Case Information
*1 Before WIENER, PARKER, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE, [*] Chief District Judge.
PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Dr. Rаjiv Khurana appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the basis that he did not have standing to bring his civil claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and *2 alternatively, because Khurana failed to plead a RICO enterprise separate and distinct from the defendant in some of his civil claims based on 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Finding that Khurana may have standing for some of his civil RICO claims, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW For purposes of this appeal, we accept the following factual allegations as true.
Dr. Rajiv Khurana (“Khurana”) filed suit in Louisiana state court against the defendant-appellees, alleging defamation and wrongful discharge from his position as Medical Director of River Region Hospital in Vacherie, Louisiana, [1] as well as civil claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corruрt Organizations Act (“RICO”), U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. , based on violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), (c), and (d). [2] Khurana’s civil RICO claims arise from *3 a Medicare and Medicaid fraud scheme in which the appellees were engaged.
River Region Hospital (“River Region” or “hospital”) is an owned subsidiary of Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc. (“Innovative”). Both River Region and Innovative are defendant- appellees in this action. Defendant-appellees also include Karry Teel and Carl Holden, who hold offices in both Innovative and River Region, and William Malone, River Region’s administrator.
Khurana is a practicing physician with dual specialities in psychiatry and neurology. In July 1993, Khurana was hired to be River Region’s Assistant Medical Director under a three-year contract. Khurana agreed to join River Region as its Assistant Medical Director on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentations as to the legitimacy of the hospital’s operаtions and qualifications. In June of 1994, Khurana was named the hospital’s Medical Director. After his promotion, he became aware that the hospital was engaging in fraudulent Medicaid and Medicare practices. He was discharged from his position as Medical Director six months later in January of 1995. The hospital went out of business in 1996.
After the appellees removed the suit to federal court, Khurana filed an amended complaint alleging that the appellees committed a variety of RICO predicate acts (wire and mail fraud, extortion, bribery, witness tampering, and violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952) and that these acts constituted a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of § 1962(b) and § 1962(c). (c) of this section.
Khurana also alleged a conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) and § 1962(c). In his complaint, Khurana contended (1) that he wаs fraudulently induced into “harmful employment associations” which caused him a loss of legitimate business opportunity and damage to his professional reputation, (2) that he was wrongfully discharged which caused him a loss in earnings, benefits and reputation, and (3) that the appellees’ “illegal competition” with him in his private and hospital practices caused him a loss in business income.
The appellees filed a motion to dismiss Khurana’s RICO claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The appellees argued to the district court that (1) Khurana did not have standing to assert the RICO claims, and that (2) Khurana failed to allege a RICO “enterprise” separate and distinct from a RICO “person,” i.e., a perpetrator, associated with or employed by the enterprise as required for claims based on 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The district court granted the motion and Khurana now presents this panel with the same two issues in his appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review the dismissal of a complaint for a failure to state
a claim for which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) de novo . Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n , 987
F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). A claim may not be dismissed unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
*5
Benton v. United States , 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). For
purposes of our review, we must accept the plaintiff’s factual
allegations as true and view them in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Campbell v. City of San Antonio ,
II. § 1964(c) RICO Standing
The appellant argues that the district court erred in dismissing the RICO claims because proper causation between his injuries and RICO violations was pleaded, giving him standing. The appellees collapse the appellant’s injuries into one mass of discharge complaints and contend that Khurana cannot have standing for any of his claims because he was not the target of any Medicaid/Medicare fraud scheme. We disagree that Khurana’s alleged injuries may be viewed as a homogeneous group. We consider the injuries individually because Khurana’s standing for each turns on a proximate causation inquiry.
A. Overview of § 1964(c) Standing
Section 1964(c) provides that
[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). In order to establish standing under §
1964(c), a plaintiff must show (1) a violation of § 1962, (2) an
injury to his business or property, and (3) that his injury was
proximately caused by a RICO violation. See Holmes v. Securities
Investor Protection Corp. ,
When the Supreme Court announced the proximate cause prerequisite to § 1964(c) standing in Holmes , 503 U.S. 258, it directed us to “the many shapes this concept took at common law.” Id. at 268.
