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Kibbe v. Dubois
269 F.3d 26
1st Cir.
2001
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 Pеtitioner, Appellee, KIBBE, Mark A. Respondents, DUBOIS, al.,

Larry et E.

Appellants. 00-2440.

No. Appeals, States

United

First Circuit. 6, 2001. June

Heard 23, 2001. Oct.

Decided *2 Benedetto, Attor-

Annette C. Assistant Reilly, General, F. whom Thomas ney brief, General, appel- was on Attorney *3 lants. brief, appel- for Speer, M.

Brownlow lee. TORRUELLA, Judge, Circuit

Before LYNCH, CYR, Judge, and Circuit Senior Judge. Circuit TORRUELLA, Judge. Circuit (“Kibbe”) was A. Kibbe Appellee Mark dwelling of a house with arson charged court in County Massachusetts. Hampden 9 and jury a June He tried before was lesser guilty of the found building. a of arson of included offense court, remedies, exhausting state After of habeas for the petitioned Kibbe writ granted The district corpus. refer- ruling prosecutor’s petition, dur- post-Miranda silence ence to Kibbe’s argu- closing examination ing cross Because we unconstitutional. ments was has satisfied Kibbe conclude that of 28 exacting standards under the burden 2254(d) by the Anti- § as amended U.S.C. Act Penalty Effective Death terrorism and court’s we reverse district petition Mark Kibbe’s grant deсision corpus. the writ of habeas

BACKGROUND Trial Testi- from the A. Facts Elicited mony 15, 1991, approximately On November Paul walked evening, in the Martin 11:15 and saw parents’ house outside Almira Road at 171 unoccupied house also in smoke. He heavily engulfed a crackling noises consistent heard parents’ returned to his Martin fire. “911,” house, mother to call told his vantage this street. From returned to the who was observed man point, Martin wearing down, what appeared to be a ei- officers then had a brief conversation with orange, brightly-colored jacket. ther red or Kibbe. Witkowski testified that an- The unidentified man walked from the swered questions and told him why he backyard of 171 down driveway Almira was in the area. edge to the of the road. When the sound trial, At Kibbe took the stand and of- audible, of sirens was the man walked back fered following testimony. On the uр the in the driveway direction from night in question, he attended an Alcohol-

which he had come. ics Anonymous meeting until approximate- minutes, Within few Detective Albert ly 9:00 p.m., and then took bus home. Rooke, Witkowski and Eugene Officer *4 home, Once he arrived at he immediately both Springfield members the police again went out pipe, smoke his because department, arrived at the scene. They he was not allowed to do inso the house. Martin, spoke with who told them that he He walked all around the neighborhood had a observed man come from back- the and a flashlight found and propane tank in yard. Witkowski went to the backyard to the woods. He then went into the back- investigate, person where he saw a in the yard of 171 Almira Road because he need- rear corner yard wearing a red There, ed to urinate. he noticed smoke jacket holding object and an in his hand. coming from the back of house. After Witkowski testified at trial that he identi- minutes, several he walked to the front of police fied himself as a officer and asked and, upon siren, house hearing a he the man if he talk with could him for a turned around and walked into the back- man, moment. In response, the later iden- yard. then “got He scared” and away, ran Kibbe, tified as ran. gave Witkowski allegedly because he was on parole. After chase and radioed for assistance. Officer he was by Rooke, apprehended Kibbe tes- Rooke, who had continued to interview tified that the “questioned officers me as Martin, responded to request Witkowski’s to what I was doing,” that he “an- and joined and the chase. Rooke down ran swered them over and again.” over Strеet, Newfield ordering Kibbe stop, allegedly which only hastened flight. his Friberg, Kenneth investigator arson continued, The chase terminating only af- scene, who was at the also testified. Once ter Kibbe fell in the wooded area in which the extinguished fire was and smoke running. red, he was Kibbe was a wearing cleared, had Friberg entered the cellar at heavy jacket winter gloves. and black He 171 Almira to determine the cause of the also had black soot marks on his and nose There, fire. he found an empty matchbook smelled of smoke. The officers recovered on top pile of a twenty about lumber. flashlight propane and small tank that feet from the cellar door. There was also Kibbe had dropped during flight. his some and paper rubbish the cellar. He could identify what kind of it paper officers advised Kibbe of his Mi- wаs due to its rights randa him charred sodden and asked state. return to There, From police observations, they cruiser. these other Fri- placed him berg under arrest and him told concluded that the they would had been de- fire pat-down conduct a liberately by search on set an open him for fire without the this, weapons. Hearing Kibbe use of voluntarily accelerants. He paper found towels matches, towels, paper removed just pipe, outside and to the of the cellar .left and pipe from pockets. tobacco door.1 alleges

