GERALD HAY KILGORE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EVELLE J. YOUNGER, as Attorney General, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
L.A. No. 31266
Supreme Court of California
Feb. 18, 1982
James Edward Green for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Fred Okrand, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Terry Smerling, Floyd J. Siegal, Stanley I. Greenberg, Margaret C. Crosby, Alan L. Schlosser and Amitai Schwartz as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
OPINION
RICHARDSON, J.—Plaintiff Gerald Hay Kilgore appeals from a judgment of dismissal of his action to recover damages for alleged defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy by defendant Evelle J. Younger, as Attorney General of California, and by various news media defendants. We will affirm the judgment.
In his complaint plaintiff alleges that in July 1977, while Attorney General, defendant Younger established an eight-member commission named The Organized Crime Control Commission (Commission) within the California Department of Justice to study organized criminal conspiracies within the state and to assess the effectiveness of existing criminal procedural controls. The Commission conducted private hearings at which it received the testimony of public officials and confidential informants. It also gathered data from “criminal offender record information,” as defined in
On May 2, 1978, the Commission formally delivered to defendant Younger its written report listing the names of 92 persons suspected of involvement in a wide variety of organized criminal activity in the state, including bookmaking, labor racketeering, loan sharking, extortion, theft, fraud, dealing in narcotics, drugs, and stolen property, arson, prostitution, pornography, and murder. Specifically with respect to plaintiff, the report included his name, residence address, picture and the following personal information: “Kilgore owns and operates a wire service in the Los Angeles area that provides information on sporting events to bookmakers in California and throughout the United States. His company has 15 telephones that provide free information concerning sporting events on a 24-hour basis. During 1976, his company had a $590,000 telephone bill. Kilgore has associated with many bookmakers
On the day the report was delivered, Younger and two Commission members held a press conference during which he distributed copies of the report to members of the news media and announced that he had adopted the report. Plaintiff was identified by name in the Los Angeles Herald Examiner on May 2, 1978, and in the Los Angeles Times on May 3, 1978, as being among the 92 persons included in the commission‘s report, without tying him to any specific organized criminal activity. Thereafter, plaintiff unsuccessfully sought from the media defendants either a correction or retraction of the stories. (See
On August 9, 1978, plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages and other appropriate relief for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. Named and served as defendants were: Attorney General Younger; the Hearst Corporation, which publishes the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, reporter Mike Quall and publisher Frances Dale; the Times Mirror Corporation which publishes the Los Angeles Times, reporter Bill Farr and publisher Otis Chandler.
Each of the defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the publication of the information was privileged. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed the action as to all defendants. (See
Because we conclude a portion of the opinion of Justice Bernstein for the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, thoughtfully and correctly treats the issue of the legal efficacy of plaintiff‘s allegations, we adopt that portion of her opinion as our own. The Court of Appeal opinion, with appropriate deletions and additions,* is as follows:
[] [T]he media—that is all defendants except Younger—premised their demurrers on the privilege afforded by subdivisions 4 and 5 of section 47 of the Civil Code: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made—
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“4. By a fair and true report in a public journal, of (1) a judicial, (2) legislative, or (3) other public official proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof, . . .
“5. By a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings of a public meeting, if such meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.” A parallel privilege contained in the Restatement Second of Torts reads in relevant part as follows: “The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of . . . a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.” (Id., § 611.)
Clearly,
Somewhat more troublesome, however, is the accompanying requirement of [subdivision] 5 that the media articles be “fair and true” reports. Kilgore, of course, takes the position that the newspaper reports are substantially misleading in that they wrongfully imply that he was, and is, “engaged in criminal conspiracies involving murder, unlawful motorcycle gangs, prison gangs, terrorists, organized gambling, loan sharking, security thefts, investment frauds, pornography, prostitution and drug trafficking.” He maintains that this is neither fair nor true, because while the committee‘s report may have characterized him as an organized crime figure, it did not suggest that he was now, or indeed had ever been involved in organized underworld activity in the manner and to the extent set forth above.
In assessing this question, “the publication[s] [are] to be measured by the natural and probable effect [they] would have on the mind of the average reader. [Citations.] The standard of interpretation to be used in testing alleged defamatory language is how those in the community where the matter[s] [were] published would reasonably understand [them]. [Citation.]” (Handelsman v. San Francisco Chronicle (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 381, 387 [90 Cal.Rptr. 188] [brackets in Court of Appeal opinion].)