[W]e use “proximate cause” to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own acts. At bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects “ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible, or of what is administratively possible and convenient.” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts § 41, p. 264 (5th ed. 1984). Id. at 268. In Holmes , the Court held that an alleged stock manipulation scheme that disabled two broker-dealers from meeting obligations to customers did not proximately cause the claimed injury of a plaintiff-corporation subrogated to the rights of the broker-dealers’ non-purchasing customers. Such was too remote an injury to satisfy the proximate cause requirement because only an intervening insolvency connected the RICO conspirators’ acts to the customers’ injuries. Id. at 271. Taking guidance from the common law’s enunciation of proximate causation, the Court reasoned that those injured only “indirectly” by racketeering activity do not have § 1964(c) standing. [3] Id. at 268, 274. Allowing for recovery *7 for the Holmes ’ secondary victims would run afoul of proximate causation standards. Id. at 274. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor explained that the “words ‘by reason of’ [in § 1964(c)] operate . . . to confine RICO’s civil remedies to those whom the defendant has truly injured in some meaningful sense.” [4] Id. at 279. The proximate cause requirement is intended to preclude recovery by plaintiffs who “complain[] of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person.” Id. at 268.
In Holmes , the Court acknowledged that articulating a
definition of “proximate cause” for purposes of § 1964(c) standing
analysis was difficult:
[5]
“the infinite variety of claims that may
arise make it virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule
that will dictate the result in every case. Thus, our use of the
term ‘direct’ should be merely understood as a reference to the
proximate cause enquiry that is informed by the concerns set out in
the text.”
Given that factual causation (i.e., “cause-in-fact” or “but-
for” causation) is now clearly insufficient to confer § 1964(c)
standing, see, e.g., Standardbred , 985 F.2d at 104, we are left
with the common law of proximate causation in making civil RICO
standing determinations. “[T]he holding of Holmes is no more than
that common law ideas about proximate causation inform the
understanding of RICO.” Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v.
Israel Identity Tours, Inc. ,
B. Termination as a Result of a § 1962(b) or § 1962(c) Violation
Khurana claimed that he was discharged from his position as Medical Director of River Region Hospital because he refused to particiрate in and attempted to stop the appellees’ RICO activities and that his discharge was an act in furtherance of the appellees’ fraud scheme. Those claims are foreclosed for a § 1962(b) or § 1962(c) violation. In Cullom v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank , [7] we held that an employee who refuses to participate in an activity that violates RICO and is constructively discharged for such a refusal does not have standing to sue under § 1964(c). 859 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1988). We found that such a situation lacked the necessary “causal connection” between the discharge and the predicate acts. Id. at 1216 (discussing and relying on RICO “whistle blower” cases *10 and citing Sedima , 473 U.S. 479). In order to have standing, Khurana’s injury, here his discharge, must “flow from the commission of the predicate acts.” Id. (quoting Sedima , 473 U.S. at 497). In our proximate causation discussion in Cullom , we explained that “Cullom’s injury resulted from SNB’s decision to fire him аfter he refused to participate in the alleged scheme . . . [N]either Cullom’s injury nor SNB’s decision to fire Cullom resulted from the alleged predicate acts.” Id. at 1216.
Just as in Cullom , Khurana pleaded predicate acts for the alleged violations which did not proximately cause his termination. Accordingly, Khurana lacks standing to bring a civil claim asserting termination injuries resulting from a § 1962(b) or § 1962(c) violation.
