Kimmel v. PetersonKimmel v. Peterson
*479 MEMORANDUM
Various defendants have filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint in this action. For the reasons which follow, their motions shall be granted in part and denied in part.
This now complex securities fraud case had rather humble beginnings. On June 25, 1982, Murray Kimmel filed a four page, two count complaint against John Peterson, alleging a violation of section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 and common law fraud. However, this relative simplicity was short-lived. On September 10, 1982, an amended complaint was filed. Dr. Kimmel was joined by four other plaintiffs — his wife and children — in suing sixteen defendants. The amended complaint, stretching some thirty four pages, contains twelve counts which allege violations of sections 11, 12(2), 15 and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
I. FACTS
Taking as true the well-pled allegations in the complaint, as I must on a motion to dismiss, 1 the factual scenario giving rise to this litigation may be summarized as follows. Dr. Kimmel responded to an advertisement in a financial journal placed by Muir, an investment banking and brokerage firm. 2 He was contacted by defendant Peterson, one of Muir’s brokers, and Dirks, a partner in and manager of Muir. Kimmel related that he had a thriving medical practice and wanted to make some prudent investments. As a busy physician, he had little time to follow the wanderings of the stock market. Therefore, he needed a broker upon whom he could rely heavily to choose investments. He emphasized that although he was seeking investments which would be profitable, they must be safe. Peterson and Dirks detailed their expertise in the area and assured him that all investments chosen would be thoroughly investigated to ensure their safety.
The fraudulent activities alleged fall into two related categories. The first involves the types of securities purchased by defendants. Despite Kimmel’s admonitions, Peterson acquired highly speculative stock for the account. Many of the high risk purchases were new issues underwritten by Muir. Kimmel was often consulted and urged to purchase these securities on the basis of insufficient, false or misleading information. The prospectuses contained similarly deficient information, causing artificial overvaluation and thus manipulation of the market for these securities. In addition, Kimmel was advised to increase his holdings by purchasing stock on margin, without being apprised of the accompanying risks. In essence, Dirks and Peterson actively ignored Kimmel’s wishes, utilizing his money to inure to the benefit of Muir.
The second category of alleged fraudulent transactions relates to the evolution of the relationship between Kimmel and Muir. On the advice of Peterson and Dirks, Kimmel became a subordinated creditor of Muir. Defendants continually tried to convince him that Muir was a safe investment, pointing to its famous general partners, such as Mario Andretti, Jimmy Connors and John Denver. When Peterson invited the Kimmel family to the Montreal Grand Prix, Mario Andretti was introduced as a general partner of Muir and did not protest or deny *480 the title. 3 Thereafter, Peterson and Dirks tried to persuade Kimmel to increase his holdings in Muir, again representing it to be a safe investment. This time, Kimmel became a limited partner with an investment of an additional $200,000. However, defendants did not disclose the risks inherent in this investment or the fact that Muir was fast becoming a vehicle for the underwriting of speculative new issues. The complaint further alleges a course of fraudulent conduct surrounding Kimmel’s partnership interest in Muir, all .revolving about the non-disclosure of crucial information on the firm’s financial health. For example, it is alleged that a financial statement misrepresented Muir’s status by failing to reflect the overvaluation of the new issues. An increased investment of $450,000.00 which was to be applied to Kimmel’s subordinated loan was, without his knowledge, used to increase his partnership interest. Unfavorable publicity caused Kimmel to once again inquire into the safety of his investments. Even after Muir had called in the Securities and Exchange Commission, Peterson still insisted that all investments were safe. On August 17, 1981, Muir closed and a trustee was appointed. It was only then that Peterson advised Kimmel to remove his investments from Muir. However, by that point, he was unable to save his investments. Both Dirks and Peterson promised to reimburse Kimmel for part of his losses; however, both refused to put that promise in writing or honor it.
