History
  • No items yet
midpage
Kindt v. Kauffman
129 Cal. Rptr. 603
Cal. Ct. App.
1976
Check Treatment

*1 Third No. 14800. Dist. Apr. [Civ. 1976.] KINDT, FRED Plaintiff and

HELMUTH Appellant, al., H. R. KAUFFMAN et Defendants Respondents.

Counsel

Friedman, Kauffman, Friedman, Collard & Collard & Poswall Wade R. for Plaintiff Thompson Appellant. Detert, Moran & Arnold and W. Hudson Defendants Mark for

Sedgwick, and Respondents.

Opinion THE COURT.* A taverncustomer here tavern sues alleging keeper, that the latter him sold alcoholic when negligently beverages intoxicated, was in violation of Code Business Professions obviously section his involvement in a later collision automobile causing to himself. trial The court sustained tavern injury keeper’s demurrer without leave to Plaintiff from the amend. general appeals of dismissal. ensuing judgment

* Paras, J., Evans, Friedman, J., Before J. P. Acting law rule to the common adhered

California courts for years many suffered civil seller’s damages patron rejecting liquor of the latter’s result or a third such injured by patron person 5 Cal.3d intoxication. Vesely Sager Court common California abrogated Supreme partially ruled law rule. claims of third court itself Limiting persons, Code, it a Professions that section 25602 of Business and making intoxicated to furnish alcoholic to an misdemeanor obviously beverages , was members of general person, designed protect public from excessive use of injury resulting intoxicating liquor. Supreme' Court stated: *4 on that the law rule of is based

“To the extent common nonliability cause, of we are reasoning proximate persuaded concepts that rule. The decisions in those that have abandoned cases jurisdictions invoke law rule which have abandoned common principles in this state cases to those established cause similar dealing proximate (See than the of alcoholic matters other beverages. furnishing 232 67 Cal.2d (1967) v. Helms Limited Schwartz Cal.Rptr. [60 Bakery 857, 510, 55 Cal.2d 863-864 (1961) v. Cox 430 P.2d Stewart 68]; [13 772, 521, 44 Cal.2d (1955) v. Ham 362 P.2d Richardson 345]; Cal.Rptr. 295, 32 Cal.2d (1948) American Pool 269]; 111 P.2d McEvoy v. Corp, [285 213, 26 Cal.2d (1945) v. Arden Farms Co. 783]; P.2d 298-299 Mosley [195 372, Co. v. Gas & Elec. 158 A.L.R. Stasulat 872]; P.2d 218 [157 Pacific Prosser, 631, 637 P.2d Proximate Cause 678]; Cal.2d 8 (1937) [67 an actor 369.) 38 Cal.L.Rev. Under these (1950) principles California an factor in liable if his is substantial be causing injury, may act of a third relieved of because of the and he is not intervening act was at the time of his if such foreseeable negligent reasonably person 863-864; Cox, 55 v. v. Cal.2d at Richardson (Stewart conduct. supra, pp. 807, 777; Ham, 812 44 Cal.2d v. 39 Cal.2d (1952) at Eads Marks p. supra, 399, P.2d (1952) 575]; v. 38 Cal.2d 257]; P.2d Benton Sloss [240 [249 218; Co., 26 Cal.2d at Fuller v. Standard v. Arden Farms Mosley p. supra, 687, Stations, Ewert v. (1967) 792]; Inc. Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.2d [58 163, 169-173 (1965) Southern Cal. Gas Co. [46 431, Moreover, Torts, 302A, ‘If the likelihood Rest.2d 631]; §§ the hazard or one of that a third act in a manner is may person particular act whether which the actor such an the hazards makes negligent, innocent, or criminal does not tortious intentionally prevent negligent, Torts, for harm caused the actor from liable (Rest.2d thereby.’ being 241-242; 449; Limited, Schwartz v. Helms 61 Cal.2d at Bakery supra, American Ham, at 44 Cal.2d Richardson McEvoy p. 299.)” 32 Cal.2d Pool Corp., supra, care, Court continued:

On the Supreme duty subject aof care, conduct the attendant standard required “A man, enactment in a be found of course legislative reasonable In this state civil presumption for does liability. [Citations.] provide enacted to which was of a statute the violation arises from of negligence is a member of which the a class of against plaintiff persons protect of the violation of suffered as a result which the of harm type P.2d Satterlee (1958) 897]; v. Vanier 50 Cal.2d (Alarid statute. The 279].) 29 Cal.2d 581 (1947) Dist. Glenn School Orange with the has codified this adoption presumption recently Legislature due to exercise care 669: ‘The failure of Evidence Code section person statute, ordinance, or of a He if: violated (1) regulation presumed or caused death (2) The violation injury proximately entity; public death or resulted from occurrence or The injury person property; ordinance, statute, was or of the nature which designed regulation the death or the to his suffering person prevent; whose the class of was one of protection persons property person *5 ordinance, statute, (a).) (Subd. was the or regulation adopted.’ defendant case a of care is “In the instant Sager by upon imposed 25602, which and Professions Code section ‘Every Business provides: furnished, sold, sells, furnishes, or causes to be who gives, person common drunkard to habitual or alcoholic any any beverage away, given of a misdemeanor.’ This intoxicated is toor guilty any obviously person Act Control of the Alcoholic was enacted as Beverage part provision 1935, 330, 62, 1151) for the at and was 1935 ch. (Stats. adopted p. to members of the from injuries general public purpose protecting from the excessive use and damage resulting property person 163-165.) (Id., at intoxicating liquor.” “ declared, . . whether ... we do not decide . further court Vesely of the statute alcoholic in violation who is served may beverages person at (Id., a result of that violation.” suffered as

recover for injuries and the California three Courts of Since Legislature Vesely, Appeal (1972) v. Carlisle here have considered Kanaywer presented. question Dist., Three) Div. 587, (First 24 591-592 Cal.Rptr. 246] Cal.App.3d [101 940, 25 944 (1972) Cal.Rptr. v. Cal.App.3d Goldberg [102 Sargent 850 Dist., Three) Div. (Second both a claim for rejected

300] patron’s own or death on that of his intoxication ground allegation showed law. as a matter of v. National contributory negligence Cooper Railroad 45 389 (1975) Corp. Cal.App.3d Passenger [119 541] Dist., result, Two) (Second Div. reached the same three basing states; 393-394, “First, That at it has been said grounds. opinion, pages that alcoholic and not their beverages drinking serving cause of results to drinker from his proximate own any injury 450, Rush, intoxication. v. (Cole Cal.2d P.2d 54 A.L.R.2d [289 1137]; Hitson v. 808-809 P.2d 952].) Dwyer, Cal.App.2d [143 Second, it is also said that even the server is though negligent violation of law to serve alcoholic by continuing beverages drinker, intoxicated the drinker’s cause of action is barred obviously Rush, his own (Cole 356), v. contributory negligence supra, p. or, we think more his of the known precisely, by voluntary assumption risks incident of alcoholic conspicuous consumption beverages in bars. 65 Misc.2d Addis N.Y.S.2d 180]; (McNally [317 see Collier Stamatis 63 Ariz. 285 P.2d One 127-128].) of these known and risks is that the bartender conspicuous possibility will fail the drinker’s intoxicated negligently recognize obviously "1 condition.1” Footnote 1 ‘Obvious intoxication is often provides: fact, after the and what is when the drinker falls recognizable only patent off his bar stool have been latent 60 (cf. seconds earlier Hitson may only Visual 952]). Dwyer, diagnosis intoxication has not Peacock’s greatly improved upon rough ready floor, classification of 1829: “Not drunk is he Can rise alone who more; he, lies, and still drink But drunk is who Without the prostrate ’ ” “Thus, drink or rise.” when drinker stool power occupies bar, he that the bartender implicitly acknowledges possibility *6 continue to serve him alcoholic even negligently he has beverages though become and intoxicated as a result of (See his condition. accident-prone Torts, Third, F.) Rest.2d we note § that while the [Fn. omitted.] bartender who serves alcoholic to an intoxicated beverages obviously Code, is the criminal law & (Bus. Prof. patron 25602) violating § is likewise law the criminal patron drunk in a violating by being public Code, 647, (Pen. (f)). subd. We have here instance of place classic delicto, fault, in or criminal in their parties pari equal relationship one another the law leaves the in the condition finds normally parties them. law reflects basic