1. The Friberg Commonwealth paper found the towels the cellar. inside this attorney reinforced closing, Trial In Excerpts from Relevant B. point: Transcript Mr. Kibbe told Mr. Kibbe? about What the stand above, took As noted night. to that up he was what police defense, offering explanation an

his own to, He told he did. have but He didn’t Road, his 171 Almira presence for his he went that where on the stand you possession police, and flight from to, he did. have He didn’t but night. towels, flashlight, ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍matches, paper counter, said dur- To Commonwealth examination direct tank. On propane closing argument: ing oc- following exchanges attorney, because you he runs tells [Kibbe] And curred: A. Q. And [*] I’m now, # parole. why did [*] you [*] run? [*] [*] tell he a case where is on explanation but parole, that, for what you’re the finders didn’t offer you know he he was doing. of the didn’t credibility. facts, have to decide you you brought back after Q. [Rooke] And *5 credibility. You to decide have you do? You did to the car what what you whether believe must decide I me as to what questioned They A. ring had a it Kibbe Whether Mark said. and them over I doing. was answered you If it didn’t. truth or whether of over again.... sаid, Mark Kibbe believe what don’t ques- they were Q. right. All When is guilty. Kibbe Mark tell them?2 you did tioning you what % ‡ ;¡t % }¡; happened. had I them what A. told inference, the in- There’s reasonable cross-examination, the Common- During consciousness, guilt guilt of of ference Kibbe: wealth asked that he explanation flight. his from you that police Q. didn’t tell You believing. worthy not of you offered right? parole, were on you ran because one explanation, a fanciful This is No, A. I did not. your idea of common comports with you ran? why them Q. never told You sense. I I did.

A. believe don’t story. and Commonwealth It is the Both Kibbe It is not a reasonable forthright- Kibbe’s to mislead on the facts commented arrived after one thereof, ness, in his conversation lack you. or night of fire. on History Procedural C. attorney statement Kibbe’s opening

said: conviction, trial and jury Kibbe’s After Court Appeаls to the proceeded the case distance stopped a short was

[Kibbe] of Massachusetts. Commonwealth They spoke police. to the away, spoke Order, and In Memorandum what he was explained and he to him Common- conviction. affirmed Kibbe’s was what the doing and situation 1111, Kibbe, 646 Mass.App.Ct. v. 38 wealth evening. ques- claim, objected this Commonwealth our disputes this review tion, Friberg answered. allowed it to be supports assertion that but the court record just having paper towels testified to found cellar outside door.

31 (1995) N.E.2d (D.Mass.2000). (affirming judgment In analyzing al- Kibbe’s (Mar. 3, 1995) (mem. only), No. 93-P-1761 leged Doyle violation, the district court 1:28). under order Rule Relying first found that the claim subject was large part Charles, on Anderson v. provisions 447 the of the Antiterrorism and 404, 2180, U.S. 100 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (1980), and (“AEDPA”), v. McClary, Commonwealth 2254(d), § 28 U.S.C. petition- Mass.App.Ct. (1992), 604 N.E.2d 706 er’s having ease been filed in January of rejected the court argument Kibbe, 120 F.Supp.2d at 118. As such, Commonwealth’s cross-examination Kibbe’s writ must be denied unless closing argument violated the rule es adjudication the state court “resulted Ohio, tablished in 426 U.S. to, decision that contrary was or involved 617-19, 91 an of, L.Ed.2d application unreasonable clearly es- (1976), prohibiting the use post-Mi law, tablished Federal determined randa impeach silence to a defendant. the Supreme States,” Court United Kibbe, No. 93-P-1761 at 2.3 The 2254(d)(1), § U.S.C. or “resulted in a ruled that since ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍Kibbe spoken had to police decision that was unreason- based about “all matters concerning the charge able determination of the facts in light of arrested,” for which he was the Common the evidence presented in the state court wealth permitted question Kibbe proceeding.” 2254(d)(2). § 28 U.S.C. about omissions in any story. Id. at 3. reviewing After Court’s In support, the court quoted “if McClary: most comprehensive interpretation a defendant does not elect to remain silent AEDPA v. Taylor, Williams 529 U.S. *6 speaks but police to the about matters 362, 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 concerning the crime for which he has (2000),the district court held that the Mas arrested, been prosecutor the may ask the sachusetts appeals court decision was both any defendant about omission from his contrary to and an involved unreasonable post-Miranda statement which is at vari application of clearly established federal ance with his trial testimony.” 604 N.E.2d law as determined Supreme the by Court.4 at 710. The Supreme Massachusetts Judi Kibbe, 120 F.Supp.2d at 121. The district cial Court denied request Kibbe’s fur for court held that the state court decision was ther review. Kibbe, v. Commonwealth 420 “contrary to” clearly established federal (1995). Mass. 648 N.E.2d 1286 First, law in ways. two it ruled that the petitioned Kibbe next for a writ of habe holding Doyle “prohibits cross-ex corpus as in the federal district court of arguments amination and jury the re Massachusetts, granted which was in garding defendant’s post-Miranda si Memorandum and September lence,” Order on should governed have Kibbe’s DuBois, 2000. Kibbe v. F.Supp.2d 120 114 claim. Id. at (citing 121-24 Doyle, 426 Bois, challenged Kibbe also (D.Mass.2000). the F.Supp.2d Commonwealth’s during argument comment closing that: “If appeal does not this conclusion. said, you believe don’t what Mark Kibbe Mark guilty.” appeals Kibbe is court found 4. The district "fully court declined to devel- remark, that the improper, while was suffi- op” appeals whether the court in- decision ciently by judge's neutralized the instructions volved an unreasonable of the determination jury regarding to the proof the burden of evidence, light facts providing in of thе closing arguments Kibbe, the of counsel. No. Kibbe, independent basis habeas relief. for review, at 4. On 93-P-1761 habeas dis- F.Supp.2d at 127 n. 24. trict found that court the error was harmless when considered on its own. Kibbe Du- by prose- and comments 2240). questioning It further held 619, 96 S.Ct. U.S. subject mat- any respect cutor with applying in court erred appeals in- ter, potential or of actual regardless did the Commonwealth because Charles defendant consistency, whenever provide failure not use Kibbe’s regard- statement makes a post-arrest expose incon flight for his a reason with rule not the This is the crime. ing testimony his trial between sistencies case The Charles v. Charles. Anderson According arrest. after his his statements to ask prosecutor only authorizes ... court, rule “The Charles to the district omissions post -Miranda questions about tri when the defendant’s triggеred only are on same omissions subject when those the same testimony addresses al arguably testimony and topic as the the defendant’s matter it. contradict Kibbe, at 123. F.Supp.2d statement.” reasons only discussed Because Kibbe Kibbe, To the at 125-26. F.Supp.2d Almira Road area of 171 in being for court decision Kibbe state extent that the from the flight for and not the reason it vio- McClary, reasoning of adopted the he had court ruled police, district law as de- clearly established federal lated silent, at least partially to remain elected Court in by Supreme termined thus, com flight, to his regard with Charles. error. constituted government

