44 S.E.2d 910 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1947
1. The motion to dismiss the writ of error is denied.
(a) Although the bill of exceptions does not specifically name a defendant in error, the recitals therein show clearly that the garnishee named in the garnishment proceeding is the defendant in error, and this is sufficient.
(b) A garnishment proceeding is a separate case from that in aid of which it is instituted, and the defendant in the main case is not a party to the garnishment proceeding, and is not a necessary party to a bill of exceptions complaining of a ruling in the garnishment case.
(c) A ruling quashing a summons of garnishment and directing that the garnishee need not answer as required by the summons is a final judgment from which an appeal will lie to this court.
2. A garnishment proceeding is ancillary to the main suit and is a distinct cause of action between different parties, and in an attachment proceeding under the Code, § 8-101, against two or more defendants, the plaintiff in attachment may levy it as to one defendant by serving a process of garnishment on another defendant requiring him to answer as to what he may owe the codefendant in the attachment suit, or what money, property or effects he may have in his hands belonging to such codefendant.
1. The plaintiff moves to dismiss the writ of error upon the ground that the bill of exceptions fails to name a defendant in error, and because it fails to include as a party the Music Corporation of America, and because the ruling complained of was not a final judgment in the court below. We do not think the motion to dismiss is meritorious. While the bill of exceptions does not specifically name a defendant in error, the recitals therein show clearly that Harry James is the defendant in error and this is sufficient. The Music Corporation of America is not a necessary party to the bill of exceptions because the ruling complained of therein was made in a garnishment proceeding to which it was not a party under the rulings cited in the second division of this opinion. The judgment complained of was final as between the parties to the garnishment proceeding. Furthermore, the attorney for the garnishee, *854
in acknowledging service of the bill of exceptions, stated that he had "no objections to offer to its form." For these several reasons we have concluded that the motion to dismiss should be denied. See Crowley v. Hughes,
2. Neither side has called our attention to any case in Georgia directly in point, and counsel for both parties seem to admit in their briefs that the question presented, that is, whether a defendant in an attachment proceeding can be made a garnishee as to property or money in his hands belonging to his codefendant, has not been decided by the courts of this State. There are several decisions in attachment and garnishment cases, however, which seem to us to control the instant case. "While ancillary to the main suit, a garnishment is a distinct cause of action between different parties, requiring a separate and independent judgment." Dent v. Dent,
Under the rulings in the foregoing authorities Harry James was a defendant in two separate and distinct cases, that is to say, in the main attachment case, and also in the garnishment case. While he obviously could not be made to answer a summons of garnishment in the latter case by saying under oath how much he was indebted to himself, as a defendant in the first case, we see no reason why he could not be required in a garnishment proceeding which was a separate and distinct action, to answer as to an indebtedness due by him to a codefendant in the attachment case. The Music Corporation of America and Harry James, the two defendants in the main case, could have been indebted to the plaintiff as alleged by him in his affidavit, and it is altogether possible and conceivable that James could also have been indebted to Music *855 Corporation of America, or could have had in his possession money, property or effects of the Music Corporation of America, wholly without regard to the indebtedness of the two defendants to the plaintiff. When the defendant James moved to quash the summons of garnishment it was amended, and without objection on his part, so as to require him to answer as garnishee merely as to what indebtedness he owed Music Corporation of America, or what property or effects he had belonging to said corporation. Therefore, the defendant James was not required to do an impossible thing, as contended by the defendant, by being required to answer as a garnishee in one case what he was indebted to a codefendant in another case; and the court erred in quashing the summons of garnishment as excepted to by the plaintiff.
Judgment reversed. Sutton, C. J., and Felton, J., concur.