Kevan BRUMFIELD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 12-30256.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 28, 2014.
744 F.3d 918
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Monisa Leola Thompson, Premila Burns, Assistant District Attorney, District Attorney‘s Office, Baton Rouge, LA, for Respondent-Appellant.
Before: STEWART, Chief Judge, and KING and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge:
IT IS ORDERED that the opinion previously filed in this case, Brumfield v. Cain, No. 12-30256, 740 F.3d 946 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2014), is WITHDRAWN. The following opinion is substituted therefor:
The State of Louisiana appeals the district court‘s imposition of a permanent injunction, enjoining the State from executing Petitioner-Appellee Kevan Brumfield. The district court granted habeas relief in favor of Brumfield, finding that he is mentally retarded1 and therefore ineligible for execution based on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). For the reasons stated herein, we REVERSE the district court‘s judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Trial and Direct Appeal
In 1995, a jury convicted Brumfield of the first degree murder of a Baton Rouge police officer—Corporal Betty Smothers—and sentenced him to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Brumfield, 737 So.2d 660 (La.1998). He appealed to the
B. State Post-Conviction Proceedings
In 2000, Brumfield filed for post-conviction relief in Louisiana state court alleging, inter alia, that he was ineligible for execution due to insanity. In his petition, he also requested funds to further develop his claims. Before the state court considered Brumfield‘s petition, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Atkins, which prohibited the execution of mentally retarded criminals. Brumfield then amended his state petition to assert an Atkins claim and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his mental retardation claim. As evidence of his claim, Brumfield provided the following: 1) his IQ score, obtained prior to trial, of 75; 2) his slow progress in school;2 3) his premature birth;3 4) his treatment at multiple psychiatric hospitals; 5) various medications he was prescribed; and 6) testimony that he exhibited slower responses than “normal babies,” suffered from seizures,4 and was hospitalized for months after his birth. In the petition, Brumfield again requested funds to develop his claims.
On October 23, 2003, the state trial court conducted a hearing on Brumfield‘s pending petition. At the hearing, the trial court denied Brumfield‘s petition in its entirety and stated as to the Atkins claim:
I guess the biggest [issue] we need to address is the claims of mental retardation and Atkins and whether or not the defendant is entitled to a hearing to determine that issue, and I‘ve read the cases that were cited and also both sides’ arguments, and even in Atkins it is clear that everybody that‘s facing the death penalty is not entitled to an Atkins hearing.
The cases say that that‘s to be taken up on a case-by-case method, and the burden of proving that [ ] is an issue that needs to be addressed is on the defendant here. I‘ve looked at the application, the response, the record, portions of the transcript on that issue, and the evidence presented, including Dr. Bolter‘s testimony, Dr. Guinn‘s testimony, which refers to and discusses Dr. Jordan‘s report, and based on those, since this issue—there was a lot of testimony by all of those in Dr. Jordan‘s report. Dr. Bolter in particular found [Brumfield] had an IQ of over—or 75. Dr. Jordan actually came up with a little bit higher IQ. I do not think that the defendant has demonstrated impairment based on the record in adaptive skills. The doctor testified that he did have an anti-social personality or sociopath, and explained it as someone with no conscience, and the defendant hadn‘t carried his burden placing the claim of mental retardation at issue. Therefore, I find he is not entitled to [an Atkins] hearing based on all of those things that I just set out.
The trial court did not address Brumfield‘s request for funding, and Brumfield‘s counsel did not raise the issue or specifi-
Brumfield then filed a writ with the Louisiana Supreme Court, alleging, inter alia, that the district court erred in failing to hold an Atkins hearing because he had presented substantial evidence supporting the claim. In the application, Brumfield requested an Atkins hearing as well as funding. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied petitioner‘s writ without explanation. Brumfield v. State, 885 So.2d 580 (La.2004).
C. Federal Post-Conviction Proceedings
On November 4, 2004, Brumfield timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the federal district court. The petition asserted, among other things, that the state court erred in failing to grant relief as to Brumfield‘s Atkins claim and in failing to hold an Atkins hearing. Brumfield also requested funds to enable him to properly present his claims.
