Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA KEVIN DARNELL BRYANT, Case No. 2:20-cv-03459-DMG-JC Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND TO ORDER
v.
RAYBON C. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 2020, plaintiff Kevin Darnell Bryant, who is in state custody, is proceeding pro se , and has since been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee (“IFP”), filed a Civil Rights Complaint (“Original Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). (Docket No. 1). On March 16, 2021, the Court screened and dismissed the Original Complaint with leave to amend. (Docket No. 21). On May 14, 2021, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 27), which the Court screened and dismissed on November 16, 2021 (Docket No. 28).
On July 13, 2022, plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (or “SAC”) against the following fifteen defendants at California State Prison, Los Angeles County in Lancaster, California (“CSP-LAC”), where plaintiff was formerly housed: (1) Warden Raybon C. Johnson; (2) Former Warden Deborah Asuncion; (3) Chief Deputy Warden Donald D. Ulstad; (4) Associate Warden Eric Jordan; (5) Correctional Sergeant Cori J. Campbell; (6) Investigative Services Unit (“ISU”) Correctional Officer (C/O) Brandon Matthew Cherpin; (7) C/O Sergio Montez; (8) C/O LaShanna Bridgeforth; (9) C/O Eduardo Torres; (10) C/O Frank David Garcia; (11) Correctional Sergeant Andrew Puentes; and (12-15) Does 1-4. (Docket No. 35). Defendants are all sued in their individual and official capacities. (SAC at 4-6). The Second Amended Complaint sets forth three “claims” which assert, respectively, that defendants (1) violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by having him assaulted in retaliation for winning his prior lawsuit; (2) failed to protect plaintiff after being notified of threats and assaults against him; and (3) violated his rights to due process and equal protection by conspiring to place him in administrative segregation (“Ad-Seg”) based on knowingly false charges. [1] (SAC at 7). Plaintiff seeks various remedies, including damages, declaratory relief and an order requiring prison officials to transfer plaintiff to another facility. (SAC at 15).
As the Second Amended Complaint is deficient in multiple respects, including those detailed below, it is dismissed with leave to amend.
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II. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [2]
The Second Amended Complaint, liberally construed, alleges the following: On May 18, 2017, while plaintiff was housed at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), he won a civil lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California against two California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) correctional officers at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), based on claims that the officers violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by conspiring with inmates to have plaintiff assaulted, failing to protect him from the assault, and conspiring to deny him medical care. (SAC ¶ 1). On July 14, 2017, plaintiff was transferred from SVSP to CSP-LAC. (SAC ¶ 5). At CSP- LAC, prison officials “almost immediately” started threatening plaintiff, and told him it was payback for filing and winning his lawsuit. (SAC ¶ 6). Plaintiff, along with his god-sister and attorney, reported the threats to then-Warden Asuncion and others, seeking protection and transfer to a different facility, to no avail. (SAC ¶ 7).
On August 16, 2017, defendants Montez and Bridgeforth told plaintiff that their fellow officers wanted to know why he had snitched on the KVSP officers (in his earlier lawsuit) and asked if plaintiff thought they were going to let him get away with having done so. (SAC ¶ 8). They continued to threaten plaintiff and tell him he was going to be assaulted for filing and winning his lawsuit. (SAC ¶ 9). On September 5, 2017, Montez had three inmates attack plaintiff under the stairs, breaking plaintiff’s nose, while Montez watched from near the counselor’s office but never pushed his alarm button or intervened to protect plaintiff. (SAC ¶ 10). Afterward, Montez told plaintiff he would be killed if he reported Montez or the inmates. (SAC ¶ 11). When plaintiff told Montez about his broken nose, Montez said he did not care. (SAC ¶ 11).
On November 6, 2017, defendant Bridgeforth threatened to have plaintiff assaulted again unless he sent her $5,000 for two cell phones she had put in plaintiff’s cell, unsolicited, weeks before. (SAC ¶ 12). At plaintiff’s request, plaintiff’s god-sister reported this directly to defendant Warden Asuncion. (SAC ¶ 13).
