Defendants appeal by leave granted the trial court’s order reinstating this medical malpractice, wrongful death action. We reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to grant summary disposition in favor of defendants. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
In an earlier appeal involving this litigation, this Court’s opinion presented a concise statement of the pertinent facts:
Decedent (DOB 5-3-00) died on May 16, 2000 after receiving treatment from defendants. Plaintiff, decedent’s mother, was appointed personal representative of decedent’s estate, and letters of authority were issued to her on September 21, 2000. On May 3, 2002, plaintiff filed a notice *168 of intent (NOI) to file a medical malpractice action, as required by MCL 600.2912d. During the time period relevant to this case, the filing of a[n] NOI tolled the statute of limitations for 182 days. Plaintiff filed suit alleging medical malpractice on November 19, 2002.
Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that plaintiffs complaint was barred by the statute of limitations because it was filed more than two years after the date of the alleged malpractice, and no saving[ ] provision applied. Defendants relied on Waltz v Wyse,469 Mich 642 , 650;677 NW2d 813 (2004), in which the Supreme Court held that the tolling period provided for in MCL 600.5856(d) did not apply to the saving! ] provision in MCL 600.5852. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Waltz, supra, did not apply retroactively to bar plaintiffs action. Subsequently, the trial court entered an order staying proceedings pending defendants’ appeal of the order denying summary disposition. Since the entry of the trial court’s order, this Court has held that the holding in Waltz, supra, applies retroactively. Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp,271 Mich App 503 ;722 NW2d 666 (2006).
Decedent died on May 16,2000; thus, the cause of action accrued on that date. Plaintiffs letters of authority were issued on September 21, 2000. Plaintiff did not file suit on or before either May 16, 2002, the date the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions expired,[ 1 ] or September 21, 2002, the date the two-year saving provision expired.[ 2 ] [Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 23, 2007 (Docket No. 257703), slip op at 1-2 (some citations omitted).]
This Court concluded that in light of its resolution of the conflict presented in Mullins, applying Waltz retro *169 actively, plaintiffs suit was not timely and was thus barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 2. This Court additionally held that judicial tolling was not available to save the cause of action. Id. at 2-3. Accordingly, this Court reversed and remanded this case to the trial court with instructions to grant summary disposition in favor of defendants. Id. at 3.
The trial court complied with this Court’s directive. After the trial court’s dismissal of the case, this Court’s conflict resolution decision in
Mullins
was reversed. Our Supreme Court held, “this Court’s decision in
Waltz...
does not apply to any causes of action filed after
Omelenchuk v City of Warren,
With this new development in caselaw suggesting that Waltz need not be applied to claimant in her circumstances, plaintiff moved to reinstate her case in the trial court. Plaintiff cited MCR 2.612(C)(1)(e) (authorizing relief from judgment where “a prior judgment on which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated”), and (f) (“[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment”). The trial court granted the motion while stating its expectation that the issue would ultimately be decided by the appellate courts.
In this appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in reinstating the case. They state that plaintiffs failure to appeal the judgment of this Court, ordering summary disposition in favor of defendants, made that decision the law of the case, which the trial court was obliged to follow. We agree.
*170
“This Court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision concerning a motion to reinstate an action.”
Wickings v Arctic Enterprises, Inc,
“Under the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court ruling on a particular issue binds ... all lower tribunals with regard to that issue. The law of the case mandates that a court may not decide a legal question differently where the facts remain materially the same.”
Webb v Smith (After Second Remand),
In this case, MCR 2.612(C)(1)(e) does not apply because this Court’s decision ordering the grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants has not been reversed or otherwise vacated; its holding has been overruled by subsequent caselaw. There is an important distinction.
Reversing or vacating a decision changes the result in the specific case before an appellate court. On the other hand, a decision to overrale a particular rale of law affects not only the specific case before the appellate court, but also future litigation. A decision to overrule is an appellate court’s declaration that a rule of law no longer has precedential value. See
Sumner v Gen Motors Corp (On Remand),
MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) is likewise inapplicable. Just as “equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights,”
Falk v State Bar of Michigan,
Furthermore, MCR 2.612 envisions a court relieving a party from its own judgment, not the judgment of a higher authority. No provision of the rule allowed the trial court in this case to relieve plaintiff from the judgment embodied in this Court’s January 23, 2007, opinion.
For these reasons, we reverse the result below and again remand this case to the trial court with instructions to grant summary disposition in favor of defendants.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.