Kilgore‘s attempt to read the reports’ delineation of organized criminal activity as pertaining in all respects to himself is unwarranted. In our view, the average reader of either paper would reasonably interpret the articles to imply only that Kilgore was connected in some fashion with organized crime. As we see it, this is exactly the import of Attorney General Younger‘s release. In other words, we simply do not believe that the average reader would take the articles to intimate that Kilgore was involved in every—or even necessarily more than one—type of organized criminal activity. We hold, therefore, that the papers captured the substance of Attorney [General] Younger‘s release, and thus that the requirement of
As far as the second cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress is concerned, the reasoning which makes such a cause of action subject to the absolute privilege of subdivision 2 of section 47 of the Civil Code, applies with equal force to the privileges contained in subdivision 5 of the same section. (See Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 573, 579 [131 Cal.Rptr. 592].)
On the other hand, Kilgore‘s third cause of action, for invasion of privacy, is not grounded on the alleged inaccuracy of the papers’ reportage. Rather, it is predicated on the charge “that even if accurate
YOUNGER‘S DEMURRER
Subdivision 1 of section 47 of the Civil Code provides that a privileged publication is one made “[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty.” When that privilege applies, it is not qualified but absolute. (Saroyan v. Burkett (1962) 57 Cal.2d 706, 710 [21 Cal.Rptr. 557, 371 P.2d 293]; see also Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 412-413 [134 Cal.Rptr. 402, 556 P.2d 764]; Rest., Torts, § 591.) The absolute privilege is extended to “high-ranking state and federal officials, such as the President of the United States, the governor of any state or territory, cabinet officers of the United States and the corresponding officers of any state or territory” (Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co., supra, 18 Cal.3d, at p. 412) on the rationale that their ability to function would be impaired and society adversely affected if they were not absolutely free of the threat of suit by the defamed seeking recompense for injury. (See Rest.2d Torts, ch. 25, [topic 2,] tit. B [, p. 243]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 294.) Unlike qualified privileges, it is not negated by malice or other personal motivation of the publisher. [] [(See Rest.2d Torts, ch. 25, topic 3, tit. A, p. 258; 4 Witkin, supra, § 306.) Further, the privilege is equally applicable to defamation and other actions, excepting only those for malicious prosecution. (Pettitt v. Levy (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 484, 489 [104 Cal.Rptr. 650].)] For the absolute privilege to attach, the public official need only be properly discharging an official duty.
[¶] However, Kilgore contends that Younger was not entitled to the absolute privilege because:
(2) The dissemination of the information to the news media was politically motivated, i.e., Younger was acting as a candidate and therefor[e] not performing an “official duty.” []
The latter argument is without merit: Younger‘s alleged activity, though it may well have been taken to produce a popular and appealing law enforcement image, was for all intents and purposes indistinguishable from actions initiated by public officials truly oblivious to the political ramifications of their moves. [] Here, Younger called his press conference in his capacity as Attorney General, purported to act in such role throughout its duration and, at least as is here relevant, dealt exclusively with law enforcement issues. As such, it may not be said that his actions were outside the scope of his official duties, or that his motives were in fact improper. []
Having found Younger to be discharging an “official duty” at the press conference, we must now address Kilgore‘s other contention as to the “propriety” of that discharge. []
It is Kilgore‘s contention that Younger‘s duty to report under the Government Code was eclipsed by his duty to remain silent under the Penal Code. Under
Similarly, Kilgore points out that under
The basic problem with Kilgore‘s arguments, however, is that [] they “assume allegations not in the complaint.” They are, rather, based on a super-benign reading of paragraph IX of the first cause of action, [] [which reads: “Pursuant to such purported authorization from defendant EVELLE J. YOUNGER, the said Organized Crime Control Commission conducted a series of private, ‘closed-door’ hearings and conferences, not open to the public, to gather information, on a confidential basis, from various law enforcement officials, representatives of various governmental regulatory agencies and confidential informants. During the course of such hearings and conferences the said Commission gathered, received and reviewed ‘criminal record information,’ within the meaning of California
[¶] By no stretch of the imagination can this paragraph be read to allege “directly and positively” (People v. Jones (1899) 123 Cal. 299, 301 [55 P. 992]) [] that any of the statements concerning Kilgore were revelations of material which the Penal Code enjoins the Attorney General to keep confidential. As far as the pleading is concerned, the “criminal record information” and the “state summary criminal history information” were simply the source of the identities of 292 persons suspected of being linked to organized crime. There is no [] suggestion that the particular statements concerning Kilgore derived from this allegedly confidential information, rather than from information gathered “from various law enforcement officials, representatives of various governmental regulatory agencies and confidential informants.” In fact, the very opposite should be the truth: the sting—at least of the defamation—can hardly be the trivial differences between the convictions which Kilgore admittedly suffered [—in 1962 for bookmaking (
The only tenable contention that Younger‘s publication was not a “proper” discharge of his official duty lies in his alleged illegal dissemination of information made confidential by
Nor can we agree with plaintiff‘s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining defendant Younger‘s demurrer without giving plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. “Leave to amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiff‘s claim is clear, but, under the substantive law, no liability exists.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, § 847, p. 2451; Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 931, 942-943 [143 Cal.Rptr. 255]; Robertson v. City of Long Beach (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 676, 679 [66 P.2d 167].)
