*1 95 75803. KEYSER v. THE STATE. 309)
(369 SE2d Carley, jury was tried before a on an accusation which
him with several misdemeanor offenses. The offenses all arose out of a appellant, neighbors, po- series of involving incidents and several lice jury officers. The returned verdicts of on three counts of simple battery, influence, of driving one count under the and one “expired count of having tag.” Appellant appeals judg- an ments of jury conviction and sentences entered on the verdicts.
1. Appellant to suppress, filed motion wherein he contended that the State had attained certain evidence as the fruit of his illegal warrantless arrest. The trial is court’s denial of that motion as error. enumerated that, subsequent accusation, filing to the of the
appellant filed a written pre-trial and that a hear- ing However, on that motion was set. the motion was dismissed when neither appellant nor his appeared hearing, counsel at the scheduled continuance, moved for a or filed conflict letter with the court. State, See Jacobs v. (1) (212 468) (1975). App. 133 Ga. 812 SE2d At trial, the trial court agreed nevertheless to hear evidence outside presence jury of the as to the existence of for probable cause State, Ellis lant’s v. (296 arrest. See generally 164 Ga. 366 SE2d 726) (1982). The evidence which produced hearing at this author- ized the trial court to probable find that cause to arrest DUI did exist at the time that he was arrested for that offense. “[I]f officer, presence while in vicinity accused, acquires (federal) ‘probable cause’ her accused outside arrest home, arrest, and fails likely to make such is there to be a failure of justice as a matter of law if the delay officer is the arrest until a warrant say, obtained. That is to we find the state rule the same as the federal An search, rule. arrest and legal under federal law, Durden v. legal are 325, (1) under state law.” 250 Ga. 327 237) (1982). See also 502, 182 Ga. (1) (356
There was also evidence adduced hearing at the trial court was further to find that appellant’s authorized arrest had occurred on house, the front porch of his complied after he had the request of police step officer to outside. An arrest of under such circumstances would not constitute an arrest which was Mincey made inside his 255, home. Santana, United States v. See also U. S. (II) (96 (1976) SC 49 LE2d (holding for Fourth purposes,
Amendment “in dwelling one who is the threshold [his] . . ‘public’ . place” dwelling). Accordingly, and not within the [is] Payton SC York, S. v. New 445 U. reliance 639) (1980), Wisconsin, U. S. 1371, LE2d Welsh authorizing and similar cases suppress misplaced. grant in- All of those cases of his motion to living private entry by police into the the warrantless volved quarters purpose making an or of con- arrest of the accused *2 Appellant’s ducting ally distinguishable are, therefore, factu- cited a search cases therein. inapposite. they legally reason, are, for that and Compare Griffith (1984). denying in did err It that the trial court not follows suppress. lant’s motion to Appellant general grounds as to conviction
2. enumerates operating expired tag. for with violation of nent a with an was vehicle (a), provided, perti- in § OCGA 40-2-8 which former any “Any operating part, person owning vehicle or follows: any public highway street in 40-2-20 on described Code Section of each April year complying with that Code section after shall without (Emphasis supplied.) The ...” a misdemeanor.
be of sufficient evidence an presented appellant operated a mo- that had State tag public expired Mississippi a of Geor- tor vehicle with street gia. presented The issue resolved is whether the State sufficient to be finding that evidence to authorize a that automobile was one § in . .” “described 40-2-20. . OCGA §
A in vehicle OCGA 40-2-20” is one which is “described registered provided [Chapter in 2 of 40 of to be “as Title OCGA]. § . . .” The evidence did not show to whom OCGA 40-2-20. registered Mississippi appellant in the vehicle or whether had been recently purchased However, au- it. of record did had thorize a evidence regardless
finding that, of current owner of the ve- who the might actually be, hicle automobile which was vehicle not an exempt requirement registration otherwise See OCGA 40-2-90 appellant of in this State. (b) (3). therefore,
§ would, that The evidence show operated § on a had a vehicle in OCGA 40-2-20” “described public Accordingly, street of this State. our review of entire presented that, trial, of from trier the evidence at rational beyond reasonably appellant guilty fact could ble doubt have a reasona- found Virginia, violating U. S. § OCGA Jackson v. 40-2-8. general In raises numerous enumerations grounds simple battery regard to his convictions and three DUI conviction. pre- argument support in of these enumerations advanced upon insufficiency part,
mised, in the evidence for the most appellant’s granted if motion which would exist suppress. the trial court had 1, however, the court did As have held in Division trial not Our err such evidence. denying presented review of the the evidence entire record reveals trial, at reasonably rational trior of fact could have found guilty beyond charges issue. a reasonable doubt of each of four at Virginia, Jackson v. supra. U. S.
4. We of er- appellant’s remaining have considered enumerations ror but find them moot without merit. either be be J., Judgment Sognier, J., Deen, concurs. P. concurs affirmed. specially. Deen, Presiding Judge, concurring specially.
In two majority opinion, of the cases in the con- judge cited one (J/O). judgment only curred Those two cases are Ga. and Griffith Ga. App. 255 A is somewhere between a J/O dissent, clips consigns concurrence and a and and to a case sort of no man’s pressure, land of case law. Like it is a high blood silent case literally killer or crippler, snuffing sucking dry spirit precedential silentio, all any life sub explana- out a case without tion. Although a may handy convenient, widget for use as a J/O quick, quasi-dissent, crippler, busy judges, or case be- this writer *3 lieves that setting forth reasons concurrence or dissent more Otherwise, beneficial to the bench and bar. relegate should most cases involving unreported pos- in order to lessen J/O’s sibility of reciting them in future cases.
Because of a total exposition lack of factual this Division important case involving convictions for the serious offenses of DUI and the three counts of I battery, fully major- cannot concur with the ity opinion. April Decided
Rehearing May denied
Billy Spruell, L. appellant. Head, Solicitor,
Patrick H. Clayton, Melodie H. Bruce D. Horn- buckle, Solicitors, Assistant appellee. INVESTMENTS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INC. COMPANY, ARCHER MOTOR INC.
Pope, Plaintiff Investments, International Business Inc. instituted this against action defendant Company, seeking Archer Motor Inc. to re-