On November 29, 2017, defendant Montez had two inmates attack plaintiff in the dayroom while Montez looked on but did not help plaintiff in any way. (SAC ¶ 15). Afterward, plaintiff told defendant Montez he would report the incident to the warden, and Montez responded by striking plaintiff on the head twice with his baton, leaving two permanent dents in plaintiff’s skull. (SAC ¶ 17). At plaintiff’s request, plaintiff’s god-sister reported this directly to defendant Warden Asuncion and others. (SAC ¶ 18).
On January 3, 2018, two gang member inmates told plaintiff that defendants Montez and Bridgeforth had promised them drugs and/or cell phones if they killed plaintiff. (SAC ¶ 19). Later that day, Montez threatened to have other inmates assault him, which was overheard by medical staff nurses. (SAC ¶ 20). Soon after, mental health staff received reports of this threat and had plaintiff transferred to a different building. (SAC ¶ 21).
On January 9, 2018, defendant Garcia, who years before had caused plaintiff’s jaw to be broken in an assault, told plaintiff he would get what he had coming to him for suing those officers at KVSP. (SAC ¶ 22).
On February 1, 2018, defendant Torres told plaintiff he was housing plaintiff with an inmate who would assault or possibly kill plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff’s lawsuits and reporting of Montez’s actions. (SAC ¶ 23). Plaintiff ///
reported this to his prior civil attorney, who complained to Warden Asuncion. (SAC ¶ 24).
On April 25, 2018, defendants Torres and Garcia paid several inmates to jump plaintiff in the dayroom. (SAC ¶ 26). As the inmates kicked and punched plaintiff in the head and back and tried to stab him in the neck, none of the officers watching did anything to stop it. (SAC ¶ 26).
On August 2, 2018, plaintiff’s god-sister reported the assaults to Warden Asuncion, who was upset about being contacted directly, and otherwise did not seem concerned about the allegations of assault and torture. (SAC ¶ 27).
On August 22, 2018, defendants Torres and Campbell directed the control booth officer to open plaintiff’s cell door, enabling two inmates to enter and attack plaintiff, while the officers watched and did nothing to stop it. (SAC ¶ 29). A few days later, on August 26, Torres and Campbell again directed that plaintiff’s cell be opened so that the same two inmates could enter and attack plaintiff. (SAC ¶ 30). The inmates sliced plaintiff’s chest with a razor blade before plaintiff could fight them off. (SAC ¶ 30). Again, Torres and Campbell watched and did nothing. (SAC ¶ 30). Afterward, when plaintiff was bleeding and needed medical attention, Torres and Campbell came to plaintiff’s cell and told him he would be attacked again if he went to the medical clinic or ever reported the incident. (SAC ¶ 31).
On September 5, 2018, defendants Warden Asuncion, Chief Deputy Warden Ulstad, and ISU C/O Cherpin, conspired to submit a knowingly false Rule Violation Report (“RVR”) causing plaintiff to be placed in Ad-Seg. (SAC ¶ 32).
On the day plaintiff was placed in Ad-Seg, while defendants Torres and Campbell escorted him to the stand-up cages in the gym, they told him they were going to take all his food and personal property and use it to pay off the inmates whom they had directed to assault plaintiff. (SAC ¶ 33). Over a thousand dollars’ ///
worth of plaintiff’s property was later taken and given away, according to several witnesses. (SAC ¶ 33).
On October 4, 2018, plaintiff appeared before defendant Warden Asuncion at his Inmate Classification Committee (“ICC”) hearing and explained everything that had been happening to him. (SAC ¶ 34). Asuncion claimed she was going to “make [plaintiff] whole again” and direct the ISU to investigate the matter, and she would also release plaintiff from Ad-Seg to the C-yard. (SAC ¶ 34). However, Asuncion retired from the CDCR several days later, without ever initiating any investigation or otherwise helping to protect plaintiff from further harm. (SAC ¶ 35).