Although Peterson and Dirks allegedly were principally responsible for these events, many Muir associates and affiliates were also implicated. As a result of defendants’ activities, the Kimmels lost their life savings and allegedly suffered tremendous mental anguish. In addition, the funds earmarked for their children’s educations were lost. 4
Peterson moves to dismiss, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. In support of his motion, he raises four grounds: (1) the entire complaint lacks adequate specificity; (2) there is no private right of action under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933; (3) the RICO count should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and (4) the count claiming infliction of emotional distress should also be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Raymond and Jessie Dirks move to dismiss, relying upon the grounds and arguments offered by Peterson. Mario Andretti also moves to dismiss for failure of the amended complaint to state a cause of action against him.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Overall Specificity
Peterson argues that the complaint lacks the specificity required under
After reviewing the amended complaint, I conclude that the dictates of
From a practical standpoint, defendants have access to all of the records of the
*482
transactions and can glean from them the information needed to respond. It is unclear whether plaintiffs have access to such detailed information and a plaintiff should not be precluded from suing if he or she does not. Fundamentally, although
As regards the allegations surrounding the loans to and interest in Muir, their specificity is sufficient. The complaint sets out dates, the sums lent, the express representations made by defendants and why those representations were fraudulent.
Generally, allegations plead on “information and belief” do not satisfy the specificity requirements of
B. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
Plaintiffs’ complaint contains a count brought under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
A majority of the courts which have implied a private right of action under section 17(a) have done so with little discussion or analysis. In the first case to imply a private remedy,
Osborne v. Mallory,
*484
Before embarking on the familiar
Cort v. Ash,
Until recently, section 10(b) was an extremely broad remedy — lacking the internal restrictions found in the express remedy provisions.
8
The judicially evolved cause of action was even being utilized as a vehicle for the redress of breaches of state-created fiduciary duties.
See Superintendent of Insurance,
Section 17(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
In determining whether to imply a private right of action, the touchstone is Congressional intent — “not whether this court thinks it can improve upon that statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.”
Touche-Ross & Co. v. Redington,
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,” — that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And *486 finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
By proscribing fraudulent activities in the offer or sale of securities, section 17(a) was obviously enacted to prevent fraud, thus protecting potential victims.
Accord Hill v. Der,
The second factor under
Cort
is whether there is any legislative intent to create or deny a cause of action. The legislative history of the 1933 Act indicates that sections 11 and 12 were perceived as the only civil liability provisions of the statute.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
Interestingly, the language of section 17(a) is very similar to section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, a provision under which the Supreme Court refused to imply a private right of action.
See Transamerica,
Nor is the third prong of
Cort
met, which requires consistency with the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme. In
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,
In light of the foregoing conclusions respecting the first three parts of the Cort test, analysis of the fourth and least important element is not necessary. Being convinced that Congress did not intend section 17(a) to be used as a private remedy, I must respect that intent. 15 Hence, the count of the complaint purporting to assert a claim thereunder shall be dismissed.
C. THE RICO COUNT
Defendants move to dismiss Count VI of the amended complaint which asserts a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (“RICO”),
1. The Statute
RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of October 15, 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). It represents the culmination of two decades of inquiry into potential solutions to the pervasive problem of organized crime. 16 The statute was envisaged as a much needed weapon with which to battle organized crime’s infiltration into legitimate business. As Congress stated in its findings:
*489 The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Pub.L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, title IX § 1 (1970). The result is a sweeping statute with a whole panoply of procedural tools to aid law enforcement officials, as well as a civil treble damage provision.
Under RICO, engaging in a “pattern of racketeering” within the confines of an “enterprise” becomes an offense separate from the predicate violations. To understand the structural mechanism of RICO, some definitions are in order. Section 1961(1) defines “racketeering activity” as specified state law offenses punishable by incarceration for more than one year, as well as any violation of a long list of federal statutes. A “pattern of racketeering activity” is defined as the commission of at least two predicate acts within ten years.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity of the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activi *490 ty or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or. indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
In addition to criminal remedies, RICO provides a private right of action for “any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
2. Connection With Organized Crime
Resting on RICO’s articulated purpose, defendants argue that the failure of the complaint to allege any link to organized crime is fatal to plaintiffs’ claim. Citing
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
Congress clearly intended RICO to be applicable in the securities fraud area in certain situations as one of the predicate offenses listed is “fraud in the sale of securities.”
