*1 ORDER PER CURIAM. NOW, 2003,
AND this 23rd day July, above-captioned appeal quashed failure file a brief.
v. PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION Appeal Pennsylvania Property Casualty & Guaranty
Insurance Association Keystone Surveys, Inc., v. Aerial Pennsylvania Property Casualty & Insurance
Guaranty Association
v. Campbell, Campbell Marisol Campbell, Vanessa and Melva Individually and As Natural Mother and Next Friend of
Penelope Campbell Campbell, and Nakita Minors.
Appeal Pennsylvania Property Casualty & Guaranty
Insurance Association. Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Oct. 2002. July
Decided 2003. *2 Pennsylvania Property & Luborsky, Philadelphia, for Lise Association, Guaranty appellant. Casualty Insurance Weston, Kerry Philadelphia, Keystone John Aerial Sur- Inc., veys, appellee. ZAPPALA, C.J., CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO,
Before NEWMAN, SAYLOR, JJ.
OPINION Justice SAYLOR. appeal requires $300,000
This an evaluation of the “per claimant” limitation Pennsylvania Property embodied Casualty Guaranty Insurance Association Act. May
In Thomas Campbell, Texas, a resident of was killed airplane Nevada the crash of an owned and operated by Appellee Keystone Surveys (“Keystone”), Aerial Pennsylvania corporation. Mr. Campbell’s wife and sur- four (also residents) viving children Texas commenced a civil action against Keystone in the United States District Court for the *3 Texas, Southern District of advancing predicated on, alia, inter theories of death and survival under Texas law.
Keystone maintained a of insurance with American (“American Eagle Company Insurance Eagle”), covering acci- dental harm to passengers. aircraft and Pursuant to the policy, terms Eagle Keystone’s American assumed in litigation however, defense Campbells; initiated 1997, December the insurer was deemed insolvent and placed in liquidation county via orders of a By Texas court. Keystone’s virtue of status as a Pennsylvania corporation and as Eagle’s insured, American insolvency triggered certain statutory obligations on part Pennsylvania of the Property Casualty (“PPCIGA” Insurance Guaranty Association “Association”) pursuant to Pennsylvania Property Casualty Guaranty Insurance Association Act.1 In particular, PPCIGA Keystone’s assumed Campbells’ defense of the 12, 1994, 1005, (as amended, 1. Act of § December P.L. 137 No. 40 991.1801-991.1820) (the Act”). §§ P.S. legislation "PPCIGA This su- perseded Act, Pennsylvania Guaranty the former Insurance Association 25, 1970, (as Act. of Nov. P.L. No. 232 amended 40 P.S. (2), obligat- 991.1803(b)(l)(i), became claims, § see 40 P.S. existing prior to the determination claims” pay to “covered ed 991.1803(b)(1), subject to § 40 P.S. insolvency, see Bell v. Sle- generally limitations. conditions and certain (2002) (describing 333, 341, 570-71 812 A.2d zak, Pa. Act). limitation of the PPCIGA operation the overall obligations that the Association’s prescribes in issue presently $300,000 exceeding an amount by paying be satisfied shall to relating return than those for claims other “per claimant” 991.1803(b)(l)(i)(B).2 § 40 P.S. premiums. See unearned im- apparently reached Association Keystone and the monetary potential of PPCIGA’s concerning the extent passe $300,000 “per alia, statutory, light of the obligаtions, inter position Association took the limitation. The claimant” claim- was a representative Campbell personal or his only Mr. liability Act, limiting potential thus its the PPCIGA ant under hand, maintained that other $300,000; on the Keystone, claimant, thereby increas- proper Campbells was each million dollars liability to 1.5 potential Association’s ing the Ultimate- surviving Campbells). ($300,000 of the five for each committing pay 1.5 action Keystone settled the Texas ly, liability on the dollars, from exchange for release million allo- $300,000 fund claims, of the settlement -with underlying final in a Campbells, as reflected surviving cated to each Keystone was reduced.3 to which the settlement judgment 1701.101-1701.605), enabling legislation for PPCI- which was the §§ Guaranty Association. Pennsylvania Insurance predecessor, GA’s states, 991.1803, 1803(b), part: in relevant P.S. 2. Section (b) following powers and duties: have shall [PPCIGA] existing prior (l)(i) [to] the obligated pay covered claims be To *4 insolvency.... Any obligation the association determination payment or upon the association’s shall cease defend an insured to association's covered equal the lesser of the an amount to tender of obligation shall policy limit. Such obligation applicable claim or the follows: by paying an amount as to the claimant be satisfied ($300,000) (B) exceeding hundred thousand three An amount not covered claims. per for all other dollars claimant 991.1803(b)(l)(i). § 40 P.S. concerning timing scope of the discus- vague and 3. The record is PPCIGA; however, judgment final Keystone and sions between agreed cooperate Campbells also with the in determining the amount of coverage available from PPCIGA.
