55 Ark. 604 | Ark. | 1892
The house consisted of a single room, and this could only be entered through the door in front of which the body of Jones was found immediately after the shooting. There-was testimony to show that King and Brown were the guests of Mrs. Ratliff on the day of the killing. A few days previous to that time an angry controversy had occurred be-between King and Jones; and from statements made by King as a witness in his own behalf it would seem that he was apprehensive that Jones would attack him. And the-instructions to the jury which he requested the court to give indicate that he sought to justify his participation in the homicide as well on the ground of self-defense as that in shooting the deceased he was resisting an assault upon Mrs. Ratliff’s house.
Where a violent attempt to enter a dwelling house is resisted as a means of self-defense and the aggressor is slain, the ground on which the homicide may be justified, according to our view of the law, is stated in Brown’s case and need not be repeated here. King’s first instruction appears to have been requested with the view of presenting to the jury the theory that his act in shooting the deceased was a measure necessary to his personal safety. It does not meet all the requirements of the law ; but so much of it as told the jury that the law did not require King to abandon the protection which the house afforded or to expose himself to increased danger by attempting to leave it was proper.
As the guest of Mrs. Ratliff, King could lawfully resist a violent attempt by Jones to enter her house for the purpose of assaulting “any person dwelling or being therein.” Mansf. Dig., sec. 1551; Brown v. State, ante p. 593; Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 S. W. Rep, 908. In defending the house when thus assailed it was his duty to avoid a resort to fatal means if he could do so without exposing himself to ■ the danger of losing his life or of receiving great bodily injury. But he could rightfully employ such force as reasonably appeared to him necessary to repel- the assault. And whether he was justified in shooting Jones to prevent the entry of the latter into the house was a question which it was his right to have submitted to the jury upon a correct charge as to both of the theories on which he relied for an acquittal. As applicable to a defense under section 1551 of the digest, his second instruction was substantially correct to the extent that it goes. - It was not sufficiently full and contained some verbal inaccuracies. But the court should have relieved it of these defects and embraced it in the charge to the jury.
As the appellant did not rest his cause solely on the ground that he shot the deceased in self-defense, the second clause of the court’s third instruction was not correct, for the reason that it excluded from the jury’s consideration the question whether the homicide was justifiable on the ground that it was done in defense of the house.
For the errors indicated the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.