71 Mo. 628 | Mo. | 1880
The only question in this case is whether rule 11, adopted and enforced by the board of the Jefferson City school district, in the case of the plaintiff’s son, is a-legal one. The question arose on a demurrer to defendant’s answer, which set up a breach of this rule by plaintiff’s son as a justification for his suspension. The circuit court sustained the demurrer. The rule is as follows : “Any pupil absent six half days in four consecutive weeks, without satisfactory excuse, shall be suspended from school.” The statute provides, (R. S. 1879, §7045,) that “the board shall have the power to make all needful rules and regulations for the organization, grading and government of the schools in their district.” It is clear that the legislature have intrusted to this school board the duty of making regulations touching the government of the school, of the necessity and propriety'- of which they .are primarily the judges. They' are elected by the people of the district, and must be presumed to be conversant
That the judiciary might intervene in case of rules manifestly reaching beyond their sphere of action and relating to subjects nowise connected with the management or successful operation of the school, was decided by this court in Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286, and that the courts might interfere also in cases where the rule was calculated to subvert or retard the leading object of our legislation on this "subject, may also be conceded. But I apprehend that the case should be a plain one. It is said that occasional absences from school, on the part of the pupil, or truancy as it is familiarly termed, is of no importance to any one except the pupil or his parents, and its indulgence is, therefore, not to be attended with such punishment as suspension or expulsion from the school entirely; that every child has a right to go to the public school, and that right cannot be taken away by a rule of the board; that such rule is subversive of the object of our system of common schools, which was designed to throw open and leave open the doors of the school to all children of the proper age, and give them an opportunity of acquiring such educution as will fit them for the after duties of life. This is true, but this right of attending school necessarily requires, when the school is joined, and whilst such attendance continues, a submission to the regulations of the school.
Suppose rule 11 to be inverted, and instead of reading as it now stands, should read thus : “ Any pupil is at liberty to go a fishing during school hours and be absent a half day or a whole day, and as many days as he pleases, provided he conducts himself decently when in attendance on school.” And this is the point to which the argument of the plaintiff tends. The pupil, it is urged, is at liberty to be absent when he pleases, and such absence is a matter solely between him and his parents. But the studies in our