Keystone present declaratory judg- then commenced the court, ment action pleas PPCIGA the common seeking requiring Campbells an order that each be Act, a separate purposes deemed claimant for of the PPCIGA required fully and the Association therefore be fund the 1.5 Campbells sought million dollar settlement. The co-plaintiffs. obtained lеave to intervene as filed an PPCIGA and, subsequently, parties answer motions filed cross summary judgment. PPCIGA,
In granting summary judgment in favor of that, law, common pleas acknowledged court under Texas each discrete, Campbells pursue was a entitled direct of action arising Campbell’s cause out of Mr. death. The court law, Pennsylvania pursuant nonetheless contrasted to which wrongful an action for personal death is maintained a representative survivors, 8301, on behalf of see 42 Pa.C.S. 2202, see also leaving Pa.R.Civ.P. No. the individual derivative, death with solely beneficiaries but not independent, SEPTA, causes of action. generally See Tulewicz v. 529 Pa. 588, 9, (1992). 597 n. 606 A.2d 431 n. 9 Since it conсluded that, had action in Pennsylvania, arisen liability PPCIGA’s $300,000, would have limited to been the court was disinclined greater to afford recovery Texas, on claims accruing thus effectively discriminating against those whose claims arise locally. Additionally, pleas the common court observed that the more interpretation constrained limitation salutary had a effect the administration of PPCIGA assets. Keystone PPCIGA, Surveys, Aerial Inc. v. No. slip 2000) (“Public op. (C.P.Phila.Sep.14, at 4 policy demands that both .. . consistency we maintain the treatment of [in in-state claimants], and out-of-state support that we the PPCIGA statute’s intent to conserve aggrieved the funds so that all against Keystonе entered the Texas district court reflects that “[a]s $1,500,000 recognize policy
result of [PPCIGA]’sfailure to limits of limits, their Keystone failure to settle the case for was forced to protect enter into the settlement to its assets.”
152 they may coverage to a source of which may insureds have turn.”). light limitation in the Reading the PPCIGA Act’s statute, court pleas the death common Pennsylvania wrongful recog- the Act Association that PPCIGA agreed thus with the person, wrongful claim death of a only for nizes wrongful death benefi- potential number regardless of the ciaries. its further support court found pleas
The common
$250,000
a statutory,
in this Court’s treatment
conclusion
against
applicable
limitation
to certain verdicts
“per plaintiff’
788, 42
1978-152,
Act
P.L.
in
the
embodied
Commonwealth
1484,
No.
at
slip op.
(repealed).
Keystone,
§ 5111
See
Pa.C.S.
430).
Tulewicz,
at
(citing
Depending on in processed the state which the action is specific asserted, the of person cause action a could be action, a plaintiff considered with his or her own of cause beneficiary a mere of cause of action asserted another person. Act, however, in Nothing the intimates that the manner in which processed an action is in a state court person’s Indeed, affects a status as a “claimant.” a third party may, cases, victim in against certain assert a claim the insured without filing ever a formal lawsuit.
