KI SE LEE; Hyаng Mahn Yang, Petitioners v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.
No. 02-4602.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
May 19, 2004.
Argued Dec. 5, 2003.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED with respect to its holding that Mount Vernon must indemnify Ina Grant for the portion of the state court judgment for which she is responsible. The district court‘s judgment is AFFIRMED as to its holdings that Mount Vernon is not obligated to indemnify Linton Grant and is not estopped from denying coverage because of its failure to disclaim as to Webster. The case is REMANDED to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Mount Vernon and for consideration of Mount Vernon‘s request for costs and attorneys’ fees.
Pеter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Linda S. Wernery, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Lyle D. Jentzer (Argued), Trial Attorney, Douglas E. Ginsburg, Michael P. Lindemann, John M. McAdams Jr., John D. Williams, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, for Respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
OBERDORFER, Senior District Judge.
In this appeal we consider the question of whether a conviction for filing a false tax return, in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are not complicated. The petitioners, Ki Se Lee and Hyang Mahn Yang, are husband and wife. They are both natives and citizens of Korea, but they have resided in the United States as lawful permanent residents since the 1980s.1 They have grown children who are United States citizens.
For many years, the petitioners operated a dry cleaning business in Philadelphia. In May 1997, they pled guilty to a three-count information, which charged them with filing false income tax returns for 1989, 1990 and 1991, all in violation of
Thereafter, in November 1997, the INS charged petitioners with being removable for having been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” as defined by section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) and (ii) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. See
An offense that -
(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or
(ii) is described in
§ 7201 4 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (related to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to theGovernment exceeds $10,000; . . .
On December 2, 2002, thе Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge‘s decision without opinion, making it the final agency decision. See
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the petitioners challenge the immigration judge‘s order of removal on the ground that their convictions for violating
A. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, we consider the government‘s contention that under
B. Have the Petitioners Been Convicted of an Aggravated Felony?
The petitioners argue that no conviction under section 7206(1) for filing false tax returns can satisfy the definition of aggravated felony in
We thus begin our analysis with the statutory language of subsection (M)(i). It may be argued that the petitioners’ convictions under section 7206(1) for filing false tax returns clearly involve “fraud and deceit,” as required by subsection (M)(i), and that we need look no further. However, the precise question before us is whether the statutory language makes it plain and unambiguous that subsection (M)(i) covers convictions for violating section 7206(1). This question cannot be answered solely by looking at “the language itself“; we must also be cognizant of “the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 209; cf. United States Nat‘l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454-55, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (“A statute‘s plain meaning must be enforced, of course, and the meaning of a statute will typically heed the commands of its punctuation. But a purported plain-meaning analysis based only on punctuation is necessarily incomplete and runs the risk of distorting a statute‘s true meaning. Along with punctuation, text consists of words living ‘a communal existence,’ in Judge Learned Hand‘s phrase, the meaning of each word informing the others and all in their aggregate tak[ing] their purport from the setting in which they are used. Over and over we have stressed that [i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.“) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, these broader considerations, specifically the presence of subsection (M)(ii), preclude a conclusion that the statutory language of subsection (M)(i) clearly and unambiguously covers a section 7206(1) conviction. Subsections (M)(i) and (M)(ii) were enacted simultaneously in 1996. Subsection (M)(i) has a general application-the gamut of state and federal crimes involving fraud and deceit causing losses over $10,000. Subsection (M)(ii) zeroes in on the crime of federal tax evasion, as described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code,
We start with the principle that if at all possible, we should adopt a construction which recognizes each element of the statute. See Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Sloan, 263 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir.2001) (recognizing that it is an “axiom of statutory construction that whenever possible each word in a statutory provision is to be given meaning and not to be treated as surplusage“) (internal quotations omitted). The only construction that satisfies this principle is the one suggested by the petitioners: that subsection (M)(i) does not apply to tax offenses. If thе government‘s proposed construction were adopted, and we were to hold that any tax offense involving fraud and deceit over $10,000 was an aggravated felony under subsection (M)(i), subsection (M)(ii) would be mere surplusage. We have considered the government‘s contention that there could be a case where a conviction for tax evasion would not involve fraud or deceit, in which case subsection (M)(ii) would exist simply to catch any cases not covered by subsection (M)(i), but the government has not identified, and wе are unable to envision, what that case might be. Indeed, in addressing what conduct might constitute tax evasion under section 7201, the Supreme Court has stated that an “affirmative willful attempt [to evade] may be inferred from . . . any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal.” Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499, 63 S.Ct. 364, 87 L.Ed. 418 (1943) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the goal of avoiding surplusage in construing a statute is satisfied only if subsection (M)(i) does not apply to tax offenses.