No California case has been brought to our attention which denies to a high-ranking state official, such as the Attorney General, immunity from civil liability for publications made in the course of his policy making functions, whether or not they are claimed to be made in violation of other statutory provisions. Instead, the disciplining of such public officials who act illegally traditionally has been left to criminal prosecution or impeachment, when appropriate, in order to free those officials “to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service . . .” (Barr v. Matteo (1958) 360 U.S. 564, 571 [3 L.Ed.2d 1434, 1441, 78 S.Ct. 204]; accord, Gregoire v. Biddle (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F.2d 579, 581; see Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 132, p. 989; 1 Harper & James, Law of Torts (1956) § 5.23, p. 429.)
Stated another way, the purpose of the official immunity accorded government officers is to avoid the “chilling effect” which the fear of damage suits would have on the energetic performance of the public‘s business. (See Barr v. Mateo, supra, 360 U.S. 564, 571 [3 L.Ed.2d 1434, 1441, 78 S.Ct. 204].) In the instant case, the potential for such a chilling effect is substantial. Mere allegation that the publication contained confidential information would avoid a demurrer. At a minimum, trials would be required to determine factually whether the genesis of the information was a statutorily protected file or some other unprotected source. Presumably, other charges of improper disclosure, no matter how trivial, would also demand factual hearings to delineate the scope of “propriety” in each case. At that point, of course, the damage to the proper functioning of government has already occurred since the threat of litigation will discourage public officials from providing for the extensive and robust dissemination of information so necessary in a democratic society.
It may be that the Legislature will determine at some point in the future that certain types of information are so deserving of confidentiality as to warrant compensation from government officials if the information is improperly disclosed. If so, such legislation would best focus on the nature of the information disclosed rather than the file from which it came, thus avoiding time-consuming and confusing litigation as to source. Pending such a legislative determination, however, the policies underlying the official immunity contained in
The judgment is affirmed.
Mosk, J., Newman, J., and Wiener, J.,* concurred.
BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.—I write separately because I cannot agree that the Attorney General, with his extensive powers over the enforcement of all state laws, has an absolute privilege to publish defamatory statements in violation of the state Constitution or statutory law. However, newspapers, which reprint this defamatory material released to them by the Attorney General, should not be liable for the republication.
I.
The California Constitution vests the office of the Attorney General with enormous powers over the lives of the citizens of this state. “Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the State. It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the Attorney General may seem advisable. Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney. When required by the public interest or
*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
In addition to being “chief law officer” of the state, and head of the Department of Justice (
The Attorney General has the duty to enforce a wide range of state statutes which require expertise in a variety of legal specialities. (See, e.g.,
In the area of criminal law, the Attorney General supervises all district attorneys and sheriffs. (
The Attorney General has been given the power to compile and disseminate certain data about individual citizens. This broad grant of power is coupled with the authority to investigate any crime as the chief law officer of the state. (
An investigation of any governmental official or agency by the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation may not take place without the prior approval of the Attorney General. (
The Attorney General is specifically authorized to set up and maintain a statewide telecommunications system for law enforcement purposes (
Having enumerated some of the unique powers and duties of the office of Attorney General, the court must decide if the chief law officer of this state may assert an absolute privilege to defame even if he violates the very statutes and Constitution he is charged with enforcing.
