B. ALLEN KING, Appellee, v. GEORGE RYAN, Secretary of State, Appellant
No. 72392
Supreme Court of Illinois
December 4, 1992
153 Ill. 2d 449
Without question, “[t]he legislature may perceive a need to enact a more stringent penalty provision in order to halt an increase in the commission of a particular crime.” (People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 320.) Because we are unable to conclude that the penalty prescribed by
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we do not find that
Reversed and remanded.
Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Daniel N. Malato, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
Edward M. Maloney, of Ahern & Maloney, of Skokie, for appellee.
Edwin A. Rothschild, of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, and Harvey Grossman, all of Chicago, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois.
John F. Donahue and Elaine Odeh, of Donahue, Sowa and Bugos, of Lisle, and Thomas A. Clancy, Dennis A. Rendleman and Mary T. McDermott, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois State Bar Association.
JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the court:
At 10 p.m. on January 31, 1991, plaintiff, Bruce Allen King, was driving south on a two-lane highway in Grayslake, Illinois. King attempted to turn left into a gas station when he collided with a car driving north on the same road. The driver of the other car, Nickie Nichols, and two passengers from King‘s car were injured and required medical treatment.
At Hegland‘s request, King accompanied him to the Grayslake police station. At the station, King took and passed a field sobriety test. Hegland then requested that King submit to a breath test pursuant to
Based upon the information provided in Hegland‘s reports, the Secretary of State notified King that his driver‘s license would be suspended for a period of six months beginning March 18, 1991. Plaintiff filed a complaint for injunction in the circuit court of Cook County on February 14, 1991, seeking to prevent this suspension.
On March 14, 1991, prior to the formal ruling in the administrative hearing, King filed a motion for temporary restraining order. On March 15, 1991, the circuit court granted the restraining order which prevented the Secretary from suspending King‘s driver‘s license. On March 18, 1991, the Secretary of State adopted the hearing officer‘s findings of fact and entered an order denying King‘s request for rescission.
On March 25, 1991, the circuit court dismissed King‘s complaint for injunction, dissolved the temporary restraining order and granted King leave to file an amended complaint. King filed his amended complaint that day seeking administrative review of the Secretary‘s findings pursuant to the
On August 13, 1991, the circuit court entered an order holding
I
Initially, the Secretary argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter an order in this case. The Secretary avers that because King filed the complaint for administrative review as an amendment to the complaint for injunction, rather than as a separate action, the complaint is insufficient to grant the trial court subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
The
The Secretary cites Burns v. Edgar (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 708, for the proposition that King was required to file a separate action for administrative review. In
Burns does not apply to the present case because King did file a complaint for administrative review. On March 25, 1991, seven days after the Secretary‘s decision, King filed his amended complaint which included a count requesting administrative review. This amended complaint was sufficient to vest the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction under the
II
We turn now to the merits of the case.
Ҥ11-501.6. Driver involvement in personal injury or fatal motor vehicle accident-chemical test.
(a) Any person who drives or is in actual control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent to a breath test using a portable device as approved by the Department of Public Health or to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or other drug content of such person‘s blood if there is probable cause to believe that such person was the driver at fault, in whole or in part, for a motor vehicle accident which resulted in the death or personal injury of any person.” (
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.6(a) .)
For purposes of this statute, personal injury is defined as “any injury that requires immediate professional attention in either a doctor‘s office or a medical facility.” (
As a preliminary matter, the Secretary contends that because King was not charged with a crime, evidence of his refusal will not be used in a criminal proceeding and, therefore, King has no standing to challenge the criminal provision of the statute. This argument is disingenuous. The fact that King passed the field sobriety tests and was not charged with driving under the influence tends to indicate that there was no probable cause to believe that he did so. The Secretary may not use this lack of probable cause as a shield to protect the validity of a search designed, at least in part, to establish the very probable cause which is lacking. Moreover, King is challenging the facial validity of
Under
The fourth amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ***.” (
The purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by the government. (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), 469 U.S. 325, 335.) The fourth amendment only proscribes searches and seizures which are unreasonable. (Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association (1989), 489 U.S. 602, 619.) Whether a particular search is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances giving rise to the search as well as the nature of the search itself. This determination must be made by “balancing its intrusion on the individual‘s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 654.
In the context of a criminal investigation, the balance of interests will ordinarily require a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. However, “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable‘” neither is constitutionally required. (Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987), 483 U.S. 868, 873, quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351.)
“[A] showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. [Citation.] In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.” (Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.)