C. Loss of Business Income as a Result of “Illegal Competition” with Khurana’s Hospital and Private Practices
We confront the same standing questions with respect to
Khurana’s standing to bring his civil RICO claim for “illegal
competition:” was there (1) an alleged injury to property or
business (2) proximately caused by (3) a RICO violation? See
Holmes ,
Khurana alleges that the defendants illegally competed with his post-termination medical practice. The defendants treated psychiatric patients for which they illegally obtained Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement, thus depleting the available number of reimbursable patients in the region, some of whom might otherwise have been treated by Khurana and other area hospitals at which he *11 practiced.
Khurana’s loss of business income is too remote to satisfy the
proximate causation requirement. See Holmes ,
Life is too short to pursue every human act to its remote consequences; “for want of a nail, a kingdom was lost” is a commentary on fate, not the statement of a major cause of action against a blacksmith.
D. Loss of Opportunity and Damage to Professional Reputation as a Result of “Fraudulent Hiring”
Khurana’s set of RICO claims based on injuries resulting from being hired at River Region must be examined under the same proximate causation requirement.
1. Loss of Business Opportunities and Damage to Professional Reputation as a Result of Substantive RICO Violations
The injuries pleaded by Khurana are denigration to his professional reputation via the “harmful employment associations” that resulted from being “fraudulently lured” into his position at the hospital and the loss of foregone legitimate employment opportunities. In Sedima , the Court held that the injury relied on by a plaintiff must be the result of a § 1962 violation. 473 U.S. at 496. The Court explained that for standing based on a § 1962(b) or § 1962(c) violation, a valid RICO injury must necessarily stem from predicate acts that underpin the § 1962 violation. Id. at 497. The necessary racketeering activities are those activities catalogued in § 1961(1). Id. at 495. Khurana contends that the defendants caused him injury by fraudulently inducing him to accept employment via mail and wire fraud, thereby damaging his reputation through association with their frаudulent activities and depriving him of other legitimate business opportunities.
a. Professional Reputation Damage Khurana pleaded injury proximately resulting from the defendants’ violations of § 1962(b) and § 1962(c) when he asserted the injury of business reputation harm. For § 1962(b) and § 1962(c) violations, the injurious conduct must be racketeering acts *14 as listed in § 1961(1). According to Khurana’s pleadings, he detrimentally relied on the appellees’ misrepresentations as to the legitimacy of the hospital’s operations in taking his position with the hospital. Such reliance on a predicate fraud act can indicate the necessary proximate relationship between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct. See Chisholm v. TransSo. Fin. Corp. , 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing cases); Standardbred , 985 F.2d at 104. In Standardbred , the defendants acquired a race track financed by municipal bonds. In the application for the bonds, the defendants stated an intent to operate the race track and assured the plaintiffs of such as well. The defendants subsequently stopped racing. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs had § 1964(c) standing because in the fraudulently induced belief that the racing would continue, they purchased, relocated and reconstructed capital equipment for use at the track and designed their purchases and training of horses with the intent to race them at the track. Khurana similarly relocated himself and his medical practice to this hospital, a significant financial and professional decision, allegedly as a result of the appellees’ misrepresentations as to the legitimacy of the hospital’s operations.
In addition, the damage to Khurana’s professional reputation
was a foreseeable result of the various racketeering acts of wire
and mail fraud . See discussion supra Part II.C. Khurana, as the
hospital’s director, was essentially the figurehead of a fraud-
ridden, now defunct institution. The act of fraudulently hiring
*15
him can be a proximate cause of any damage that his professional
reputation has suffered. Damage to his professional reputation is
easily seen as a natural outgrowth of such an employment
association. As the predicate acts were pleaded as responsible for
Khurana’s acceptance of his employment with River Region, we find
that the pleadings presented the claim of necessary proximate cause
for Khurana’s standing for this claim . See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel
& Carnegie ,
b.
