61 So. 100 | Ala. | 1913
In 1911 appellee filed her bill under the statute to settle the title to lands held by her. The cause was submitted on proof of the will of John W. Kidd, back to whom all parties tráce their titles, a certain deed of trust executed by him, and an agreed statement of facts, all which, so far as necessary to an under
As will appear, in 1858 John W. Kidd executed and delivered the deed purporting to convey to trustees, upon the trusts therein set down, certain lands other than those in controversy. On the same day, but following the execution of the deed, Kidd executed his will, which was duly probated after his death in 1865. This deed, which was duly acknowledged and recorded, though it was testamentary in that part which authorized the trustees therein appointed to demand and receive of executors to be appointed any legacy or bequest which the grantor might give to his wife and the children of his second marriage, was not probated as a part of the will. It cannot therefore be recognized as a substantive part of the will. — Wood v. Mathews, 53 Ala. 1. However, regard may be had for its disposition in the construction of doubtful provisions of the will as constituting a part of all those attendant circumstances to which the court will look in order to learn the true intent and purpose of the testamentary language used, though such provisions as may be clearly located and ascertained within the four corners of the instrument cannot be affected or changed by considerations aliunde. In part at least the instrument of first execution was not of testamentary character, for it operated in presentí to pass title to the property therein described, though postponing possession, and was as to that title and its limitations not revocable. The nearness of the two acts to one another, their common purpose to make provision for the second wife of the grantor-testator and his children by her, and the reference of each to the other, lead the court, as far as may be without transgressing established rules of law for the transmission
At one place in his will testator said: “I hereby give unto my beloved wife whatever real estate I may die seized and possessed of, situated in Shelby county.” But the will must be construed as a whole, testator’s intention being gathered from a consideration of all parts of it in connection, and in the forepart of the same sentence from which we have quoted above testator said: “Whereas I have in the providence of God been twice married and have children by each marriage. My first children have all left me and have, by way of advancement, received a part of.my estate hereinafter more particularly set forth, and I have by deed heretofore conveyed to my beloved wife, Mary Georgiana, and my
The deed of the widow, Mary Georgiana, under which complainant holds and claims by mesne conveyance, though it purported to convey the entire estate in fee with covenants of warranty, was effective as a conveyance of her interest as a tenant in common for her life only. — Colemcm v. Stewart, 170 Ala. 255, 53 South. 1020; Fielder v. Childs, 73 Ala. 567; McMichael v. Craig, 105 Ala. 382, 16 South. 883; Hall v. Condon, 164 Ala. 393, 51 South. 20. And that is now the extent and character of complainant’s title, unless, by lapse of time coupled with adverse claim, a larger interest has become vested in her.
So far as concerns the term for the life of Mary Georgiana Kidd, who still survives, we think it has been lost to defendants. There is nothing in the agreed facts to indicate an assertion of title hostile to respondents prior to the sale by the widow to Flippin in 1880. The agreement is that “Flippin under his deed from Mary Georgiana Kidd went into immediate possession and held said land for 10 years in actual, notorious, and exclusive possession, and during such time did not recognize or admit the title of the respondents or any other party,
But another contention, resting npon principles different from those obtaining in cases to which the statute of limitations applies, must be taken into account. For more than 30 years complainant and her immediate grantor have been in possession without any recognition of the rights of defendants. During that time, it is to be inferred, defendants have enjoyed no benefit of their ownership, and for more than 20 years they might have taken or claimed possession and upon denial of their rights might have maintained an action in their own name and behalf. This court has repeatedly held that the lapse of 20 years, without recognition of adversary right, or admission of liability, operates an absolute rule of repose. Many of the cases are cited in Jackson v. Elliott, 100 Ala. 669, 13 South. 690, where the question of the application of the doctrine of prescription to a case between tenants in common was put aside because not raised by the record in such form as to require consideration. A reading of these cases leads us to the conclusion that, as to the estate for the life of testator’s widow, defendants have been barred by a failure for more than 20 years to assert their rights. In the meantime complainant and her immediate predecessor in title have been in the uninterrupted and unquestioned possession of the land and in the like enjoyment of its undivided usufruct without the slightest
The estate in remainder must be disposed of on still different principles. As to that, defendants have never at any time been in a position to ask for any judgment or decree presently operative upon the possession of the property or the enjoyment of its usufruct. In such case laches cannot be predicated on the ground of mere delay because there, can be no delay where there is no right to move. In such case the remainderman cannot be barred pending the life estate by the statute of limitations, nor is there field for the operation of the doctrine of prescription. See the cases cited in Jackson v. Elliott, supra, and our recent case of Winters v. Powell, 180 Ala. 425, 61 South. 96.
It folloAvs that, as between the parties, complainant is entitled to an unincumbered estate in the entire property for and during the life of Mary Georgiana Kidd. As to. the remainder, upon the birth of John M. Kidd, he became entitled to share equally with William, James, and Anna Philida, each taking a fourth. On the death of Anna Philida in 1887, intestate, unmarried, and without children, her undivided fourth in the remainder devolved under the statute then in force on her three surviving brothers, who thereupon became the. OAvners of the entire interest in remainder in the proportion of an undivided one-third interest each. On the death of James W. in 1909 intestate, his third devolved upon his children Thos J., Meeda T., and James M., in the proportion of one-ninth each; and so the title stands at this time. In one particular the chancellor
Reversed and rendered.