“We think each foregoing expressions view of provides primary against society self-police defense A role. and outside secondary evils intoxication only police plays a failure of not excused or condoned is failure of by policing primary has no and the responsibility primaty person secondary policing, This one who is for losses recourse only secondarily responsible. against in Nolan v. Court of Connecticut the reason forth for by Supreme put ‘To in 154 Conn. 432 A.2d Morelli (1967) recompense 387]: an to an intoxicated his property resulting person damages in be his own intoxicating might, quite properly, overindulgence liquor rather than to felt the General discourage, Assembly encourage, ” added.) (Italics such overindulgence.’ the 1972 of the California Assem- session During regular Legislature, Bill No. 1864 was introduced Ketchum—March bly (Assemblyman 1972). (see It was in decision part attempt codify Vesely Pacific L.J. 191) to extend its so as to make purview any person licensed under the Alcoholic Control Act liable to the Beverage civilly where the sale in and Professions Code violation of Business patron will 25602 and it is that the consumer section foreseeable reasonably This a motor vehicle while still under the influence of alcohol. drive 16, 1972, the bill deleted amendment on June was provision thus remainder of the bill died in the Senate. later the Legislature rule of three an extension of the courts rejecting joined appellate to the drunken patron. compensability in 1975 the when the law on the was the status of

Such subject Co., 13 Cal.3d 804 decided Li Yellow Cab Court Supreme California court abolished There the 1226]. common law doctrines contributory negligence interposed In their of risk as total barriers negligence. recovery assumption which diminishes a the court established1 negligence, comparative place, (Id., at to his own negligence. recovery negligent plaintiff’s proportion of action fail to state a cause 828-829.) No does longer complaint Such a because on its face it portrays contributorily negligent plaintiff. to a to total ouster from the courts but is not vulnerable only reduction of his damage recovery. proportionate has altered the otherwise whether the Li case

The issue now is *7 law to the well-settled remedy denying legislatively judicially here Has the the tavern owner. drunken patron against injured diminished to be for his only a cause of action stated damages, to his own misconduct? proportion

I We note that the court in Li failed to extend the consciously It doctrine of to the area of willful misconduct. comparative negligence stated, of the treatment of willful there is “Finally problem under a . . . The misconduct system comparative negligence. thought is that the difference between willful and wanton misconduct and is one of kind rather than in that the former ordinary negligence degree order, different involves conduct of and under entirely [fn. omitted] this it well be conception might urged comparative negligence should have no when one been has concepts application parties guilty . . . . wanton misconduct The existence of the foregoing [i] of willful areas of (as well as others which we have not difficulty uncertainty Schwartz, 21.1, here mentioned—see 335-339) has § generally pp. not diminished our conviction that the time for a revision of the means fault in this state is due and that it dealing contributory long past lies within the of this court to initiate the needed our province change by decision in this case. Two of the indicated areas (i.e., multiple parties us, willful are misconduct) not involved in the cases before and we consider it neither nor wise address ourselves to necessary specific of this nature which be to arise. . . .” (Italics problems might expected added.) 825-826.) at (Id., First,

Two themselves. is the drunken questions present patron so, Second, of willful misconduct rather than if should guilty negligence? Li be extended add willful misconduct doctrine to comparative comparative negligence? the first in the affirmative.1 is more

We answer question Nothing than that a becomes intoxicated as a result elementary person normally of his own volition. As out in the drunken pointed Cooper, supra, patron commits a crime as he sits bar stool. Before reality upon imbibing all, he is aware of the effects of alcohol fully debilitating upon senses, and of its total effect himself. He knows that if he consumes excess, it to his activities render him a and a subsequent danger others, Yet, menace to himself and innocent third especially persons. this he to consume despite prior knowledge, inexcusably proceeds alcohol in sufficient about result.2 This quantities bring predicted is willful and wanton misconduct clear as any imaginable. 1 In willful juxtaposition misconduct is the act plaintiff’s of the tavern wrongful Code, bartender), (or (Bus. 25602). owner his violation of a statute & Prof. penal For decision, we this deem to also be

purposes willful misconduct. 2 While the of intoxication with the degree progresses continued “imperceptibly” alcohol, there is consumption nothing or obscure about the drinker’s imperceptible

853 Let us note that we are not here concerned with a parenthetically 235 minor v. 492 (cf. (1965) Hamilton Boyles Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. [45 who from an nor with an alcoholic suffers irresistible 399]), fact, to drink Such a be may, urge excessively. person pathological self-control, ill and thus under certain extremely physically incapable limited and circumstances of willful not misconduct. extraordinary guilty Tate v. (Cf. Canonica (1960) 28].) Cal.App.2d [5 condition, Plaintiff no such but almost asserts pleads boldly, defiantly, Code, his drunken state as induced. (Evid. 668.) We §§ voluntarily are concerned with an adult who became drunk because he plaintiff desired and intended that result.

The second is more Heretofore and question thought provoking. prior Li, to while was held not to bar claim based contributory negligence misconduct, willful willful misconduct was upon contributory recognized as a bar thereto. v. Rothbaum complete (Cawog Cal.App.2d Witkin, P.2d 1063]; of Cal. Law (8th 1974) ed. Summary Torts, 2974; Torts, Rest.2d It § does not however follow p. the Li that decision because we now have readily upon comparative we also have willful misconduct. Whether we do negligence comparative or not whether a of care should be declared to exist in hinges upon favor of the willful this in turn formulation of wrongdoer; requires court, As observed the Li the difference between public policy. kind, and willful misconduct one of comparative being should to the latter. negligence concept arguably apply A threshold is whether the intoxicated customer is question obviously a member of the class section 25602. protected by According Vesely, the statute was “members of the designed protect general public . . . from excessive use of injuries resulting intoxicating liquor.” (Vesely 165.) This court stated in Hitson Sager, supra, p. Dwyer 803, 808 the statute was not adopted statute, intoxicated customer. The protect obviously language with the lead together us Vesely pronouncement, disapprove dictum, Hitson as did the Court. Supreme (Vesely Sager, supra, here, 167.)The tavern, as a customer in the defendant’s was one plaintiff of the members of the for whose benefit section 25602 was general public enacted. fact, of ultimate results he embarks his bacchanal. our

preconception limiting remark to the we context of this little difference litigation only, perceive conceptual between our drunken here and the or LSD his who heroin into person injects body. *9 854 the facto however duty does not

This conclusion generate ipso A criminal favor. which is essential for civil plaintiff’s under the courts because of civil becomes a rule liability only prohibition standard. (Alber it as common law controlling accept principles 117, 790, 781]; 427 P.2d 798-799 66 Cal.2d Owens (1967) Cal.Rptr. [59 72, As in P.2d 777].) 22 75 Cal.2d (1943) Clinkscales Carver [136 of defendant owes whether the duty the is still Vesely, prime question statute of a criminal the existence the care to injured person, element in is but one the defendant’s conduct perception punishing of duty. determination of reasonable

