32 W. Va. 184 | W. Va. | 1889
Appeal from the decrees of the Circuit Court of Ohio county, pi’onounced in a suit brought September 11, 1886, by Mary Key and her children against the executors of Thomas Hughes deceased. The plaintiffs’ bill avers, that Mary Leech late of the city of Wheeling by her last will directed her. executor, the said Thomas Hughes, to set apart $5,000.00 of her estate and invest the same in' interest-bearing bonds and pay the interest or dividends derived therefrom to Mary Key during her life, and at her death to divide the principal equally among the children of said Mary; that said Hughes on July 13, 1868, duly qualified as such executor, set apart said $5,000.00, and after paying the United States succession tax there remained in his hands as a trust-fund for the plaintiffs $4,807.76, which he in July, 1869, invested in United States bonds of the par value of $4,500.00 the premium thereon being at that time $307.76 ; that from time to time the executor paid to the plaintiff", Mary Key, the interest on said bonds, but since the year 1873 she has never received any statement of account from the executor, nor has he made any settlement before any commissioner or court, showing such account; that he claimed to have deposited said bonds for safe-keeping in the Wheeling Savings Institution, a bank doing business in tbe city of Wheeling up to about the month of Pebrnary, 1871, when it became insolvent and ceased to do business; that the executor claimed that by the failure of said bauk the said bonds had been wholly lost, but that this claim was not made until April, 1873, more than two years after the alleged loss; that the plaintiffs have no information other than the mere statement of the executor, whether or not said bonds were in fact ever deposited in said bank, and they insist, that until it i’s shown, that said bonds were lost without the fault of the executor, his estate is liable therefor; that in April, 1873, said executor represented, that he had procured from the treasurer of said bank some scurities, from which something might be
The defendants answered the bill admitting, that the trust-fund came into the hands of their testator as executor of Mrs. Leech in the manner stated in the bill; and averring that said fund had been invested in Hnitcd States bonds of the issue known as “ ten-forties,” and said bonds were deposited in the Wheeling Savings Institution, a bank of good repute and financial standing, and that they had been feloni-ously abstracted therefrom by A. C. Quarrier, the treasurer of said bank, without the knowledge or authority of said Hughes, and wholly "lost without the fault of said Hughes, and in such manner as to relieve his estate from any liability therefor. The defendants also plead the statute of limitations and claim, that the laches of the plaintiffs in the assertion of their alleged demand have been such as to forbid any relief in this case.
The cause was finally'hoard on June 2, 1888, on the depositions filed, the report of a commissioner and the exceptions thereto ; and the court held and decreed, that the estate of Thomas Hughes, deceased, was chargeable with the principal sum of $4,500.00 and $316.57'accrued and unpaid interest thereon and appointed James P. Rogers, trustee, to collect and administer said sums according to the will of the said Mary C. Leech. The defendants obtained this appeal.
The important inquiry is: Are the facts and circumstances appearing in this cause of such a character as to relieve the trustee, Thomas Hughes, and his estate from lia
Quarrier further says, that this transaction occurred at the banking-house of said savings institution, and that the said bonds were to remain under the control of said savings institution subject to the order of Mr. Hughes as executor; that Mr. Hughes never until after the failure of said bank asked for or received any such bonds from said bank; that on one occasion the interest was paid to Mr. Hughes in coupons of ten-forty bonds; and whether the witness detached them from bonds then in the bank or he bought them, he does not remember, and on all other occasions the said bank paid to him the value of the interest-coupons in money. This witness further says, that the probabilities are, that he did not have the bonds in .the bank, as he was awaiting Mr. Hughes’s demand for them to give the order to purchase them in Hew York, it being understood that they were tobe held subject to his demand or order; but no demand was ever made for them, nor was.Mr. Hughes ever informed that the bonds had been purchased.
After the failure of the said bank its books showed, that under date of July 10, 1869, the sum of $4,874.76 had been
These are all the material facts appearing in the record in respect to the management and loss of the said trust-fund; and the question presented is : Do they show such care and diligence on the part of the executor or trustee as to relieve him from liability for its loss ?