Legitimate Employment Opportunity
Regarding Khurana’s claimed loss of legitimate business
opportunity, we begin our consideration by noting that RICO civil
standing is not limited to only the immediate victim of a
defendant’s RICO violation. See Zervas v. Faulkner ,
In Mid Atlantic , the Fourth Circuit noted that the plaintiff was not seeking to vindicate the claims of its competitor’s customers, but rather its own alleged distinct and independent *17 injuries of lost customers and lost revenues. Id. at 264. We agree with the Fourth Circuit that distinct and independent injuries are in keeping with the Supreme Court’s understanding of proximate cause in Holmes . Khurana pleads his own injury of loss of legitimate employment opportunity. In Holmes , an intervening event, the insolvency of the securities brokership, broke the causal link between the plaintiff’s injury аnd the defendant’s conduct, 503 U.S. at 262, 264, so that the plaintiff was a “secondary victim.” Id. at 273. In contrast, the plaintiff in this case seeks to recover for losses substantially attributable to the defendants’ conduct.
Finally, as explained before, the fact that Khurana pleaded reliance on the defendants’ racketeering acts as a cause of this injury indicates a valid claim that the racketeering acts proximately caused him to forego other legitimate business opportunities. See Chisholm , 95 F.3d at 337; Standardbred , 985 F.2d 102. Khurana claims that he was fraudulently induced to take his position with the hospital and argues that such proximately caused him to lose other legitimate business opportunities. As Khurana’s loss of other employment opportunities was foreseeable by the defendants and could certainly be anticipated as a natural consеquence of their alleged misrepresentations, Khurana has sufficiently pleaded that the alleged substantive violations of § 1962(b) and § 1962(c) proximately caused his business opportunity loss. See Chisholm , 95 F.3d at 337 (relying on plaintiff’s detrimental reliance on defendants’ material misrepresentations to *18 find proximate cause and noting that “[i]n order for the scheme to succeed, the appellants needed to be convinced that the ‘private sales’ referenced in the TransSouth notices were legitimate . . . . concealment of the nature of the ‘private sales’ was the very linchpin of the scheme.”); cf. Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. , 885 F.2d 1162, 1170 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming the dismissal of a RICO claim based on a “loss” of the plaintiff’s former job where there was no allegation that the employer reneged or the plaintiff was “duped out of her old job”).
. Standing for a § 1962(d)-based Civil RICO Claim for Loss of Business Opportunity and Damage to Professional Reputation as a Result of Hiring Khurana pleaded that the defendants conspired to commit RICO violations, and in doing so, injured his professional reputation and caused him a loss of legitimate business opportunity. In Cullom , we held that a “retaliatory” discharge lacks sufficient causation for § 1964(c) standing for a substantive RICO violation. However, Cullom was limited to a causation inquiry and did not address standing for a RICO civil claim premised on conspiracy acts, i.e. , acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit a pattern of racketeering, a violation of § 1962(d). [8]
There is a division of circuit authority on the question of
*19
whether § 1964(c) civil RICO standing for a § 1962(d) violation may
be premised on injury proximately caused by overt acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy that are not § 1961(1) predicate
acts. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc. ,
Section 1962(d) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any
*20
person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection
(a), (b), or (c) of this section.” It is well-established that we
must follow a plain meaning statutory interpretation unless a
statutory provision presents an ambiguity or an inconsistency with
a statute’s legislative purposes. United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc. ,
In addition, while the Second Circuit noted that RICO was
designed to combat substantive violations, Hecht v. Commerce
Clearing House, Inc. ,
Having determined that Khurana’s standing is not precluded by the necessity of causative racketeering acts, we must consider whether his pleading sufficiently alleges proximate causation for § 1964(c) standing premised on an underlying § 1962(d) violation.
In Shearin , the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff’s hiring as window dressing and firing to preserve the fraud both qualified as conspiracy acts for a § 1962(d)-based civil claim. Shearin’s hiring and firing plausibly constitute overt acts that not only would establish a conspiracy, but in this case were allegedly essential to it. Assuming that the hiring and firing were injuries, those injuries did occur “by reason of” Hutton’s violation of section 1962(d).