At the outset, I note that the statute does not use the term “organized crime” or attempt to define that nebulous concept. According to the legislative history, this was a conscious decision by Congress. Fashioning a definition was recognized as a difficult task which would be of dubious benefit. See, e.g., 116 Cong.Rec. 35,204-206 (Oct. 6, 1970); 116 Cong.Rec. 35, 343-345 (Oct. 7, 1970). For example, an amendment was proposed that would have made the mere membership in La Cosa Nostra an offense. 116 Cong.Rec. 35,343 (Oct. 7, 1970) (Rep. Biaggi). This was rejected as overly narrow and potentially unconstitutional. Id. at 35,344-346. However, the topic of the scope of the statute was hotly debated throughout the Congressional hearings. As Professor Blakey noted, during the 1970 House hearings, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York criticized the proposed Title IX as reaching beyond the scope of organized crime. See Blakey, supra note 16 at 272-73. A report issued by that body lambasted the addition of certain offenses, including securities fraud cases. 18 Relating to the Control of Organized Crime in the *492 United States: Hearings on S.30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm, on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 329 (1970) (emphasis added). The report stated:
[WJithin the definition of ‘racketeering activity’ is ‘fraud in the sale of securities.’ Against the background of expanding securities regulation, this definition could include the various officers, directors, and employees of corporations and underwriters of securities who have been found guilty of fraud in the sale of securities in some of the recent Rule 10(b)5 cases. Fraud in the sale of securities is simply not synonymous with racketeering activity-
Relating to the Control of Organized Crime in the United States: Hearings on S.30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm, on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 401 (1970). Thus, RICO’s reach beyond the talismanic “organized crime” into the field of securities fraud was well recognized by the Congress. Yet,
In addition, many of the Congressmen verbally recognized that RICO was not intended to be so limited. Representative Poff stated that “the concept of organized criminal activity is broader in scope than the concept of organized crime; it is meant to include any criminal activity collectively undertaken .... ” 116 Cong.Rec. 35,293 (October 7, 1970). Senator McClellan remarked:
the curious objection has been raised to S.30 as a whole, and to several of its provisions in particular, that they are not somehow limited to organized crime itself ... as if organized crime were a precise and operative legal concept like murder, rape or robbery. Actually, of course, it is a functional concept like white collar crime, serving simply as a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying group of criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances.
116 Cong.Rec. 18,913 (June 9, 1970). These comments illustrate not only recognition of the broad scope of the statute, but they also point up some of the practical problems which would ensue, were RICO limited to “organized crime.” For example, it would not be easy for a putative plaintiff to
prove
a defendant’s affiliation with a certain organization. If it were easy enough for a private plaintiff to prove, then RICO would probably not have been necessary in the first instance.
See e.g., Hanna Mining,
1982 Fed.Sec.L.Rep. ¶ 98,742 at 93,736-37. This burden of proof might well emasculate the private remedy provision.
See Mauriber,
In light of Congress’s recognition of RICO’s broad scope, the refusal to omit such offenses as securities fraud from the list of predicate acts and in light of the liberal construction mandate, I conclude that a link to organized crime is not a requirement of a civil RICO cause of action. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground is therefore denied.
3. Causation
In order to collect treble damages under
The concept of competitive or commercial injury is one borrowed from the field of antitrust. Although the courts requiring it have failed to define it, apparently it involves injury to plaintiffs’ ability to compete. The court in
Landmark,
allegedly eschewing a competitive injury requirement, defined, by way of illustration, the concept of a “racketeering enterprise injury.”
Borrowing antitrust concepts for application in the civil RICO context has a great deal of support in the legislative history. RICO was intended to combat the threat to the free market system posed by racketeer infiltration of legitimate business. Indeed, the antitrust laws were a model for RICO’s civil provisions. Senator Hruska, in introducing a version of the civil statute noted:
Patterned closely after the Sherman Act, it provides for private treble damage suits, prospective injunctive relief, unlimited discovery procedures and all the other devices which bring to bear the full panoply of our antitrust machinery in aid of the businessman competing with organized crime.
The bill is innovative in the sense that it vitalizes procedures which have been tried and proven in the antitrust field and applies them where they have been seldom used before.
