68 P. 625 | Kan. | 1902
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The plaintiffs in error filed their petition in the district court of Wilson county for an injunction to restrain the defendants in error, the city of Neodesha, P. G. Pinney, county treasurer, and O. W. Isham, county clerk, of Wilson county, from levying a special assessment against certain lots in the city of Neodesha, and from assigning certain tax-sale certificates which had been issued to the county on tax sales of said lots, and from executing tax deeds to said real estate. A temporary restraining order was issued. Thereafter the defendants filed a demurrer to the petition alleging all the statutory grounds except the third. Upon a hearing this demurrer was sustained, and, the plaintiffs electing to stand on their petition, judgment was rendered for the defendants. The only question involved is whether the petition states a cause of action..
The petition alleges the ownership of the property in plaintiffs, that the city passed an ordinance establishing the grades of the streets - on which such lots are situated, and an ordinance providing for the building of sidewalks thereon, prescribing their width, the
We are not informed on which ground stated in the demurrer the court held the petition insufficient. However, defendants in error urge but two. The first is that the plaintiffs’ cause of action, if they ever had-any, is barred by their own laches, or, putting it more
The second contention of defendants in error is that the contractors, Munday & Purnell, should have been made parties. We are unable to understand what interest these parties have in this litigation. The levy-, ing and collecting of the taxes, the assignment of the tax-sale certificate and the issuance of the deed are matters over which they have no control, and, in fact, no interest. They are not even proper parties.
Referring again to the petition, should the demurrer have been sustained on the ground that the petition does not state a cause of action ? It is formally sufficient, and it contains facts which, if true, would entitle the parties to the relief demanded. It alleges that the grading of such portion of the streets on which the sidewalks were laid was let in the same contract with the building of the walks, and assessed against the lots, together with the expense of building the walks, and carried on the tax-rolls as one item, and cannot now be separated. There is no authority
“The cities coming under the provisions of this act in their corporate capacities are authorized and empowered to enact ordinances for the following purposes: . . . (2) To ' open and improve streets¡ avenues and alleys,make sidewalks, and build bridges, culverts and sewers within the city; and for the purpose of paying for the same, shall have power to make assessments in the following manner, to wit: First. For opening, widening and grading all streets and avenues, and for all improvements of the squares and areas formed by the crossing of streets, and for buliding bridges, culverts and sewers, and footwalks across streets, the assessments shall be made .on all taxable real estate within the corporate limits of the city, not exceeding ten mills on the dollar, for these purposes, in any one year. Second. For making and repairing sidewalks, macadamizing, curbing, paving and guttering, the assessments shall be made on all lots and pieces of ground abutting on the improvements, according to the front foot thereof.”
It will be observed that the cost of grading the streets cannot be assessed against the abutting lots This is an expense which must be assessed against all taxable real estate within the corporate limits. Before a city can legally levy a special assessment for building sidewalks, it must establish a grade and bring that part of the street on which the walk is to be built to the grade so established.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to overrule the demurrer.