51 Cal. 181 | Cal. | 1875
Lead Opinion
The complaint avers that the defendant entered upon the demanded premises as a tenant at will of the plaintiff, under a verbal lease, and “that the time for which said premises were demised as aforesaid has terminated, and that the said defendants hold over and continue in possession of the said demised premises, without the permission of the said plaintiff and contrary to the terms of said lease.” It then avers that “since the expiration of the term for which said premises were demised ” the plaintiff made a demand in writing upon the lessee to surrender the possession, and that more than sixty days have elapsed since the demand, but the defendant has during all that time refused, and does still refuse to surrender the possession. The prayer is for a judgment of restitution, with treble damages. The action was brought under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act of April 27, 1863 (Stats. 1863, 652), which provides a remedy in cases wherein a tenant shall hold over “after the termination of the time” for which the premises were eternised; and section four provides that if the tenant holds over contrary to the terms of the lease, the landlord may make demand in writing for the possession; and if the tenant shall refuse or
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
The act of 1861 (p. 514), provides that when there is a*184 tenancy at will it may be terminated “by the landlord’s giving one month’s notice in writing to the tenant requiring him to remove from the premises;” and (section three): “At the expiration of one month from the service of the notice the landlord * * * may proceed in the manner prescribed by law to remove such tenant, without any other or further notice to quit.”
The notice of three days, required by the act of' 1863 (p. 652), is a notice to be given to a tenant whose term has already expired under the provisions of section three of that act. It has no reference to a tenant at will; Avhile the statute of 1861 specially refers to a tenant at will, and provides that after the giving of the thirty days’ notice proceedings may be instituted “ without any other or further notice to quit.” The respondent proved, at the trial, the giving of this notice of thirty days, and I am of opinion that this was sufficient notice to support the judgment rendered below.
For these reasons I dissent from the judgment of the majority.