Keystone, 777 A.2d
Superior
at 93. The
Court deemed the
decision,
court,
Tulewicz
common pleas
cited
the
distin
guishable,
Act
since
1978-152’s limitation
a “per
functioned as
plaintiff’
cap,
contrast
to the PPCIGA Act’s
of
approach
limiting
obligations
the Association’s
“per claimant.”
Keystone,
See
Finally,
Superior
Court declined
invitation to
PPCIGA’s
undertake a choice-of-law
assessment
determine whether
Pennsylvania,
Texas,
as opposed to
law governed
of
resolution
controversy. Because,
analysis,
under the above
resolu-
question
tion of the
of who is a claimant depends primarily on
interpretation
issues
contract
and not on where or how such
claims are asserted in an adjudicatory setting, it was not clear
to the court that a true conflict between state laws at
issue
persisted.
the case
parties
See id.
specifi-
Since the
had not
cally addressed
question
Campbells’
whether the
claims
within
were
the contemplation of the American Eagle policy,
the court remanded for further proceedings, directing pleas court,
alia,
common
inter
to determine the number of
Further,
Superior
Court
claims.
and covered
claimants
court
restraining
pleas
the common
from
expressly refrained
of its
in the course
principles
choice-of-law
applying
from
n. 15.
id. at 94-95
policy terms. See
examination
pres-
its
rendered
decision
Superior Court
After the
Bell,
In
claims,”
reasoned
“covered
the Court
constituted
claims,
third-party
express reference
Act makes
PPCIGA
is consistent with the
of such claims
cognizance
and that the
broad,
purposes
and the remedial
statutory definition
Bell,
344,
572. Re-
Pa. at
We hold that the correctly Court *8 determined Campbells that each of the five is a proper claimant for purрoses Act, long so as it can be fairly said that their claims arise out of and are within coverage provided Potts, Compare, Virginia e.g., Guaranty 5. West Ins. v. Ass’n 209 W.Va. 682, 660, (W.Va.2001); 550 Oglesby Liberty S.E.2d 665-66 v. Mutual Co., 834, (Okla.1992), Ins. 832 840-41 Transport P.2d with Builders v. Cas., 419, Prop. (S.C.1992); S.C. & S.C. S.E.2d Cole, Guaranty Florida Ins. v. (Fla.App. Ass'n 573 So.2d 870-71 1990). pleas common court’s and the Eagle policy, American Association was in favor of the summary judgment award properly reversed. presently before question have answered
Although we merits dissenting opinion Court, Castille’s Mr. Justice permit law does not that Texas opines dissent response. The actions, and, for this in death claimants multiple must be Campbells’ claims theory all of the reason, any under Dissenting claim. derivative single, aggregate, considered a language posits that the dissent then at 305. The Opinion, Op. same command the policy would liability insurance any automobile insurance conclusion, example of an offering an $30,000per and occurrence $15,000 individual per a policy with exposure on company’s limit, indicating that the insurance and could exceed in such circumstances wrongful death Further, con- the dissent id. at 306. $15,000 limit. See policy underlying language of the tends “claimant” for person is a whether not control should interpre- that our suggests Act of the PPCIGA purposes salutary aims. id. at the enactment’s compromises tation 307. matter, liability insurаnce preliminary as a response,
In and the associated individualized highly to be tend policies technical; therefore, broad specialized law decisional dissenting opinion are sort offered generalizations liability aircraft example, the misleading. For likely to be only an occurrence- in this case contained portion of the “per passen- no $5,000,000 simply is limitation of based —there individual”) limitation as the (or “per or “per person” ger” American must be. See suggests there dissenting opinion Policy, Cover- Aircraft Insurance Company Eagle Insurance N/A”). ... (“Passenger sub-limit Page 2 age Identification in this case is well aggregate sеttlement Additionally, since the not, simply do policy limits $5,000,000figure, beneath the manner that the themselves, cap as a function they must.6 also claims dissenting opinion limitations, may forms of suggest not be other that there 6. We do not otherwise, process in the may be discerned which definitional
157
in
Furthermore,
providing its assessment
the term
law,
“claimant” under
misconstrues our
Texas
the dissent
holding.