ment granting for ground alternative As an that the finding relief, held that basis the district court As a second habeas clearly contrary to adjudication involved an court court’s state decision the stаte law, court clearly the district estab- application established federal unreasonable misstated court Id. at 126. appeals held lished law. Id. at 125. disagreed v. Charles. pointedly of Anderson rule The district court relied, on the large part, that Kibbe The state court conclusion appeals appeal. in its en- rejecting McClary case silence had waived turn, incon- Instead, parsed on the focused not the district court McClary, tirety.5 arrest poten- the defendant’s sistency arson and Kibbe’s subject between *7 the statements, on categories: but instead and trial into two his tial involvement his to waive Almira being that the defendant chose at Road explanation fact for to answer right to silence and Miranda and evening the November on N.E.2d by police. po- the from the questions posed flight for his explanation that this The district court found 126-27. Because at 710. Id. at night. lice that the expanded impermissibly the rea- approach discuss with Kibbe did not re- a defendant for court found questioning flight, bounds the district son for out -Miranda silence set to remain garding post “waived that Kibbe had matters, to but respect Charles: with some silent Id. to all at respect in not with matters.” language the The breadth however, to 127. the door opened McClary, court based appeals that the belies the disagreement the district notion that

5. It was in this complete, appeals court the rather than explicitly that its on court held the affirmance silence, that was had made a factual determination than the partial, rather waiver evidence, light clearly of the unreasonable police about the crime speaking that tо idea the deci- determine but declined to whether prosecutorial comments opens to the door Kibbe, 120 on the error. sion was based story. conclude that one's We omissions in court's district F.Supp.2d 127 n. is a dead end. avenue to habeas relief this- decision interpretation of the court own state appeals court from Examining Rounding precedent, decisions out its favorable First, Second, Fifth, the Eighth, and district court discussed United States Casamento, (2d v. Tenth Circuits evaluate reasonable- decision, Cir.1989), ness of court the district holding prosecu the state its that the tor interpretation court concluded that its own erred in cross-examining the defendant “Doyle-Charles of the framework” was cor- about his pretrial silence when his and acknowledging Id. at 127-30. trial were rect. While statements inconsistent. district court applicable precedent First Circuit in- concluded: “These cases case, Hall, demonstrate that the only cludes one Kibbe decision runs Grieco (1st Cir.1981), directly contrary existing prece spe- F.2d 1029 in which we federal mentioned, Thus, dent I resolve, applying Charles. cifically but conclude failed not only that Kibbe has the the exact better two issue was before Rather, court, legal arguments. reasonable I the district cited Grieco as am firmly convinced error occurred “rejecting] analysis the loose waiver ex- and Kibbe,” that the Kibbe decision is an emplified by id. at 128. The court unreasonable Kibbe, that, outcome.” any F.Supp.2d stated “This does not mean that 130- time a makes any defendant statement door to full open is cross- The district court went on to find that examination about the defendant’s failure alleged not harm- Doyle errors were exculpatory story

