Kidd v. StateKidd v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Shahood, Polen, May
Appellant, Mickey T. Kidd, was found guilty by a jury of one count of first-degree murder with a firearm and one count of attempted robbery with a firearm. The sole issue he raises on appeal is his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
“The general rule is that the adequacy of a lawyer‘s representation may not be raised for the first time on a direct appeal. The rationale for the rule is that that issue has not been raised or ruled on by the trial court.” Dennis v. State, 696 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Such claims should properly be raised on a motion for post-conviction relief. See
Appellant cites Gordon v. State, 469 So.2d 795, 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), in which this court acknowledged the general rule against ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal but found that trial counsel‘s deficient performance was apparent on the face of the record. However, this court noted that Gordon was an extraordinary case because the appellant had pointed out 104 instances where defense counsel had failed to object to improper questions or comments by the prosecutor. Gordon, 469 So.2d at 797. Concurring specially, Judge Anstead wrote to caution litigants that the court would not ordinarily hear ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal, and that the proper procedure for such a claim was a motion for post-conviction relief:
Such claims ordinarily turn on issues of fact and both sides are entitled to present relevant evidence to the trial court to resolve those issues. It is only because of the gross and patent showing of ineffectiveness virtually conceded by the state on this record that we are taking the highly unusual step of intervening at this stage of the proceedings.
Id. at 798. After the passage of
Appellant claims defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he allowed the state to introduce inadmissible hearsay in the form of prior testimony of an unavailable witness where state failed to prove the unavailability of the witness. The record shows that appellant‘s trial counsel did not simply fail to object, but that appellant and his counsel discussed the matter and decided for their own reasons to allow the state to admit the testimony uncontested. We make no ruling on the trial court‘s admission of the testimony. We hold only that ineffective assistance of counsel was not apparent from the face of the record.
We therefore affirm without prejudice to appellant‘s ability to file a
Affirmed.
POLEN and MAY, JJ., concur.