a claimant
We have not conditioned status as
under
particular
the PPCIGA Act on
definitions of
state law
Rather,
term
adopted
Superior
“claimant.”
we have
term,
Court’s view that
this
in
as used
Section
991.1803(b)(1)(B)
Act,
possessed
with
means one
claim,”
alia,
subsuming,
“covered
inter
losses occasiоned to
parties
insured,
third
caused
which
and for
the insured
insurer,
would
recompense
be entitled to
from its
but for the
insolvency.
insurer
Keystone,
Judge
See
Respecting
language
the dissent’s assertion that the
underlying policy
possessed
should
affect who is
with a
claim,
covered
indicated,
as
have
we
this issue was resolved
construing
dissent,
response
issue. Other
at
than the
to the
our focus
answering
presented
here
on
question
has been
in the
case, namely,
summary judgment
properly
whether
was
entered on the
reasons
pleas
offered
the common
court.
aside,
that,
however,
7. As an
interesting
it
holding
to note
that a
statutory "per person"
upon wrongful
against
limitation
death claims
governmental
person injured
opposed
units referred to the
as
to the
beneficiaries,
derivative
Supreme
expressly
Texas
Court
distin-
guished
legislature’s
broader,
its
use
"per person"
of the term
from the
formulation,
“per claimant”
employed
latter of
which
court
referring
when
City
Cooksey,
Austin v.
to the beneficiaries.
(Tex. 1978).
S.W.2d
Slezak,
571 Pa. at
Bell v.
position
dissent’s
contra to the
third-party
expressly
Bell
held
Former Chief Justice ZAPPALA did participate in the decision of this case.
Justice CASTILLE files a dissenting opinion. CASTILLE,
Justice dissenting. I disagree with Majority’s conclusion that each of the surviving five members of decedent Thomas Campbell’s imme- fаmily diate is a separate claimant for purposes of determining obligation exposure of the Pennsylvania Property and Casualty (“PPCIGA” Guaranty Insurance Association or “As- sociation”), so long as their may derivative claims fairly be said to arise out of and fall within scope of coverage provided by insurer, the defunct American Eagle Insurance Company. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The provides PPCIGA Act that the Association obligated is pay to covered arising out of the insolvency of insurers authorized to property write casualty and policies insurance Pennsylvania, subject to certain limitations. 40 P.S. § 991.1803. pertinent The limitation in appeal this provides that the Association’s obligation is met when it pays “an amount not exceeding ($300,000) three hundred thousand dol- per lars claimant” for all claims other than involving those premiums. unearned question Id. germane The to this appeal is whether the Assembly General intended that family when litigate survivors wrongful a death action deriving from the death of an insured single decedent, the number of statutory claimants and the amount of the exposure Association’s should according increase to the survivors; number of or, did the Assembly intend that single the decedent through whom the litigate survivors determines the number of claimants? The Majority agrees with the Superior Court that appropriate definition of “claimant” depend should upon the language of the underlying policy insurance with the insolvent and, therefore, insurer exposure Association’s may vary. I cannot accept Majority’s approach, since it permits to displace underlying
language of effectively eliminating the thereby statute governing recovery. “cap” on Superior Court and the
Preliminarily, I that both the note multiple law that allows Court assumed Texas Common Pleas Super. slip op. wrongful actions. See Ct. death claimants 13; slip at 3. That not how op. n. court is at 3 n. and 19 trial on admittedly provided this Court I scant authorities read the death wrongful 71.004 of the Texas question. Section 71.004, lists benefi- Rem.Code statute, Civ. Prac. & Tex. may file that action wrongful action and who ciaries a death under statute:
(a) damages by this sub- provided as An action recover surviving for of the the exclusive benefit
chapter children, deceased. parents spouse, (b) children, the de- surviving parents spouse, those may action one or more bring the
ceased all. bring action may individuals benefit (c) bring an have action of the individuals entitled If none months after action within three calendar