115 Cong.Rec. 6993 (March 20, 1969).
However, there is a limit upon what translates well from the antitrust genre to organized crime. The American Bar Association rejected a proposal for amending the Sherman Act to provide a civil RICO remedy, preferring instead separate statutes. The Report of the Antitrust Division of the American Bar Association noted that “[b]y placing the antitrust-type enforcement and discovery procedures in a separate statute, [from the antitrust statutes] a commingling of criminal enforcement goals with the goals of regulating competition is avoided.” 115 Cong.Rec. at 6995 (emphasis added). The Report went on to say:
[O]n the other hand, by inserting in the Sherman Act a provision which does not have as its primary objective the establishment or maintenance of free competition, may result in an undesirable blending of otherwise laudatory statutory objectives. Criminal conduct which violates existing antitrust laws can be proceeded against under those laws. Additional conduct sought to be reached should be attacked under separate legislation. Moreover, the use of antitrust laws themselves as a vehicle for combating organized crime could create inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of persons injured by organized crime who might seek treble damage recovery. Such a private litigant would have to contend with a body of precedent — appro priate in a purely antitrust context — set ting strict requirements on questions such as “standing to sue” and “proximate cause.”
115 Cong.Rec. at 6995 (emphasis added). This recommendation, which was adopted, recognized as inappropriate the application of the antitrust commercial injury-standing requirement in the RICO context. The court in
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,
observed that
The American Bar Association Report also points up the different policies underpinning the antitrust and organized crime laws. The Eighth Circuit noted this policy-distinction, stating that “although RICO borrowed the tools of antitrust law to combat organized criminal activity .... Congress did not see the objectives of RICO and the antitrust laws as coterminous.”
Bennett v. Berg,
Finally, reading a competitive injury requirement into
Given the legislative history and statutory objectives, I conclude that RICO does not require proof of a commercial or competitive injury. As the Seventh Circuit recently observed: “RICO was broadly aimed at ‘striking ... a mortal blow against the property interests of organized crime.’ This court is reluctant to undermine that broad mission of RICO by en-grafting onto its civil provisions a competitive injury requirement.”
Schacht,
at 1357-58 slip op. at 29 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ allegations that their monetary losses were a result of defendants’ innumerable acts of securities fraud are sufficient to state a cause of action under
4. Collapse of “Enterprise” Into Predicate Acts
Defendants claim that the amended complaint must be dismissed for failure to allege an “enterprise” separate and distinct from the “pattern of racketeering.” Muir is undistinguishable from the alleged acts of securities fraud, they contend, pointing to language in the complaint to the effect that defendants were “transforming the nature of the firm into a vehicle for underwriting speculative new issues.” (Complaint at ¶ 29). This argument misperceives the nature of both the law and the facts, as set forth in the amended complaint.
Defendants are correct in insisting that a RICO plaintiff must prove the existence of both an “enterprise” and a “pattern
*496
of racketeering activity.” As the United States Supreme Court observed; “[t]he ‘enterprise’ is not the ‘pattern of racketeering activity;’ it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must be proven.”
United States v. Turkette,
The enterprise alleged by plaintiffs is the partnership Muir. The statute specifically mentions a “partnership” as an appropriate entity for an enterprise. 25 The pattern alleged is an ongoing scheme of securities fraud, perpetrated by defendants, who are affiliated in various ways with Muir. However, Muir has an existence distinct from this pattern of fraud. Even though the complaint alleges that defendants were transforming Muir into a vehicle for the underwriting of speculative issues, it is also alleged that Muir was a brokerage and investment banking firm until it went into receivership in August of 1981. (Complaint at ¶ 5). As such, it still rendered services to its customers apart from the alleged acts of fraud.
The Eighth Circuit rejected a remarkably similar argument in
Bennett v. Berg,
In support of their position, defendants cite
United States v. Lemm,
The arson ring, through hand-delivery of insurance claims, could have conducted its activities without any predicate acts of mail fraud. In other words, if we eliminate for purposes of argument the predicate acts of mail fraud, the evidence still shows an on-going structure which engaged in legitimate purchases and repairs of property as well as acts of arson.
Id. at 1201. Similarly, if the predicate acts of securities fraud were eliminated, Muir still had an on-going structure as a brokerage house. Moreover, despite the Lemm court’s distinction, defendants’ link to one another was only the perpetration of arson. Here, defendants are linked through a separate, legitimate business. Thus, I conclude that Muir was an enterprise distinct from the alleged securities fraud. Defendants’ motion is therefore denied.
5.