When defendant Johnson replaced defendant Asuncion as warden, in October 2018, plaintiff’s god-sister called Warden Johnson and told him about the assaults on plaintiff, and Warden Johnson said he would investigate and protect plaintiff, but did not do so. (SAC ¶ 36). Plaintiff’s god-sister also told defendants Associate Warden Jordan and Chief Deputy Warden Ulstad about the threats and assaults, but they, too, did nothing to help and instead moved to cover up every complaint and allowed the harms to continue. (SAC ¶ 38).
On January 8, 2019, defendants Warden Johnson, Chief Deputy Warden Ulstad, and ISU C/O Cherpin conspired to submit a false RVR causing plaintiff to be placed back in Ad-Seg. (SAC ¶ 39). At plaintiff’s subsequent hearing on the RVR, plaintiff was not allowed to call witnesses or even submit written questions to witnesses, who would have testified that the charges were knowingly false. (SAC ¶ 40). The senior hearing officer, Lt. Lugo (not a defendant), told plaintiff that defendant Warden Johnson had directed him to deny plaintiff any witnesses and to find plaintiff guilty, even though Lt. Lugo acknowledged there was no evidence of plaintiff’s guilt. (SAC ¶ 41). Defendant Ulstad also signed off on the hearing decision. (SAC ¶ 40).
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On March 21, 2019, Associate Warden Jordan, who had been contacted by plaintiff’s god-sister, came to plaintiff’s cell in Ad-Seg and said plaintiff and his god-sister would be killed if they did not stop making complaints. (SAC ¶ 42). Defendant Jordan also told plaintiff that defendants Torres and Campbell were taking his property and orchestrating assaults against plaintiff as retaliation for his lawsuits and complaints, and it would not be over until plaintiff was dead. (SAC ¶ 43).
Defendant Chief Deputy Warden Ulstad chaired all of plaintiff’s ICC hearings in Ad-Seg, and assertedly conspired with defendants Warden Johnson and Sergeant Campbell to have plaintiff assaulted. (SAC ¶ 44). At an ICC hearing on April 4, 2019, defendant Ulstad ordered plaintiff to be released from Ad-Seg and returned to the C-yard. (SAC ¶ 45). However, because plaintiff’s god-sister had paid prison gang members to protect him, the planned assault on plaintiff did not materialize, so Warden Johnson had plaintiff placed back in Ad- Seg four days later, on April 8. (SAC ¶ 46).
On the morning of April 8, 2019, two or three officers took plaintiff to the gym, strip-searched him, and locked him in a stand-up cage, which they said they were doing at the warden’s orders. (SAC ¶ 47). Three or four other officers (defendants Does 1-4) then came and told plaintiff they were taking him to the program office to see defendant Campbell. (SAC ¶ 48). Plaintiff told the officers that he required a waist chain due to his reliance on a cane, but they refused to obtain one. (SAC ¶ 49). They handcuffed him behind his back and took him straight to the staff restroom in the gym, where one of the officers grabbed plaintiff in a choke-hold from behind until he was unconscious. (SAC ¶ 50). The officers continued to repeatedly choke plaintiff unconscious each time he awoke, for an unknown length of time. (SAC ¶ 50). When plaintiff finally regained consciousness, he was on the floor, and the Doe defendants were pulling up plaintiff’s pants and underwear. (SAC ¶ 51). Plaintiff felt extreme pain in his rectum. (SAC ¶ 51). The officers lifted him up, put him back in the stand-up cage, and left. (SAC ¶ 51).
Defendant Campbell arrived a few minutes later and told plaintiff that the warden had said to teach plaintiff some humility by subjecting him to sexual assault. (SAC ¶ 52). Defendant Campbell asked plaintiff if he felt humiliated and started laughing and making fun of him for having been sexually assaulted. (SAC ¶ 52). She admitted defendants Johnson and Ulstad had directed this assault. (SAC at ¶ 52). Around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m., two officers (not defendants) came and took plaintiff back to Ad-Seg. (SAC ¶ 53).
