87 S.W. 844 | Tex. App. | 1905
W. P. King sued to recover of J. P. Griffin damages for the alleged breach of a rental contract. Griffin demurred to the petition, which was sustained, and King failing to amend, the suit was dismissed, and this action of the court is assigned as error.
King alleged, in effect, that in October, 1904, he entered into a contract with Griffin by which Griffin was to lease to him for the year 1904 a certain tract of land of about 35 acres, 30 acres of which he was to cultivate in cotton and five acres in corn; that there was on said land a good house, barns, etc., that he was to use; that Griffin, without just cause or excuse, breached said contract by renting the land to another and placing him in possession of same, thereby depriving him, King, of the use thereof; that he would have raised on said land sixteen bales of cotton, three-fourths of which would have been reasonably worth $600, and have raised 250 bushels of corn, two-thirds of which would have been worth $85; that he was to pay Griffin one-fourth the cotton raised and one-third of the corn raised. It was further alleged that the use of the house, barn, etc., was worth $100 for the year; and plaintiff was able and willing to fulfill said contract as he had agreed to do. He further alleged that by reason of said breach he necessarily lost about thirty days, together with his wagon and team in hunting for other land, to plaintiff's damage $60. The total damage he alleged to be $845.
The special exception urged to the petition and sustained by the court was that King did not set out sufficient facts to show that he was entitled to recover for the value of the crops he alleges he would have made, etc. This being sustained, the court did not have jurisdiction of the remaining amount of damages alleged and the cause was dismissed.
So the only question for solution is, was the proper measure of damages alleged? In the case of Lloyd v. Capps,
In the case of Rogers v. McGuffey,
It seems the Supreme Court does not regard the rule laid down in the Lloyd-Capps case as sufficiently comprehensive to allow compensation in cases like this, and while there is some uncertainty in arriving at the true damages sustained in attempting to show what probably might be raised on the land under a contract like the one under consideration, yet it comes nearer affording compensation for the loss actually sustained than the other. (Brincefield v. Allen, 25 Texas Civ. App. 258[
We, therefore, hold that the rule in Lloyd v. Capps, supra, is not applicable to this character of case, and in that respect it is overruled.
The trial court having erred in sustaining the exception to plaintiff's petition, the judgment is reversed and cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.