delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Kiefer-Stewart Company, is an Indiana drug concern which does a wholesale liquor business. Respondents, Sеagram and Calvert corporations, are affiliated companies that sell liquor in interstate commerce tо Indiana wholesalers. Petitioner brought this action in a federal district court for treble damages under the Sherman Act. 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 15. The complaint charged that respondents had agreed or conspired to sell liquor only to those Indiana wholesalеrs who would resell at prices fixed by Seagram and Calvert, and that this agreement deprived petitioner of a continuing suрply of liquor to its great damage.
*
On the trial, evidence was introduced tending to show that respondents had fixed maximum prices above which the wholesalers could not resell. The jury returned a verdict for petitioner and damages were awаrded. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an agreement among competitors to fix maximum resale prices of their products does not violate the Sherman Act. For such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment. We reaffirm what we said in
United States
v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
The Court of Appeals also erred in holding the evidence insufficient to support a finding by the jury that respondents had conspired to fix maximum resale prices. The jury was authorized by the evidence to accept the following as facts: Seagram refused to sell to petitioner and others unless the purchasеrs agreed to the maximum resale price fixed by Seagram. Calvert was at first willing to sell without this restrictive condition and arrangеments were made for petitioner to buy large quantities of Calvert liquor. Petitioner subsequently was informed by Calvert, however, thаt the arrangements would not be carried out because Calvert had “to go along with Seagram.” Moreover, about this time conferences were held by officials of the respondents concerning sales of liquor to petitioner. Thereafter, on identical terms as to the fixing of retail prices, both Seagram and Calvert resumed sales to other Indiana wholesalers who agreed to abide by such conditions, but no shipments have been made to petitioner.
The foregoing is suffiсient to justify the challenged jury finding that respondents had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding when they forbade
*214
their purchasers to exceed the fixed ceilings. Thus, there is support for the conclusion that a conspiracy existed,
American Tobacco Co.
v.
United States,
Respondents also seek to support the judgment of reversal on other grounds not passed on by the Court of Appeals but which have been argued here both orally and in the briefs. Thеse grounds raise only issues of law not calling for examination or appraisal of evidence and we will consider thеm. Respondents introduced evidence in the District Court designed to show that petitioner had agreed with other Indiana wholesalers to set minimum prices for the sale of liquor in violation of the antitrust laws. It is now contended that the trial court erred in сharging the jury that petitioner’s part in such a conspiracy, even if proved, was no defense to the present cаuse of action. We hold that the instruction was correct. Seagram and Calvert acting individually perhaps might have refused to deal with petitioner or with any or all of the Indiana wholesalers. But the Sherman Act makes it an offense for respоndents to agree among themselves to stop selling to particular customers. If petitioner and others were guilty of infrаctions of the antitrust laws, they could be held responsible in appropriate proceedings brought against them by the Gоvernment or by injured private persons. The alleged illegal conduct of petitioner, however, could not legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize them against liability to those they injured. Cf.
Fashion Originators’ Guild
v.
Trade Comm’n,
*215
Respondents next suggest that their status as “mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandizing unit” makes it impossible for them to have conspired in a manner forbidden by the Shеrman Act. But this suggestion runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws.
E. g. United States
v.
Yellow Cab Co.,
It is also claimed that the District Court improperly refused to withdraw from the jury an issue as to respondents’ violation of the Clayton Act which had been charged in the complaint but which was not provеd. A fair reading of the instructions to the jury, however, reveals that the trial court submitted to them only the cause of action under the Sherman Act. We are convinced from this record that a more formal withdrawal of the Clayton Act issue would have sеrved solely to confuse.
Other contentions of error in the admission of evidence and in the charge to the jury are sо devoid of merit that it is unnecessary to discuss them.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Notes
Petitioner also charged a violation of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 18, but this theory has been abandoned and is not important here. See p. 215, infra.