From a holding cell in Ad-Seg, plaintiff quietly tried to report the sexual assault to a psychologist (not a defendant), who said he was leaving for the day and had no time. (SAC ¶¶ 54-55). The psychologist said he would tell the Ad-Seg sergeant, defendant Puentes, though plaintiff begged him not to. (SAC ¶ 55). Soon after, defendant Puentes came by and threatened plaintiff that if he reported the assault, the officers would get away with it and plaintiff would be hurt and possibly killed. (SAC ¶ 56). Plaintiff insisted that he would report it anyway. (SAC ¶ 57).
At about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m., after defendant Puentes had threatened plaintiff for hours, defendant Garcia and Officer Smith (not a defendant) brought plaintiff to an interview room, and a team from Antelope Valley Hospital performed a forensic exam. (SAC ¶ 58). The nurse who performed the exam remarked that she saw something inside plaintiff’s rectum, and plaintiff was ordered to be transported by ambulance to Antelope Valley Hospital. (SAC ¶ 59). At the hospital, a plastic spoon was painfully extracted from plaintiff’s rectum. (SAC ¶ 60).
On May 9, 2019, plaintiff served defendants with private administrative process, which consisted of a “Formal Request for a Contested Case Administrative Hearing,” along with exhibits, presenting all the issues as needed to exhaust his administrative remedies and create a complete administrative record for the court. (SAC ¶ 62).
On May 10, 2019, when plaintiff was finally allowed to make a phone call, he called his god-sister, who then reported the incident to the governor. (SAC ¶ 61). Eleven days later, on May 21, plaintiff was suddenly transferred to the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison in Corcoran, California (“CSATF”), where prison staff continued to try to have plaintiff assaulted. (SAC ¶ 61).
III. PERTINENT LAW
A. The Screening Requirement
As plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP on a civil rights complaint against
governmental defendants, the Court must screen the Second Amended Complaint,
and is required to dismiss the case at any time it concludes the action is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); Byrd v. Phoenix Police
Dep’t,
When screening a complaint to determine whether it states any claim that is
viable, the Court applies the same standard as it would when evaluating a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso,
To avoid dismissal on screening, a complaint must “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Byrd,
At this preliminary stage, “well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint
are assumed true, while “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action”
and “legal conclusion[s] couched as a factual allegation” are not. Id. (citation and
quotation marks omitted); Jackson v. Barnes,
In general, civil rights complaints are interpreted liberally in order to give
pro se
plaintiffs “the benefit of any doubt.” Byrd,
If a
pro se
complaint is dismissed because it does not state a viable claim,
the court must freely grant “leave to amend” (that is, give the plaintiff a chance to
file a new, corrected complaint) if it is “at all possible” that the plaintiff could fix
the identified pleading errors by alleging different or new facts. Cafasso, U.S. ex
rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc.,
B. Section 1983 Claims
To state a Section 1983 claim, a complaint must allege that a defendant,
while acting under color of state law, caused a deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal
rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins,
An individual “causes” a constitutional deprivation basically when he
(1) “does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to
perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation”; or
(2) “set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which the [defendant] knows or
reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.”
Lacey v. Maricopa County,
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Similarly, a government official acting in a supervisory capacity “causes” a
deprivation to the extent he (1) personally participates in or directs a subordinate’s
constitutional violation; or (2) was not “physically present when the [plaintiff’s]
injury occurred,” but the constitutional deprivation can, nonetheless, be “directly
attributed” to the supervisor’s own wrongful conduct. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d
1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied
C. First Amendment – Right to Seek Redress and to Be Free from Retaliation
“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison
officials . . . .” Watison v. Carter,
Retaliation against a prisoner for exercising his First Amendment right to
seek redress/access the court is an independent constitutional violation. Brodheim
v. Cry,
summary judgment context). “[T]he mere
threat
of harm can be an adverse action
. . . .” Watison,
To satisfy the causation element of a First Amendment retaliation claim, an
inmate/plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a specific causal link between the
defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct and the inmate’s exercise of a
constitutional right. See generally Hartman v. Moore,
D. Eighth Amendment – Excessive Force/Failure to Protect
“Not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a
prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny[.]” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 319 (1986). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[C]ourts
considering a prisoner’s claim must ask: 1) if the officials acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind; and 2) if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Somers v. Thurman,
E. Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process
A due process claim based on prison disciplinary proceedings requires
allegations that state officials placed the inmate’s liberty interest “at stake.”
