272 Mo. 416 | Mo. | 1917
I. This is an action in two counts, one for an ejectment and the other to try title. The subject of the suit is twenty-six acres of land lying in Howard County, which were a part of the farm of David Cooper, who died in 1869, leaving four children, to whom he devised the land in question by the following clause of his will:
“3rd. It is my wish that my daughter Fannie E. Cooper have the use of my farm on which I now reside, during her natural life or until she is married, after which I desire that my children, J. D. Cooper, Eliza J. "Woods and Sallie King shall have an equal part of my estate both real and personal share and share alike, and that it shall descend to the bodily heirs of each of them thereby entailing my estate upon them. If my daughter Fannie E. Cooper shall marry then she is to have an equal share with the rest.”
The four children mentioned in this clause of the will died respectively in 1897, 1899, 1908 and 1912, none of them leaving any issue except Sallie A. King, who left six children, the plaintiffs in the present suit.
In April, 1878, three of the devisees mentioned in the above clause of the will brought an action against the other devisee, Sallie King, and her husband and children ' (the present plaintiffs), to partition the land of which their father died seized, including the twenty-six acres in controversy. Partition was prayed according to the provisions of the will. The present plaintiffs (then minors) were made defendants and were represented by a guardian ad litem, a decree in partition was granted, and the land divided into four parcels, numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4, and allotted in severalty to each of the four children of David Cooper.
The defendant. of the present action claims by mesne conveyances from L. L. Lynn, to whom the land was conveyed by the trustee under the foreclosure of said trust deed..
In June, 1900, L. L. Lynn, in virtue of his purchase of said land, brought a suit under section 2092-, Revised Statutes 1889, making all of the present plaintiffs parties, and they were duly served with process, but after taking legal advice, declined- to appear in said action. But the attorney who represented other defendants, also filed an answer on behalf of the present plaintiffs, wherein they disclaimed any interest in the land. In that case the prayer of the petition filed by L. L. Lynn was granted. On the trial of the present suit defendant relied on these prior, suits as creating an estoppel, the Statute of Limitations, and-. his paper title.
A judgment was rendered in his favor, from which plaintiffs have duly appealed.
This construction is necessarily applicable to the terms of the third clause of the will of David Cooper, for the reason that by its. language an estate tail at common law would have arisen upon the marriage or death of Fannie E. Cooper, and since that form of ten
. It being thus apparent upon the conceded evidence the plaintiffs could not recover as against the defense of the Statute of Limitations arising in the open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession on the part of .the defendant and those through whom' he claimed, it is unnecessary to discuss whether or not the plaintiffs were not bound by the unreversed judgment of the court in the partition suit between the life tenants in 1878, to which action the plaintiffs were made parties and personally served with process. [Castleman v. Relfe, Guardian of Perry, 50 Mo. 583; LeBourgeoise v. McNamara, 82 Mo. 189; Freeman, Co-Tenancy and Partition (2 Ed.), p. 626.] The evidence in support of the Statute of Limitations was admissible under a general denial. [Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo. l. c. 601; Stevenson v. Smith, 189 Mo. 447; Johnson v. Calvert, 260 Mo. 442.]
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.