114 P.2d 831 | Kan. | 1941
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action to quiet title to real estate, and from an adverse judgment the defendants appeal. The principal question at the trial was whether the particular real estate was and had been the homestead of plaintiff’s predecessor in title at the time plaintiff acquired the title, and arose out of the following circumstances:
At the trial there was no controversy of fact concerning the ownership of the real estate by Elmer Killough or that he and his wife had conveyed it to the plaintiff, Maurice Killough; neither was there any dispute of fact concerning the rendition of the judgment nor what followed with respect to it. The sole question was whether
“1. Elmer Killough purchased the property in question, to wit,: Lot 7 of Alberty’s first addition to the city of Pittsburg, Crawford county, Kansas, same being numbered 201 West Quincy avenue, in. February, 1913. His family, consisting of himself, his wife and his son, Maurice, lived in the property continuously until May, 1931, at which time they moved to a rented dwelling in Asbury, Missouri, 15 miles from Pittsburg, Kansas. Elmer Killough was at that time and had been since 1930, engaged in the cream business at Asbury, Missouri, drove to and from his work, his business hours were from 7 in the morning to 9:30 at night, 6 days a week and until noon on Sunday. The business in Asbury was of temporary nature, the only equipment owned by Elmer Killough was an automobile truck and he was engaged on a commission basis. Elmer Killough at no time owned any real estate in Asbury, Missouri, either residence or business property. The removal to Asbury was to enable Mr. Killough, who at the time of the trial was 65 years of age, to be closer to his work early in the morning and returning home late at night. At the time of the removal to Asbury, only a part of the household goods of Elmer Killough and wife were moved. In 1934, Elmer Killough, his wife and son moved to another rented house in Asbury and at- that time moved the balance of their household goods from the West Quincy property. In July, 1936, Elmer Killough and wife moved back to the West Quincy property and continued to live there until October, 1936.
“2. (Details conveyance from Elmer Killough and wife to Maurice Killough.)
“3. (Details judgment in favor of Swift and proceedings thereon.)
“4. During the period Elmer Killough and wife were absent from the West Quincy property, it was always their intention and purpose to return to and occupy the West Quincy property as their home. Both Elmer Killough and wife testified that such was at all times their intention and that such intention continued up to and including the time of the conveyance of August 24, 1936. That at any time the business in Asbury did not prove profitable, they intended to move back to their home, the West Quincy property, because they always considered it their home. Mrs. Killough always wanted to come back to the West Quincy property and considered it her home.
“5. Elmer Killough and wife did not in the period between May, 1931, and July, 1936, acquire or establish any homestead and did not during said period intend to abandon their homestead rights in and to the property here in question;”
and concluded as a matter of law that the property was continuously from date of its purchase up to August 24, 1936, the homestead of Elmer Killough and his wife, and that the lien of the judgment to Swift did not attach to the property.
Defendants’ objections and exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law and their motion for a new trial were respectively
In substance, appellants present three contentions:
1. Evidence was erroneously received.
2. Defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence should have been sustained.
3. The findings of fact were not sustained by competent credible evidence.
It is contended the trial court erred in permitting Elmer Killough and his wife to testify with respect to their intention to return to the real estate in question and to occupy it as a home. We note from the abstract that before either witness was asked such a question there had been a series of questions, bringing out in detail all of the facts concerning their reasons for leaving; that part of their furniture was left for a time; that they had owned no other dwelling house or other real estate, etc. Appellants cite no authority in support of their contention. In Blitz v. Metzger, 119 Kan. 760, 241 Pac. 259, which involved homestead rights, it was held:
“When the intention or purpose of a party is the subject of inquiry — the fact permissible to be proved under the substantive law of the case — the party may testify to his intent and to the purpose of his acts.” (Syl. If 3.)
(See, also, Peoples State Bank v. Hill, 125 Kan. 308, 263 Pac. 1045; State v. Myers, 152 Kan. 56, 102 P. 2d 1023.) There was no error in the admission of evidence.
We find some difficulty in following appellants’ argument their demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence should have been sustained, as it is in part coupled with criticism of the findings of fact made by the trial court. It may here be said that our examination of the record as abstracted discloses that the findings are supported by the evidence. Appellants seem to place some weight on the fact that Elmer Killough testified that fifty-two days before he made the deed to his son he had decided to give up the homestead. Although the findings of fact did not fix the date, Mrs. Killough testified they moved back into the property the first of July. If that be true, Mr. Killough concluded to pay his son by conveyance of the property at a time when he was actually, as distinguished from constructively, occupying it. To say the least, that testimony did not render plaintiff’s evidence subject to demurrer — for it would take concurrence of decision and action to constitute abandonment. The ruling on the demurrer was not erroneous.
No error has been made to appear and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.