On August 22, 1973, dеfendant Curtis C. Dunn (hereinafter referred to as "the pilot” or "the son”), was *225 flying alone a private aircraft owned by defendant Charles C. Dunn (hereinafter "the aircraft owner” or "the father”). While so flying, the engine of the aircraft stopped functioning due to fuel starvation and the pilot attempted an emergency landing on the median strip of Interstate 285 in DeKalb County. In its attempt to make an emergency landing, the aircraft was proceeding in a generally westward direction.
Contemporaneously with the emergency landing attempt, an automobile operated by plaintiff Darlene Kimbell, with her passenger, plaintiff Linda Gail Tapp, was proceeding generally eastward on Interstate 285, and was being followed by another automobile owned by defendant Larry DuBose аnd operated by his daughter, defendant Roxanne Lee DuBose. The aircraft flew close to the automobiles, but struck neither, and the automobile driven by dеfendant DuBose struck the automobile being driven by plaintiff Kimbell with resultant injuries to plaintiffs Kimbell and Tapp.
The plaintiffs sued the owner and pilot of the airplanе and the owner and driver of the automobile. At the trial of the case, the judge directed a verdict in favor of defendant Charles C. Dunn, the owner of the airрlane. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs against defendant Curtis C. Dunn (pilot) and in favor of defendants Larry P. DuBose and Roxanne DuBose, the automobile owner and driver respectively. Judgments were entered in accordance with the foregoing. The judgments in favor of the DuBose defendants were not appealed. The plaintiffs appeal the direction of verdicts in favor of defendant Charles C. Dunn and the denial of their general grounds motion for new triаl.
1. The verdicts and judgments were authorized by the evidence. The general grounds of the motion for new trial are without merit.
2. The only issue remaining is whether the "family-purрose doctrine” should be applied to the negligent operation of an airplane. The evidence showed that the airplane was owned by the father, and used for the entertainment and pleasure of himself and his son. The son was an unmarried, unemployed 21-year-old, who lived in his parents’ home. The son did part-time
*226
mechanic work on the airplane. The keys to the airplane were kept in a place easily accessible to the son. On the day of the occurrence, the son had taken the keys and flown the airplane without his father’s knowledge or consent. He had done so many times in the past. Also, he had never been refused permission to fly the plane. While the son had considerable experience in piloting the aircraft, he had only a student pilot’s license, which had become invalid due to the son’s failure to meet certain requirements. While some of the foregoing recited faсts are disputed by other evidence, on motion for directed verdict all evidence and inferences therefrom are construed against the movаnt.
Isom v. Schettino,
The above-quoted provision of our law contains no exclusions. We have long ago sеttled the construction of phrases such as "within the scope of his business.”
3
The principles set forth in Code Ann. § 105-108 have been applied to cases involving аircraft.
Southern Airways Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
*228 3. The plaintiff contends that if a new trial is ordered, the same should apply to all defendants — not just the owner and pilot of the aircraft, but also the owner and driver of the automobile (defendants Larry DuBose and Roxanne DuBose). This contention is not valid. The plaintiff enumerated no error relative to the defendants DuBose except on general grounds, which we have held to be unmeritorious in Division 1.
In
Durrett v. Farrar,
In this case, the jury resolved the factual issues in favor of the DuBose defendants. Therе is no basis or necessity for a new trial as to them.
4. (a) For the reasons set forth in Division 2, the judgment of the trial court is reversed as to defendants Charles C. Dunn and Curtis C. Dunn, and a new trial is granted as to them.
(b) For the reasons set forth in Divisions 1 and 3, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to defendants Larry DuBose and Roxanne DuBose.
Judgments affirmed in part; reversed in part.