The existence of also a duty requires 40, General, 15 Cal.3d 46 (1975) v.RKO Inc. (Weirum foreseeability [123 728, 468, 539 P.2d 68 Cal.2d 739-741 36]; (1968) Dillon Cal.Rptr. Legg 912, 441 P.2d which we no 1316]), A.L.R.3d have Cal.Rptr. [69 however, here. does not still difficulty finding Necessarily, inquiry “ there, for the of far more ... should be stop concept duty complex. itself, is not sacrosanct in but recognized ‘duty’ only expression the sum total of those considerations of which lead the law to policy say that the (Prosser, is entitled to Law of particular plaintiff protection.” 332-333; Torts ed. 1964) Dillon v. 68 Cal.2d at (3d Legg, supra, In v. Paradise School Dist. (1963) Raymond Unified 1, 8 we summarized the considerations 847], Cal.Rptr. policy [31 of care: “The social out of underlying utility activity duty conduct; arises, which the with the risks involved in its injury compared the actor is of a the kind of whom workability dealing; person care, relative rule of in terms of ability adopt especially parties, the relative means ability parties preventing injury; practical and the of means bear the financial burden availability of statutes which loss be shifted judicial body spread; effect which color the relationship; prophylactic precedents parties’ which . . the moral of a rule of . and judges liability; finally, imperatives are the a role in share with citizens—such factors their play fellow are subsumed within the the determination of These factors duty.” moral, administrative, (2) (3) socio-economic (1) categories Ice, considerations, v. Home all of which must be evaluated. (Amaya Cal.2d 310-315 Fuel & Co. Cal.Rptr. Supply overruled on other in Dillon v. grounds Legg, supra.) the tavern substance and in the last the attribution of a analysis, “ here and an innate sense of must be natural reason ‘inspired by keeper ....’” v. Bethlehem Steel 12 Cal.3d justice (Rodriguez Corp. 765, 525 P.2d 669].) considerations, Administrative while (as militating against do), do not cause us recoil at always they prospect allowing *10 Indeed, the that . . “Justice . exists recovery. accepting premise only it when can be administered” at 310), we are effectively (Amaya, p. supra troubled the of a that would allow by efficacy decision-making process arise, the cause action. In order for the cause of action to sought-after defendant the must violate section Business and Professions Code is, that sell to an intoxicated intoxicating liquor “obviously person.”3 v. one To be intoxicated must (Vesely Sager, obviously supra be in (or first intoxicated. the time the tavern his owner By agent) fact statute, violates has himself into such a state already patron put to be to as himself and others. If he is then served a dangerous single drink, himself, he which leaves the who is following premises injures that the tavern owner’s violation service of the one say statutory a drink contributed if cause to the Or before the proximate injury? he visits a few more taverns and drink at consumes one each of them, who is to which of the drinks at which of the taverns was a say cause? The standard is that it is a of fact for proximate response question and so it But the is. to be the fact jury; speculation indulged finder, dozen, whether the violation a involve drink or one single five, tavern or is considerable. be, as this Court has made it

Disquieting Supreme repeatedly clear that such considerations not to about wholesale ought bring of a (See discussion in Dillon v. rejection right recovery. Legg, 735-739.) did not extension of supra, pp. They prevent Vesely Sager reflection, And even us to for causes liability. though pause administrative factor does not cause us to the drunken deny patron for his own recovery injuries.

The moral and lead socio-economic factors however us to the conclusion that the the tavern owner drunken requisite duty exist, does not that the doctrine of Li patron comparative negligence misconduct, not does to willful rule apply Vesely Sager not does extend to to the drunken himself. injuries patron The inestimable reason and self-control cries out preserva- gift and the devolves each tion its preservation every person, member of the When the of reason and restraint public. ability 3 We note that of Business and Professions Code section 25602 which portion sale to a or common drunkard" is involved in this case. “habitual prohibits conscious, act of

care for one’s self are self-indulgent perverted by those no casts off intoxication powers, temporarily voluntary nor violation of or social societal or public policy personal wrong, actor held answerable for his or violated if the is alone accomplished uncoerced, uninvited self- voluntary, independent, injury. “[T]he the difference between of him who right wrong knowing indulgence Stamatis (Collier effects follow” injurious apt no alcohol arouses nonetheless consumes 128]) Ariz. 285 [162 violation so as to and when it is trigger repeated ready sympathy; no reward. it merits Code section and Professions Business *11 their own con Governmental paternalism protecting people be and scious fosters individual is normally folly irresponsibility (1975) 52 Harrah Shore South (Cf. discouraged. Corp. Duff v. To another and allow 259].) monetary go yet step and to one who becomes intoxicated thereby injures recovery knowingly in our view indefensible. himself is morally a from that of driver conduct differ Does this conceptually plaintiff’s street, attains in a contest on a crowded who speed city engages speed vehicle, himself, hour, and loses control of his of 100 miles injures per misconduct willful then sues his fellow contestant on comparative we, we, a driver to recover? Would should allow such Certainly theory? Yet, available favor of here are not. all the equally plaintiff arguments there, the contention that and recovery by denying including applicable for his defendant we allow the accounting escape culpable so, the defendant in either case latter not misdeed. This is necessarily misconduct, and such for his to criminal prosecu- subject prosecution driver or and be tion indignant speed by injured instigated C.J.S., Crim. (22 law officers much as enforcement drunk patron so, with a we are faced Law, if it were 790). But even practical § p. the one on contestant drunk choice of speed patron “favoring” Without the other.4 on and cocontestant owner hand or tavern one, (42 delicto doctrine a “favor” to pari age-old any conceding us to 490) C.J.S. directs recovery. deny fault

Let us comparative fantasy application dispel it would rather that here would not merely patron, principle favor time of his loss while the same assess to him a giving portion proper McGill L.J. value in 20 4 See an excellent of our judgment discussion problem 492, 507-509. attractive, While treatment tavern owner. this is semantically equal to an drunk allowance of reality any recovery injured the tavern owner accrues to the financial benefit patron against him, It is immoral under the no less benefit to no less patron. herein, because could be principles espoused recovery greater. Heretofore, no allowed such a to now allow has been recovery plaintiff; it in award a windfall would be to financial any degree simple pure which no can to an amount of undeserving theorizing plaintiff, temporal change.

How far removed is this from one who undertakes with voluntarily Code, Code, another to in an 415) or a duel (Pen. (Pen. § engage affray 225) and who thereafter sues his for an caused antagonist thereby? Should a assault now evolve? comparative batteiy concept Curiously total, there are which have enough, jurisdictions imposed just Prosser, (see in such cases Law comparative, liability antagonist 1971) ed. (4th 107). Torts fn. Such have now been holdings Witkin, Law, discredited. of Cal. (See thoroughly Summary *12 Torts, 2484-2485; Prosser, Torts, 107; Law of § Rest.2d pp. p. Torts, 60, 92-93.) Prosser it in these “But the cases have words: puts been criticized on the that no one should be rewarded roundly grounds for own his in a damages voluntary participation wrong, particularly where, case, crime; as is the he commits a that the state is usually himself able to itself criminal and that the fully protect prosecution; parties, all, if to the law at which is are they give any thought quite improbable, as to be the that hurt can quite likely encouraged by hope they get they if states, still win in court. A of some with the minority eight support Restatement, action, have held that the consent will defeat the civil where the omitted.) force used exceeds the (Idem.) (Fns. consent.” except California, added.) In (Italics ruled has not been precise question (cf. Hudson Cal.2d 654 P.2d 7 A.L.R.2d upon Craft but in 696]), Warda Sayadoff v. case, followed, rule was the court restatement closely analogous 631): the court should violation (at discourage saying “Admittedly, state, that this end statutes of this but is doubtful penal highly of civil It is also be the medium should highly sought through litigation. that would be afforded doubtful deterrent allowing damages any a line of conduct Such well such a case as this. encourage holding might us,—the abortions with no we have submission to such as before successful, financial with the if are but assurance they complaint non We find this volenti if the woman reward injured.” participant fit notion of intentional tort law case before injuria highly analogous us. Just willful in a contest should be participant speed precluded from his cocontestant for incurred in the proceeding against injuries contest, so should the drunken be patron precluded proceeding the tavern owner. against

Socio-economic considerations also militate allowance a against 25,000 cause of action here. There are over licensed on-sale alcohol California, businesses the State of dispensing throughout there are hundreds of thousands of who use their facilities patrons daily, large of whom drive percentage automobiles after some consumption alcohol. The latter are for largely responsible devastating highway from automobile carnage accidents. resulting' Everything reasonably conceivable should be done to such discourage activity; conversely, it, should be done to nothing A encourage particularly by judiciary. rule of here could have no other effect possible upon patrons than to them to excessive encourage taverns. liquor consumption Forthwith the announcement of a rule of law which permits drunken to recover for his own from the patron tavern damages injuries who have heretofore felt concern their own keeper, patrons safety efforts, should become intoxicated will relax their they overly personal First, for three reasons. because will assume that readily apparent they behalf; second, bartenders will exercise care in their because greater will feel if are hurt they will be very naturally they they hurt; third, we, for such because will compensated judiciary, effect have their their delin- encouraged overindulgence, by pampering It cannot be otherwise. The quency. statistics so already tragic *13 describe the of innocent horribly drunk drivers will slaughter persons by increase, to further immediately society’s disadvantage.

