On October 26, 1899, the defendant was engaged in the livery business at Greenville, N. 0., and on that day, for a valuable consideration, sold to the plaintiff his teams, vehicles, etc., and agreed that he would not run or operate any other livery business in the town of Greenville for the period of three years from that date.
Soon thereafter the wife of the defendant opened and engaged in the livery business in said town, and employed the defendant, her husband, to superintend the business, which he is now operating and conducting in said town. On the hearing of a restraining order, the injunction was dissolved, and the plaintiff appealed.
*198 The general rule was, and still is, that contracts in restraint of trade and the like are void, on the ground that they are against public policy, similar to contracts illegal and contra mores. Clark on Contracts, 451 — 451.
This rule has been modified in order to protect the business of the covenantee or promisee, when it can be done without detriment to the public interest. The reasonableness of such restraint depends in each case on all the circumstances. If it be greater than is required for the protection of the promise©, the agreement is unreasonable and void. If it is a reasonable limit in time and space, the current of decisions is that the agreement is reasonable, and will be upheld.
In the present case, the restriction is confined in terms to a single county town, and to a period of three years. This seems to this Court not unreasonable.' The restriction applies to one individual only, and it is quite probable that, if the demands of that place require more extensive livery business, some other enterprising citizen will supply the demand, especially if it be profitable. The defendant has received his consideration, and. good faith requires him to perform his agreement. A husband may be his wife's agent, but it requires but little scrutiny to' look through these facts and discover’ who controls the business and enjoys the profits.
The whole ground of this contention was disposed of in
Baker v. Cordon,
The defendant referred to 5 Am. and Eng. Enc., (2d Ed.),. 480, to show, as we understand him, that a livery man is a common carrier. The author there has under consideration the distinction between the liability of carriers to passengers and his liability for failing to carry goods, holding that the former depends upon negligence, and -1116' latter upon contract of bailment, being liable in the latter case for all injuries not caused by the act of God or the public enemy. The same distinction is pointed out in Boyer v. Anderson, 2 Pet., (U. S.), 155. We are unable to make any application of that doctrine to the present case, which is simply for a breach of a contract in the sale of personal property.
Reversed.