to recount earli- less, granted petition for a protections equally er. Miranda apply to writ corpus. of habeas Id. at 131-33. refusals to answer Id. specific questions.” 1034). Grieco, (quoting 641 F.2d at DISCUSSION explicit The district court found more agree We the district court’s support for its conclusion that petition Com- statements that Kibbe’s habeas is governed provisions AEDPA, monwealth violation in by committed closing its and that cross-examination com- case the most Williams comprehensive ments the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. commentary by Su (5th Laury, preme interpretation United States v. 985 F.2d 1293 the proper Court on Cir.1993), Fifth held that a of AEDPA. AED- agree Circuit We also questions prosecutor’s provisions compel analy- and comments re- PA two separate (1) garding the defendant’s failure tо come ses: whether state court decision trial, forward with his alibi prior despite contrary clearly established law as Court; (2) having exculpatory made statements after forth set *8 arrest, impermissible were comments whether the court state decision effected on post-arrest application the defendant’s silence. 985 an unreasonable Dubois, F.2d at Similarly, precedent. 1303-04. the Tenth Cir- Court O’Brien v. 145 (1st Cir.1998).6 16, cuit has addressed F.3d “par- circumstances district silence,” tial and a court that having concluded that defen- found Kibbe was entitled dant is to to under Doyle protection “contrary still entitled as habeas relief both the clauses, to are to” application” silences that not inconsistent with and “unreasonable testimony. proceed analysis his trial United v. Can- we will with our that States 483, (10th Cir.1993). however, First, terbury, F.2d order. we аn ar- address present analysis Although pre-dated parallels Su- the the case the O’Brien Williams case, preme good we Court's Williams have since "thus remains law.” Williams Mates anz, Cir.2000). (1st two-step inquiry held that the set out 230 F.3d when, fact, he had with the authorities the that by Commonwealth gument made Shue, judicial atten- little not. States v. 766 F.2d has thus far received United (7th Grieco, Cir.1985); tion. permit- will not defendant be “[T]he Cooperation Inference of A. a tool to ted to use fashion the various chal response to version of uncontradicted and distorted and clos lenges to the cross-examination A the post-arrest behavior.” Id. review of issue, argument at the Commonwealth ing transcripts pri- us that a persuades hybrid of a de something has mounted to con- strategy defense was indeed mary to trial references prosecutor’s fense оf the vey cooperation of full to the picture a times, At the Common Kibbe’s silence. jury, too into the getting without much Charles, wealth, McClary relying just that en- specifics cooperation what willingness to an argued has that Kibbe’s po- asked what he told the tailed. When his involve police questions ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍swer about lice, responded, “I told them what Kibbe with the fire demonstrated waiver ment you which happened,” prompted, “Ok. So such, prose of his to silence. As that explained happened, to them what question cutor to Kibbe about was entitled opening and “Yes.” In his state- correct?” from any omissions state ment, be- Kibbe’s counsel said Kibbe’s throughout ment. Common Woven police, explained “[H]e havior toward the statements, filings and in-court wealth’s he was and what the situation doing what however, separate argument is the that during evening.” Finally, was on that merely permis tactics prosecutor’s were closing argument, defense counsel stated: impression to counter the attempt sible up police “Mr. Kibbe told the what he was that conveyed by Kibbe’s defense he had to, night. to that didn’t have but he He cooperated fully police. with the did.” Relying McClary, appeals the state very true Kibbe may declined comment on this It well be court order cooperation justification. every question police district responded footnote, rejected in a argument him asked on November 1991. Unlike stating that because Kibbe had answered court, however, the district we do not be- to him questions put all of the cooperation, as to lieve fully police, cooperated: he had “He sim- him, questions posed entitled him to ply did voluntеer information about give impression jury to the erroneous required he why fled. He was not to do provided complete that he had version Kibbe, 120 at 122 n. 16. F.Supp.2d so.” including to the the rea- police, events Any impression that had creat- the defense flight. son believe that Kibbe’s We voluntarily had fully ed strategy convey defense intended was, cooperated according to district that, trial, impression he giving court, depiction an accurate of what simply story given had exact same he had occurred. is, the situation was on earlier—that “what *9 evening”—when reality that in he had not. one, circuits, including this Several put place, this trial was in strategy Once have that the restriction on a Doyle held was entitled to ask Kibbe prosecutor post-arrest does not defendant’s silence ran. police why whether he hаd told the he apply a defendant has created the when no in the testimony We find constitutional error impression through his and de presentation fully cooperated fense that he cross-examination. Charles,