In those instances in which a search or seizure has been deemed reasonable without some level of individualized suspicion, either the intrusions were minor (see, e.g., Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (1990), 496 U.S. 444 (stop of car at stationary roadblock checkpoint for 15 to 20 seconds reasonable in light of State‘s interest in preventing harm from drunk drivers); People v. Bartley (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 273 (same); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976), 428 U.S. 543 (stop of car at stationary roadblock near border reasonable due to government‘s interest in controlling illegal immigration)), or the person to be searched had a diminished expectation of privacy (see, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; People v. Adams (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 331; New York v. Burger (1987), 482 U.S. 691 (search of junkyard reasonable because owner‘s expectation of privacy lessened by virtue of participation in closely regulated business); see also Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 (search of probationer‘s home supported only by reasonable suspicion which did not
The Secretary argues that
In Skinner, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Federal Railroad Administration regulation which, in certain circumstances, required railroad employees to submit to chemical analyses of their breath, blood and urine. The regulations at issue in Skinner applied when the employee was directly involved in a major train accident (see
Skinner is distinguishable from the present case in two important areas. First, it was not disputed that the tests in Skinner were implemented to prevent railroad accidents rather than to aid in the criminal prosecution of employees. The Court noted that it was unclear whether its decision would be different if evidence col-
Similarly, we find the Secretary‘s reliance on Adams is misplaced. In Adams, we upheld the constitutionality of the testing provisions in
Even though neither Skinner nor Adams is controlling, arguably the special needs exception could still apply to this case. It is clear that the State has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from the hazards caused by intoxicated drivers. Illinois has decided to promote this interest through a combination of civil and criminal provisions. (Cf. People v. Esposito (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 491 (summary suspension of driver‘s license under
However,
In balancing the interests in this case, we find no reason to deviate from the probable cause standard usually applicable to a criminal case. Although the statute promotes the laudable goal of public safety, this factor alone is not sufficient to justify a relaxing of the constitutional requirements in light of the clearly expressed criminal applications of the statute. Moreover, we believe the objective and subjective intrusions on the driver‘s reasonable expectation of privacy are significant.
The objective intrusion is “measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation.” (Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.) We note that Sitz and Bartley involved stationary roadblocks at which motorists were stopped in a systematic manner for approximately 15 to 20 seconds. Although the stops in both cases were found to be
“Detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard.” (Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451, citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976), 428 U.S. 543.)
Unlike the brief stops in Bartley and Sitz, prior to administering a breath test under
The subjective intrusion is also significant. The subjective intrusion to be considered is “the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists” by the search. (Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.) In the present case, we believe that requiring a motorist to accompany a police officer to the police station for testing will engender fear in generally law-abiding citizens. This is especially true because the motorist will necessarily have been involved in an accident and may be shaken from that experience. Further, where, as here, the request for the test is made after the motorist passes a field sobriety test the subjective fear is even greater.
We do not agree with the Secretary‘s assertion that a probable cause requirement will unduly hamper the State‘s ability to protect its citizens from drunk drivers. This argument is belied by the fact that under
III
In addition to the Federal constitutional infirmities,
“The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means.” (Emphasis added.) (
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6 .)
Because the Illinois Constitution recognizes a zone of privacy, the protections afforded by the Illinois Constitution go beyond the guarantees of the Federal Constitution. In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 381.
In Will County Grand Jury, we held that probable cause was required before a grand jury could subpoena head and pubic hairs from an individual under investigation but not charged with any offense. In reaching that decision, we stated that “cutting a person‘s hair is less intrusive than removing blood from his body.” (Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d at 399.) We believe that requiring a urine sample is more intrusive than cutting a person‘s hair and that a chemical analysis of an individual‘s breath is at least as intrusive as requiring a hair sample for testing. It follows that chemical tests authorized under
The dissent points out the alarming number of deaths and injuries caused by drunk drivers annually. We recognize the human tragedies behind these numbers, and note that this court has on many occasions upheld the validity of laws enacted to combat the problem of intoxicated drivers. (See, e.g., Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273; People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 85 (statutory summary suspension does not violate due process); People v. Esposito (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 491 (statutory summary suspension does not violate equal protection).) However, despite the laudable goal of combating drunk driving, we cannot uphold the current statute in the face of the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the statute authorizes a search and seizure of a motorist without the slightest indication that the motorist has been drinking, we find that it is unconstitutional.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:
The majority finds that
Like the majority, I would apply the special needs test to the present case. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (1990), 496 U.S. 444, the Court found the problem of intoxicated drivers sufficient to justify use of the special needs test. Because the underlying State interest in Sitz is the same as in the instant case, I believe the special needs test is appropriate.