There would be no converse effect to in terms of prophylactic society deterrent to the tavern owner. We are aware of. the fully practical section 25602 and of difficulty criminally administratively policing how such has been ineffective to stem the on our policing slaughter But it does not follow that the creation of a rule of civil highways. simply in favor would have effect. All that liability patron any salutary would occur would be that a rash of lawsuits would be filed in owners, behalf of of tavern from the who falls off patrons ranging patron his stool (Hitson v. who heirs of kills Dwyer, supra) patron home, (to himself in his own shower at after hours his revelries say of the inevitable who will claim because his nothing damages her). drunk and beat These him when he came home wife divorced uniform substantial in will about lawsuits bring upward adjustments Tavern will owners insurance pay higher premiums.5 increase their prices public, appropriately liquor premiums in the no foreseeable rate of reasonably change absolutely to the Business and Code section 25602 adherence Professions proscrip- tion. carried out at of section 25602 is to be

If more efficacious enforcement it such methods as increased let be done directly, by expense, public the addition of and concentration surveillance (including emphasis violators, detect and and stricter necessary prosecute manpower) violators.6 But and more administrative financially painful penalties drunks to serve as the undesirable lawsuits by undeserving expect which will this result naive and unrealistic. is panacea accomplish considerations, and unfavor are of course other both favorable There issues, both which we have not deemed able to sides necessary Dist., (see detail here School Paradise minutely Raymond Unified all, them We have considered have carefully analyzed supra). found the scales allowance of Our recovery. tipped heavily against conclusion is further confirmed action of the negative Legislature to enact which would have refusing proposed legislation brought about an Eu (See result. v. Chacon 16 Cal.3d opposite 1, 546 P.2d 289].) Our from our brother is principal point departure dissenting justice in his treatment of the act as one rather than plaintiff’s Indeed, willful misconduct. of the Li doctrine application compels Li, the drunken Prior to right recovery, plaintiff merely negligent. if (Cole the California cases v. Rush recovery appellate denying plaintiff 45 Cal.2d 345 54 A.L.R.2d 1137]; Carlisle etc.) terms of Kanaywer, supra; Goldberg, supra, spoke Sargent 5 Seefootnote 10of the dissenting opinion. 21,000 6 Therewere over on-sale and over off-sale alcoholic licenses beverage 27.000

issued 333 1974 and 1975.The of Alcoholic Control filed Beverage only during Department (for 25602) (a 1974and 249 1975 number of § accusations violation of during during & which were of without of business under Bus. interruption doubtless disposed any thus, 23095). It that area needs and Prof. Code. this considerable legislative appears attention, all accidents and 17.67 of all executive since “Over 407 of fatal particularly (1974 accidents the accident . . . had been drinking.” party causing [show that] Patrol, Accidents, Fatal Vehicle California Highway Annual of and Motor Report Injury 57.) p. of v. National for the above portion Cooper (except quoted negligence course, was, for them There of no need Railroad Corp., supra). Passenger and between into the niceties of distinction to delve negligence deeper relate to the intentional even (or willful misconduct they wrong) case, course, in such The Li conduct. indulgence requires patron’s willful, our considerations; conduct to be noted plaintiff’s having which we have reached.7 us to the conclusion reasoning.leads

II in this this There is another reason why procedurally recover, even if a rule of be entitled to case would not comparative enunciated. The Li court its misconduct had been willful gave compara stated, “It it limited In so doctrine tive retroactivity. doing, rule here announced to which the us to determine extent remains for in than those which are commenced to cases other shall have application nature of this state that determinations future. It is the rule in this of fairness and turn considerations Upon policy. public [Citations.] of cases reflection, number view substantial mature very in the trial and are now which the matter here issue pending involving state, to considera attention this courts of particular appellate to the cases to individual stage tions of reliance according applicable reached, a rule of that we have concluded which have litigation they that the we hold here. limited should obtain Accordingly retroactivity trial has to all cases in which shall be opinion applicable present court, but that becomes final in this before the date this decision begun date which trial before that not be case in shall began applicable any if be reversed on than the instant (other any judgment case)—except reasons, retrial.” other this shall be any opinion applicable appeal for Co., 829.) v. Yellow added.) (Li Cab (Italics supra,.at p. was sustained demurrer judgment

Defendant’s May filed March Co. was 1974. Li v. Yellow Cab entered dismissal September and its of Li that within Defendant claims 1975. meaning “tried” 829), the case was (id., at retroactive prior application and thus itself is correct Li. The contention disposes finality appeal. plaintiff’s conclusion, of little has been law of other the decisional jurisdictions 7 In our reaching law concept the traditional common A few have

assistance. denies relief to states departed statutes” providing some have adopted,“dram-shop the drunken patron; the common law adhere to continue to majority for a of action for patron; right reasons, of relief. a right the intoxicated patron deny for various articulated concept, 923; 705; 1152; 75 A.L.R.2d (54 65 A.L.R.2d A.L.R.2d 64 A.L.R.2d

861 a “trial” took where of Plaintiff whether place judgment questions was entered after a demurrer without leave to dismissal sustaining demurrer, the law amend. It did. At the time of on hearing under attack had been enunciated in pleadings clearly applicable Rush, v. Cole v. Carlisle v. Kanaywer, Sargent Goldberg, supra, on demurrer was therefore correct. supra; ruling on include defined to hearing Trial has been always variously v. of the action. was if that O’Day demurrer dispositive proceeding 540, the court 621], 544 18 Cal.2d Court (1941) Cal.Rptr. [116 Superior follows, all a ‘trial’ includes trial defined rulings “Generally speaking, it made in furtherance of decisions in before court proceedings form the made the issues in the case which basis judgment. Court, .)” v. 178 Cal. 140 . . . In Berri v. Court (Stow Superior Superior stated, 43 P.2d “When the 8], Cal.2d 856 the court at 859 (1955) page [279 demurrer has been of dismissal has been sustained judgment entered, there has been a trial and the action is dismissal subject under section 583. ... has been said in a trial generally defining [1] [I]t fact; that it is the determination of an of law a demurrer of issue course calls for the determination of an law issue of only. (City of Court, Pasadena v. 212 Cal. 309 P. v. 968]; Superior O’Day Superior [298 Court, Cornwell, 18 Cal.2d P.2d Cal. 621]; 540 v. 90 49 Redington [116 [27 501; Co., P. v. M. 57 v. 40]; Comanche & M. Cal. Booth Tregambo County . Los 69 104 P.2d . .” 401]; Angeles, Cal.App.2d [158 Our v. Court Power Co. Supreme McDonough Superior Equipment 527, 330, Cal.3d 531 503 P.2d (1972) Court 8 page [105 “ stated, ... ‘trial’ we have said ‘that it is the determination of defining 856, (1955) of law or fact’ 43 Cal.2d 859 (Berri issue Court Superior P.2d or ‘the examination ... of the facts or law in issue in 8]) put [279 ’ 501, . . . . 57 Cal. (1881) cause v. Comanche M. and M. Co. (Tregambo 867, 505; (1959) see also Adams v. Court Cal.2d Superior [345 cited; and cases there 49 Cal.2d Simmonds Carney 466] P.2d 305]; Pasadena v. Court 212 Cal. City Superior P. 968]; Good State California, supra, Cal.App.2d 590-591; City Smith v. Los 301-302 Angeles, supra, cited.)” and cases there authorities, with these we hold that where a Consistently files which under law states no cause of complaint existing action, and a demurrer thereto is sustained without leave to general amend, and is entered thereon judgment fully finally disposing