Yet, holding inqui not end the in that rather than Doyle, this does and, prosecutor’s case, second, because the comments ry, controlled Kibbe’s in during Kibbe’s closing argument regarding relying McClary, on an incorrect interpre- explain flight to take a different failure his tation Charles. of order to determine than the In clos slant cross-examination. a state contrary whether court decision is prosecutor ing, said: to law federal as determined the Su- preme you And he he runs he is Court: tells because parole, you but know he didn’t tell key bottom, inquiry, [T]he is whether that, as an didn’t offer that rule—by a Supreme Court virtue of its exрlanation for he was In a doing. what similarity (though factual not necessarily you’re case where finders of identicality) or its distillation of general facts, you credibility. have to decide federal law into a precepts channeled credibility. You have to decide analysis of specifically mode intended exposing Rather than Kibbe’s cooperation for application to variant factual situa- was, strategy partial for the sham that it fairly require tions—can be said to a prosecutor’s reference to si- Kibbe’s particular particular result in a case.- instead attacking lence seems aimed at O’Brien, added). (emphasis F.3d at 25 credibility regarding the proffered category falling of cáses under the flight. reason for his This use of Kibbe’s to” “contrary prong should not be con- arguably permissiblе silence exceeded the broadly “sap ceived so as to the ‘unreason- prescribed cooperation for the ex- bounds application’ any able clause meaning.” of government may ception: use “[W]hile Matesanz, (1st Phoenix post-arrest a defendant’s im- silence to Cir.2000). peach testimony about the circumstances hand, Turning to the case at the appeals arrest, of an then government may contrary court clearly decision would be to that in- argue the defendant’s silence was if established federal a reading law of claim consistent with this of innocence.” Charles, conjunction in Doyle, com- Shue, 766 F.2d at 1130. cannot “[W]e pelled contrary outcome. The Charles of uphold interpretation the facts in this interpretation Doyle states that: “The which case would allow the to exception case two who involved defendants made no Grieco, swallow the rule.” F.2d postarrest statements their involve- about Commonwealth, having 1033-34. The em- Charles, in the ment crime.” 447 U.S. at phasized suggest Kibbe’s silence to S.Ct. 2180. The Court story worthy believing,” “not in faced a question different from justify cannot now its actions through in presented the state court to the cooperation exception safe harbor to rely right extent that Kibbe did not on his prohibition. Doyle’s compelled, We are silent, to remain but answered all then, instead proceed to the argument rejected to police questions relating potential district by the court Kibbe had waived responsibility for the fire. unpro- silence thus was by Doyle. tected find significant this distinction We Contrary Clearly B. Established Doyle requires on the question whether Federal Law finding process of due violation this case, the fact especially light district held that contrary clearly Supreme prosecutors state court decision was has allowed first, ways: established federal law two comment a defendant’s si- *10 36 application” Supreme of circumstances. Charles “unreasonable multiple

lence “if the state court identi precedent of Court post- of use a defendant’s admits some from governing legal fies the correct rule expose prior to inconsistent arrest silence unreasonably ap Further, this cases but a Court’s defendant’s silence statements. particular it to the of the state plies facts impeachment purposes may be used case,” “if ei prisoner’s or the state court a has not received Mi- when defendant a unreasonably legal principle ther extends Weir, warnings. Fletcher v. 455 randa a precedent from our to new context 603, 606-07, 1309, 102 71 S.Ct. U.S. unreasonably apply it should not or where (1982); Anderson, Jenkins v. L.Ed.2d 490 to a new principle refuses to extend that 239, 231, 2124, 65 447 U.S. Williams, it apply.” where should context (1980). These cases caution L.Ed.2d 86 529 at 120 This U.S. S.Ct. 1495. expansive an absolute and con- against analysis “question distills to a of whether mandate, Doyle’s especially struction of case-spe court’s derivation of a state considering particular factual circum- generally cific rule from the Court’s rele found here. stances jurisprudence appears objectively vant view, cannot ex Doyle our be (em O’Brien, 145 at 25 reasonable.” F.3d contrary so a compel tended far as added); Williams, phasis accord 529 U.S. Indeed, outcome Kibbe’s case. were the 409-10, at (holding S.Ct. obvious, outcome so there would have been of assessment unreasonableness demands no reason for us to leave unresolved objective an analysis). question of whether or Charles broad, objective Because of this apply should “to situation where the standard, a ha- grant federal court cannot after defendant has maintained silence disagrees relief because it simply beas arrest, exculpatory post-ar but made has finds an in the court’s or error state rest statements which are not themselves application of law. at federal See id. the exculpatory inconsistent with trial sto end, 1495. In S.Ct. a state court subject ry, but which relate a different under objectively decision is unreasonable Grieco, matter.” 641 F.2d at 1036. The only AEDPA if exist it is “so offensive to t finding district court’s that Kibbe main ing so рrecedent, support, devoid record ained his silence as the reason for his arbitrary, or it so indicate is flight Doyle necessarily and that therefore plausible, outside universe of credible extrapolation more applies appropri an 25; O’Brien, outcomes.” 145 F.3d ate for an application” “unreasonable anal Matesanz, Williams F.3d ysis “contrary analysis. than for the to” (1st Cir.2000) (affirming outside-the- “the test). universe-of-plausible-outcomes” Application” C. “Unreasonable of Su- preme Precedent Court case, In the instant the district clearly unreason controlling

