37 Neb. 731 | Neb. | 1893
On the 26th day of November, 1889, a petition was filed in the district court of Dawes county, Nebraska, on behalf of Andrew J. Richardson, Jr., an infant under the age of fourteen years, by his next friend, Andrew J. Richardson, Sr., against John D. Kilpatrick and others associated with him as partners under the firm name and style of Kilpatrick Bros. & Collins. This petition alleged that the defendants began the construction of a tunnel in the said county of Dawes, previous to the injury complained of, and continued said construction until that time; and that while engaged in said work of construction, the said defendants negligently and knowingly caused and permitted a large number of exploders, which were of a dangerous character, to be left and scattered over the ground at and near the north end of said tunnel, and upon and adjacent to the right of way of the railway for the use of which said tunnel was being made at that point, where children and persons not acquainted with the dangerous character of said exploders, and not accustomed to the use thereof, were accustomed to pass and repass; and that the defendants, by their agents, servants, and employes, carelessly, negligently, and knowingly suffered and permitted said exploders to remain.scattered over the surface of the ground at said point, exposed and unguarded, up to and including the 6th day of October, 1889, well knowing that children of tender years and childish instincts, without any knowledge or warning in reference to the great danger and peril to which they were ex
The answer admitted the partnership as charged, and that during the year 1889 the defendants were engaged in the construction of a tunnel on the line of railroad running into and through Dawes county, Nebraska, and that in the construction of said tunnel the said defendants used and exploded dynamite in the removal of rock from said tunnel by the use of exploders; but alleged that if the plaintiff was injured, it was by reason of his own carelessness and negligence and through no fault of the defendants, and long after the defendants had finished their work on said
At the October, 1890, term of the district court of Dawes county a trial of the issues joined was had, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, upon which judgment was duly rendered. In due time proper proceedings were taken for the presentation in this court of errors alleged to have occurred on said trial.
The testimony discloses, as undisputed facts, that on Sunday, the 6th day of October, 1889, the lad who was injured, accompanied by his parents, his aunt, and one sister and perhaps another member of the family, went to the tunnel which had been constructed as alleged in the petition. The plaintiff, and the others who accompanied him, resided in Dawes county about twelve miles from the tunnel which they visited. ' Their object seems to have been simply to look at the tunnel as a matter of curiosity, and, perhaps, pleasantly employ the hours of that holiday. The boy who was injured was of the age of about eight years. Accompanied by his sister, aged about twelve years, he explored the surroundings of the tunnel, and finding several exploders, he and his sister brought them to the place where their mother and aunt were sitting. These exploders were about one and one-eighth inches in length, and from the testimony it would seem that they are from one-eighth to one-fourth of an inch in diameter and of a cylindrical shape. One end is closed and the other left open in the same manner as the shell of a cartridge for use in a rifle or pistol. Inside this exploder is placed for use some material which easily explodes, causing a report and jar which explodes the dynamite cartridge with which it is placed in contact. The boy having found a horseshoe nail, proceeded, with childish curiosity, to remove the contents of one of the exploders which he had found. This, as the boy in his
The first and most important question with which we are confronted is, where did the lad find the exploder which caused the injury of which he complains? His own testimony was that he picked up a dynamite cartridge just a little ways from the tunnel; that he saw about fifteen other cartridges where he picked up this one; that they were lying around on the ground ; that he picked this particular one with a horseshoe nail he found at the tunnel, and that the cartridge Mowed off and hurt him. On his cross-examination this lad testified that he found the cap which exploded around the tunnel on the west side of the tunnel.
Maggie Richardson (Andrew’s sister, of the age of' twelve years at the time of the accident) testified that she saw some of the exploders before the accident. She said,
“ We picked them up all around in the little building where they had been, where they had staid nights.” She further testified that she could not tell how many buildings there were, but there were lots of them around there; that they picked up -no exploders anywhere else than in those buildings that she remembered of. These buildings were just pine trees cut down and covered over with brush and stuff. Some had doors, some had not. All were open. No one was in them. They found the exploders lying on the floor or on a little stand or table among some gunnysacks that laid around. This was on the hillside quite a way from the banks over the tunnel.
E. C. Simmons testified that when attracted by the explosion, he went at once to the scene of the accident and found lying around there some other articles and a tin box in which are usually kept exploders, and saw some exploders; that the little girl said “he got them [the exploders] over there,” waving her hand off towards the “Dago shacks,” as they were called. Mr. Simmons testi
■ John Waldo, one of plaintiff’s witnesses, in the district court, testified that the shanties or dug-outs were about ■fifty yards from the north end of the tunnel. Some of them ■were right above the tunnel,
Ben Hayden, another witness for plaintiff, testified that there were buildings that might be termed “ shanties,” or “dug-outs,” some of them over the tunnel; that there was over a half dozen of these shanties which witness guessed the Dagoes had put there.
