KIM
(2) A conviction for the crime of robbery in violation of
This is an appeal from an immigration judge‘s decision dated January 30, 1979, in which the respondent was found deportable under
The respondent is a 24-year-old male alien, a native and citizen of Korea who last entered the United States on May 28, 1968, as a nonimmigrant student authorized to stay until October 17, 1969. On July 2, 1973, his status was adjusted to that of a permanent resident. On December 31, 1973, the respondent pled guilty and was convicted of the crimes of rape and robbery which were committed on April 22, 1973. He served 4 years and 8 months in the state prison for these crimes.
The respondent denied at the hearing that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and that he had been sentenced to confinement in a state prison for a year or more. The respondent further denied deportability.
Based on the record, the immigration judge found that the respondent was convicted of robbery committed on April 22, 1973, in violation of section 211 of the California Penal Code.1 Under
The immigration judge further found that the respondent was not prima facie eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Act, citing Matter of Anwo, 16 I&N Dec. 293 (BIA 1977), and refused to admit the application. The immigration judge also found that the respondent was not eligible for voluntary departure since his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude precluded a finding of good moral character within the meaning of
On appeal, the respondent, through counsel, contends that the immigration judge denied him due process of law by failing to accept the application for advance permission to return to unrelinquished domicile, citing Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2 Cir. 1977).
We agree with the immigration judge‘s finding that the respondent is deportable under section 241(a)(4) of the Act for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within 5 years of entry and sentenced to confinement in prison for a year or more.
We also agree with the immigration judge‘s finding that the respondent did not establish that he was prima facie eligible for relief under section 212(c) of the Act. To be eligible for section 212(c) relief, the respondent must establish that he has maintained a “lawful unre
The respondent‘s argument that the Lok decision is applicable in this case is without merit. The Ninth Circuit in Castillo-Felix v. INS, supra, has clearly rejected the rationale of Lok and has held that the respondent must accumulate 7 years of lawful unrelinquished domicile after his admission for permanent residence to be eligible for relief under section 212(c) of the Act. Since the present case arises out of the Ninth Circuit, the court‘s decision in Castillo-Felix v. INS, supra, is controlling.
We further agree with the determination of the immigration judge that the respondent cannot be considered to be a person of good moral character because the crime of which he was convicted is one involving moral turpitude. See section 101(f)(3) of the Act; Matter of G—R—, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the respondent is deportable as charged, prima facie ineligible for relief under section 212(c) of the Act, and is ineligible for voluntary departure. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.