Absent court held the state court dispositive ably rule law Supreme applied clearly Court that is established federal claim, petitioner’s by extending federal habeas Charles the facts of specifically, must determine “whether the state case. the dis court’s Kibbe’s More (or use) existing use of failure to law in trict court ruled that the Kibbe court’s deciding petitioner’s application claim involved un attempted Charles “is devoid support” application given significant reasonable record O’Brien, A precedent.” factual dissimilarities between the two Kibbe, may F.Supp.2d state court decision be set aside as an cases. at 126. The *11 district court noted that Charles autho- cross-examining the defendant about rized a prosecutor to questions ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍ask about his failure to recount the story upon his post-Miranda omissions when those omis- arrest. U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 2240. sions were on the same topic as the trial Unlike Doyle, where the defendants re- testimony. case, however, the mained completely silent after being ar- prosecutor commеnted on the defendant’s rested, Kibbe post made a -Miranda state- post omissions, -Miranda even though ment to police about the crime. those omissions not did relate to the sub- facts Kibbe’s case do not fall ject matter trial testimony. Be- squarely Charles, within either. The cause of this discrepancy, the district court Charles Court ruled that when a defendant concluded that the state court had unrea- makes post-Miranda statement a par- sonably applied Charles to Kibbe’s case. ticular subject, then makes a second The district court discovered a second statement subject same trial, at unreasonable application of federal law prosecutor can to post-arrest refer silence when it found that the Kibbe con- decision expose any inconsistencies betwеen the tradicted several federal circuit court two statements. 447 U.S. at cases. The district court held that Charles, 2180. Unlike however, Kibbe’s state court’s and, specifi- more decision— testimony trial dealt with a subject mat- cally, the application of Charles to Kibbe’s ter not addressed post-arrest in his state- case—was an anomaly: a decision that was is, ments —that the reason for his flight. in such contrast with existing pre- federal Thus, neither nor Charles dealt with cedent as to be “offensive.” presented situation here: where Kibbe Though the district court’s interpreta- post-arrest made a statement, which was tion of precedent federal and its analysis of not inconsistent with his trial testimony. post-arrest silence may correct, issues be Because of this issue, unresolved our analysis here is confined to determin- likelihood increases that there are other ing the reasonableness, not the accuracy, reasonable, yet contradictory, interpreta- of the state court’s Again, decision. nei- tions of Supreme Court precedent. One ther disagreement with nor the existence clear interpretation of Doyle-Charles of an error in a state court’s decision is framework argues, as the district court enough to set aside a conviction under did, that when a defendant has waived his AEDPA. right to silent, remain a prosecutor’s inqui- With these guiding principles, we next ry into the post-arrest defendant’s silence consider whether the state court’s decision is limited to exposing inconsistencies be- in Kibbe is objectively reasonable —wheth- tween the defendant’s state- er it falls “outside the universe plausi- ment and trial Kibbe, testimony. ble, credible O’Brien, outcomes.” 145 F.Supp.2d However, at 127. an alterna- F.3d at 25. In assessing the reasonable- tive interpretation argues, as the state ness of the decision, it is important did, that when a defendant waives to reiterate that the facts of this case fall to remain silent and answers outside of any clearly established Supreme questions about crime, a prosecutor precedent, most notably Doyle v. can inquire into the defendant’s post-ar- Ohio and Anderson v. Charles. rest silence to expose any differences be- In Doyle, the Court held that a prosecu- tween the defendant’s post-arrest state- tor could not impeach a defendant’s excul- ment and trial testimony, just prior patory story told for the first time inconsistent statements. *12 Entry. of Port 676 F.2d interpretation of fed- at the San Ysidro a