862 a “trial” has taken trial to which litigation, place, only plaintiff entitled. we no other sense in which the Li Analytically court perceive could have used the word as relates to a case where contributory context, on the face of the In such-a negligence appears complaint. fully the trial courts follow expecting binding precedent (People Triggs 408, Witkin, 8 Cal.3d P.2d Cal. 232]; Cal.Rptr. 1971) Procedure ed. (2d 4578), life § Court Appeal, Supreme evidence, could not have trial contemplated including plaintiff’s full evidence, rebuttal, decision, defendant’s verdict or intended argument, for such an all-inclusive trial to Li would finally judgment; prior have been unless conducted maverick court impossible, refusing follow At some the trial court would have precedent. point, its resolved performed litigation adversely plaintiff by alia, Proc., such inter as directed 624), verdict (Code Civ. procedures, § Proc., nonsuit (Code 581c), Civ. under § Code of Civil judgment 631.8, Proc., Procedure section (Code 437c), Civ. summary judgment § Witkin, on the (4 Cal. judgment (2d 1971) Procedure ed. pleadings Trial, Without 161 et 2816). Proceedings These must seq., p. procedures trial, all be deemed to constitute a necessarily for the logically instant, reason that the law of the inescapable given has each of them received a full of his entire case before a exposition judicial tribunal, and a He disposition receives no less when his accordingly. fails to state a cause of complaint action and a demurrer thereto general is sustained. “cases in which trial using phrase has not final,” before the date this decision begun becomes Court Supreme doubtless had in mind the hundreds of in which the pending cases defense of was and which contributory were entitled pleaded, event; these, to trial in proceed as to (evidentiary hearing) any would or comparative would not negligence concept apply, depending whether “trial . . has . There was no intent to begun.” upset legally correct demurrer or other similar dispositions by on the ruling applicable law, court, since final as to the trial more than to long similar any upset results Co., trial. Li v. Yellow Cab following evidentiary does not apply. is affirmed. judgment

FRIEDMAN, view, P. J.I Acting dissent. The in err on majority, my (a) both basic on points: demurrer holding proceedings amounted to a “trial” within the of Li v. Yellow Cab Co. meaning 13 Cal.3d (b) refusing *17 of care to a retail seller owes his customer to that duty recognize liquor when the latter reached a drinks to the customer has refrain from selling of obvious intoxication. stage

I Vesely of our commences immediate history problem There the 486 P.2d 5 Cal.3d 153 Cal.Rptr. 151]. Sager [95 law of Business and California tort court considered impact upon That Code 25602. statute Professions section “Every person provides: furnished, sold, sells, furnishes, to be or who or causes given away, gives, drunkard or to habitual or common alcoholic any beverage any any is of a misdemeanor.” intoxicated obviously person guilty rule the common law In Court Vesely abrogated Supreme drunken sellers from for caused exempting injuries by liquor It held when he tavern negligent patrons. keeper presumptively 25602; third violates section held that the seller owes a of care to the intoxicated customer. The court persons injured by expressly abstained from whether the drunken recover for could deciding patron 157; his own 5 Cal.3d at see injuries. (Vesely Sager, supra, generally, Keenan, 5 Pacific L.J. (1974); Law Liquor Liability California, Santa Clara Law. 46 (1973); The Intoxicated Patron—A Silberberg, Care (1974) 20 McGill L.J. Reappraisal Duty have Since three California courts attempts rejected Vesely, appellate At a the drunken himself. to extend the rule of patron compensability two courts was a total bar to time when recovery, negligence contributory when on its face held that a exhibited negligence contributory complaint decedent, hence was it intoxication alleged plaintiff plaintiff’s Kanaywer (1972) 24 (Carlisle v. vulnerable demurrer. general 246]; 591-592 Goldberg Cal.Rptr. Sargent Cal.App.3d [101 held the A third court 300].) Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d [102 risk, his customer barred his by assumption specifically assumption fail to the risk “that the bartender recognize will'negligently v. National Railroad intoxicated condition.” drinker’s obviously (Cooper 541].) 393-394 (1975) 45 Cal.Rptr. Passenger Corp. the State three cases were followed These Supreme post- Vesely (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. Court’s seminal decision California 532 P.2d In Li the court abolished 858. law common doctrines negligence contributory interposed their of risk total barriers to recovery negligence. assumption the court established the place principle comparative negligence, which diminishes a negligent plaintiff’s recovery proportion force of his (Id., 828-829.) No does contributory negligence. longer when, face, fail to state a cause of action on its complaint portrays Such a is not vulnerable to contributorily negligent plaintiff. ouster from the but courts reduction of only proportionate damages. Thus, here, if v. Yellow Li Cab Co. the three applies Vesely post- decisions, drunken under now-discarded ousting plaintiffs contributory rules, of risk have their lost assumption precedential *18 force.

II Co., In Li v. Yellow Cab the Court accorded limited Supreme doctrine, to the new it to retroactivity comparative negligence confining cases in which “trial” after the date the Li became final. began opinion In the case the defendants’ demurrer was sustained present general without leave amend in 1974 and a of to. dismissal August judgment 1974, entered in seven months before the Li September approximately decision. This case was on at the time the of Li decision. pending appeal The that the on demurrer majority amount- opinion argues proceedings “trial,” ed ato such decisions as Power Co. citing McDonough Equipment Court 8 Cal.3d 531-532 Superior P.2d 1338],

The word “trial” be used inas to describe broadly, McDonough, merits, a decision the any on procedure reaching narrowly, the contest decision on factual issues. denoting Oil Co. (Superior Court 6 Cal.2d Whether a 950].) Superior hearing on demurrer constitutes a trial the individualized depends upon purpose of the Witkin, declaration in which the word (4 Cal. appears. Procedure, Trial, § p.

A series of leads to its erroneous misjudgments majority appraisal First, of the Li declaration of the Li was partial retroactivity. opinion Second, at this of this court ambiguous point. majority attempt resolve the resort to abstract definitions from other sources ambiguity by without to the individualized of Li regard declaration. purpose Third, the but statement Li majority quote ignore only opinion a clue to the Court’s intention. That statement supplying reads Supreme reflection, (13 829): Cal.3d at mature in view of the “Upon very substantial number of cases the matter here at issue which are involving state, in the trial of this now courts pending appellate attention to considerations of reliance to individual applicable particular reached, which have cases we litigation they according stage have concluded that a of limited should rule obtain here. retroactivity we hold be that the shall to all Accordingly present opinion applicable in which cases trial has not before the date this decision becomes begun final . . . ." can the issue be

Only decided rarely on contributory negligence demurrer; the issue must await the trial fact and the verdict usually Thus, of the contribu- jury. litigation” “stage disposes trial, issue tory negligence jury preliminary, easily on the “considerations reliance” reparable jousting pleadings. mentioned in Li revolve around the of evidence and its assemblage under then instructions current .the presentation jury shaped legal course, doctrines. Of Court holds to its own only Supreme key *19 context, utterance. that utterance I in believe that the cryptic Construing confined court the word to the “trial” trial of fact.

Ill Next, we arrive at the the left unanswered principal question, question in the tavern Vesely—is liable to customer who keeper civilly was served drinks while intoxicated? obviously considered the seller’s to a third

Vesely person injured by customer; drunken it found of care from the seller to the duty running decisions—Carlisle, third The Court of person. Vesely post- Appeal conduct, a bar Sargent Cooper—asserted plaintiff’s arising a bar has now been removed Li v. Cab Co. Yellow Aside from dicta, obiter none of the decisions into the existence Vesely post- inquired of a of care owed seller to customer. The is thus at duty question conclude that section 25602 is large. majority correctly designed the intoxicated with other members of the customer protect along public. Thus, I in the of the dictum Hitson v. join majority’s disapproval (1943) 807-808 P.2d As criminal Dwyer [143 25602 does not its hand until section stay licensing regulation, third It when the drunken customer is violated bartender injures party. intoxicated customer and sells him drinks. The statute sees obviously as well as the third customer’s party’s safety. designed guard

A statute the defendant’s conduct does not facto prohibiting ipso a rule civil A criminal becomes a rule of generate liability. prohibition civil because the law courts under common liability only principles (Alber standard. 66 Cal.2d Owens accept controlling 798-799 P.2d Carver 781]; Clinkscales v. Cal.2d As in 777].) is whether Vesely, prime question the defendant owes a of care to the The existence of duty injured person. (cid:127)a criminal the. defendant’s conduct is but one element statute-punishing in the of a perception duty. in a

My colleagues majority indulge subjective idiosyncratic First intoxicat approach duty problem. they place concededly scales, ed on their moral him find personal wanting him of willful misconduct on the face of the pronounce guilty pleadings and as a matter of law. him Having pushed beyond pale judicial solicitude, in a rationalization which culminates in they indulge seeming Evolution of the fault doctrine has not negation duty. comparative misconduct, reached the where a of willful point plaintiff, guilty recover (Li his loss from a defendant. v. Yellow part merely negligent Co., Cab 13Cal.3d at Once the find the 825-826.) majority patron misconduct, of willful their rationalization is a guilty superfluity. result, terms of the drunken customer and reward majority punish seller the latter from law-breaking liquor by immunizing sharing the loss. withhold it Disavowing judicial paternalism, they explicitly *20 the customer and extend it to the tavern The result silently keeper. of even-handed In of terms social hardly example justice. utility, utter represents disadvantage.