Defendants’ final RICO argument involves plaintiffs’ failure to adequately allege a violation of
D. INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Count XI of the amended complaint purports to set out a claim for infliction of emotional distress, alleging that plaintiffs suffered significant mental and physical trauma as a result of defendants acts and that defendants knew or should have known that this would occur. Defendants move to dismiss this count, asserting that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action for either negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
At the outset, I note that it is not altogether clear whether plaintiffs are claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress. Although the count is labeled simply “infliction of emotional distress,” the averment that defendants knew or should have known the results of their conduct bespeaks intentional action. In addition, plaintiffs responded to defendants’ motion only on the intentional infliction issue, rendering unopposed defendants’ motion on the negligent infliction issue. However, in the event that plaintiffs did intend to allege negligent infliction as well, I must agree with defendants that no cause of action has been established. Giving plaintiffs’ factual allegations the most expansive reading possible, this case simply does not rise to the
*498
level of negligent infliction of mental distress.
See, e.g., Niederman
v.
Brodsky,
With respect to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendants argue that the alleged behavior does not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous” conduct. Plaintiffs contend that whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous is a factual question for the jury to decide. Viewing all factual allegations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, I conclude that plaintiffs’ complaint fails to establish outrageous conduct as a matter of law.
Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the intentional infliction of emotional distress as follows:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965). Although Pennsylvania has apparently adopted the Restatement formulation
sub silentio, see D’Ambrosio
v.
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co.,
Only in very extraordinary cases have plaintiffs been held to state a cause of action under this tort. In
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club,
These egregious situations must be compared with those cases denying a cause of action for intentional infliction. In
Mullen v. Suchko,
Although this case does not fall neatly into either category, it most certainly is closer to the latter cases than the former. Plaintiffs strenuously argue that this is not a “garden variety” securities fraud case, but rather a course of fraudulent conduct perpetrated by a trusted advisor. However, that does not mean that the case rises to the level of outrageous conduct. It involves the mere loss of money, not the more personal loss of a life or health as in Papieves or Chuy. Comment (d) to section 46 indicates:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the action, and lead him to exclaim “outrageous.”
This case simply does not fit the above description and Count XI shall be dismissed. 29 To hold' otherwise would transform every sophisticated confidence scheme into an action for intentional infliction of mental distress in clear derogation of the narrow scope accorded' this tort by the Pennsylvania courts.
E. AIDING AND ABETTING
Defendant Mario Andretti moves to dismiss those counts of the amended complaint which attempt to characterize him as a participant in this securities fraud scheme. According to the amended complaint, Andretti’s only involvement surrounds his introduction to the Kimmels during the Montreal Grand Prix in September of 1979. Dirks introduced Andretti as one of Muir’s general partners at a party and “Andretti gave plaintiffs no reason to believe he was not a General Partner.” Amended Complaint at ¶ 28. Andretti is apparently only a limited, rather than, general, partner. This is the sole allegation against Andretti, with the exception of plaintiff’s assertion that his conduct constitutes “aiding and abetting.”
Defendant cites several grounds for his motion, some of which rely on extraneous evidence, reference to which would require me to treat this as a motion for summary judgment. Since I can dispose of this issue *500 on the face of the complaint itself, I will not refer to this extraneous material. 30
In order to establish a claim of aiding and abetting in this Circuit, the plaintiff must satisfy a tripartite test. The plaintiff must allege and prove that (1) there was an underlying violation of the securities laws; (2) that the aider-abettor had knowledge of the violation and (3) that the aider-abettor “knowingly and substantially participated in the wrongdoing.”
Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc.,
I will assume for purposes of this motion that an underlying violation of the securities laws has been established, thus satisfying the first prong. However, the complaint fails to allege that Andretti had any knowledge of the web of fraud allegedly woven by the other defendants. This violates the Third Circuit’s directive that an aider-abettor have “conscious involvement in impropriety or constructive notice of intended impropriety” or even a “general awareness that his role was part of- an overall activity that is improper.”
Monsen,
In addition, the amended complaint fails to satisfy the final prong of the test. Substantial assistance or participation is required to establish liability as an aider-abettor. The
Monsen
court noted that mere inaction without conscious participation does not rise to the level of aiding and abetting.
Notes
.