Through credible а in vehi- finding for heroin the quite plausible Upon it is at 1284. precedent, eral cle, court’s deci- at the Kibbe the defendant and court to arrive officials arrested First, some argue, a court could as gave warnings. sion. him the Miranda have, prohibition inquiring Doyle’s remain right then waived to defendant only post-arrest silence into a defendant’s exculpatory and made statements. silent invokes when the defendant applies trial, the testi- Id. at 1286. At defendant Charles, 447 remain silent. See right to and details that he fied to information (characterizing S.Ct. 2180 at U.S. statement, post-arrest from his omitted two defen- a “case that involved as inquired prosecutor into these and the no statements postarrest who made dants omissions, though even some the omis- crime”); in the involvement about their neces- differed from—but were not sions Ochoa-Sánсhez, F.2d v. United States post-arrest with—his sarily inconsistent (9th Cir.1982) in a (noting that at found Id. 1287. statement. not defendant does in which the situation the and comments re- prosecutor’s inquiry silent, authority is controlling the remain permissible the because garding omissions Second, Charles, the Doyle). though testimony trial raised an the defendant’s prosecu- only authorized a Charles “ar- credibility, prosecutor and the issue of post-arrest silence tor comment closing argument in about gued vigorously be- reveal inconsistencies when omissions trial testimo- credibility the defendant’s the post-arrest statements and tween the ny.” Id. ar- testimony, plausibly a court could trial Ochoa-Sánchez, in prosecutor in the As holding that this should be extended gue exposed the between the of Kibbe’s case. In both Kibbe differences to cover facts cases, testimony their voluntarily post-arrest waived trial defendants defendant’s to remain silent and offered an by emphasizing important statement with their testimony that was at variance failure to explain omission—Kibbe’s statement, in- either because post-arrest flight upon divergence his arrest. This as in Kibbe or be- formation was omitted Fol- gives credibility. rise to an issue of given were as cause inconsistent versions Ochoa-Sánchez, ruling in lowing the the thrust of Charles. Because question prosecutor proceeded in Kibbe holding exposing aimed at Charles was credibility focusing defendant multiple diverging version defendants’ defendant] on the omission: “And [the events, credibly conclude court could is on you parole, tells he runs because he read to allow should be Charles that, but know he didn’t tell the you any be- prosecutor probe differences exрlanation what didn’t offer that an for and trial tes- tween statements you’re In doing. he a case where failure timony, including defendant’s facts, you have to decide finders of the time important information provide credibility.” of arrest. explicit support Furthermore, More for the support there can be found United existing In Kibbe decision Kibbe decision case law. (1st Goldman, Cir. Ochoa-Sánchez, car was States defendant’s 1977).7 Goldman, the defendant made stopped inspected by customs officials Charles, positively. Fur Though pre-dates Goldman Charles thermore, analysis in Goldman is opinion, the-waiver the Charles Court cited Goldman an exculpatory statement during inter matter.” 641 F.2d at 1036. Had ap- rogation by a federal agent, but refused plication of Charles to such a scenario been respond to agent’s two questions. sо “offensive” or “arbitrary,” it is unlikely trial, Id. at 503. prosecutor At com *13 that this Court would have left the issue on mented the defendant’s failure to re unresolved. Furthermore, given its limit- spond to questions, these upheld we ed scope of AEDPA, review under a feder- the prosecutor’s conduct. This Court rea al habeas ought court provide not the de- soned that because the defendant had finitive answer to open this question. his right silent, waived to remain he “dis pell[ed] particular prejudice by feared CONCLUSION Court that jury would Given that the state analysis court’s draw ‘strong negative ... inference from the Doyle-Charles framework upon rests the fact that the defendant remained silent plausible interpretation of Supreme Court ” at the time of his arrest.’ Id. at 504 precedent, considering the case law that (quoting Hale, United States v. 422 U.S. supports dеcision, the Kibbe and noting 171, 180, 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 that the Grieco court left the specific issue (1975)). Thus, if a talks, defendant any addressed unresolved, in Kibbe we hold “ thing that says ‘he or omits is to be that the state court’s decision is objectively ” judged on its merits or demerits.’ Id. reasonable, it as does fall “outside (quoting States, Vitali v. United 383 F.2d the universe of plausible, credible out- (1st Cir.1967)). 