MEMORANDUM OPINION
Thе plaintiff, Mourad Khalil (“Khalil”), worked as a linguist from August 2003 to July 2006 for a government contractor providing security in Iraq: the defendant, L-3 Cоmmunications Titan Group (“L-3”). (First Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 8] ¶¶ 3-5.) Khalil alleges that L-3 discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, violated thе Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990, wrongfully discharged him, and breached an implied contract. Currently before the Court is L-3’s Motion to Dismiss the case or, alternatively, to Transfer it to the Eastern District of Virginia. For the following reasons, L-3’s Motion tо Transfer is GRANTED and its Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot.
BACKGROUND
In considering L-3’s Motion to Transfer venue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), the Court “аccepts the plaintiffs well-pled factual allegations regarding venue as true, draws all reasonable inferеnces from those allegations in the plaintiffs favor and resolves any factual conflicts in the plaintiffs favor.”
James v. Verizon Servs. Corp.,
A Title VII claim is governed by a statutory venue provision that is specific to Title VII. Under that provision, venue is “proper in any of the fоllowing judicial districts: (1) where ‘the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed’; (2) where ‘the еmployment records relevant to such action are maintained and administered’; (3) where the plaintiff ‘would have wоrked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice’; but (4) if the defendant is not within those three districts, the ‘action may bе brought
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within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.’ ”
Kloeckner v. Solis,
No. 08-762,
With respect to the first subsection, the parties agree that the unlawful employment practice did not occur in the District of Columbia. (Pl.’s Opp’n [Dkt. # 11] at 3.) In fact, Khalil concedes that the unlawful conduct occurred either in Iraq, where he was working, or in Florida, where he returned after leaving Iraq. (Id.) Therefore, jurisdiction is not proper under subsection (1).
The seсond subsection provides that venue is proper in the district where “the employment records relevant to such [alleged unlawful employment] practice are maintained and administered.” 42 U.S.C. § 20006-5(0(3). While Khalil does not address where the rеcords are maintained and administered, he does offer the unsupported conclusory assertion that “there is а dispute as to where [his] employment records are ‘maintained and administered.’” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.) He speculates thаt his employment records are “likely maintained electronically” and could easily be accessible for litigаtion in the District of Columbia.
(Id.
at 3-4.) However, the statutory venue provision does not provide for venue wherever reсords could be accessed, but rather where they are “maintained and administered.”
Kendrick v. Potter,
No. 06-122,
With respect to the third subsection, Khalil concedes that “there is no evidence on whеre Mr. Mourad [sic] would have worked for [defendant but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) Therefore, venue is also not proper in the District of Columbia on the basis that Khalil would have worked in this district but for the allеged employment practice.
The fourth and final subsection provides that
if
the defendant is not within one of the previous three districts, venue is proper in the district where the defendant “has his principal office.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). While L-3 does have offices in the District of Columbia,
(see generally
Pl.’s Ex. 1 [Dkt. # 11-2]), its headquarters (and likely its “principal office”) are located in Reston, Virginia,
(id.).
More importantly, perhaps, the Court cаnnot even consider the fourth venue scenario, as this subsection applies
only
in the event that the defendant is not located in one of the first three districts.
Donnell v. Nat’l Guard Bureau,
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Thus for all of the above reasons the Court finds venue for Khalil’s Title VII actiоn is not proper in the District of Columbia,
2
and must either dismiss Khalil’s Title VII claim or, “if it be in the interest of justice, transfer [it] to any district or divisiоn in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a);
Akers v. Gutierrez,
No. 07-266,
Notes
. Additionally, in determining whether a defendant has defeated the plaintiff's assertion of venue, "[a] court may cоnsider materials outside the pleadings.”
Ridgely v. Chao,
No. 05-1033,
. While Khalil asserts venue is proper in the District of Columbia because he "worked on a contract issued by the U.S. Department of Defense in Washington, D.C. and Defendant may be found in this judicial district,” (First Am. Compl. ¶ 2), Title VII does not provide that venue is proper on this basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(3).