E. Standing for a § 1962(d)-based Civil Claim for *22 Termination Injuries
We explained earlier that Khurana does not have standing under § 1964(c) to pursue a § 1962(b) or § 1962(c) claim for termination injuries. However, he may have § 1964(c) standing to pursue a claim for termination injuries as a result of an act in furtherance of a conspiracy. RICO racketeering acts as well as acts in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy may provide standing to sue for civil conspiracy сlaims if they are the proximate cause of an injury.
Khurana alleged that he was discharged from his position as
Medical Director in furtherance of the appellees’ scheme of
Medicaid fraud. “The discharge was intended to remove Plaintiff
from continuing to have access to information about defendants and
to intimidate him to hinder and prevent his testimony as a witness
in future proceeding,” “to eliminate his access to information
concerning the defendants’ illegal activities” and was an act “to
maintain control of and conduct” the enterprise. In addition, and
probably most importantly, Khurana alleges that terminating him had
the effect of rescinding Khurana’s order of ten days previous in
which Khurana suspended the admission to the hospital of illegal
Medicaid patients. Khurana alleges that he was terminated so that
the defendants could “continu[e] their illegal procurement of
Medicaid and Medicare funds and minimiz[e] impediments thereto.”
As such, Khurana has presented the necessary proximate causation
for standing to pursue his claim for termination injuries because
the termination was an alleged overt act in furtherance of the
*23
alleged RICO conspiracy. Such an allegation presents sufficient
causation to confer standing. See Rehkop , 95 F.3d at 290-91
(holding that the plaintiff’s termination constituted an overt act
in furtherance of an alleged conspiracy and thus the plaintiff had
RICO standing); Schiffels , 978 F.2d at 350-51 (holding that a
plaintiff-employee may have RICO standing when he alleges that he
was fired in an attempt to prevent him from causing the conspiracy
to unravel by disclosing scheme); Shearin , 885 F.2d at 1170
(holding that allegation that plaintiff was fired in furtherance of
a conspiraсy in violation of § 1962(d) stated a claim for relief
under § 1964(c)); White v. Hall ,
III. The Enterprise-Person Distinction for a § 1962(c)
Violation Khurana also contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and § 1962(d) (to the extent involving a conspiracy to violate § 1962(c)) for failure to plead a RICO enterprise which is separate and distinct from the RICO person referenced in § 1962(c).
We must consider this contention in relation to Khurana’s
remaining § 1962(c) claims. The remaining § 1962(d) claims must
also be considered in relation to this issue to the extent that
they are based on a conspiracy to commit a § 1962(c) violation.
Ashe v. Corley ,
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employеd by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The statutory definition of enterprise includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other alleged legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Khurana alleged that the enterprise is an association-in- fact of all five defendants (the three individuals and the two corporate entities).
The district court dismissed Khurana’s claims that were bottomed on § 1962(c) on the alternative basis (from the dismissal on the basis of standing) that Khurana failed to plead a RICO defendаnt that was distinct from the enterprise in his § 1962(c)- premised claim and his claim based on a conspiracy to commit a § 1962(c) violation in violation of § 1962(d).
For purposes of a claim based on § 1962(c), RICO persons
associated with or employed by an enterprise must be distinct from
the RICO “enterprise.” Crowe v. Henry ,
Khurana has failed to plead a corporate defendant distinct
from the enterprise in that the association-in-fact enterprise that
he pleaded is in reality a “stand-in,” or another name, for the
corporate entity. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland
Bank, N.A. ,
by alleging a RICO enterprise that consists merely of a corporation defendant associated with its own employees or agents carrying on the regular affairs of the defendants . . . . Where employees of a corporation associate together to commit a pattern of predicate acts in the сourse of their employment and on behalf of the corporation, the employees in association with the corporation do not form an enterprise distinct from the corporation.