Wilkinson v. Austin,
In disciplinary proceedings which implicate the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, a prisoner charged with a disciplinary violation is entitled to
certain due process protections. Wolff v. McDonnell,
F.
Fourteenth Amendment – Equal Protection
Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
persons who are similarly situated must be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Texas
v. Cleburne Living Center,
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend for violation of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, as discussed below, several of plaintiff’s claims fail to state a viable claim for relief.
A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
As noted above, Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Each
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).
Conclusory allegations are insufficient. See Iqbal,
The Second Amended Complaint violates Rule 8 by failing clearly to
convey the legal and factual basis for each claim being asserted against each
defendant. Instead, plaintiff very briefly sets forth three general “claims” that
neglect to identify which specific defendants or conduct is at issue. Plaintiff then
includes a lengthy section of Factual Allegations, which comprises a variety of
detailed allegations against numerous defendants, many of whom had very
different responsibilities or involvement in the alleged harms. Although the
Factual Allegations occasionally allude to “retaliation” and “due process” and to
plaintiff’s rights to be free from deliberate indifference and abuse under the Eighth
Amendment, they fail to provide any clear notice as to which specific defendants
are being sued for each violation and for which conduct. As a result, most
defendants would be unable to adequately understand and respond to the claims
and allegations against them. To remedy this problem, plaintiff must, at a
minimum, provide clear factual allegations against each named defendant, separate
each legal predicate into a separate claim, and expressly identify which
defendant(s) are sued in each claim and which allegations are at issue in each
claim. See Twombly,
Because the Second Amended Complaint fails to give defendants clear
notice of the claims asserted against them, dismissal of the Second Amended
Complaint for violation of Rule 8 is warranted. See Hearns v. San Bernardino
Police Dep’t,
B. Failure to State a Claim
In addition to violating Rule 8, the Second Amended Complaint is deficient in other respects, as well, including a failure to state certain claims. [4]
First, plaintiff fails to state a First Amendment claim against at least
defendants Asuncion and Cherpin because plaintiff does not provide allegations
showing that these defendants ever acted with the intent to prevent plaintiff from
exercising his First Amendment rights or to retaliate against him for exercising
such rights. See Watison,
Second, plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against at least
Bridgeforth, Cherpin, and Puentes because he does not allege that these
defendants ever actually caused plaintiff harm or knowingly failed to protect
plaintiff from a serious threat of harm. See Hearns,
Third, plaintiff fails to state a due process claim against any defendant,
particularly because plaintiff does not allege that any liberty interest was at stake.
He has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or
consequences of his disciplinary hearings which show “the type of atypical,
significant deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin,
Finally, plaintiff fails to state any equal protection claim because he does
not allege facts showing that any defendant intentionally discriminated against
him based upon his membership in a protected class, such as race, see, e.g., Lee v.
City of Los Angeles,
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V. ORDERS [5]
In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, plaintiff must do one of the following:
1. File a Third Amended Complaint which cures the pleading defects set forth herein; [6] or
2. Sign and file the attached Notice of Dismissal which will result in the voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice; or
3. File a Notice of Intent to Stand on Second Amended Complaint, indicating plaintiff’s intent to stand on the Second Amended Complaint despite the ///
pleading defects set forth herein, which may result in the dismissal of this action in its entirety based upon such defects.