Executive officials are privileged if the defamatory statement or material they publish bears “some relation to the executive proceeding in which the officer is acting.” (Id., at p. 710, quoting Rest., Torts, § 591.) This privilege applies equally to claims of defamation and other causes of action. (Pettitt v. Levy (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 484, 489 [104 Cal.Rptr. 650] and cases cited therein.) However, it does not affect cases involving malicious prosecution. (Ibid.)
In the present case, the Attorney General demurred to the complaint and claimed he had an absolute privilege to defame based on his official duty privilege. He claims that he was obliged to report on his activities in the area of organized crime control. (
Plaintiff contends that the Attorney General lost the protection of the privilege by improperly discharging his duty and unlawfully publishing defamatory material about him. The Attorney General‘s free access to confidential and potentially damaging materials and his special duty to keep it secure make plaintiff‘s charge especially serious. Plaintiff contends that the Attorney General may not unlawfully divulge private data and then use the shield of his privilege since the privilege is available only when he is acting in the “proper” discharge of his duties.
The Attorney General relies primarily on Saroyan v. Burkett, supra, 57 Cal.2d 706. He claims that the official duty privilege is absolute and even a showing of unlawfulness will not deprive him of his statutory immunity. However, this position ignores the clear language of the statute which requires a “proper discharge” of duties before a person can invoke its protection.
The weight of authority suggests that an absolute privilege is not always accorded a governmental official. For example, if an official goes outside the grant of authority, such acts are not absolutely privileged. (See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas (1896) 161 U.S. 483, 498 [40 L.Ed. 780, 786, 16 S.Ct. 631] [“head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his authority” is absolutely privileged]; Cheatum v. Wehle (1959) 5 N.Y.2d 585 [186 N.Y.S.2d 606, 159 N.E.2d 166]; Rest.2d Torts, § 591, com. f.) Also, if an official is fulfilling only a ministerial and not a policy-making function, he is not absolutely privileged. (Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co., supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 413; H & M Associates v. City of El Centro (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 399, 408 [167 Cal.Rptr. 392].) These authorities illustrate that the bare assertion of an absolute privilege is not sufficient. Certain prerequisites must be shown before entitlement to such a privilege can be established.
Plaintiff contends that one such prerequisite is that the Attorney General‘s action must constitute a “proper,” or lawful, discharge of his duties. (See
Thus, the issue is whether an unlawful publication of allegedly defamatory confidential material by the Attorney General, who is responsible for safeguarding its dissemination, can ever be considered a “proper discharge” of his official duties. It would strain the credulity of even a jaundiced observer of the governmental scene if this court were to rule that an unlawful or unconstitutional act by the Attorney General could, nonetheless, be considered a “proper” discharge of his official tasks.
An absolute privilege only applies if the public service or administration of justice requires complete immunity. (Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at p. 824; see also Butz v. Economu, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 507 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 916].) The public has an overriding interest in the effective functioning of its government. However, it invests no discretion in its officials to violate the law. Moreover, the public has no interest in shielding high government officials from liability for unlawful or unconstitutional acts engaged in knowingly. On the contrary, when an executive officer engages in illegal activity, the cloak of his or her governmental office should not be used to immunize wrongdoing.
The Supreme Court articulated this important axiom in United States v. Lee (1882) 106 U.S. 196 [27 L.Ed.2d 171, 1 S.Ct. 240]. “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All of the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it. [¶] It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.” (Id., at p. 220 [27 L.Ed. at p. 182].)
With the memories of gross abuses by the highest officers of our land still fresh, it is especially important that an illegal act not be approved by this court as an official duty encompassed within the mandate of public office.
The Attorney General‘s office is a particularly sensitive office since the holder of that position is the chief law enforcement officer of the state. As the attorney for the state, the Attorney General must take responsibility for his own violations of statutory or constitutional prohibitions. Impeachment is not a useful remedy for the state‘s citizenry because it is a cumbersome and unwieldy process which is never used. Also, it may be too great a sanction for every violation. Further, reliance on the criminal prosecution machinery to correct unlawful governmental acts by the Attorney General is inadequate at best. Since
The average citizen who commits an unlawful act may be held both criminally and civilly liable. Surely, the Attorney General claiming the protection of his office is no more authorized by that office to commit a crime or an unconstitutional act than is any other citizen of this state. Is it too much to expect that the Attorney General meticulously obey both the letter and the spirit of the law? I think not. The Attorney General is scarcely in a position to claim that he is authorized to violate any provision of the law. Since the Attorney General occupies a unique position, he should not be able through an unlawful act to cause injury to a citizen of this state with impunity. The public interest is not being served and the victim of his illegal act should be free to pursue his legal remedy for damages.
