Lead Opinion
Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc. (“Safeway”), petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jackson Circuit Court to grant Safeway’s Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss a bad-faith claim against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For reasons explained below, we deny the petition.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Richard Thomas Kimbrough alleges that, on November 19, 2011, a deer ran across Jackson County Road 33, causing a truck in the southbound lane to swerve into the northbound lane, where Kim-brough was driving. According to Kim-brough, the truck struck his vehicle and ran him off the road and into a creek bed. The driver of the truck allegedly fled and remains unknown.
As a result of the accident, Kimbrough broke his right femur, right hand, and nose. As part of his medical treatment, screws were inserted into his leg, and he required plastic surgery to his face. His medical еxpenses totaled $96,947.70.
At the time of the accident, Kimbrough held an insurance policy with Safeway that included uninsured-motorist benefits of $25,000 per vehicle or a stacked policy limit of $50,000 per occurrence. Kim-brough submitted a claim to Safeway for uninsured-motorist coverage, alleging that the driver of the “phantom vehicle”
On February 6, 2012, Kimbrough sued Safeway, asserting claims of breach of contract and bad faith, alleging that Safeway, without lawful justification, had intentionally refused to pay Kimbrough’s claim. On June 7, 2012, Safeway moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that a claim for uninsured-motorist benefits is not ripe for adjudication until liability and damages have been established. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as Safeway’s
II. Standard of Review
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and, will be granted only where there is ‘(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty uрon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ Ex parte Alfab, Inc.,586 So.2d 889 , 891 (Ala.1991). This Court will not issue the writ of mandamus where the petitioner has ‘full and adequatе relief by appeal. State v. Cobb,288 Ala. 675 , 678,264 So.2d 523 , 526 (1972) (quoting State v. Williams,69 Ala. 311 , 316 (1881)).”
Ex parte Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB,
III. Analysis
Safeway argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Kimbrough’s bad-faith claim and, therefore, that it was required to dismiss it pursuant tо Rule 12(h)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides: “Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”
Safeway’s claim that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction is based on thе holding in Pontius v. State Farm, Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
On appeal, the issue before this Court was whether an action for bad-faith failure to pay an uninsured-motorist claim could be maintained against an insurance compаny before the plaintiff demonstrated that she was legally entitled to recover damages from the uninsured motorist. This Court held that “ ‘[t]o be “legally entitled to recover as damages” the insured must establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist, which gives rise to damages, and must thеn prove the extent of those damages.’ ” Pontius,
The Court then cited LeFevre and Bowers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
Safeway argues that the reasoning in Pontius controls
“[B]ecause (1) liability had not been established and (2) damages were ques-tionablef,] ... Safeway is entitled to litigate liability and damages without being subjected to a pretrial tort of bad fаith discovery and the threat of an extra contractual judgment at trial of what is a simple automobile accident case.”
Petition, at 6. We disagree that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a simple concept:
“Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. The principle of subject matter jurisdiction relates to a court’s inherent authority tо deal with the case or matter before it. The term means not simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying the attention*43 of the court but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the particular case belongs.”
21 C.J.S. Courts § 11 (2006). In determining a trial cоurt’s subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court asks “ ‘only whether the trial court had the constitutional and statutory authority5 to hear the case.” Russell v. State,
Alabama’s uninsured-motorist statute, § 32-7-23, Ala.Code 1975, protects “persons ... who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.” We have held that “[ujnknown phantom drivers ... are included within the definition of an uninsured motorist.” Walker v. GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co.,
“A motorist ‘legally entitled to recover damages’ under § 32-7-23 is one who presents facts sufficient to prove thаt the motorist was involved in an accident under circumstances that would entitle the motorist to uninsured-motorist coverage. Such a motorist is ‘legally enti-tied’ to damages if the motorist meets his or her burden of presenting substantial evidence to survive a motion for a summary judgment or a judgment as a matter of law and the fact-finder is reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the motorist should recover damages. See § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975. In [the plaintiff motorist’s] case, the only evidence of a culpable phantom vehiсle is [the plaintiff motorist’s] own testimony, which could constitute substantial evidence.”