Plaintiff is cautioned that plaintiff’s failure timely to file a Third Amended Complaint, a Notice of Dismissal, or a Notice of Intent to Stand on Second Amended Complaint may be deemed plaintiff’s admission that amendment is futile, and may result in the dismissal of this action with or without prejudice on the grounds set forth above, on the ground that amendment is futile, for failure diligently to prosecute and/or for failure to comply with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 25, 2023
_______________/s/____________________ Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Attachments
Notes
[1] Although plaintiff does not clearly or accurately specify the legal right at issue in these claims, they are construed as asserting, respectively, (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim, (2) an Eighth Amendment excessive force/failure-to-protect claim, and (3) a Fourteenth Amendment due process/equal protection claim.
[2] The “Factual Allegations” section of the Second Amended Complaint is organized in 26 sixty-five paragraphs, numbered sequentially, from 1-65. (See SAC at 8-14). All citations to paragraphs in this Order refer to the numbered paragraphs in the Factual Allegations section of 27 the Second Amended Complaint. The named individuals in these allegations are listed as 28 defendants unless otherwise noted.
[3] The “some evidence” standard of review applies even when an inmate alleges that a
hearing officer has falsely found plaintiff guilty of a rules violation. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d
265, 269-70 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
[4] Plaintiff’s allegations at least arguably state First and/or Eighth Amendment claims against some defendants. Specifically, plaintiff at least arguably states a First Amendment claim against the following defendants, based on retaliatory acts of assault or threats of assault, related to the exercise of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights: Johnson (SAC ¶¶ 46-47, 52), Jordan (SAC ¶¶ 42-43), Ulstad (SAC ¶ 52), Montez (SAC ¶¶ 8-9, 11, 17), Bridgeforth (SAC ¶¶ 8-9), Garcia (SAC ¶ 22), Torres (SAC ¶¶ 31, 43), Campbell (SAC ¶¶ 31, 43, 52), Puentes (SAC ¶¶ 56-58), and Does 1-4 (SAC ¶¶ 48-52). He also at least arguably states Eighth Amendment failure to protect or excessive force claims against the following defendants: Asuncion (SAC ¶¶ 13-14, 16, 18, 25, 27-28, 34-35), Johnson (SAC ¶¶ 36-37, 46-47), Jordan (SAC ¶ 38), Ulstad (SAC ¶¶ 38, 44, 52), Montez (SAC ¶¶ 10-11, 15, 17), Garcia (SAC ¶ 26), Torres (SAC ¶¶ 29-31), Campbell (SAC ¶¶ 29-31, 48, 52), and Does 1-4 (SAC ¶¶ 48-51). Even so, however, the Second Amended Complaint as a whole still merits dismissal with leave to amend, at least due to the violation of Rule 8 discussed above, which makes it difficult for defendants to properly discern and defend against the claims.
[5] The Magistrate Judge’s orders herein constitute non-dispositive rulings on pretrial
matters. See McKeever v. Block,
[6] The Clerk is directed to provide plaintiff with a Central District of California Civil Rights Complaint Form, CV-66, to facilitate plaintiff’s filing of a Third Amended Complaint if he elects to proceed in that fashion. Any Third Amended Complaint must: (a) be labeled “Third Amended Complaint”; (b) be complete in and of itself and not refer in any manner to the Second Amended Complaint – i.e. , it must include all claims on which plaintiff seeks to proceed (Local Rule 15-2); (c) contain a “short and plain” statement of each of the claim(s) for relief (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)); (d) make each allegation “simple, concise and direct” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1)); (e) set forth clearly the sequence of events giving rise to the claim(s) for relief in sequentially “numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)); (f) allege specifically what each defendant did and how that individual’s conduct specifically violated plaintiff’s civil rights; (g) state the names of all defendants in the caption and not include in the body of the Third Amended Complaint defendants who are not also named in the caption (Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)); and (h) not add defendants or claims that are not reasonably related to the claims asserted in prior complaints.