See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County,
. Muir was a limited partnership which, according to the complaint, went into receivership in August of 1981. Amended Complaint ¶5. _
. During the period involved, from the summer of 1978 until 1981, Peterson and his associate Nancy Rochford, regularly entertained Dr. and Mrs. Kimmel to further cement their relationship of trust.
. Defendants’ had also convinced the Kimmels to make their children subordinated creditors of Muir as well.
. The Ninth Circuit eschewed an overly stringent reading of
Defendants say that an allegation that they knew that the representations were false is not the equivalent of an allegation that they were false. How could defendants know that they were false if they were not false? We had thought that this kind of nit-picking had disappeared in 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first adopted.
. Of the courts of appeal to address the issue, four have implied a private right of action,
see Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd.,
. The trend away from implying private remedies can be witnessed outside the securities area.
See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n,
. For example, sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act are subject to the statute of limitations contained in section 13. As an implied cause of action, there is no statutory statute of limitations for actions brought under section 10(b). The most nearly analogous state statute applies, which is often longer than the period found in section 13.
. By its very language, section 17(a) is broader than section 10(b), as it encompasses fraud in the “offer” or “sale” of securities, rather than just fraud in the purchase or sale.
. In
Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston,-U.S.-,
. Many lower courts have developed interesting solutions to this perceived procedural escapism.
See, e.g., Feldman v. Simkins Industries, Inc.,
. In
Landry,
the Fifth Circuit found the first prong of
Cort
wanting, as “the statutory language does not suggest a private cause of action.”
. Section 13 is the statute of limitations section that applies to sections 11 and 12. See note 8 supra. Professor Loss notes that to allow an implied cause of action 17(a) would be “to attribute to Congress the rather elaborate intention that a purchaser may avoid the statute of limitations prescribed in § 13, as well as the possibility of having to post security for costs and perhaps the necessity of proving his *487 own lack of knowledge of the falsity as in § 12(2) ...” 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation at 1786 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
. While discussing the propriety of implying a private remedy under section 10(b), Professor Loss explained the interrelationship of all of the statutory provisions:
The question is simply whether there is the same justification for implying such liability under the 1933 act as there is under the 1934 act. It is one thing to imply a private right of action under § 10(b) or the other provisions of the 1934 act, because the specific liabilities created by §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18 do not cover all the variegated activities with which that act is concerned. But it is quite another thing to add an implied remedy under § 17(a) of the 1933 act to the detailed remedies specifically created by §§ 11 and 12. The 1933 act is a much narrower statute. It deals only with disclosure and fraud in the sale of securities. It has but two important substantive provisions, §§ 5 and 17(a). Non-compliance with § 5 results in civil liability under § 12(1). Faulty compliance results in liability under § 11 and § 17(a) has its counterpart in § 12(2). It all makes a rather neat pattern. Within the area of §§ 5 and 17(a), §§ 11 and 12 (unlike §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18 of the 1934 act) are all embracing. This is not to say that the remedies afforded by §§ 11 and 12 are complete. But the very restrictions contained in those sections and the differences between them — for example, the fact that § 11 but not § 12 imposes liability on certain persons connected with the issuer without regard to their participation in the offering and the fact that § 12(2) does not go so far in relation to § 17(a) and § 12(1) goes in relation to § 5 — make it seem the less justifiable to permit plaintiffs to circumvent the limitations of § 12 by resort to § 17(a). Particularly is this so in view of the fact that § 11, together with the statute of limitations in § 13, was actually tightened in the 1934 amendments to the Securities Act.
Loss at 1785.
. Many of the same arguments could be made as regards the implication of a private right under section 10(b). The arguments would not be as persuasive, however. As Professor Loss pointed out, the express remedies in the 1934 Act are not as broad as in the 1933 Act.
See
note 14
supra.
Thus, there is arguably more need for a private action under section 10(b). The fact that a private right of action has been implied thereunder is not a determining factor. As noted earlier, the section 10(b) right of action was essentially thrust on the Supreme Court, which like many of the lower federal courts, accepted its existence without much analysis.
See Redington,
. The infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business was isolated by the Kefauver Committee as early as 1951. The McClellan Committee documented the infiltration of labor unions and the existence of “La Cosa Nostra.” The problem' was also studied in 1967 by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. See generally, Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts — Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 Temp. L.Q. 1009, 1014-15 (1980). For an exhaustive legislative history of RICO, see Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 Notre Dame L.Rev. 237, 249-80 (1982). [Hereinafter cited as Blakey].
