Killian v. CraftKillian v. Craft
The plaintiffs, claiming to be and admittedly owners of 313 slot machines, seized by the Sheriff of Vernon Parish with the intention of destroying them, seek to be decreed the owners of the machines and seek injunctive relief to prevent the sheriff from destroying them.
At the time the sheriff seized the slot machines they were stored in a warehouse in the Town of Leesville, Vernon Parish, having been in storage for two years or more awaiting the permission of the authorities to ship them to the State of Nevada. They were not being operated as gambling devices or otherwise in use at the time they were seized and had not been in use or operated for more than two years. They were so manufactured, designed and constructed as to be capable of being used as gambling devices, if in proper state of repair and working order, and are what are commonly called slot machines. The plaintiffs paid property taxes on these machines for the years, 1949 and 1950. The plaintiffs were not dealers in handling these machines, but were operators and were trying to liquidate a former business and had no intention of' operating any slot machines in Louisiana.
Upon hearing of a rule nisi, issued in. pursuance to plaintiffs’ petition, the rule and the case on- its merits were submitted together on the agreed statement of facts, hereinabove set out. The lower court gave judgment recalling the rule, rejecting plaintiffs’ demands and ordered the sheriff to destroy the machines. The plaintiffs-have appealed.
Counsel for the plaintiffs contends that Act 231 of 1928, now
In the case of Schimpf v. Thomas,
In the case of State v. Ricks,
In the case of Giamalva v. Cooper,
Act 231 of 1928 was incorporated in the Revised Statutes of 1950 and became
In the case of Guillot v. Nunez,
It is stated in the case of Guillot v. Nunez, supra, after discussing
“Thus, the design of the Legislature is explicit; it has in no wise, by levying a tax on the illegal business of operating gambling slot machines, ever intended to lift those devices from the category of contraband to the status of property capable of private ownership, notwithstanding the seeming variance of provision originally contained*379 inLSA-R.S. 47:375. That apparent discord was almost immediately discovered and rectified by the amendment passed at the Regular Session of 1950.”
It would appear that this answers the contention urged herein and that slot machines are contraband and not property capable of private ownership. Therefore, under the express provisions of the statute they shall he destroyed whenever they come to the attention of an officer whether they are in operation or not.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment is affirmed at appellants’ cost.