The law is stated in 2 Lomax, Ex. 482, (293,) as follows: “The result of the best authorities on this subject was thus stated by Lord Cottenham : ‘Although a personal representative acting strictly within the line of his duty and exercising reasonable care and diligence will not be responsible for the failure or depreciation of the fund, in which any part of the estate may be invested, or for the insolvency or misconduct of any person, who may have possessed it, yet, if that line of duty be not strictly pursued, and any part of the property
In the opinion of the court in Elliott v. Carter, Judge Lee after reviewing a number of eases says : “Many other cases and opinions of learned judges might be cited tending to the same conclusions; and the fair result of the views which they present and the reasoning they adopt is that, where a trustee has acted in good faith in the exercise of a fair discretion, and in the same manner in which he would probably have acted if the subject had been his own property, and not held in trust, he ought not to be held responsible for any losses accruing in the management of the trust-funds.” 9 Gratt. 559. And then after adverting to the fact, that in Virginia executors and other trustees are allowed compensation, which is not the case in England, and expressing the opinion, that this fact ought not to make the rule more stringent as to the measure of their responsibilities the same judge on page 560 says: “As at present advised therefore I should not feel disposed to extend the responsibilities of trustees beyond the limits by which they would.seem to be bounded in the cases to which I have referred; and where they have intended to discharge their duties fairly, I think they should be treated with tenderness, and due caution taken not to hold them liable upon slight or uncertain grounds, lest, by a different policy, men of integrity, and who
It is plainly shown by these'views of Judge Lee and other Virginia decisions, that the degree of responsibility of trustees'has never been supposed to be any iess rigid in Virginia, than it is in England. There- are however some Virginia cases, in which the general rule has been relaxed : but they involve the acts of trustees during the late civil war. These cases are anomalous and exceptional and are not to be considered as qualifying the settled law in cases not peculiar in their nature. 2 Minor, Inst. (2d Ed.) 219; Meyers v. Zetelle, 21 Gratt. 733; Davis v. Harman, Id. 194. The case at bar iuvolve's nothing eccentric or unusual either in the condition of the-country or the terms of the trust. In all the essentials it is very similar to the eases of Matthews v. Brise, 6 Beav. 239, and Rowland v. Witherden, 3 Mac. & G. 568. In the former it was decided, that, where a trustee had properly invested trust-funds in exchequer bills and then left them in the hands of his broker, by whom they were misappropriated, the trustee was personally responsible. The syllabus in the latter ease is as follows: . '
“ Trustees of stock sold it out and committed the proceeds to their solicitor for investment, b,y whom it was misapplied and lost. Held-, that the trustees were liable for1 a breach of trust, and that the cestuis que trust were entitled to relief against both the trustees and the solicitor, and that they might sue cither the trustees alone, or the trustees jointly with the solicitor.”
The Lord Chancellor in that case says: “The trustees were bound to satisfy themselves in 'some other way than by the mere assurances of their solicitor, and by the payments made by him as for interest, that the money was really advanced on mortgage. But they did not even require a sight-of the mortgage-deed.” In both of these cases the fund was properly placed- in the hands of a third party, but because the trustees failed to see, that such third party had done his duty by actually making the investment, the trustee was made responsible.
The grounds, upon which the responsibility of Hughes has been placed, render it unnecessary to say much in regard to the refusal of the Circuit Court to allow the defendants to re-take the deposition of A. C. Quarrier. The only new fact, ■which, the defendants claim, they could prove by Quarrier, is, that, at the time he agreed to sell United States bonds to Hughes, the said bonds were in the custody of the Wheeling Savings Institution. It is not pretended, that he would testify, that any bonds were ever delivered to Hughes, or that they had been selected and deposited in the bank for safe-keeping as the property of Hughes. The fact, that they may have been in the bank as the property of the bank or of Quarrier, would not relieve Hughes from responsibility in view of the other fact appearing in the record. The gram-men of Hughes’s default and the ground, on which he is made responsible, is his failure to have said bonds placed on special deposit as his property and in his name, so that they could not be controlled or used by any person other than himself without the commission of a felony, or at least of something more wrongful than a mere breach of trust and confidence.
It is however insisted for the appellauts, that the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by the statute of limitations. On April 4, 1873, Hughes wrote a letter to the plaintiff, Mary Key, addressed to Baltimore, where she resided, in which he stated, that he had invested the trust-fund in United States bonds, and deposited the same in the Wheeling Savings Institution for safe-keeping, and that they had been lost by the failure of the bank in such a manner as to make that bank liable for them; that he had waited to see, what would be realized from the assets of the bank, and had already received two dividends on the said fund, amounting to
It is further contended, that the laches of the plaintiffs has barred their right to relief in this cause. The record shows, that Hughes continued to pay to the life-tenant the interest upon the trust-fund or an amount nearly or quite equal to such interest up to the time of his death, which did not occur until March, 1886, a few months before this suit was commenced. It is true, there was a difference in the form of the receipts, which he took from Mrs. Key for the payments made prior to 1873, and those he took for payments made thereafter. In the former he is mentioned as “Thomas Hughes, trustee,” and in the latter as “Thomas Hughes” simply. JBut whether the payment was made in the one form or the other, it was a payment in fact and a satisfaction of the only claim, which Mrs. Key had against him. There was no default in the payment, and consequently she had no cause of action, unless she had notice of repudiation of the trust by him. The only pretence of such notice is the letter of April 4, 1873, which we have already considered and hold insufficient for any such purpose. The fact, that the receipts did not describe him as trustee or state, that the payment was on account of interest, did not in the face of the actual payment of the interest even tend to prove a denial of the
The appellees have made a counter-assignment of error. They claim, that, because the answer of the defendants denies the allegations of the bill, that the payments made by Hughes to Mrs. Key after the loss of the United States bonds were paid as interest on the trust-fund, said payments must be treated as mere gratuities or gifts, and as such it was improper to allow the defendants credit for them, as was done by the decree of the Circuit Court. From the views, we have taken of facts in this cause in the preceding portions of this opinion, it is clear, that this claim of the appellees can not be sustained. We have treated all the payments made by the trustee, Hughes, to Mrs. Key both before and after the alleged loss of the trust-fund, as payments on account of the interest on said fund.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated I am of opinion, that the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.
Afeiemed.