The rests on a of the function. majority approach usurpation jury misconduct, When a lawsuit turns on willful occurrence its is essentially fact, is, a of an issue for the and not for the court. question jury 456, 470, v. 475 (Reuther (1965) Viall 62 Cal.2d 398 P.2d Cal.Rptr. [42 Intoxication is but one of the should consider in 792].) factors jury (Sholar (1962) the of v. 211 issue willful misconduct. Barker determining 31, (1959) 34 v. 169 451]; Fuller Chambers Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. [27 602, 605 P.2d The cite not decision 848].) one Cal.App.2d majority [337 cathedra, for their ex ex arbitrio the drunken fastening pronouncement with willful misconduct ex se. per plaintiff proprio vigore The error of the willful is under- misconduct majority’s assumption scored decisions which refuse to find an intoxicated contribu-

867 of law. as a matter Los torily Ry. negligent (Emery Angeles Corp. 455, Pioche, 61 (1943) 112]; 461 P.2d Robinson v. Cal.App.2d [143 C.J.S., 460, 461; 143, (1855) & Co. 5 Cal. 65A Bayerque Negligence, 174; 1085, 17 1105-1108.) A.L.R.2d IV fault Li v. Yellow Cab Co. doctrine effectively comparative of the con factors the formulation of of rearranges pro affecting duty care. The of or shared loss prospect split plays profound role in the powerful duty analysis. doctrine, to current California fore reasonable

According care; initial, of harm is the of of court-determined test seeability duty decide, a series of factors moves the courts to aas secondarily, policy law, matter of whether to accord the protection particular plaintiff. 40, 468, General, (Weirum (1975) v. RKO 15 Inc. Cal.3d 46 Cal.Rptr. [123 382, 539 P.2d 36]; (1974) v. Bethlehem Steel 12 Cal.3d Rodriguez Corp. 765, P.2d Dillon 68 Cal.2d 669]; Cal.Rptr. Legg [115 739-741 A.L.R.3d 1316].) Cal.Rptr. School Paradise Dist. Raymond Unified this the of court sought capsulize array policy of “The considerations the care issue: social underlying utility arises, out of which the with risks activity injury compared conduct; involved in its kind of whom the actor is person care, of a rule of terms dealing; workability especially relative means parties’ ability practical injury; adopt preventing relative to bear the financial burden ability parties which the means loss be shifted or availability spread; of statutes and which color the body judicial precedents parties’ “effectof a rule case of a relationship; prophylactic liability; defendant, the extent of its role public agency imposed powers, *21 it the law and limitations it the imposed upon by budget; finally, moral which share with their fellow citizens—such imperatives judges are the a in the The factors role determination of play duty.” duty moral, factors have been into administrative and socio-economic grouped Ice, v. (1963) Home Fuel & Co. 59 Cal.2d categories. (Amaya Supply 309-315 P.2d in overruled on other 513], Cal.Rptr. grounds [29 Green, Dillon v. see The Problem in generally, Duty Legg, supra; 1014, (1929) (1928) 28 29 Colum.L.Rev. Cases Colum.L.Rev. Negligence 255.) a of of

Accidental is foreseeable result the sale reasonably least, At we drinks to one who is intoxicated. obviously already that would a find reasonable apprehend jury probably foreseeability.1 fault, In the moral blame attached a based compensation system upon Ice, conduct is thrown into the balance. Home (Amaya parties’ Bauer, 315; Co., 59 Cal.2d at see The Fuel & supra, Degree Supply p. of (1933) 81 as U.Pa.L.Rev. Moral Fault Liability Affecting Defendant’s did “rest 586). defense not The now-discarded contributory negligence of toward the idea the defendant relieved the that any duty upon [was] 417.) ed.) In the (4th on Torts (Prosser preliminary plaintiff.” p. the the could at that time focus court duty-of-care inquiry, If the too bore moral defendant’s responsibility, responsibility. plaintiff the moral blame Thus the would recovery. plaintiff’s likely deny jury of in the the defendant’s had little court’s duty. investigation significance the of for The could examine the defendant’s court safety responsibility for of little for the others with safety responsibility regard plaintiff’s self. a

In cases like this—where of finding plaintiff’s doctrine or eventuality—the comparative negligence frequent expected in to reduce the now recovery proportion jury plaintiff’s permits The of a for his his recovery prospect plaintiff’s responsibility. resis- encounters intoxication-caused expectable judicial-moral injuries conceal moral drunken tance. Some of the decisions disapproval when of doctrine.2 In the behind a veil contributory past, legal 1 An into of care those duty poses ultimately inquiry frequently questions paralleling James, Torts, 18.8, (2 1059-1061.) & Law of presented v. jury. Harper Wright 812], Arcade School Dist. we suggested factor, i.e., fact, that even as a was a of one for decision duty foreseeability, question was on a Richards 43 Cal.2d based suggestion passage Stanley jury. of This was cited Wright opinion recently phase approval Nevertheless, General, Inc., 15 Cal.3d 46. other Supreme Weirum v. RKO at supra, page factor, as is a Court have made apparent foreseeability, duty question decisions 741; court, (Dillon v. Amaya Cal.2d Legg, supra, p. for not determination. jury, Co., Ice, these & 59 Cal.2d at of Synthesis viewpoints Home Fuel Supply for determination of foreseeability lies that the court makes preliminary in recognition In the trial stage, for on demurrer. duty inquiry, example, purpose in the ultimate determination question ingredient becomes foreseeability jury . negligence. I that they with the veil. suggest the majority dispense respectfully 2 Mycolleagues That analysis. factor in factor is compounded moral misapprehend should reduce coloration an irreducible The judges personal scorn subjective praise. fault does not bend with visceral leanings appellate Liability minimum. western civilization. held interweaves with ethical *22 generally expectations it judges; defense, could judges privately negligence supplied complete appellate the drunken their moral by publicly charging satisfy predilections a matter of law.” The “as contributory negligence plaintiff route. To rule now blocks this escape negligence juridical comparative must for his own the drunken deliver safety responsibility plaintiff factor. faced as be duty-of-care squarely as well we moral of the may

In view expressions, majority’s subjective a cloak of writers conceal beneath what most bare opinion lay evaluation A force in the and “rules.” processes moving “reasoning” “innate sense of common law is court’s the substantive justice.”3 factor, are the courts moral blame as really “giving duty assessing (Bauer, law.” cit. that no real attention to which is op. part norms as 81 U.Pa.L.Rev. at responsibility Recognition p. identification of those norms. entails substructure of negligence liability civilization are of Western held ethical imperatives generally altruism, forces, between two characterized egoism opposition these forces and care others. The tension between care for self would do unto unto would the credo: “Do others as resolved you they context,- credo this uttered in appeals religious Although you.” law, finds into tort alike.4 and humanists Transported religionists simultaneous which addresses in a normative concept expression (1) that each assume demands to the forceful parties: equally that each assume (2) for his own responsibility safety, responsibility Torts', 463, b.) com. for the Rest.2d (See others. safety fulfillment of Real life forestall simultaneous situations frequently are in fulfillment these dual aims. frequently Compromise partial in the moral forces order. The doctrine places comparative rule of contribu- the traditional equilibrium by abrogating approximate which and immunized penalized guilty plaintiff tory negligence, defendant.5 that recognizes guilty Comparative negligence will be this not allow irresponsible; irresponsibility 12Cal.3d at 393. The role of “justice” v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra. 3 Rodriguez in Justice Cardozo’s decisional law was described initially in the evolution of “morality" (1921). on the appellate Judicial One noted commentator Nature of the Process seminal Law it as The Common describes “situation-sense.” (Llewellyn, process Tradition: Ames, Morals, 59-61.) in Law and reprinted See also. Deciding Appeals 1. Action page Jurisprudence ethics, altruism, (1972)). Britannica utilitarianism 4 See egoism, (Encyclopedia Co. describes the operation 5 Thusthe Li v. YellowCab “inequitable” opinion defense, “fails distribute responsibility former contributory negligence notions and all intelligent to all reason to fault” and “remains irresistible proportion *23 fault off scot-free. As in defendant to any comparative get irresponsible situation, is attainable here by forcing approximate equilibrium to share the defendant and the law-breaking plaintiff irresponsible Each and neither wins. loss. loses former’s which excoriates a formulation is shattered

