Thе estate represented by appellee shows title to the land in controversy, which in its regular deraignment from the оriginal grantee is not questioned except in one particular by appellants Davis & Co., who are the real defendants, who seek to show that they are purchasers in good faith without notice of the outstanding chain of title through whiсh appellee claims.
It is urged that the proceedings had in the District Court for Fannin County in the partition of the estatе of T. D. Jones and the deed made in pursuance thereof are insufficient to show title from the estate of Jones tо Haley.
The proceedings had in the District Court are not set out in full, but the statement of facts shows that a suit was pending in the District Court
The District Court had jurisdiction to render such decrees аs are shown to have been rendered, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary it must be presumed that it acquired jurisdiction of all persons necessary to empower it to make decrees that would bind ail persоns interested in the estate of T. D. Jones, and that every step was taken required by law to authorize the court to cause the land to be sold for purpose of partition.
Appellee then shows title to the land in the estate represented by her, and was entitled to recover unless appellants showed that they were innocent purchasers.
The case of Davis v. Agnew,
Appellants’ title to the land in controversy in -this action is the same in all respects, except one, as was it in the case above referred to, and the title of appellee is the same as that shown by Agnew, except in the proceedings had in the District Court for Fannin County before referred to. In so far as the questions are the same in this сase as were they in the case referred to, it is unnecessary again to discuss them.
In the case of Davis v. Agnew it was hеld that appellants showed no title, holding as they did through a deed from a married woman, a •daughter of the original grantee, not acknowledged as deeds are required to be to pass title to land, the separate estate оf a married woman. Appellants, in the case of Davis & Co. v. Agnew, claimed title through a deed made hy a daughter of the original grantee, dated January 12,1872, to Joseph W. Farrier, and through a purchase made by them under a judgment in their favor аgainst Farrier.
The daughter of the original grantee was a married woman at the time •she and her husband attempted to convey her interest in the land to Farrier by deed which, for want of sufficient acknowledgment, was inoperative.
The original grantee, by warranty deed of date September 4,1845, conveyed the entire tract to one under whom appellee holds by regular .chain of title.
That deed and the subsequent deeds through which appellee holds were not reсorded in the county in which the land is situated until March 9, 1882, except the deed to her intestate, which was. recorded Februаry 15. 1881.
That deed is sufficient to pass to appellants whatever title its makers' had at the time it was executed, and it contains recitals that Farrier páid valuable consideration for the land at the time "the inoрerative deed was. executed to him.
The deed last referred to was admitted in evidence, and there was evidеnce showing that Davis & Co., when they bought under execution against Farrier, paid the costs which had accrued in their aсtion against-him.
On these facts appellants claim that they are innocent purchasers for value, and that their right rеlates to the date of the attempted conveyance to Farrier.
There is no proof that Farrier pаid any sum or gave anything of value-when the daughter of the original grantee and her husband attempted to convey to him.
As аgainst appellee, whatever right appellants have grows out of the-deed made to them by the daughter of the original grantee, of date May 13, 1887. Before that date the deed from the original grantee, the father of appellants* vendor, had been placed on record, and they were thus affected with notice that their vendor nad no title when they received a deed from her.
This is conclusive of the rights of the parties, but were it not so we do-not seе that appellants could acquire any right or equity by reason of the fact that Farrier may have paid a valuаble consideration.when he received the deed not properly acknowledged.
At the sale made under thе execution against Farrier and in favor of appéllants, they only acquired such right to the land as Farrier had, and not" any equities which may have existed between the latter and the daughter of the original grantee growing out of transactiоns between them; but were this not so, proof that Farrier paid a valuable consideration, as against apipеllee, could not be proved by recitals in the deed to appellants of date May 13, 1887.
Appellant King was in possession of the land at the time the action was brought as the tenant of his codefendants, and the court did not err in rendering judgment against him for the land and costs, notwithstanding his disclaimer.
There is no error in the judgment and it will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Delivered November 19, 1889.