68 Mass. 331 | Mass. | 1854
By the first section of St. 1852, c. 294, “when-, ever, by the provisions of the sixty-sixth chapter of the revised statutes, the right of action of any creditor of the estate of a deceased person against the executor or administrator of such person is limited to the space of four years from the date of the bond of such executor or administrator, or from any other time therein mentioned, such right of action shall be hereafter limited to the space of two years from such time.” If this provision is to have a retroactive, as well as a future operation — that is to say, if it is to be availed of by those executors and administrators who had given bonds before the passage of the act, as well as by those who should thereafter give bonds — the defence interposed to this action is effectual and complete; otherwise, it cannot prevail.
It is said by the chief justice in the case of Brigham v. Bigelow, 12 Met. 273, that “ if the legislature should declare that a period already elapsed should bar an action, this would be, under color of regulating, arbitrarily to take away all remedy, and in effect destroy the contract, within its jurisdiction; and would be a mere abuse of power, not to, be anticipated from any legislature.” And it might be doubtful whether such an exercise of power would not be a violation of the constitution of the United States, as impairing the obligation of contracts. Angell on Lim. (2d ed.) § 22. But it is unnecessary to look at the statute in this aspect, as there is another construction which may reasonably be put upon it, giving substantial force to all its provisions, and in no way affecting rights which existed when it took effect. When it is declared that the rights of action against executors
In a very recent case in the supreme court of the United States, Mr. Justice Daniel, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “As a general rule for the interpretation of statutes, it may be laid down, that they never should be allowed a retroactive operation, where this is not required by express command, or by necessary and unavoidable implication. Without such implication or command, they speak and operate upon the future only. Especially should this rule of interpretation prevail, where the effect and operation of a law are designed, apart from the intrinsic merits of the rights of parties, to restrict the assertion of those rights.” Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 423. Under this rule of interpretation it would seem to be very clear that the St. of 1852 must be prospective only in its operation. There is certainly no express command in it that it shall operate upon the past; and its terms being in some degree ambiguous or of doubtful import, it cannot be said that an unavoidable implication to that effect arises from them. The limitation which it imposes upon creditors should therefore be confined to rights of action which accrue against executors and administrators who gave bond subsequent to the time when it became the law of the land. Judgment for the plaintiff