In Butz v. Economu, supra, the United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion. The Butz opinion rested on the impor-
“If, as the Government argues, all officials exercising discretion were exempt from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution could provide no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter federal officials from committing constitutional wrongs. . . . [¶] The extension of absolute immunity from damages liability to all federal executive officials would seriously erode the protection provided by basic constitutional guarantees.” (Id., at p. 505 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 915].)
Based on public policy considerations, the court concluded that qualified immunity would be sufficient to protect officials invested with discretionary powers.8 “. . . [C]ases have recognized that it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law, and that insisting on an awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment. . . . [¶] . . . Federal officials will not be liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law. But we see no substantial basis for holding, as the United States would have us do, that executive officers generally may with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is known to them to violate the United States Constitution or in a manner that they should know transgresses a clearly established constitutional rule.” (Id., at pp. 506-507 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 916].)
In the present case, the issue before the court involves the privilege as it applies to the chief law enforcement officer in the state. The Attorney General is not authorized as part of his official duties to violate constitutional mandates or statutory proscriptions. The nondisclosure statutes which are the basis of plaintiff‘s gravamen and which he alleges were violated in this case specifically prohibit the wholesale dissemination of criminal records.9 They protect the individual‘s constitutional right of privacy.
Here, if the Attorney General knew or should have known that the publication of confidential material violated clear constitutional or statutory law when he published it, then he could not be said to be “properly discharging his official duties.” (Cf. Wood v. Strickland (1975) 420 U.S. 308, 322 [43 L.Ed.2d 214, 225, 95 S.Ct. 992].) He has no absolute privilege to do so under
If unlawful acts committed by the Attorney General are not “proper” within the meaning of
Plaintiff contended that the Attorney General invaded his right of privacy by disseminating criminal records about him which the Attorney General was duty-bound under these statutes to keep confidential. These assertions were alluded to in the complaint but were not specifically alleged. As a result, the complaint is defective as to substance. However, the defect may be cured by the inclusion of the missing alle-
Since there is a possibility that plaintiff can plead a proper legal claim, the cause should be returned to the trial court. It is conceivable that plaintiff can allege a knowing violation of his constitutional right of privacy (
II.
The trial court was correct in granting a general demurrer without leave to amend as it applies to the media defendants. Since the opinion of the Court of Appeal by Judge Florence Bernstein properly resolved this issue, that portion of her opinion is set out in pertinent part.12
“[][T]he media—that is all defendants except Younger—premised their demurrers on the privilege afforded by subdivisions 4 and 5 of section 47 of the Civil Code: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made— . . . 4. By a fair and true report in a public journal, of (1) a judicial, (2) legislative, or (3) other public official proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof . . . 5. By a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings of a public meeting, if such meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.”
Clearly,
Somewhat more troublesome, however, is the accompanying requirement of [subdivision] 5 that the media articles be “fair and true” reports. [Plaintiff] takes the position that the newspaper reports are substantially misleading in that they wrongfully imply that he was, and is, “engaged in criminal conspiracies involving murder, unlawful motorcycle gangs, prison gangs, terrorists, organized gambling, loan sharking, security thefts, investment frauds, pornography, prostitution and drug trafficking.” He maintains that this is neither fair nor true, because [] the committee‘s report may have characterized him as an organized crime figure, [but] it did not suggest that he was now, or indeed had ever been involved in organized underworld activity in the manner and to the extent set forth above.
The media respond by asserting that the protection of the privilege is earned by any report which captures the substance, the “gist” or “sting” of the subject proceedings or documents. (See Hayward v. Watsonville Register-Pajaronian and Sun, supra.) Both papers, of course, urge [that] the trial court‘s conclusion [be upheld] that in fact the substance of their reports remained true to [the Attorney General‘s] statements and the materials released by him.