begun the individual, injured his executor or adminis- death action re- prosecute unless bring shall trator not to all those individuals. quested Thus, reсog- although the statute supplied). Id. (emphasis beneficiaries, speaks it multiple potential nizes Moreover, 71.003 of the Code action. Section death may subchapter an “This limits such action be filed: when injured have if the individual would been entitled applies only if had lived.” Civ. injury action for the he Tex. bring *12 has Appeals of Prac. 71.003. The Texas Court & Rem.Code de- statutory language demonstrates the recognized that the Wrongful wrongful of a death claim: “the nature rivative any expressly and Survival Statute state Death Statute are derivative of the decedent’s brought action under either Resources, Inc., Natural 94 S.W.3d v. rights.” Zacharie U.S. Camp- while Accordingly, (Tex.Ct.App.2002). 757-58 wrongful potential beneficiaries undеr Texas bells all are (here statute, brought by for the their “claim” one death all) benefit of is a single claim derivative of the decedent’s Thus, law, law, claim. Pennsylvania Texas no less than appar- ently recognizes that a single decedent cannot of be the source multiple, derívate death “claims.” very
The policies nature of insurance also commands a finding of a policies claimant here. of all Insurance automobile, types, they be general liability commercial or policies, designate exposure. limits of liability These limits on typically are per per stated terms of the limit claimant and For example, oсcurrence. policy may automobile insurance $15,000 liability limit per $30,000 individual claimant and per If occurrence. the insured on that policy automobile is involved in an accident a third party fatally injured, where is party’s $15,000 the third estate would policy recover the limit individual, per regardless depen- the number third party decedent left. The dents/heirs/beneficiaries fortuity that the decedent left four heirs would not increase exposure $60,000. insurer’s fourfold to exposure, case, every would properly policy $15,000 be the limit of because the true claimant against decedent, is the arbitrary and unpredictable number of heirs or surviv- try ors who squeeze single pair into his of shoes. The survivors’ right of recovery capped by is their decedent’s right; and the exposure insurer’s limit of commensurately ascertainable and assured.2 Majority misapprehends
1. The purpose my "preliminary” discus- law, sion Texas only which was occasioned because I believe that the parties suggest misunderstood it. I do not that Texas law controls the number of PPCIGA claimants in this or case that Texas law defines exposure. that, fact, simply PPCIGA I tangential point my note understanding of the PPCIGA Act does not create a conflict with Texas law. Majority 2. The purpose also my misconstrues the discussion of these general principles. agree insurance Majority I with the ques- that the judice tion in the case sub interpretation is one of regarding PPCIGA Act Majori- what is a claim or claimant. Unlike the ty, I conclude that the exposure statute intends to limit PPCIGA’s to one multiple claim where would-be claimants seek relief as survivors of a single, Thus, injured actual my deceased individual. discussion of general principles guidepost explicating is not meant as a Eagle policy, the American explain but rather is offered to further what *13 policy typically function policies containing limits
Insurance limit limit policy the absolute same manner. The sets the dependents, number heirs or liability; unpredictable of not arbi- a claimant leaves behind does deceased beneficiaries deliber- policies are trarily multiply exposure. Insurance provide to ately structured with foreseeable limits order risk, ie., to upon with a which calculate their insurers basis they pay inject to claims. To an amount will need covered and, indeed, as exponential variable such unknowable person dependents injured or of an number of beneficiaries insur- computations leave potentially would skew actuarial claims, resulting which pay insufficient funds -with ers with insolvency.3 prospect in the insurer emergency an insurer and The Association acts like limited insurer, subject steps into of an in fact the shoes insolvent limiting obligations statutory provisions the Association’s on exposure. provisions cap financial Those set a claimant, cap a that is tantamount per amount recoverable Here, insurer, liability. limit of the now-insolvent an insurer’s Surveys under a Eagle, Keystone insured Aerial American passengers. harm to covering accidental aircraft and airplane Campbell tragically Thomas was killed when But, single by Keystone with him that owned crashed aboard. children, decedent, surviving four was his wife their aircraft. Had sur- passenger the doomed the decedent had a claim injury single with would have vived he insurer; demise, tragic, of his while does not circumstance Rather, unitary common change the nature of that claim. practices that and standard should dictate he sense purposes claimant for Act and is the true Assembly exposure I the General intended when it defined the believe PPCIGA. agree Majority party I with the that this case involves third claimants. 