11 Paige Ch. 235 | New York Court of Chancery | 1844
The general principle is well settled, that as to matters which are not within the defendant’s own knowledge he must answer both as to his information and belief. True, it is not necessary that the defendant should say, in so many words, that he has no knowledge, information or belief in relation to the charge contained in the bill; but it is sufficient if he uses any other expression in the answer which necessarily amounts to the same thing, in substance. Thus in Jones v. Wiggins, (2 Young & Jer. Exc. Rep. 385,) where the defendant stated that he was wholly ignorant of the matters charged, and could not make any other answer thereto as to his knowledge, belief, or otherwise, it was held equivalent to a denial of any knowledge, information or belief on the subject. So, in the case of Morris v. Parker, (3 John. Ch. Rep. 297,) where the defendant denied all knowledge or information as to the facts charged in the bill, Chancellor Kent held the answer to be sufficient, although the defendant said nothing as to his belief; upon the ground that a defendant, who had no knowledge or information of the matters charged, except from what was stated in the bill, was not bound to express any belief one way or the other. And in the same case, the answer of the defendant, that he was utterly and entirely ignorant of the fact alleged, as to the time of issuing a commission of bankruptcy in England, was held sufficient. But the connection in which that language was found in the answer, rendered it perfectly certain that the defendant intended to deny any information as well as any knowledge of the fact charged. In Amherst v. King, (2 Sim. & Stu. 183,) where the defendant answered that “ it might be true for any thing that he knew to the contrary, that” &c., as stated in the
Again; it is a substantial objection to this answer, that the defendant has answered literally as to charges in the bill which are laid to have been done with divers circumstances. For instance, that part of the answer to which the first exception relates, is in substance that the defendant is ignorant whether the complainants, on the particular day and year, and at the
The decision of the master, allowing these exceptions to the answer for insufficiency, was therefore right; and the order appealed from is erroneous and must be reversed, with costs. The exceptions to the master’s report must be overruled and the report confirmed; and the defendant Hensdil must pay the costs upon the exceptions to the answer, and upon the argument of the exceptions to the report, to be taxed. He must also put in a further answer within the twenty days allowed by the master, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court for that purpose, or, the bill may be taken as confessed against him for want of such answer.