794 P.2d 1214 | Okla. Civ. App. | 1990
OPINION
The facts of this case are not in dispute. In 1987, the County Assessor of Oklahoma County completed a county-wide revaluation of the taxable property as required by 68 O.S.Supp.1989 § 2481.1.
Faced with such a magnitude of complaints, the Oklahoma County Board of Equalization began hearing protests regardless of the date of filing, even though 68 O.S.Supp.1989 § 2460,
Following the Board’s adjournment, Assessor timely filed several hundred appeals to the district court, in each case challenging the Board’s grant of relief to taxpayers who had not filed complaints within the twenty-day protest period set forth in section 2460. The appeals were consolidated, and on the court’s own motion were set for hearing to determine whether the Board had jurisdiction to adjust property assessments when taxpayer protests were not filed according to the statute. For purposes of the hearing, the court assumed that Assessor had properly mailed notices of increased assessment to the taxpayers, but did not assume that the taxpayers had received them.
The district court held that the Board had “the authority to hear any complaint by the taxpayer filed after the expiration of the 20-day protest period.” The district court reasoned that the “20-day provision is not a statute of limitations, but it is a restriction placed upon the taxpayer,” and therefore the Board had the discretion, but was not required to hear complaints which were not filed within twenty days. It is from this order that Assessor appeals.
Assessor contends that the filing of a protest within the time period set forth in section 2460 is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the Board’s ability to adjust the assessed valuation of a taxpayer’s property, and that “[t]he Board of Equalization may not act upon a protest filed more than twenty days after the mailing of the notice of increase in assessment.” Therefore, according to Assessor, the orders for relief granted by the Board upon complaints filed beyond the
A taxpayer must timely resort to the statutory remedy for adjustment of an assessment claimed to be erroneous or excessive or lose the right to receive a hearing before the Board upon demand. However, from a review of the statutory scheme at issue, it is clear that the Board’s jurisdiction to adjust assessed valuations of property is not limited to situations in which a taxpayer complaint is timely filed.
Title 68 O.S.Supp.1989 § 2460, provides a remedy for taxpayers who believe the assessment of their property is excessive, erroneous, or improper. When a taxpayer receives notice of increased valuation by mail, he has “twenty (20) days from date of mailing of such notice in which to file, with the secretary of [the Board of Equalization], a written complaint, specifying his grievances.” Id. Upon receipt of a complaint the Board is “authorized and empowered to take evidence pertinent to said complaint; ... is authorized to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, records, and papers by subpoena, and to confirm, correct, or adjust the valuation, as may seem just.” Id.
However, even if no taxpayer complaint is filed, county boards of equalization still have the duty and the authority under 68 O.S.Supp.1988 § 2459,
Moreover, the Constitution of Oklahoma
In the instant case, if the Board considered the numerous taxpayer protests as an indication that the information and method of valuation used by Assessor generally resulted in value determinations which exceeded the fair cash value of the property, then the Board had the statutory duty to correct and equalize the various individual assessments.
We find that the action taken with regard to assessment of the subject property was within the power, authority and discretion of the Board. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
. Repealed by Laws 1988, c. 162, § 165, effective January 1, 1992. See Ad Valorem Tax Code, 68 O.S.Supp.1989 §§ 2801-2899.
. See n. 1, at 2.
. Repealed by Laws 1989, c. 321, § 28, effective January 1, 1992.
. Okla. Const, art. X, § 8.