Another “commonplace [rule] of statutory construction” is that the “specific governs the general.” Doe v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 199 F.3d 146, 154-55 (3d Cir.1999) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992)); see also Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228, 77 S.Ct. 787, 1 L.Ed.2d 786 (1957) (“The law is settled that however inclusive may be the general language of a statute, it will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment.“), quoted in Doe, 199 F.3d at 155. As explained by the Supreme Court, “where Congress includes particular language in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447-48; see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994). Moreover, “[t]his principle has special force when Congress has targeted specific problems with specific solutions in the context of a general statute.” Doe, 199 F.3d at 155. And it applies “particularly when the two [provisions] are interrelated and closely positioned, both in fact being parts of the same statutory scheme.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The statutory section at issue here is a perfect example of this phenomenon. Subsections (M)(i) and (M)(ii) were adopted at the same time, appear adjacent to each other, and arе the only two parts of subsection (M), within a statute with many
While the legislative history of the Immigration and Naturalization Act оffers no help in discerning Congress’ intent in enacting subsection (M)(i), the history and structure of the criminal tax laws persuade us that in enacting subsection (M)(ii), Congress intended to single out tax evasion as the only tax crime that is a removable offense. See United States Nat‘l Bank of Oregon, 508 U.S. at 455 (“Statutory construction is a holistic endeavor and, at a minimum, must account for a statute‘s full text, language[,] as well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter.“) (internal quotations and citations omitted), quoted in Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir.2003).
As the Supreme Court explained many years ago, tax “evasion” is the “capstone” of tax law violations. See Spies, 317 U.S. at 497. A felony since at least 1903, it has long been recognized as “the gravest of offenses against the revenues.” Id. at 499. In his opinion for the Court in Spies, Justice Robert Jackson (a former General Counsel for the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Assistant Attorney General for the Tax Division, Solicitor General, and Attorney General), after outlining the then civil and criminal “penalties imposed by Congress to enforce the tax laws,” id. at 495, concluded that “[t]he climax of this variety of sanctions is the serious and inclusive felony, defined to consist of а willful attempt in any manner to evade or defeat the tax,” id. at 497 (emphasis added). Thus, for Congress to select tax evasion as the “aggravated” tax felony, justifying removal of an alien who committed it, while sparing lesser tax felons, is thoroughly consistent with the history and structure of criminal tax offenses.
In the end, after considering various tools of statutory construction, we believe that Congress’ intent is clear: in enacting subsection (M)(ii), it intended to specify tax evasion as the only deportable tax offense; it follows that it did not intend subsectiоn (M)(i) to cover tax offenses.10
To the extent that any ambiguity lingers, we note that there is a “longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.” Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449 (principle is a corollary to the rule of lenity that applies in construing criminal statutes); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001); see also Valansi (“This rule of construction . . . may be applied as a canon of last resort to determine the intent of Congress on an ambiguous issue.“). The facts of the present case highlight the reason this principle exists: it is a plain fact that in reality nеither the prosecution, nor the sentencing judge involved in the prosecution, plea and sentencing of petitioners, treated their offense as “aggravated.” The prosecution acquiesced in, if it did not negotiate, a plea agreement, and the judge imposed a sentence characteristic of a misdemeanor, not a felony-much less an “aggravated one” (however it be defined). See Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 170-71 (3d Cir.2001) (noting that the importance of this principle is highlighted “given the changes in immigration law effectuated by the [1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act] ).”11
Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioners’ conviction for violating section 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue Code is
III. CONCLUSION
The Petition for Review of the decision of the BIA approving the removal order of the IJ is granted with directions to vacate the removal orders with respect to the petitioners.
ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because I believe that the offense of filing a false tax return and thereby causing a tax loss of more than $10,000 falls squarely within the definition of an “aggravated felony” in
The term “aggravated felony” is defined to include:
(M) an offense that -
(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or
(ii) is described in section 7201 of Title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000; . . .
Thus, subsection (M)(i) sets out two requirements. First, the offense must “involve fraud or deceit.” This means that the offense must include “fraud or deceit as a necessary component or element.” Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2002). Second, “the loss to the victim or victims” must exceed $10,000.
The offense of filing a false tax return and causing a tax loss of more than $10,000 satisfies these elements. “Fraud” or “deceit” is a necessary element of
Despite the clarity of subsection M(i), the majority concludes thаt this provision does not apply to tax offenses. Invoking two venerable canons of statutory interpretation (viz., that statutes should be read if possible to avoid surplusage and that the specific should take precedence over the general), the majority reasons as follows. The provision that directly follows subsection (M)(i), i.e.,
I must disagree with this analysis for two reasons. First and most important, this analysis fails to account for the language of subsection M(i). If Congress had not wanted subsection M(i) to apply to “tax offenses,” Congress surely would have included some language in that provision to signal that intention. As adopted, however, subsection M(i) contains no such hint. In order to argue that the filing of a false tax return does not come within the language of subsection M(i), one would have tо argue either that the term “victim” was not meant to apply to the Treasury or that the term “loss” does not include a tax loss. However, both of these arguments fail to comport with ordinary usage. See United States v. Fleming, 128 F.3d 285, 288 (6th Cir.1997) (“In tax fraud cases, we consider the United States Treasury the victim.“); U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1 (“Tax Loss” table).
Second, the majority errs in inferring from subsection M(ii) that Congress believed that subsection M(i) did not reach tax offenses. Subsection M(ii) may have been enacted simply to make certain-even at the risk of redundancy-that tax evasion qualifies as an аggravated felony. While good statutory draftsmanship seeks to avoid surplusage, other goals, such as certainty and the avoidance of litigation, are sometimes more important. Here, those responsible for drafting the provisions in question may have had a measure of doubt that subsection M(i) would be interpreted as covering all (or any) evasion cases, and subsection M(ii) may have been added to dispel any such uncertainty.
The tax evasion statute provides in relevant part as follows:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony....
This offense has three elements: “1) the existence of a tax deficiency, 2) an affirmative act constituting an attempt to evade or defeat payment of the tax, and 3) willfulness.” United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1023 (1992). See also United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1089 (3d Cir.1996). In this context, willfulness requires proof that the defendant knew that his or her conduct was unlawful. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991).
Neither “fraud” nor “deceit” is mentioned in the statute as a necessary element of tax evasion. The statute applies to the willful attempt “in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof.”
Congress did not define or limit the methods by which a willful attempt to defeat and evade might be accomplished and perhaps did not define lest its effort to do so result in some unexpected limitation. Nor would we by definition constrict the scope of the Congressional provision that it may be accomplished “in any manner.”
In light of the statutory language and the case law, cautious drafters might have concluded that it was prudent to add subsection M(ii) for at least two reasons. First, even if the drafters, like the majority in this case (see Maj. Op. at 225), could not think of an evasion case that did not involve fraudulent or deceitful conduct, the drafters might not have trusted their ability to anticipate every possible variety of evasion case and might have added subsection M(ii) just to be sure that no evasion case fell outside the definition. Second, even if the drafters were certain that no defendant would ever be convicted of tax evasion without proof of fraudulent or deceitful conduct, the drafters might have been concerned that some courts would hold that tax evasion falls outside the scope of subsection M(i) because neither “fraud” nor “deceit” is a formal element of the offense. See Valansi, 278 F.3d at 210 (in determining whethеr an offense involves “fraud or deceit,” we look to the necessary elements of the offense of conviction). Thus, given the choice between (a) the risk that some or all tax evasion cases would not be covered and (b) the inclusion of a potentially redundant statutory provision, the drafters might have selected the latter option.
For these reasons, I think that it is unwarranted to infer from subsection M(ii) that subsection M(i) was not intended to reach “tax offenses.” I would heed the clear language of subsection M(i)13 аnd hold that the offense of filing of a false tax return and causing a tax loss of more than $10,000 is an aggravated felony.