10 Wend. 675 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1833
My the Court,
The plea puis darrein continue anee waived all previous pleas, and on the record the cause of action was admitted to the same extent as if no other defence had been urged than that contained in this plea. By operation of law the previous pleas are stricken from the record, and every thing is confessed except the matter contested by the plea puis. 6 Bacon’s Abr. 479. Cro. Eliz. 49. 1 Ld. Raym. 693. Bull. N. P. 309. 1 Salk. 178. 2 Wend. 300.
The only quest ms to be litigated upon the record were, 1. Whether Kiniston had assigned his interest in the note to his co-plaintiff Kimball, and 2. Whether the defendant had notice of such assignment before the execution of the release. If proper attention had been bestowed upon the pleadings, only one of these questions could have been raised, as a denial of either fact was a sufficient answer to the replication. The court may, on special application, allow a defendant to rejoin several matters, if necessary for the “ attainment of justice 2 R. 8. 356, § 27; but it does not appear that any such application was made in this case.
The defendant, in a brief submitted, assumes that the cause of action is not confessed, and objects to the admissibility of the due bill in evidence under either cou it iu the declaration, and the ground upon which he places this objection is, that it is not a note, within the statute. Even if his assumption was right, the argument he derives from it could not be sustained. The instrument is a promissory note, within the statute, as it contains every quality essential to such paper. The «c
It is objected that there is no evidence in the case to shew that the $160 or any other sum was paid by Kimball to Kiniston, in consideration of the assignment. The proof relied on is, that Kimball took the note on a settlement of accounts with Kiniston, and allowed him therein for his share or moiety. If the evidence on this point was competent, it was fairly submitted to the jury, and their verdict must be conclusive.
It is said, admitting that half the note was accounted for, it still would not appear that the $160 was paid, as alleged in the replication. The half of the note was $162,50, which of course includes the $160 alleged to have been paid. Proving more than the amount certainly cannot be objected to, or prejudice the plaintiff. If the assignment had been in writing, then there might have been A variance between the instrument proved and the one described; but no such objection could be taken here, as the whole rested in parol.
It is said the evidence of Eunice Hutchinson in relation to the settlement was improperly admitted. She proved that about six years before the trial her father and Kiniston were together with their books to make a settlement of their accounts ; that she was a part of the time in the room, and the settlement was amicably made. After it was completed, they came into the room where she was, and said they had settled all their accounts, and that Mr. Kimball was to have all the property connected with their business in New-York. The testimony of James Hutchinson corroborates most of the above facts, and proves, in addition, an entry under date of December, 1822, in the account book of Kimball, by which he charged himself with the amount of the note. The declarations of the plaintiffs in relation to the terms of settlement were made at the conclusion of it, and not afterwards, as contended by the
The notice of the transfer is abundantly proved. E. H. Kimball swears that he called on the defendant in behalf of his father for payment of the note, and was answered that it could not then be made, and was requested to ask his father to take the note to himself individually, and it would be soon paid; that in the fall of 1825 he informed the defendant that Iris father-had settled with Kiniston and taken the note to himself, and again in 1827; and that since 1825 the defendant had frequently promised to pay the note. If this testimony is to be believed, the assignment of the note to Kimball was in pursuance of a request from the defendant, and of which assignment he was duly advised.
The refusal of the agent who procured the release to relate the circumstances under which it was obtained, particularly in reference to that part of the transaction which tested the merits of it, was calculated to excite in the minds of the jury, and no doubt did, a suspicion unfavorable to the release, and gave color and strength to the view taken of it by the plaintiffs.
The letters of Kiniston to the defendant were clearly inadmissible. They were written after the assignment and notice;
New trial denied,