. Criminal decisions on this issue should have the same precedential import as civil rulings.
See Eaby, et al. v. Richmond, et al.,
. The Bar Association Report stated:
On the one hand, the crimes listed as “racketeering activity” include several categories which are plainly beyond the intention of the Senate Committee, as expressed in the Report, and which should not, in our view, be subjected to the severe penalties of Title IX. The Senate Report states: “ ‘Racketeering activity’ is defined in terms of specific State and Federal criminal statutes now characteristically violated by members of organized *492 crime.” Senate Report 34. This statement is not supported, however, by the language of the statute, which includes as racketeering activity such things as theft from an interstate shipment regardless of the value of the property stolen (18 U.S.C. § 659 ), unlawful use of a stolen telephone credit card (18 U.S.C. § 1343 ), the “mom and pop” variety of illegal gambling business which, as we point out above, would be covered by Title VIII (proposed18 U.S.C. § 1955 ), any securities fraud case, and virtually any state felony or federal misdemeanor involving drugs— which would clearly include marijuana violations.
. Commenting on the New York Bar Association’s objections, Professor Blakey noted that: Despite this testimony, Title IX was not only reported out, but the treble damage clause was added. Accordingly, those who seek to have the courts restrict the scope of the statute to curtail its application to fraud are refighting in the judicial forum a battle they lost in the legislative arena ....
Blakey, supra note 16, at 273 n. 112. (Emphasis in original).
. Senator McClellan, in explaining that RICO attempts to proscribe the type of crimes often committed by organized crime, praised their ingenuity:
Members of La Cosa Nostra and smaller organized crime groups are sufficiently resourceful and enterprising that one constantly is surprised by the variety of offenses that they commit. It is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well.
116 Cong.Rec. at 18,940 (June 9, 1970).
. The requirement of a commercial or competitive injury, like the necessity of proving a link to organized crime, may be reflective of judicial discomfort with the broad sweep of RICO. Indeed, the statute federalizes many state offenses and provides supplemental remedies in areas where remedies already exist. The
Harper
court expressed this sentiment by noting that “[i]t is simply incomprehensible that a plaintiff suing under the securities laws would receive one-third the damages of a plaintiff suing under RICO for the same injury.”
. This similarity in language was a result of a suggestion made by the American Bar Association. Hearings on S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 543-44 (1970) (testimony of Edward Wright, President Elect of the American Bar Association).
. Plaintiffs pose the following rhetorical question; “who would have standing to sue a group of racketeers who are engaged in a pattern of arson fraud? The gangster’s competitors?” Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 26.
. The court defined the enterprise as “an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.”
. Enterprise is defined as “any individual,
partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”
. The
Bennett
court noted that an entity is more likely to be deemed an “enterprise” distinct from acts of racketeering when it is a creation of the law.
. The court in
Lemm
held that a RICO enterprise must meet three tests: (1) a shared purpose; (2) continuity of personnel and (3) a structure distinct from the pattern.
. Plaintiffs’ only rebuttal to this argument is the assertion that a claim was stated and the suggestion that the appropriate remedy is requiring a more specific pleading, rather than dismissal.
. In his motion to dismiss, defendant Mario Andretti also notes that Count XI should be dismissed, as his failure to correct Mr. Peterson as to his status as a limited, rather than general partner in Muir fails to state a cause of action for intentional infliction. For all of the reasons stated above, I agree. Mr. Andretti’s conduct is simply not “outrageous,” as that term has been defined under Pennsylvania law. Count XI shall be dismissed against all defendants.
. Defendant argues that since Kimmel had to sign the partnership agreement before becoming a partner and since that agreement listed Andretti as a limited partner, Kimmel had notice and no fraud occurred. Were I to rest my decision on the partnership agreement submitted by Andretti, I would probably agree. This impacts upon the materiality of the misrepresentation. While it is dubious in the abstract, whether Andretti’s misrepresentation would be material to Kimmel’s decision to become a limited partner in Muir, knowledge would certainly defeat materiality. I note that it is not clear that Andretti had a duty to correct Dirks’ misstatement.