Kimber v. DavisKimber v. Davis
Rendered on May 7, 2013
Mark Fisher, for appellee.
Eric J. Hoffman, and Adam S. Eliot, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.
BROWN, J.
{¶ 1} Marvin Davis, defendant-appellant, appeals from the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, in which the court sustained the objections to the magistrate‘s decision filed by Traci Kimber, plaintiff-appellee.
{¶ 2} On July 5, 1984, appellee gave birth to T.K. On January 29, 1986, the trial court established the father-child relationship between appellant and T.K. The court ordered appellant to pay child support in the amount of $25 per week, effective February 7, 1986.
{¶ 3} On March 16, 1992, appellee gave birth to M.K. Through Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency (FCCSEA), appellee requested that paternity be
{¶ 4} On June 1, 2003, T.K. was emancipated. However, neither party requested that child support terminate, and FCCSEA did not initiate a termination of child support.
{¶ 5} On August 16, 2010, FCCSEA held an administrative hearing on the termination of support for T.K. On September 16, 2010, FCCSEA issued findings and a recommendation to terminate the support order and found appellant made overpayments of $9,408.78. The termination of support for T.K. coincided with the emancipation of M.K.
{¶ 6} On December 6, 2010, FCCSEA held a hearing to determine how appellant would receive reimbursement of his overpayment. On December 15, 2010, FCCSEA issued a decision and recommendation, finding that the issue was beyond the scope of the hearing and sustained its September 16, 2010 decision. The December 15, 2010 decision was never adopted by the trial court because FCCSEA never requested that the court do so.
{¶ 7} On November 3, 2011, appellee filed an objection to the administrative decision, arguing that FCCSEA led her to believe that the seven years of overpayments by appellant were actually child support payments for M.K. Appellee also claimed she did, in fact, object to FCCSEA‘s December 15, 2010 decision, although FCCSEA has no record of such.
{¶ 8} On May 25, 2012, a magistrate heard appellee‘s objections. On July 3, 2012, the magistrate issued a decision, in which she dismissed appellee‘s objection to the December 15, 2010 decision as being untimely filed. Appellee filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision on July 18, 2012.
{¶ 9} On August 6, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on appellee‘s objections. On September 13, 2012, the trial court issued a decision and judgment entry. In the judgment, the trial court sustained appellee‘s objections, finding that appellee timely filed her objection to FCCSEA‘s December 15, 2010 decision, appellee timely filed her objections to the magistrate‘s July 3, 2012 decision, and appellant‘s seven-year delay in raising the issue of overpayments was prejudicial to appellee. Appellant appeals the judgment of the trial court, asserting the following assignments of error:
[I.] The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that Plaintiff-Appellee timely filed an objection to the December 15, 2010 Administrative Termination Hearing Decision and Recommendation.
[II.] The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that Plaintiff-Appellee timely filed an objection to the July 3, 2012 Magistrate‘s decision.
[III.] The trial court erred as a matter of law, reached a decision against the manifest weight of the evidence and abused its discretion in sustaining Plaintiff-Appellee‘s objections to the Magistrate‘s Decision and entering a final judgment establishing no over-payment of child support without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
{¶ 10} Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred when it found that appellee timely filed an objection to the December 15, 2010 FCCSEA decision.
{¶ 11} In the present case, FCCSEA issued its decision on December 15, 2010. Appellee did not file her objection to FCCSEA‘s decision until November 3, 2011. Thus, appellee‘s objection was filed over ten months after FCCSEA‘s decision, and over nine months beyond the 30-day period delineated in
{¶ 12} Appellee counters that, because FCCSEA failed to file its decision with the court as required by
{¶ 13} Here, appellee fails to cite any authority to support her contention that FCCSEA‘s decision was not final because the agency failed to file its decision with the court as required by
{¶ 14} Appellee also counters that, pursuant to
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
{¶ 15} Therefore,
{¶ 16} The remainder of appellee‘s argument outlines FCCSEA‘s failings in this case, including FCCSEA‘s failure to establish a support order for M.K., the younger child, despite appellee‘s requests, FCCSEA‘s failure to terminate the support order for T.K. until seven years after her emancipation, and FCCSEA‘s failure to file with the court its decision
{¶ 17} However, FCCSEA‘s prior failures to properly pursue this matter do not impact the issue of whether appellee timely filed an objection to the administrative decision and the finality of the decision. None of FCCSEA‘s actions or inactions in handling the matter prevented appellee from filing a timely objection, and FCCSEA‘s failure to file its decision with the trial court did not affect the finality of the decision, as explained above. Although we fully comprehend the equitable principles at play and can sympathize with appellee‘s position, the statutes at issue are clear in their legal requisites. While it may be true that equity is an important concern in juvenile and domestic relations matters, equitable concerns must follow the law, especially when that law is clear and based upon statutory provisions, as it is in the present case. See Civ. Serv. Personnel Assn., Inc. v. Akron, 48 Ohio St.2d 25, 27 (1976) (when the rights of parties are clearly defined and established by law, especially when the source of such definition is through a constitutional or statutory provision, the maxim equity follows the law is usually strictly applied); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 12th Dist. No. CA2008-02-019, 2009-Ohio-2201, ¶ 80 (even when obvious concerns over equity emerge, the appellate court is not in the position to rewrite state law to permit a more equitable result); In re Barone, 11th Dist. No. 2004-G-2575, 2005-Ohio-4479, ¶ 19 (equity follows the law and cannot be invoked to destroy or supplant a legal right). See also Bagley v. Bagley, 181 Ohio App.3d 141, 2009-Ohio-688, ¶ 33 (2d Dist.) (it is fundamental that equity follows the law). Thus, while it may be tempting to decide [a] case on subjective principles of equity and fundamental fairness, [a] court has a greater obligation to follow the law. State ex rel. Schwaben v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 76 Ohio St.3d 280, 285 (1996). Accordingly, despite the equity and fairness principles involved in this case, we cannot use these concepts to override the clear statutory language of
{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, appellant‘s first assignment of error is sustained, his second and third assignments of error are rendered moot, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
KLATT, P.J., and SADLER, J., concur.
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