121 This waiver analysis comes.” reasons, For these we reverse permitted the prosecutor to comment on the district court’s grant decision to Mark any omissions in post-arrest Kibbe’s state petition for the writ of habeas by ment virtue of the fact that the defen corpus. dant did not invoke to remain Reversed. silent. As further support for the reasonable- LYNCH, Judge Circuit (concurring in ness of the state decision, court this Court judgment). in Grieco left unresolved the specific issue I concur in the judgment revеrsing and presented here. Grieco explicitly open left vacating the district grant court’s of habe- question of whether Doyle or Charles corpus. should apply “to a situation where the defendant has not maintained silence after The standard of reasonableness we must arrest, but has made exculpatory post-ar- in use evaluating the state court’s decision rest statements which are not themselves is that articulated by the Supreme Court inconsistent with the exculpatory trial in sto- Williams v. Taylor, 362, 529 U.S. ry, but which relate to a subject different S.Ct. (2000).8 146 L.Ed.2d 389 In employed still Circuit, in the Second which ("[F]or standard. See id. at 25 the writ to prosecutors allows to comment issue, on omissions the state court decision must be so in a defendant’s statements when offensive existing precedent, so devoid of See, defendant testify refuses to аt trial. support, record arbitrary, or so as to indicate e.g., Meachum, Bradley v. that it is outside plausible, the universe of (2d Cir.1990). outcomes.”). view, credible my this par- holding ticular of O’Brien—the “outside the I agree do not that the standard this Circuit plausible, universe of credible outcomes” applied Dubois, in (1st O’Brien v. 145 F.3d 16 test—has been aspects overruled. Other Cir.1998), at read, literally least as it is Nevertheless, O’Brien remain sound. this is equivalent to or consistent with the Williams actions, at of his development a full (commanding, case, O’Connor Justice This cooperation. the issue least majority of opinion, her part this Ohio, 426 v. U.S. predates 2254(d)(l)’s reasoning § Court) 28 U.S.C. read (1976), 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 610, 96 S.Ct. ‍‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍power courts’ the federal limitation by the Court approval cited and was mean that corpus of habeas grant writs Fair States United case. See issue may not habeas fedеral “[a] (5th Cir. 1378, 1383-84 child, F.2d court concludes simply because writ 619 n. 426 U.S. 1975), Doyle, cited relevant judgment independent its continue analyses Similar S.Ct. clearly estab applied decision state-court circuit federal *14 in decisions appear incorrect erroneously or law federal lished States E.g., United supreme courts. be state also must Rather, application that ly. (5th 678, Cir. 683-85 Reveles, 190 F.3d 411, v. 120 S.Ct. at U.S. 529 unreasonable.” 1123, F.3d Dorsey, 87 1999); v. Earnest however, warned, that Court State, v. Cir.1996); Pennycuff (10th 1135 inquiry the transform “should not court (Ind.2001). Our 804, 812-14 N.E.2d 745 its deter by resting subjective one into (1st Hall, 1029 v. Grieco at own that simple fact on the instead mination it although does Cir.1981), acknowledges, ap jurists has the Nation’s of least one cooperation the holdings of the apply, not the same law in federal relevant the plied view, Kibbe my In at 1033-34. 410, Id. at cases. Id. did.” state the manner sufficiently admit wide 2254(d)(1), the door opened § applying 120 S.Ct. prose the and the cross-examination both law under novelty of assessing in the as closing. comment single 288, cutor’s 109 S.Ct. Lane, 489 U.S. v. Teague explana regarded Kibbe’s comment (1989), latter “the mere 334 1060, L.Ed.2d 103 he why question and the flight, for his tion not does authority” conflicting of existence ques the up with sufficiently bound is Williams, fled 529 U.S. question. the resolve I do not that cooperated he whether v. tion Wright (quoting 410, 1495 120 S.Ct. at of process due violated comment 2482, 120 think the 304, 112 S.Ct. West, U.S. 505 supports alone rationale That J., (O’Connor, law. (1992) concur L.Ed.2d 225 court, it state by the reached (internal outcome quotation judgment)) ring court’s by that reached outcome Moreover, re is omitted). Court marks followed, it path than the rather reasoning, Fourth by the advanced test jected the Hurtado ultimately assess. must we that habeas of grant permitted Circuit (2001). Tucker, F.3d v. agree” all jurists would if “reasonable only fed applying court erred state based analysis Second, if an even (quot Id. law. eral cooperation to use decision (4th French, F.3d 865 be), v. ing (as Green it should not rejected is theme omit (internal marks Cir.1998)) quotation somewhere placed is case. ted). decision the state spectrum, Doyle-Charles application “unreasonable not an simply habeas of grant I reverse would ... law Federal clearly ... established combina- reasons, or in alone two

either by the determined argued First, when tion. U.S.C. States.” United on the with the cooperated he had 1996). all That is 2254(d)(1) II (Supp. § the door arrest, 'opened he night of reason, I reasoning. the same For issue, my as either to resolve case not the of O’Brien use majority opinion's consider here. same result yield the would standard dictum. reason, exposition engage in I do not For this we prefer need decide I engage

in extensive discussion in dicta possible

developments in law in this area.

AUGUSTA COMPANY, NEWS

Plaintiff, Appellant, CO.,

HUDSON NEWS Portland News

Co., and Hudson-Portland News

Co., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 01-1269.

United States Court of Appeals,

First Circuit. Aug.

Heard

Decided Oct.

Case Details

Case Name: Kibbe v. Dubois
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date Published: Oct 23, 2001
Citation: 269 F.3d 26
Docket Number: 00-2440
Court Abbreviation: 1st Cir.
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