Id. While it is theoretically possible for a corporation to play
a separate active role in RICO violations committed by its
employees and agents, see Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk ,
In addition, the distinctiveness requirement is not satisfied
by pleading a subsidiary corporation or affiliated entity as a
perpetrator-defendant if the parent corporation and the
subsidiary’s roles in the alleged racketeering activities are not
sufficiently distinct. Discon, Inc. v. Nynex Corp. ,
We must also consider the claims in relation to the other
named defendants, the officers and employees of the two corporate
entities. See, e.g, Banks v. Wolk , 918 F.2d 418, 424 (3d Cir.
1990) (leaving RICO action intact against certain individual
defendants while dismissing the corporate defendant for failure to
withstand distinctiveness requirement); Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
Fidelcor, Inc. , 926 F.2d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 1991) (considering
§ 1962(c) claim separately for each defendant’s fulfillment of
distinctiveness and other requirements). As we explained above,
Khurana’s complaint essentially pleads the corporation as the
enterprise. Section 1962(c) may impose liability on individual
corporate officers and employees who conduct the corporate
enterprise which employs them through a pattern of racketeering
activity. See Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co. , 46
F.3d 258, 266-269 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Robinson , 8 F.3d
398, 407 (7th Cir. 1993); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp. , 978 F.2d
1529, 1534 (9th Cir. 1992); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett , 875 F.2d
1271, 1280 (7th Cir. 1989); McCullough v. Suter ,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE in part and AFFIRM in part. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Khurana’s claims based on alleged violations of § 1962(c) and § 1962(d) (to the extent they allege conspiracy to violate § 1962(c)) against the two *29 corporate defendants. We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of all claims alleging injury from “illegal competition.” Additionally, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Khurana’s claims alleging termination injuries as a result of § 1962(b) and § 1962(c) violations. We reverse the district court’s dismissal of all other claims with directions to reinstate them for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [9]
Notes
[*] Chief Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
[1] Khurana’s state law claims were remanded to state сourt following the district court’s Fed. R. Civ P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of his RICO claims. Only issues related to the dismissal of Khurana’s RICO claims are before the panel.
[2] 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)-(d) is as follows: (b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate of foreign commerce. (c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. (d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to viоlate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or
[3] The Court noted that in using such a term, it did “not necessarily
use it in the same sense as courts before us have.” Holmes ,
[4] To repeat, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is as follows: Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney’s fees. (emphasis added).
[5] In fact, it is generally true that an articulation of the meaning of “proximate cause” is a “fruitless quest for a universal formula.” Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 42, p. 279. “The search for some test or formula which will serve as a universal solvent for all of the problems of ‘proximate cause’ has occupied many writers.” Id. at 276.
[6] In his concurrence, Justice Scalia offered a thought in the same vein.
[7] While Cullom predated Holmes , like Holmes , it imposed a proximate causation requirement for § 1964(c) standing. Thus, Holmes did not disturb the our holding in Cullom .
[8] In this section we consider civil standing for a § 1962(d) violation. Based on our previous discussion in Part II.D.1., we also recognize that Khurana pleaded proximate cause for § 1962(d) violations causing reputation damage and business opportunity loss where the § 1962(d) violations are predicated upon the racketeering acts of wire and mail fraud already discussed. Accordingly, we also reverse the district court’s dismissal of Khurana’s claims on that basis, subject to our discussion in Part III in which we affirm the dismissal of some of Khurana’s claims as to the corporate defendants.
[9] Our reversal of the dismissal of these claims is not meant to
express any opinion as to other issues related to these сlaims which the
district court may address on remand. Given that the parties did not brief
any other issues to the district court and that only the appellant briefed
the properness of his pleadings of RICO violations, we have concerned
ourselves only with the district court’s legal conclusions supporting its
dismissal of Khurana’s RICO claims, namely the issues of proximate
causation for his standing and the necessary distinctiveness for the §
1962(c)-related claims. We leave any other issues or challenges for the
district court’s consideration in the first instance. See Youmons v.
Simon ,