175 Ga. 146 | Ga. | 1932
E. L. Kilburn sought injunction to restrain Mechanics Loan & Savings Co. from causing process of garnishment to be served upon his employer, and prayed also that three judgments obtained by Mechanics Loan & Savings Co. in the municipal court of Atlanta against Kilburn be declared null and void, and canceled of record; that garnishments instituted against petitioner be declared void; that if the court should hold that the municipal court judgments could not be collaterally attacked, then that enforcement of such judgments and the institution of successive garnishments be enjoined until motions to set them aside in the municipal court could be determined; and for general relief. The causes alleged as a basis for the relief sought are that Mechanics Loan & Savings Co. brought two suits against Kilburn in the municipal court of Atlanta. In one of them judgment was for the plaintiff, while in the other the judgment was for Kilburn. Motions for new trial were filed in both cases. At this time Kilburn
The general demurrer of the defendant, on the grounds that the petition failed to state a cause of action or any ground for the relief prayed, and showed that the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law, was sustained and the petition was dismissed. The petitioner excepted. His insistence is that the giving of the note in order to avoid the threatened objection to his discharge in bankruptcy was void, because contrary to public policy; that this constituted a good defense to the suit on the note, of which he was deprived by the fraud of the Loan & Savings Company in representing to him that the suit would be dismissed.
The petition alleges that the defendant company threatened to object to the discharge of petitioner in bankruptcy “on the grounds that petitioner . . had . . made to the defendant herein materially false statements in writing respecting [his] financial condition, in order to induce defendant herein to make loans of money to petitioner.” Nowhere in the petition is it alleged that this contention is unfounded, nor is the contention denied. The petition must be construed most strongly against the pleader. Accordingly the petitioner admits the truth of the contention of the de
In Moore v. Trounstine, 126 Ga. 116 (54 S. E. 810, 7 Ann. Cas. 971), it was held: “A promise by a debtor to pay a previously existing debt to his creditor, made after the former’s adjudication as a bankrupt but before his discharge, will not be impaired by the subsequently acquired discharge.” In the opinion this court said: “It has been very generally held that the new promise may be made any time after adjudication of bankruptcy, before or after discharge. Brandenburg on Bankruptcy, § 391; 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.), 790, note; 5 Cyc. 409, and cases cited. The discharge of the bankrupt relates back to the adjudication of bankruptcy, and a promise by a bankrupt to pay a debt provable in bankruptcy renews the debt. In Anderson v. Clark, 70 Ga. 362, the defendant pleaded that he had been adjudicated a bankrupt, and prayed a stay of proceedings, but subsequently withdrew the plea and confessed judgment; and the court held that such conduct amounted to a new promise to pay and an agreement that the judgment should bind him, and precluded him in a subsequent suit on the judgment from making the defense of bankruptcy. The principle of this case was also recognized in Steadman v. Lee, 61 Ga. 58, Howell v. Glover, 65 Ga. 468, and in Adams v. Dickson, 72 Ga. 846.” In the opinion Ross v. Jordan, 62 Ga. 298, and Thornton v. Nichols, 119 Ga. 50 (45 S. E. 785), were explained. The ruling made in Moore v. Trounstine was followed in Dicks v. Andrews, 132 Ga. 601 (64 S. E. 788, 16 Ann. Cas. 1070). In the present case the new note sued upon was given after bankruptcy and before discharge. Moreover, under the allegations of the petition, the debt for which the note was given was not dischargeable in bankruptcy; therefore the case falls within the ruling made in Moore v. Trounstine and Dicks v. Andrews. In the latter case the court discussed
While the suit on the new indebtedness evidenced by the new promissory note was pending in the municipal court the maker was informed by the loan company that the suit was instituted by mistake and that it would be dismissed. The maker, acting upon this advice, paid no further attention to the suit. The loan company disregarded the advice so given, and took judgment on the note. Under the ruling made above, the petition does not set up any reason for a writ of injunction. Conceding that petitioner was misled and misinformed, as alleged, such conduct on the part of the loan company could not in any way injure the petitioner, since he sets up no valid defense to the pending suit on the note.
A large number of cases may be cited, holding that a court of equity will set aside a judgment procured by fraud, whether the fraud is committed on the court or on the opposite side. An instance would be where the opposite party or his counsel was kept away from court by reason of some sort of valid agreement based upon a valid consideration of mutual benefits, which the promisor had no intention to and did not perform. As an example of such cases see Hemphill v. Ruckersville Bank, 3 Ga. 435, 442; Markham v. Angier, 57 Ga. 44; Beverly v. Flesenthall, 142 Ga. 834, 837 (83 S. E. 942). This list is not exhaustive, but it is sufficient for purposes of illustration. All of these cases and like cases, however, were cases wherein the defendant had a good defense to the action and where he was fraudulently induced to withdraw his de
The third headnote does not require elaboration.
Judgment affirmed.