Whether a particular practice is permissible under the special needs test is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual‘s fourth amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. (Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 654.) The majority agrees that the State has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from intoxicated drivers. The majority, however, finds this interest insufficient to justify the burden caused by
The majority holds that because information gathered under
I believe the present case is analogous to Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association (1989), 489 U.S. 602. In Skinner, the Court held the government interest in deterring intoxi-
I believe those subject to testing under
As in Skinner, law enforcement personnel have limited discretion in applying
Application of
Because I believe that the special needs balancing test weighs in favor of the State, and agree with the State constitutional analysis contained in Justice Heiple‘s dissent, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, also dissenting:
On November 3, 1991, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution offered a compelling account of the state of this nation‘s highways: “An estimated 22,084 Americans were killed [in 1990] in crashes involving intoxicated drivers, nearly equaling the number of murders and tripling the number believed slain in drug disputes. *** An additional 355,000 people were injured in DUI crashes.” (Georgia‘s DUI Scandal, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, November 3, 1991, §A, at 1.) This was by no means atypical. “Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000, and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage.” 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure §10.8(d), at 71 (2d ed. 1987).
Over 20,000 lives lost per year. Many times that injured. When you factor in friends and relatives, it is safe to assume that over a million people are adversely affected by drunks on the road every year. The loss that society suffers due to drunks on the road is staggering.
This backdrop is important because it illuminates the need that faced our General Assembly when it passed the statute that the majority today finds unconstitutional. This need is stated quite simply: to rid our roads of drunk drivers. Coupled with this need is the unique problem that accompanies any approach designed to keep drunks off the roads-the transitory nature of intoxication.
I therefore find it incredible that the court today holds that this agreement between State and driver violates the United States and Illinois Constitutions. I write separately to voice my strong disagreement with the reading that the majority gives to those documents.
I first address the majority‘s analysis of the Federal Constitution‘s fourth amendment. The majority correctly concludes that these tests are searches within the meaning of the amendment. It is at this point that the majority and I part ways, however.
Relevant to the constitutionality of the tests at issue is Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association (1989), 489 U.S. 602. In that case, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the requirements that the fourth amendment imposes upon a government before it may conduct a search of a person. That Court‘s reasoning fully supports the constitutionality of the tests at issue.
As noted in the majority opinion, Skinner involved railway employees who were required to submit to alcohol tests if they were involved in certain types of accidents, regardless of whether there was individualized suspicion of intoxication. The Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment did not prohibit these tests. While
The Court in Skinner took great care to point out that the reasonableness of a search depends on the surrounding circumstances. The circumstances that the Skinner Court gave importance to were: the fact that the railway industry is heavily regulated; the fact that delay would frustrate the government‘s purpose, since intoxication is not lasting; and the relatively minor intrusion that these tests impose.
In the instant case, the statute deals with the State‘s highways. Although highways are not as regulated as railways, they are nevertheless highly regulated. The final two circumstances cited in Skinner are present here for precisely the same reasons: delay in testing while individualized suspicion can be established would frustrate the government‘s objective of identifying and removing drunk drivers from the roads, and the tests are minimally intrusive.
Finally, great weight should be given to the fact that a person consents to this search by driving on the State‘s highways, pursuant to the statute at issue. This consent is valid and enforceable. The State is not required to grant driving privileges to everybody. It is well within the State‘s discretion to limit driving privileges to those who agree to a minimally intrusive search for intoxication after they cause an accident. Having consented to this search, a driver is in no position to complain when the State seeks to enforce this agreement.
The cumulation of these circumstances indicates that, as in Skinner, the alcohol tests are reasonable searches and not prohibited by the fourth amendment.
The United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (1990), 496 U.S.
The majority correctly points out that underlying the rationale in both Sitz and Bartley was the short amount of time (less than a minute) that the search took to conduct. Here, on the other hand, the driver must be taken into the police station, given field sobriety tests, and then undergo the alcohol tests. In the appellee‘s case, this took 20 minutes.
What the majority fails to note is that the driver is brought to the station and given the field sobriety tests under a different statute than the one held unconstitutional today. Regardless of whether the statute under attack is enforced, the driver is already committed to most of the detention time. The additional test required of the driver adds only a short amount of time to this detention, and like Sitz and Bartley, is not unreasonable.
Further, it should be noted that these tests are administered only after a person causes an accident. A person involved in an accident normally expects to be delayed for a significant amount of time. Therefore, gone from the analyses in Sitz and Bartley is any expectation the driver might have of promptly resuming his trip.
Finally, I disagree with the majority that the search violates the Illinois Constitution. The majority‘s entire analysis on this point is simply a comparison to our recent decision in In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 381.
Deaths due to drunk driving are reaching epic proportions. Before allowing a person to drive, a State should be allowed to require the minimal search at issue here as a condition to granting driving privileges. A person should be allowed to consent to such a search by accepting the driving privileges as well as all the responsibilities that go with those privileges and should be held to this consent. The People should be allowed to live with the safer highways that the enforcement of such agreements will produce. Neither the United States nor the Illinois Constitution is a barrier to this attempt to create safer roads. I dissent.