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiffs employment and not granting him a permanent light-duty position. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 10-11.)
. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the claim is evaluated pursuant to the remainder of the familiar burden-shifting framework, wherein
the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment decision. If a defendant meets this burden, "the plaintiff must point to evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for impermissible retaliation.”
Treglia,
.Accordingly, we disagree with defendants’ argument to the contrary, namely, that plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct until he complained to the EEOC fourteen months after defendants already had commenced ter
. Although defendants do not specify their legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff's employment as part of their retaliation analysis,
see supra
note 18, we note that other district courts in the Second Circuit have held that N.Y. Civ Serv. Law § 71,
see supra note
10, may serve as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for a disabled employee’s termination.
See Hatter v. Fulton,
No. 92 Civ. 6065,
. Accordingly, we also decline defendants’ invitation to apply the holding of
Trovato,
. Plaintiff notes correctly that defendants have not moved for summary judgment on his claim that the Town wrongfully withheld his retroactive pay raise.
. Plaintiff argues that
Sheehan
is inapposite because in the present case, his termination violated the ADA and the NYHRL. (PL Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 18.) We disagree. We concluded as a matter of law in Part II of this Opinion and Order that plaintiffs termination did not violate the “reasonable accommodations" clause of the ADA. Moreover, with respect to the circumstances surrounding the termination of his § 207-c benefits, it already has been determined at an administrative hearing that plaintiff refused to perform light duty as assigned.
See supra
note 8 and accompanying text. This is a factual determination that is entitled to conclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because plaintiff had the full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his refusal in the quasi-judicial administrative context of the hearing before hearing officer Zaidins.
See, e.g., Locurto v. Giuliani,
.Specifically, the Town stated that from October 30, 2000 to October 29, 2001, plaintiff received: (1) $38,189.60 in salary and uniform allowance; (2) a $7,691.20 heаlth insurance premium; (3) a $697.20 dental and vision premium; (4) $2,883.25 for the Town’s portion of the FICA payment on his salary overpayment; and (5) $43.24 for the Town’s portion of the pro-rated pension contribution. (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. CCC at 1-2.)
. Specifically, the Town proposed to apply $2,228.67 of claimed back pay under the April 2002 amended CBA and $333.37 from plaintiff’s unused accumulated compensatory time to offset the $49,504.49 total. (Defs. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. CCC at 2.) After these reductions were applied, the Town stated that $46,942.55 remained for recovery. (Id.)
. Trouble v. Wet Seal, Inc.,
. Plaintiff has provided admissible evidence that creates issues of fact with respect to monies owed, namely the withheld April 2002 paycheck for a net amount of $4,489.47 after taxes and deductions from a gross amount of $6,326.40 (PL Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. 11) and the 2002 W-2 form that the Town provided to plaintiff stating a total of $7,500.58 in wages, tips and other compensation. (Id., Ex. 12.) We need not address plaintiffs entitlement to the April 2002 retroactive pay increase in this Opinion and Order because defendants have not moved and plaintiffs have not cross moved for summary judgment with respect to that claim. Thus, we leave this issue for subsequent consideration at trial or via an appropriate pretrial motion.