Eddie James King was tried by a Morgan County jury and found guilty of one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
“On appeal from a criminal conviction, the defendant is no longer entitled to a presumption of innocence and we therefore construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict.” (Citation omitted.) Marriott v. State,
Based on information obtained during their investigation and surveillance of King’s home, several law enforcement agents accompanied King’s probation officer to King’s house on April 10, 2008.
After King consented to the search of his house, he became even more nervous. According to Stewart, King appeared dizzy, his stomach became upset, and he defecated in his pants. Additionally, when it became apparent that officers were going to search the home, King’s nephew fled from the carport on foot.
During the search, officers found both powder and crack cocaine located inside a tin canister sitting on top of the kitchen cabinets. The powder cocaine, which weighed approximately 3.35 grams, was packaged in sixteen small bags, while another bag contained four or five rocks of crack cocaine, weighing a total of 0.87 grams. Stewart stated that based on his training and experience as a narcotics investigator, the total amount of cocaine found in King’s house was greater than the typical amount that would be held by an addict or regular user of the drug, as those people did not generally have the financial means to obtain that quantity of cocaine at one time. Rather, the total amount of cocaine and the way in which it was packaged indicated that the drugs belonged to a dealer — i.e., someone who was selling the drug to third parties. Stewart also explained that powder cocaine was a “unique item” in the Madison area and the only person he knew of in the area who sold cocaine in powder form was King.
Brian Moore, an officer with the Ocmulgee Drug Task Force, also participated in the search of Kang’s residence and testified at trial. He confirmed that after King consented to the search, he appeared to be
When the cocaine was discovered, King insisted that the drugs did not belong to him but instead belonged to White. According to the investigating officers, however, White, who is approximately 5'5" tall, would have been unable to access the drugs easily, as they were located on top of cabinets ending approximately seven to seven-and-one-half feet above the floor. Conversely, King, who is approximately 6'2" tall, could have reached the drugs by stretching and extending his arms. Moreover, Stewart and King’s probation officer were both familiar with White, and both men knew White to be a “hard core” drug addict, but did not know her as someone who sold drugs. Nevertheless, officers arrested both King and White and charged each of them with possession with intent to distribute.
White testified at King’s trial and admitted that she was a drug addict who was attempting to overcome her addiction
White further testified that because of her serious cocaine addiction, King generally hid his supply of cocaine from her and would
The State also introduced similar transaction evidence showing that in December 2002 law enforcement began an investigation into reports that King was selling powder cocaine out of his house.
At his trial on the current charges, King testified in his own defense and acknowledged that he owned the house where the drugs were found and that he was the only person who had a key to the residence. He nevertheless denied ownership of the drugs or knowledge that they were in his house. King also testified that White was living with him in his house in April 2008, and that she was using drugs at the time.
1. King asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions because the State failed to prove that he possessed the drugs found in his kitchen.
the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In determining that question, we consider the inferences that can be logically derived from the evidence presented at trial. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be upheld.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Wade v. State,
King contends that the State relied solely on circumstantial evidence to prove its case and its proof was therefore required to “exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of” King’s guilt. OCGA § 24-14-6. The State failed to meet this burden, King argues, because the evidence supported his equal access defense —• i.e., the hypothesis that the drugs belonged to either White or Jonigans. We disagree.
King’s argument ignores the fact that White’s testimony that she obtained cocaine from King on the evening of April 9 and morning of April 10, and that she saw King make two separate sales of cocaine to a third party on the morning of April 10, constitutes direct evidence. See Allen v. State,
[t]he issue in circumstantial evidence cases is not whether someone else might have committed the crimes in question.*782 The issue is whether the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that the only reasonable hypothesis was that [the defendant] was guilty.
(Citations omitted.) Graham v. State,
[q]uestions as to the reasonableness of hypotheses are generally to be decided by the jury which heard the evidence and where the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, that finding will not be disturbed unless the verdict of guilty is insupportable as a matter of law. [And] it is for the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and questions of witness credibility, not this Court.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State,
Here, after hearing the evidence and having the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the jury concluded that the only reasonable hypothesis was that King possessed the drugs found hidden in his kitchen. Because the evidence supports this conclusion, we will not disturb the jury’s judgment. See Reid v. State,
The decision as to whether “a confidential informant’s identity is discoverable rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Strozier v. State,
As King acknowledges in his brief, the controlled buy made by the Cl was not the subject of the prosecution, and the Cl was neither a witness to nor a participant in the crimes for which King was on trial. He nevertheless argues that he was entitled to discover the Cl’s identity because the Cl’s testimony was relevant to his equal access defense. Specifically, King contends that testimony that someone other than King was selling drugs out of King’s residence would have supported his claim that the drugs found in his kitchen did not belong to him. We have previously rejected a similar argument, finding that under circumstances such as these the defendant failed to show the relevance and materiality of the Cl’s testimony. See Turner,
Turner was indicted for possessing with intent to distribute the cocaine found in his living room. He was not charged with selling cocaine to the confidential informant. The informant was not present during the search and arrest and was neither a participant in nor a witness to the specific offense with which Turner was charged. His testimony would not have been material to the issue of Turner’s guilt or punishment. Thus, the threshold requirements of the first step of the inquiry were not met, and the trial court did not err in refusing to require the [Sjtate to reveal the informant’s identity.
Id. at 777 (2). The same rationale applies here, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the testimony of the Cl regarding the controlled buy made in this case was neither relevant nor material to the issue of whether King possessed the drugs found hidden in his kitchen.
Moreover, assuming that evidence of the controlled buy was relevant to King’s defense of equal access, the Cl was not the only witness qualified to testify regarding that buy. Moore worked with the Cl on the controlled buy and monitored the transaction, and he testified regarding that buy at the motion hearing. Moore’s testimony shows that he was competent to testify as to the fact that someone other than King sold cocaine to the Cl. Accordingly, King also failed to demonstrate the necessity of the Cl’s testimony
3. King contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on such a claim, King bears the burden of proving both that the performance of his lawyer was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result of this deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington,
The sole ground for King’s ineffective assistance claim is that trial counsel failed to question Stewart and Moore regarding the controlled buy of cocaine at King’s residence, including the fact that it was Jonigans, rather than King, who sold the drugs. As trial
Given the strategic nature of trial counsel’s decision, it “can provide no grounds for [an ineffective assistance claim] unless it was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mantooth v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
OCGA § 16-13-30 (b).
OCGA § 16-13-32.5 (a). The jury acquitted King of the charge of possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a public housing project.
As a special condition of his probation, King had signed a waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights, pursuant to which he agreed to submit to a search of his person or his
Officers immediately apprehended the nephew and charged him with obstruction.
White testified that at the time of trial in October 2010, she had been drug-free since May 2009.
This house was the same residence out of which King was accused of selling drugs in this case.
King’s sister, who testified as a defense witness, also stated that White was living with King at the time the drugs were discovered.
To convict King of possession with intent to distribute, the State was required to prove that he possessed the cocaine at issue with the intent to distribute it to other people. See OCGA § 16-13-30. To convict him of possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a public park, the State was also required to prove that King’s house was within 1,000 feet of such a park. See OCGA § 16-13-32.5 (a). On appeal, King does not dispute that his home is located less than 1,000 feet from a public park.