KIM v. WALLS
S01G1569
Supreme Court of Georgia
May 13, 2002
275 Ga. 177 | 563 SE2d 847
THOMPSON, Justice
THOMPSON, Justice.
In Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga. App. 259 (549 SE2d 797) (2001), the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to excuse for cause a prospective juror who indicated bias in favor of one party to the litigation. We granted certiorari, and for the reasons which follow, we affirm.
During voir dire, a member of the venire acknowledged that she was a registered nurse who worked in hospital emergency rooms, that she was employed at the hospital where defendant Dr. Tae Won Kim worked, and that she had worked with defendant previously in that hospital‘s emergency room. This ongoing relationship, she admitted, would “probably” color her view of which party ought to prevail. She further acknowledged her belief that the scales are not equally balanced because of her professional relationship with Dr. Kim. Plaintiff‘s counsel moved to strike the juror for cause, based on those responses. At the request of defendant‘s counsel, the court posed a “rehabilitation” question, as follows:
After all the facts are in and you have the law as given you in charge, can you set aside your personal feelings and make a decision in this case which speaks the truth based upon the evidence that you‘ve heard, setting aside your preconceived notions, and deciding this case solely upon the evidence and the law as given you in charge?
The juror responded affirmatively to the court‘s inquiry; however, in response to a subsequent question posed by defendant‘s counsel, she again affirmed that she did not view the parties equally or neutrally “because I know Dr. Kim; I mean, I‘ve worked with him, met him. I‘ve never met the [plaintiff].” Plaintiff‘s counsel attempted to inquire further concerning the juror‘s conflicting responses, but the court curtailed further inquiry. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Kim.
In all civil cases it shall be good cause of challenge that a juror has expressed an opinion as to which party ought to prevail or that he has a wish or desire as to which shall suc-
ceed. Upon challenge made by either party upon either of these grounds, it shall be the duty of the court to hear the competent evidence respecting the challenge as shall be submitted by either party, the juror being a competent witness. The court shall determine the challenge according to the opinion it entertains of the evidence adduced thereon.
There is no specific test for the disqualification of a juror for favor in a civil context as there is in a criminal one.1 In both civil and criminal contexts, however, the trial judge “is the only person in a courtroom whose primary concern, indeed primary duty, is to ensure the selection of a fair and impartial jury.” Walls, supra at 260. Because of this, trial courts have broad discretion to evaluate and rule upon a potential juror‘s impartiality, based upon “the ordinary general rules of human experience,” Daniel v. Bi-Lo, 178 Ga. App. 849, 850 (1) (344 SE2d 707) (1986), and a trial court may only be reversed upon a finding of “manifest abuse” of that discretion. Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 691 (7) (512 SE2d 896) (1999).
Yet the potential impact of juror bias must not be underestimated.
Running through the entire fabric of our Georgia decisions is a thread which plainly indicates that the broad general principle intended to be applied in every case is that each juror shall be so free from either prejudice or bias as to guarantee the inviolability of an impartial trial. . . . [I]f error is to be committed, let it be in favor of the absolute impartiality and purity of the jurors.
Cambron v. State, 164 Ga. 111, 113-114 (137 SE 780) (1927). Thus, when a prospective juror has a relationship with a party to the case that is either close or subordinate, or one that suggests bias, the trial court must do more than “rehabilitate” the juror through the use of any talismanic question. The court is statutorily bound to conduct voir dire adequate to the situation, whether by questions of its own or through those asked by counsel.
In the present case, the prospective juror expressed partiality in
In Cohen v. Baxter, 267 Ga. 422 (479 SE2d 746) (1997), we rejected a bright-line or per se rule that excluded a class of persons from jury duty based, in that instance, on the existence of a doctor-patient relationship. We also admonished that the creation of such a rule under those circumstances, would “open the door to the expansion of the per se rule to . . . other numerous categories.” Id. at 423. The dissent in Walls, supra, suggests that the majority, likewise, created a per se rule requiring the exclusion of an entire class of jurors who have an employment relationship with a party to the lawsuit. Walls, supra (Ruffin, J., dissenting). If that were so, Walls, supra, would contravene our ruling in Cohen, supra, that “a per se rule cuts too broadly and is inconsistent with the traditional discretion given trial courts in this area.” Id. at 423. Therefore, to the extent that Walls, supra, can be read to advocate such a per se rule, it is expressly disapproved.
Our holding today in no way modifies our adherence to the fundamental principle that “[t]he law presumes that potential jurors are impartial,” Cohen, supra at 424, and that the burden of proving partiality still rests with the party seeking to have the juror disqualified.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, C. J., and Hunstein, J., who concur specially.
CARLEY, Justice, concurring.
I agree with the majority that the opinion of the Court of
FLETCHER, Chief Justice, concurring specially.
I concur in the majority‘s affirmance of the Georgia Court of Appeals. I write separately because I believe that the well-reasoned opinion of the Court of Appeals did not establish a per se rule and is not contrary to the opinion I authored in Cohen v. Baxter.2 Furthermore, I disagree with the majority that the trial court prevented the plaintiff from developing competent evidence of bias. The Court of Appeals was correct that the responses given by the juror were sufficient to show that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse the juror for cause.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this special concurrence.
DECIDED MAY 13, 2002.
McCall, Finney & Phillips, Walter E. McCall, Paul G. Phillips, for appellant.
Mathis, Cannon & Cormack, Billy C. Mathis, Jr., Del Percilla, Jr., for appellee.
Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Thomas S. Carlock, Butler Wooten Overby Fryhofer Daughtery, James E. Butler, Jr., Joel O. Wooten, Jr., Thomas W. Malone, amici curiae.