3. derivative, is, definition, party here a third claim. survivor claim disagree Majority's party simply that that third I with the conclusion because, merely multiplies exponentially by happenstance, there claim single pair left multiple step into the of shoes are survivors to claimant, party the deceased. true third here claims of family merely his survivors are derivative arising planе insured claim out of the crash.4 way
In the that policy provide same limits insurers with *14 and, some measure of control the amount paid over for claims therefore, ability appropriate to tailor premiums commen- involved, statutory cap surate with the risk the on the Associa- obligations tion’s is cap helps essential. The ensure that the amount the Association will in pay given year out a will not tightly-controlled exceed the paid by amounts into it insurers writing policies Pennsylvania. The Association is funded by assessments solvent insurers. The Association calcu- lates the total amount to obligations needed meet its and then assesses each solvent insurer its of “in share that total the proportion that the net premiums direct written of the mem- ber preceding insurer for the year calendar ... bears the aggregate premiums net direct written of all member insurers 991.1808(b). for preceding year.” the calendar § 40 P.S. maximum against any insurer, however, assessment solvent is no limited: insurer can greater be assessed “an amount than (2%) per two centum of that member insurer’s net direct premiums written preceding the year.” calendar Id. 991.1808(d). Due to statutorily limited resources avail- Association, able statutory cap absolutely essen- tial to maintaining integrity of the Association and its ability to pay claimants at least recovery some on covered claims frоm insolvent insurers. Majority,
Unlike the I would not question leave the of the meaning of term claimant to vagaries of various intestacy states’ laws lest the Association itself become Indeed, given insolvent. Association, the function of the structure, its financial I reading believe a of the statute that would define the word permit claimant to multiple survivors of likelihood, 4. In all liability due to the policies nature of therein, liability limits on contained Superi- remand ordered by majority Court and affirmed a of this finding Court will result in a was, indeed, that the decedent language the sole claimant under the But, Eagle policy. the American that does impracticality not alter the analytical paradigm approved by Majority. against the Association separate recoveries a tort victim purpose to the antithetical is both unreasonable wrongful death Pennsylvania pertaining law Association. personal representative of a decedent permits only actions action on behalf the decedent’s wrongful to file death 2201(a); Tulewicz v. Southeast Pa.R.C.P. beneficiaries. Auth., Transp. Pa. A.2d Pennsylvania ern (Pa.1992) caps apply do not to each (separate damage n. 9 only it is “clearly provides Rule 2201 beneficiary because who maintain may personal representative the decedent persons death for the benefit those an action for death.”). damages -wrongful for such law to recover entitled here, directly applicable provides This while principle, “claimant” as used conclusion that the term support for the actually injured the course Act the individual means survivors, event, who and not that individual’s the covered *15 pair into step single his shoes. have
Here, Campbell family surviving members insur- injury to themselves insolvent no for single from the decedent’s Rather, claims devolve er. their upon claim his for which became his estate’s injury, claim Thus, I hold that the enumerated members would death. estate, through comprise decedent’s Campbell family, their I Accordingly, Act. would purposes claimant grant trial Court and affirm the court’s Superior reverse the of the Association. Because summary judgment favor otherwise, respectfully I dissent. Majority does