The duty equilibrium the defendant from insulates for lack of self-responsibility, the whole and turns messy for others disgust responsibility a reason for rejecting business. To culpability assign plaintiff’s new of shared obstructs the defendant’s responsibility. concept duty blame, toward a of care When both bear moral duty negation parties defendant. exonerates culpable culpable plaintiff only

V does to limit his own The intoxicated consumption ability plaintiff’s a of care. The exclude him as the beneficiary duty necessarily Co. envis- Yellow Cab described in Li v. doctrine comparative negligence A of their loss. ions who recover a share plaintiff’s negligent plaintiffs aof not foreclose to his own does imposition safety ability guard did, no occasion for there would be the defendant. If it rule. comparative negligence initial drinker with or recreational be an occasional

The customer may drinker over his own impaired control consumption, problem His with no control. drinker ability prevent control or compulsive his not be obscured should assigning his drinking injury by limiting reaches the when he alcoholism.6 stage to the “disease” of Only plight drinks offend sale of defendant’s continued does the visible intoxication Whatever his (See ability original infra.) statutory prohibition. has reached that who has the bar stage control his patron drinking, harm. diminished ability prevent sharply 810-811.) counsels (13 against It states that “fundamental justice" fairness” Cal.3d 812-813.) (iii., this sort Frank bespeak expressions the old doctrine at pp.

retention of the new doctrine. the moral underpinnings sale to an liquor of section prohibiting involve that 6 Thiscase does not part sale to an obviously against but only prohibition drunkard" “habitual or common debate aroused by into the not entail entry ongoing does intoxicated inquiry person. legal as a a alcoholism classifying of alcoholics by to dilute responsibility proposals 88 S.Ct. only L.Ed.2d 1254. 392 U.S. In Powell v. Texas disease. (Sec as a disease. Jacobs alcoholism Court recognized of the federal Supreme minority Bel. Ins. Appeals Unemployment California be no there should implication the tavern 364].) keeper, In a action against thisAt of contributory negligence. bars finding alcoholism plaintiff's proof factor, not as as duty injury only ability prevent we evaluate plaintiff's juncture, his fault. a means of measuring *24 Balanced the intoxicated customer’s the blameworthiness is against blame moral to the tavern or his The attaching keeper employee. liquor business is “attended with to the thus danger community,” subject the close state. v. 137 Christensen U.S. regulation by (Crowley 620, 623-624, 91 L.Ed. S.Ct. 1 11 Sandelin v. Collins 13]; [34 Cal.2d 956].) A.L.R. The Alcoholic Beverage [33 Act Control the declares the welfare and protect safety purpose also, state; of the declares its involve in the people provisions highest economic, the social and moral and degree people’s well-being safety. Code, & Prof. (Bus. 23001.)

In section the its own normative indulges Legislature of the retailer who liquor profits by judgment, expressing disapproval all to his intoxicated customer. The drinks is selling obviously syndrome tavern, too familiar—the customer the staggers endangering and himself the of others. statistics demon- threatening safety Startling strate the drinker who his drives potential tragedy posed by tavern, automobile from his next toward destination.7 weaving factor, Viewed as a statute duty-of-care prohibitory expresses obverse of the for the of others. responsibility ethic—responsibility safety customer shields Denying recovery irresponsible irresponsible seller. Unless one cares in the sterilities of liquor indulge comparative and the moral cons are a dead heat. disapprobation, pros The facet several administrative denotes kindred duty inquiry elements—the need to relational tort boundaries on extensions of place and the tribunals in cases effectiveness fact-finding deciding Co., Ice, of the kind at v. hand. Home Fuel & (Amaya Supply supra, teaches, 310-313.) Cal.2d at As the is decision8 Palsgraf foreseeability itself on the Yet are inhibition there foreseeable liability. spread extensions, law, for which the risks of undue no permits apprehensive (See, Adams Southern Pac. Co. recovery. example, Transportation (1975) 50 216].) In this case the extension Vesely is court extended the problem simple. Sager, of care to a victim of the there violation. Here statutory privity between the tavern future a direct keeper plaintiff, physical economic nexus between the conduct defendant’s injury-producing intoxication. plaintiff’s injury-producing declares; 7 Arecent California statistical “Over all fatal compilation 40% of accidents all and 17.6%of accidents showed the . . accident . had been party causing (1974 of Fatal and drinking." Annual Motor Vehicle Report Injury Accidents. California Patrol, Highway (1928)248 8 Palsgraf Island R. Co. N.Y. 339 Long N.E. A.L.R. 99.59 The of courtroom be scrutinized problems proof jury efficacy may with the socio-economic simultaneously phase duty congeries—the care, of a rule of in the terms workability especially parties’ relative means of ability adopt practical preventing injury. standard of care is that Business and Professions proposed supplied by care, Code section 25602. The statute’s as a standard of appropriateness *25 breach, the kind of aimed to show or proof compliance jury’s efficacy in or breach—these can be measured finding compliance only by the statute as a rule of conduct. examining practicably expedient

VI intoxicated assumes statutory phrase obviously pivotal significance seller who to seeks with A the law. drinker liquor comply passes by somewhat from to mild imperceptible degrees sobriety tipsiness Short of blatant recognizable visual inebriety. displays, diagnosis through observation is difficult and uncertain. The establishment drinking may crowded, be its too to scrutinize individual employees customers. busy Refusal of service in the revels a delicate early patron’s poses problem customer relations. fault, v. establishes a rule of

Vesely or Sager liability a rule of strict or status Three decades section liability. ago was so construed as to make it a standard of practicably expedient conduct on the of a who wishes to part liquor dispenser comply law. It does not the seller to test his customer’s or to require sobriety check his The statute is aroused progress sobriety inebriety. only is, when the customer is intoxicated; obviously, visibly manifestly, if the customer or intoxicated and the seller visibly manifestly him, law, continues to serve the seller has violated the either because he because, failed to observe what was seen others or easily having observed, he that which was Johnson ignored apparent. (People 975-976 see 105]; also Supp. People Smith P.2d 98].) Cal.App.2d Supp.

Thus, decades, for the three section 25602 has past stood as a rule of conduct for practicable retailers. in law-abiding liquor Applied instructions to its jury conforming sec- long-established interpretation, tion 25602 does not make the seller an insurer of his liquor patrons’ neither does it sobriety demand safety; extraordinary vigilance. measure, Workable aas criminal and it is also workable as a regulatory civil rule of care. to decide created

A false issue is jury inability by postulating intoxication. The the line” of obvious the customer “over drink pushed in advance of well faculties be bar substantially impaired patron’s in a condition He himself or another that state. preliminary may injure Under those short of visible intoxication. of alcohol-induced impairment harm is no of each circumstances party’s ability prevent comparison When the customer 25602 is not activated. because section needed yet intoxication, as found of obvious has in fact reached by jury, stage care. to exercise he has diminished ability self-protective Johnson, is scrutinized When as section interpreted People care, instructions rule of the factors of proof, jury presumptive are are and clear-cut. Juries frequently jury capability manageable determine a called state particularly party’s sobriety, *26 Code, 23101, 23102.) In a (Veh. under the influence” cases. §§ “driving civil trial the are more difficult and the courtroom no damage problems sum, decisional no factors less questions explicit. “workability” toward a declaration of gravitate duty.

