131 So. 792 | Ala. | 1930
The first subject for consideration on this appeal involves an interpretation of a partition deed between the heirs of Robert King. The rules which control the court in this respect are well settled by our cases.
One of the late cases, Long v. Holden,
This rule limits the inquiry to facts and circumstances, and does not give effect to what the parties may have otherwise stated, nor their negotiations, nor their purpose or intentions obtained through other sources. These matters all culminated in the document itself. So that much of the evidence in this case violates the rules, and cannot be considered. Many of the important facts are shown by the instrument itself, viz.: That the land in question was a part of a large tract owned by Robert King, deceased, and set aside to his widow as dower; that the widow was dead, and the purpose of the parties was that the "heirs, legatees and distributees" of Robert King shall thereby make a division and partition of the dower land. So that the instrument itself recites on its face that its purpose is to effect a division or the land. The names of the parties are grouped, showing their connection with deceased, and in each instance the name of the husband or wife is expressed, and it is also stated whether the one or the other is the heir. There are four parts or equal interests. Two of the children having died, their descendants are stated to be entitled to the parents' share. In describing the lands for each such four shares, the name of each of the members of the four groups is given, and the name of the spouse is stated, if there is one. In one clause of the deed the words used are that to such parties there "is set off" a certain portion of the land fully described. Following this is the granting clause, thus expressed: "And the said heirs, legatees and distributees herein mentioned do hereby reciprocally waive, convey and confirm unto each other their heirs and assigns all of their right, title, and interest in the several tracts of land allotted as described in this instrument of writing."
Section 6839, Code 1923, in effect when this instrument was executed, provides that: "Any instrument in writing, signed by the grantor * * * is effectual to transfer the legal title to the grantee, if such was the intention of the grantor, to be collected from the entire instrument." While such statute was in effect this court, in the case of Brewton v. Watson,
With equal force the statute was considered in Webb v. Mullins,
The foregoing quotations were referred to in the case of Long v. Holden, supra, where the deed contained the following words: "It is so understood that at my death this land is to go to my daughter, L. L. Holden." She was the grantee's daughter.
The words used in the instrument in this case to wit, "is set off," are not words of grant or alienation in their ordinary sense. They import a meaning, otherwise expressed, that the parties are merely dividing the land among themselves, and designating a portion for each of the four shareholders, and their respective portions are therefore said to be "set off" for them. Under a statute of this state the homestead is "set apart" to the widow. The terms "set off," "set apart," and "designate," in this connection, would seem to carry the same idea. We could not call them words of alienation or grant unless such intention is otherwise apparent. Cloud v. Dean,
In some respects this deed is similar to that considered in Clark v. Northern Coal Coke Co. (Ky.)
We are not in agreement with the conclusion reached by the circuit court that Lucy S. King took the land as a cograntee with George P. King under the agreement whereby certain land of Robert King was divided among his heirs. That was its clear purpose, and she was not an heir.
After the death of Lucy S. King, George P. King filed his bill in chancery, making the heirs of Lucy S. King parties, alleging that "through error the person who wrote the deed, conveyed to this complainant, George P. King and his wife Lucy S. King the land which was allotted to complainant, and should have been deeded to complainant." The bill sought a reformation of the deed. For answer, the respondents, among other things, set up (1) laches, (2) that the persons who executed the deed are not made parties, (3) and that the deed expresses on its face what was intended. There was a final decree adjudging that complainant was not entitled to relief, and dismissing the cause. No part of that proceeding here appears except the bill, answer, and decree.
Appellee claims that the effect of that decree is an adjudication upon the effect and construction of the deed, against the contention now made by complainant. Complainant is bound by the legal effect of that proceeding, the same as George P. King. She became his second wife, and claims under a deed from him executed after he filed that suit though before the final decree was entered.
The bill did not undertake to allege any excuse for such a long delay — twenty-six years. There is nothing to show what issues were *248
actually tried or on what grounds relief was denied. Relief could have been denied for want of averment showing sufficient excuse for such long delay. Lewis v. Belk,
It is also well settled that equity takes note of a want of necessary parties in a suit of this nature, and refuses to proceed until such parties are brought in. English v. Huckaba,
The dismissal of the suit could therefore have been predicated upon laches, and staleness of the claim, or for want of necessary parties. If it had been dismissed on account of either cause, it would not be an adjudication on the merits of any other controversy or issue. Crausby v. Crausby,
A former judgment is not a bar as res judicata unless it was on the merits of the case. Crausby v. Crausby, supra; McCall v. Jones,
What issues were necessarily involved in the decree denying relief to complainant? We say necessarily involved, because there is no evidence aliunde here submitted. The question of merit was a prayer for reformation. If that was denied because of laches, it was a decision on the merits to that extent, and it concluded the parties as to any claim of reformation as much so as for want of proof. If it was denied for want of necessary parties, it should not be considered as decided upon the merits. But whether decided on the merits or not, and assuming every question was decreed adversely to complainant which could have been decided on the merits, what is the result? The bill sought a reformation. That was the matter of merit in it. That relief was denied. Assuming that it thereby precludes a further suit for reformation, that relief is not here sought, nor any right necessarily concluded in the decree denying that relief, the result is that the deed itself speaks the intention of the parties when properly interpreted and the court declined in that suit to say that it does not. It seems apparent that complainant in that suit interpreted it to convey an interest to Lucy S. King. But such interpretation was not the basis of any court action nor necessary to the decree rendered. It did not grant any relief upon that alleged meaning so that she would be estopped to deny such to be its proper meaning. Non constat the court may have decided that relief was not needed because the deed did not have the meaning so stated. We are in the dark as to the basis of the decree. It is sufficient to say that we see no reason why complainant is estopped thereby to give the true interpretation to the deed because of an erroneous one then entertained and expressed in the bill.
As we view the proceedings in the former suit, they amount to neither res judicata on the question here involved nor to an estoppel on complainant to insist on the interpretation made in this suit.
This being a statutory suit to quiet title, and finding that appellees have no right or title to, nor interest, claim, or lien on, the property, a decree will be here rendered to that effect and to reverse that of the circuit court.
Reversed and rendered.
ANDERSON, C. J., and GARDNER and BOULDIN, JJ., concur.