In assessing this question, “the publication[s] [are] to be measured by the natural and probable effect [they] would have on the mind of the average reader. [Citations.] The standard of interpretation to be used in
[Plaintiff‘s] attempt to read the reports’ delineation of organized criminal activity as pertaining [in] all respects to himself is unwarranted. [T]he average reader of either paper would reasonably interpret the articles to imply only that [plaintiff] was connected in some fashion with organized crime. [T]his is exactly the import of [the] Attorney General[‘s] release. [] [T]herefore, [] the papers captured the substance of [the] Attorney General[‘s] release[.] [T]hus[,] [] the requirement of
As far as the second cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress is concerned, the reasoning which makes such a cause of action subject to the absolute privilege of subdivision 2 of section 47 of the Civil Code, applies with equal force to the privileges contained in subdivision 5 of the same section. (See Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 573, at p. 579 [131 Cal.Rptr. 592].)
On the other hand, [plaintiff‘s] third cause of action, for invasion of privacy, is not grounded on the alleged inaccuracy of the papers’ reportage. Rather, it is predicated on the charge “that even if accurate the publication of the facts interferes with his ‘right to be left alone.’ [Citation.]” (Kapellas v. Kofman, supra, 1 Cal.3d 20, 35 [81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912].) With regard to the media, however, [plaintiff] enjoyed no such rights: [b]y virtue of the release of the report and appendix A thereto, [plaintiff‘s] name and alleged criminal involvement became matters of public record. Manifestly, the publication of such “newsworthy” information may not be circumscribed, at least where, as here, the articles carefully noted the “alleged” nature of the report and [plaintiff‘s alleged] underworld involvement. (See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, 420 U.S. 469 [43 L.Ed.2d 328, 955 S.Ct. 1029]; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. b: “There is no liability [for invasion of privacy] when the defendant merely gives further publicity to informa-
III.
The Attorney General has been entrusted by law with the power and duty to prosecute any violation of state law. He cannot claim an absolute privilege based on an official duty exemption where he is shown to have committed unlawful acts himself. The chief law enforcement officer of this state is not above the law. Since he is responsible for the uniform application of the laws, he cannot be held to be immune from suit when his actions are illegal. His office must set an example for the citizenry by scrupulously obeying all statutory and constitutional mandates.
When the occupant of that office knowingly violates the law, he improperly discharges his functions and loses the protection of his privilege. If the plaintiff can allege facts that show that the Attorney General knew or should have known that his publication violated statutory or constitutional provisions, the complaint states a cause of action that is not covered by the official duty privilege of
I would reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to permit plaintiff leave to amend the complaint as it relates to the Attorney General‘s alleged unlawful acts. In all other respects, I would affirm the judgment.
Tobriner, J.,* and Tamura, J.,† concurred.
TAMURA, J.,† Concurring and Dissenting.—I am in full accord with the views expressed by the Chief Justice in her concurring and dissenting opinion.
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. †Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
Nor am I persuaded by the rationale that there will be a “chilling effect” on the energetic performance of official duty if public officials are not accorded unconditional immunity from civil liability for otherwise unlawful or unconstitutional acts. This theoretical basis for the rule of absolute official immunity has been properly criticized as presupposing that the specter of civil liability will deter a conscientious official from discharging his official duties in an energetic and responsible manner. (See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus (1963) 10 UCLA L.Rev. 463, 478-480.) During our recent national tragedy similar justifications were offered to excuse official excesses.
A rationale like the one advanced to support unconditional immunity of public officers from civil liability when acting in the scope of their duties has been advanced in defense of the doctrine of sovereign immunity from torts. It has been said that “public service would be hindered and the public safety endangered” if the doctrine of sovereign immunity were abolished. (The Siren v. United States (1869) 74 U.S. 152, 154 [19 L.Ed. 129, 130-131]; 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 25.01, pp. 438-439.) As Professor Davis points out experience has shown that abolition of the doctrine has neither hindered public service nor endangered public safety. Indeed, he notes that “the New York experience proves overwhelmingly that substituting sovereign
The notion that public officials must be unconditionally shielded from civil liability for injury caused by even a knowing violation of a statutory proscription or a knowing violation of a citizen‘s constitutional right because otherwise the officials would be deterred from the energetic discharge of their duties is as groundless as the justification offered for the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The language of
Bird, C. J., and Tobriner, J.,* concurred.
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