VII effect”) social of is a factor utility (“prophylactic potential liability 11,000 discernment. In California duty-of-care approximately licensed establishments hard on the dispense consumption liquor bottle; 14,000 a similar number hard over sell premises; by liquor on-sale and retail off-sale licensees are located in Los Angeles County alone.9 Available law enforcement and Alcoholic Control Beverage Sustained, can best.10 only sporadic personnel supply policing and effective control of these establishments criminal myriad through An tavern sanctions is absentee licensing virtually impossible. keeper statute, from his bartender’s chronic of disregard may reap profit of and himself from criminal claims ignorance shielding liability sanction, As a criminal and section licensing nonparticipation. In a civil

ineffectual to stem the tide of drink-caused traffic carnage. for the bartender’s action the tavern damage operator’s responsibility own breach would stimulate the of his energetic policing operator Control, Licenses Alcoholic Beverage Alcoholic Beverage 9 California of Department as of 1975. April notice, records, of which we take judicial Control Beverage of Alcoholic Department the calendar during year 333 accusations for violation of section reveal the filing the inference that These create figures inspection personnel 1974 and 249 1975. during with the rate of violation. and facilities are not able cope probable all establishment. extended to within Damage eligibility, protective silent, of section would steadfast deterrent scope supply statute’s violation. doubt, of care advocated this

Beyond any duty dissenting have a would effect California bars opinion profound sobering It would taverns. diminish the carefree flow of drinks to drunken to refuse them service and illicit patrons, compel dispensers' dry up revenues in those establishments the law. The habitually ignore issue in a lies choice between prime policy relatively free-wheeling trade and reduction in the rate of alcohol-induced liquor injuries deaths. The social of a of care utility strongly urges duty’s affirmation.

As to the relative to bear the financial burden of injury parties’ ability loss, and the of means to shift availability spread problem bears the features as are these general liability enterprise negligence the new rule shaped by comparative negligence. Ongoing experience in this area of would a basis.for provide computing liability insurance one the retail trade. premiums expenses liquor Because of the frequency contributory negligence, recovery settlement would be low to other varieties averages comparison enterprise damage payments.11

VIII The coloration lent the of American law decisional is diluted by body a of number state acts” the character and extent of by “dramshop fixing 11 Recent accounts declare that insurance newspaper carriers are liability imposing increased vastly premium rates on California tavern a owners as the consequence of Vesely claims The same reveal third-party accounts that emanating Sager. fears business; tavern some owners be forced out the alternatively, of drinks price must be raised. to customers as well third Liability injured would add to the persons the economic burden. If are increases based actual loss reported reported premium upon that fact reveals and lamentable If experience, the increases are widespread violations of section 25602/ not based loss a need are indicative of for upon experience, they inquiry the into the have rate-fixing insurance The witnessed the to the practices industry. past years and extension of doctrines tort without attention expansion reparations system. insurance medical liability corresponding Commerce have industry experienced liability increased costs, which are the As the by borne current ultimately consuming public. illustrates, increases, or insurance cost malpractice predicament justified result ultimately politico-economic which arouse unjustified, pressures legislative need, attention. The of the insurance not social rate-fixing practices industry, ongoing some Judicial new or finally generate renovations. extended legislative development doctrines thus forces far The fit liability beyond control. the courts must triggers judicial decisional law times as best they to executive changing may. leaving legislative the branches to burdens. business and the unwarranted financial protect community public against

875 64 A.L.R.2d (See civil Annots. seller’s liability. liquor 161-162) lists a 923.) Cal.3d (5 A.L.R.2d Vesely opinion which, have nullified number of decisional development, jurisdictions A few law rule of to states the common third-party plaintiffs. nonliability law rule in have a to adhere to common its manifested disposition a have (See 54 A.L.R.2d Other courts statute entirety. recognized to a sales or administrative “visibly regulation prohibiting liquor which makes tavern intoxicated” as the source of a duty person (3d (Galvin v. liable to the himself. patron Jennings keeper civilly injured Ramsey v. 1961) law); Anctil Cir. 289 F.2d 15 New Jersey (applying Inc. 900]; 106 N.H. A.2d Soronen Olde (1965) Inn. [211 Milford Hotel N.J. 582 A.2d v. Brodhead 630]; Majors [218 Alaska, also, 1973) (D. Pa. 265 A.2d Vance v. United States 873]; see statute). Alaska (based F.Supp. the states A be attacked. collateral should Among recognizing problem intoxicated common law seller’s patron, visibly liquor two, is New hold that contributory negligence Jersey Pennsylvania, the entire loss seller bears defense.12 those states liquor restriction; customer bears caused his violation of the sales liquor the,defense a rule none. decisions are These withholding grounded upon where defendant’s consists contributory negligence their a statute a class violation of against protect persons adopted rule has been followed in own themselves. A inability protect parallel (1965) 235 child labor v. Hamilton California case. (Boyles Torts, 483, c.) see com. 399]; 496-498 Rest.2d available defeat diminish Whether is contributory negligence If statute’s violation purpose. recovery statutory depends upon care for to establish a standard of the statute ordinary merely designed risk, plaintiff’s contributory against protection plaintiff’s *28 asserted; the be if statute persons designed protect negligence may Owens, 66 (Alter it not. v. in a state of supra, personal helplessness, 797-798; Hamilton, at v. 235 Cal.2d Cal.App.2d pp. supra, Boyles pp. 2973-2974; Torts, Law, Witkin, 496-497; Cal. 4 of pp. Summary 425-426; Palm Hotel ed.) see v. Lone (4th Prosser on Torts pp. Haft 756, 770, 465].) P.2d Child 3 14 478 Cal.3d fn. Hamilton, v. (Boyles the latter kind of statute. labor laws exemplify supra.) Inc., Inn, v. Majors A.2d at Brodhead 634-636: supra, pp. 12 Soronen Olde Milford

Hotel, holds a tavern A.2d at A third New Hampshire, keeper 876. state. supra, p. assert as a the intoxicated customer’s contributory negligence liable but him to permits Anctil, 901-902.) (Ramsey A.2d at defense. of the Exclusion defense is not contributory negligence compatible with the in an affirmation of It analysis culminating duty. profoundly Here, the disturbs of factors. their has been array policy analysis influenced the new California significantly comparative negligence doctrine. That doctrine seller to bear permits liquor buyer liquor to the share of fault each damages proportioned imputed jury. The rule here serves two each damage policy proportioned objectives, an affirmation of with the supporting duty. Consistently principle should own it reasonable to his every person pay regard safety,13 permits loss on intoxicated customer. jury impose part deterrent to the seller’s violation Simultaneously, provides practical the Alcoholic Act. The of Control division of Beverage damages of the customer establishes To equilibrium responsibility. exempt from share of loss of destroys responsibility. equilibrium defense from The rule which removes the negligence contributory which in an environment violation cases was born certain statutory The new as a defense. featured complete contributory negligence demand its reexamina doctrine may ultimately comparative negligence of tion. A of unavailability contributory negligence plus presumption of strict or status the virtual would accomplish equivalent Mula v. (See Meyer liability. fault, was the of The tavern

107].) Vesely negligence, gravamen keeper’s the area of Here we need do no more than enlarge Sager. negligence liability. Veselyrecognized springboard is not immunization from contributory negligence plaintiff's Code and Professions to achieve the Business objective necessary commences his 25602. The customer section usually progress liquor In the trial of case in state toward sobriety. plaintiff’s the defendant’s violation of seeks to duty by portraying attorney prove intoxication. The drift into the condition of obvious his client’s statutory to a effective his his client’s more finding greater exposure portrayal, difficult in which the It is case contributory imagine negligence. would not be able to draw an inference of contributory negligence jury drunk, conduct after he his plaintiff’s getting regardless drunk. In the became his toward obvious early stage progression intoxication, is not bereft of the to exercise ability *29 care. At that he is outside the statute’s stage self-protective protective Witkin, 463, b; Second, Torts, Summary comment section 13 Restatement Torts, Law, 2969. section page California Thus the does call for exclusion statute contributory scope. negligence. view, factors calls for an and balance my analysis policy I care. would reverse

affirmative declaration of defendants’ and direct the trial court to overrule the demurrer general judgment defendants Kauffman. denied A for a was May appellant’s rehearing petition June 1976. Court denied for a was hearing by Supreme petition

Case Details

Case Name: Kindt v. Kauffman
Court Name: California Court of Appeal
Date Published: Apr 29, 1976
Citation: 129 Cal. Rptr. 603
Docket Number: Civ. 14800
Court Abbreviation: Cal. Ct. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.