Walker,
In light of the foregoing, Safeway has not clearly demonstrated that this case is not ripe or that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Safeway does not have a clear legal right to mandamus relief.
IV. Conclusion
Safeway has not demonstrated a clear legal right that would necessitate the intervention of the Court into this ongoing litigation. Therefore, we deny the petition for the writ of mandamus.
PETITION DENIED.
Notes
. "When the owner or operator of the vehicle causing the accident is unknown, the motorist is an 'uninsured motorist.’ When the operator is unknown, these are usually referred to as 'hit-and-run' cases or 'phantom vehicle’ cases.” Ronald G. Davenport, Alabama Automobile Insurance Law § 20:5 (3d ed. 2012).
. A distinction between the facts in Pontius and the facts before us complicates the application of the Pontius holding here: The present case allegedly involves a phantom driver, whereas Pontius involved a known driver. Decisions following the Pontius holding involved known uninsured drivers, not phantom drivers. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith,
. As Justice Murdock stated in his special cоncurrence regarding ripeness and subject-matter jurisdiction as expressed in a similar case:
"I am not persuaded ... that the concept of ‘ripeness’ is the appropriate concept by which to describe the problem with the plaintiff's clаim. And I especially am not persuaded that the problem here is of a jurisdictional nature. For all that appears, this is a case in which the plaintiff simply is unable to demonstrate that the wrongful conduct she alleges to have occurred, actually has occurred. Addressing such circumstances is one of the purposes for which summary judgment is made available under Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.”
Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama,
. We should not be understood as implying that Kimbrough’s action lacks merit.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
Because I am unable to distinguish the facts of the present case from this Court’s controlling decisions in Ex parte Safeway Insurance Co. of Alabama,
Here, as in both Safeway and Pontius, Safeway has presented unrefuted evidence establishing that both damages and liability are in dispute.
“Safeway has established a clear legal right to a dismissal without prejudice of Galvin’s bad-fаith claim because that claim is not ripe for adjudication, and, consequently, the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. ‘[TJhere can be no bad-faith action based on conduct arising before the uninsured motorist’s liability is established and damages are fixеd; therefore, “there can be no action based on the tort of bad faith based on conduct arising prior to that time, only for subsequent bad faith conduct.” ’ Pontius,915 So.2d at 565 (quoting LeFevre [v. Westberry,590 So.2d 154 ] at 159 [ (Ala.1991) ]).”
Id. at 352-53 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
In light of the foregoing, this Court’s prior decisions in Pontius and Safeway both appear directly on point and to mandate this Court’s granting the requested relief. I would, therefоre, grant Safeway’s
BOLIN, J., concurs.
. In fact, Kimbrough’s brief fails to even mention Pontius, instead arguing only that, because his submitted medical expenses exceed the available uninsured-motorist coverage, his case is distinguishable from Safeway in that it is allegеdly unnecessary to resolve the dispute regarding the amount of damages because, according to Kimbrough, he has already established his entitlement to an amount in excess of his uninsured-motorist limits, and Safeway's failure to remit that amount was tantamount to bad faith. That position, however, ignores the fact that Kimbrough’s mere submission of the claimed damages fails to demonstrate that he is “ ‘legally entitled to recover [them].’ ” Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
. In fact, given the unresolved nature of those issues, Safeway maintains, contrary to the conclusion reаched by the main opinion, that it was merely awaiting additional information from Kimbrough and that it has not actually denied Kimbrough's claim for uninsured-motorist benefits. Petition, at p. 6.
. The main opinion attempts to distinguish Pontius as involving "a known driver” as opposed to the "phantom driver” in the instant case. I see no meaningful distinction because, as Kimbrough acknowledges, ”[u]nder Alabama law, a driver who flees the scene of a wreck is presumed uninsured.” Kimbrough’s brief, at p. 9 (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Lambert,
. The insurance carriers in both Safeway and the underlying litigation filed dismissal motions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. I see nothing in the motion presently before us suggesting, as the main opinion concludes, that Safeway, in any way, relied on Rule 12(h)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.