41 A.2d 436 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1944
Argued October 26, 1944. During 1943, and before, appellant held a retail liquor license in East St. Clair Township, Bedford County. On September 14, 1943, at a special election under the Liquor Control Act of June 16, 1937, P.L. 1762, § 501, 47 P. S. § 744-501, the electors of the township voted against the granting of liquor licenses in that territory. The Liquor Control Board, solely because the district had thus become dry, refused to issue a license to appellant for 1944. She appealed to the court below, where appellees were permitted to intervene, and there she raised the sole question whether the notice of the special election was timely and sufficient. That court dismissed her appeal, and she brought her case here.
Following the cited Act, the special election was held on the date of the primary election. The only notice of the special election was contained in the county commissioners' proclamation of the primary election which was published twice a week in two newspapers about seven weeks before the election. After announcing the date of the primary, and that the election for the nomination of candidates for designated county and township officers would be held at the usual polling places, the proclamation continued: "The Question of Local Option in the following Boroughs and Townships is also to be voted on at the coming Primary, both as regards Liquor and Malt Beverages in each instance: Bedford Borough, Bedford Township, East St. Clair Township, Everett Borough, Hyndman Borough, and Napier Township." No other or further notice was published, and, relying uponHarper Appeal,
The court below distinguished the Harper case, because in that case there was an entire failure to give notice, the primary election proclamation containing only a provisional notice of possible local option referenda without naming townships or municipalities, while in this case the proclamation did constitute a specific and positive notice of the fact that elections would be held in certain designated districts. It also distinguished Kittanning Country Club's Liquor License Case,
However that may be, our power to determine the merits of the controversy has been foreclosed by appellees' successful challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court. The Liquor Control Act, supra, § 404, 47 P. S. § 744-404, provides for appeals to the court of quarter sessions from the refusal of the board to grant, renew or transfer a liquor license and further provides: "The court shall hear the application de novo at such time as it shall fix, of which notice shall be given to the board. The court shall either sustain the refusal of the board or order the issuance of the license to the applicant. There shall be no further appeal."
(Italics supplied). Following Grime v. Department of PublicInstruction, *62
Confining our decision to the realm of our legal competence, we have examined the record and have found that the court below possessed jurisdiction and that the proceedings therein were regular.
Appeal dismissed.