It would seem by this evidence clearly established, that the exploder which caused the injury to the boy was obtained by him in one of the shanties occupying the northern slope of the ridge through which the tunnel was built; and that the nearest of these shanties to the tunnel was distant therefrom fifty yards, up a steep and bluffy hill j • •the others within a radius of one hundred and fifty yards from the tunnel, measured over like ground.
There was a great deal of evidence directed to showing the manner in which the exploders were used during the progress of the work previous to August 28, the date of its completion. There was testimony on behalf of the defendants that the exploders were never attached to the fuse-outside of a little house erected for that purpose, unless in very exceptional cases of hurry, while the contrary was-testified to by the witnesses of the other party litigant. On the part of the plaintiff in the district court, there was evidence that at times exploders were, during the progress of the work, kept in unnecessary numbers of from one to-one hundred, and there -was also evidence that on different occasions these exploders were permitted to lie near the work on the ground. There was, however, no proof that the alleged careless manner in which the exploders were brought to, used, and permitted to lie promiscuously about in the tunnel, caused the injury complained of. It seems to be assumed, however, that this negligent use of these dangerous agencies, if established by proof, would justify the inference that such use was the direct cause of the accident ; and the plaintiffs in error contend that the court, by the instruction to which reference will now be made, presented to the jury a state of facts materially different from any such as the evidence showed to exist.
After saying to the jury, in effect, that if they found that defendants were engaged in making a tunnel which re
The evidence has been carefully collated, and the facts ' have been stated as favorably as possible to the contentious of the defendant in error, that it might be determined, upon a careful comparison, whether a state of facts reasonably deducible from the evidence was correctly set forth in this instruction. Our conclusion is that the court erred in assuming that there was evidence showing that the exploder, to which this injury was due, was one left by plaintiffs in error in the tunnel, or that said exploder was found upon the floor of any building owned by the plaintiffs in error, or under their control, or that the plaintiffs in error were in any way responsible for said exploder being where it was found. It is possible that this explosive was taken from the powder house wherein it had been stored; or it may have been picked up by some one who carried it to the shanty where it was found. In either event the testimony should have shown that fact, and that plaintiffs in error were in some way responsible for its being placed where it was found, or had control of and were responsible for the condition of the shanty in which the boy unfortunately discovered it.
In Meyer v. Midland P. R. Co., 2 Neb., on page 336, Lake, J., thus quoted the modification made to an instruction: “This is the law: Unless the conductor or engineer in charge of the train, by the exercise of care and watchfulness, might have seen the child or children running directly towards the track so as to cross it, and from their size and conduct knew the child or children to be under the years of discretion, it was then the duty of those in charge of the train to check its speed, if possible, and put the same under such control, if practicable, as to be
On page 338 of the volume referred to, the opinion is continued in these words : “ There was no testimony tending even to show that the child was seen ‘ running towards the track;’ or that she was in a position where she could have been seen by the engineer one moment sooner than she was, as sworn to by him. It is altogether probable, and it seems to be generally conceded, that she and her little brother were concealed in the small ditch which crossed the track at the place of the accident, and stepped out of it upon the track when the train was so near that, by the efforts which were put forth, it was not stopped until the engine had passed over them. The tendency of this instruction was to mislead the jury and give them to understand that they were at liberty to resort to mere conjecture to enable them to account for what the testimony failed to show; and that they might infer the existence of a state' of facts in respect to the relative position of the parties which the testimony would not warrant. There was no evidence upon which to predicate this instruction. The charge of the court to the jury should always be founded on, and be applicable to, the testimony; and when it is not, and is calculated to mislead the jury in considering the facts of the case, the judgment ought to be reversed. (Meredith v. Kennard, 1 Neb., 312, and cases there cited.)”
On page 339 of the same case, the following language was used: “It is the right of a party to a suit, by proper instructions, to have the minds of the jury directed to the essential features of the case, and their attention challenged to the testimony which should - influence them in making up their verdict. They should also be advised of the legal effect of the establishment of, or failure to establish, the material facts of the case. When, however, this is not done, but, on the contrary, their minds are diverted from the real issues to be tried, and permitted to wander outside of the
The principles recognized and laid down in that case are the settled law in this state. No amplification of ours could render more clear the necessity for a strict adherence to the facts proven in discussing in instructions, the law as applicable to the facts which are in controversy before the jury. These principles, applied to the facts in this case and the instruction complained of, are decisive of this proceeding, and the judgment of the district court is
Reversed.