After Brumfield filed his petition, the district court appointed counsel, and the Federal Public Defender Board provided expert funding. In 2007, Brumfield amended his petition to incorporate the expert findings. The magistrate judge (“MJ“) issued a Report and Recommendation, which first found, when considering the evidence Brumfield submitted to the state court, the state court‘s refusal to grant an Atkins hearing to be “reasonable and in accordance with clearly established federal law.” However, the MJ concluded that it should consider the additional evidence Brumfield presented in his amended habeas petition. In the MJ‘s view, Brumfield demonstrated cause for failing to provide the state court with the new evidence because he did not have the requisite funding. Additionally, if Brumfield was barred from presenting the new evidence, he would be prejudiced due to a state statute of limitation. After reviewing the additional evidence, the MJ concluded that Brumfield had established a prima facie case of mental retardation such that he was entitled to an Atkins hearing. The district court adopted the MJ‘s report and recommendations, and it held a six-day Atkins evidentiary hearing in 2010.
On February 22, 2012, the district court granted Brumfield‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for execution. The district court then issued a permanent injunction, forbidding the State from executing Brumfield. The State timely appealed.5
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the State first argues that the district court erred by failing to give the proper deference to the state court‘s denial of Brumfield‘s request for an Atkins hearing. The district court therefore erred, in the State‘s view, by holding an evidentiary hearing. Alternatively, the State contends that, even if this court were to consider the evidence produced in the federal evidentiary hearing, Brumfield has not proven that he was mentally retarded. We address each argument in turn.
A. Standard of Review
When considering an appeal from a district court‘s grant of habeas relief, this court reviews issues of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Wiley, 625 F.3d at 204–05 (citing Fratta v. Quarterman, 536 F.3d 485, 499 (5th Cir. 2008)). The Antiterrorism and Effective
When a state court adjudicates a prisoner‘s claim on the merits, a federal habeas court “shall not” grant the prisoner‘s writ of habeas corpus unless the state court‘s ruling:
- resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
- resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Under
Under
B. Applicable Law
The Supreme Court “did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides for determining when a defendant is mentally retarded.” Hearn v. Thaler, 669 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir.2012) (quoting Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 831, 129 S.Ct. 2145, 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Supreme Court left “to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [the] execution of sentences.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, we examine Louisiana law to determine whether Brumfield established the prerequisites of an Atkins claim.
Louisiana defines mental retardation as “a disability characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. The onset must occur before the age of eighteen years.”
Adaptive functioning “refers to how effectively individuals cope with common life demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence expected of someone in their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community setting.” Id. at 463 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized “six major life activities related to adaptive functioning: self-care, understanding and use of language, learning, mobility, self-direction, and capacity for independent living.” Id. (citation omitted). This prong is satisfied when there are “significant limitations in ... at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety....” Id. at 459
In State v. Dunn (Dunn II), 974 So.2d 658, 662 (La.2008) (per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the procedure it explained in State v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835 (La.2002) governed cases in which the issue of whether to hold an Atkins hearing is raised post-trial. That is, a defendant must first “come forward with some evidence to put his mental condition at issue.” State v. Dunn (Dunn I), 831 So.2d 862, 884 (La.2002). The defendant must undergo a mental examination “[i]f the court has reasonable ground to doubt whether the defendant is mentally retarded.” Id. Essentially, “[t]he defendant [must] come forward with some evidence initially to put his or her mental condition at issue.” Dunn III, 41 So.3d at 461. Then, the “defendant must prove his or her mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
C. Analysis
We first consider whether the state court‘s judgment was “on the merits” as contemplated by
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
The district court erred in its determination that the state court decision was not entitled to AEDPA deference. In the district court‘s view, the state court was required to provide Brumfield with the funds necessary to develop his claims. However, there is no Supreme Court decision that has held that prisoners asserting Atkins claims are entitled to expert funds to make out a prima facie case. Rather than present cases holding that Brumfield was entitled to funding to develop his prima facie case, the district court faulted the state court for failing to extend the due process precepts in Atkins, Ford, and Panetti to encompass this aspect of due process. See Chester, 666 F.3d at 344 (holding that a state court‘s decision is not entitled to AEDPA deference under
The district court‘s holding was an unwarranted extension of Supreme Court jurisprudence. See id. at 345 (“The first step in determining whether a state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law is to identify the Supreme Court holding that the state court supposedly unreasonably applied.“). Under Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), a court is explicitly required to provide an “opportunity to be heard” once the prisoner has made a “substantial threshold showing of insanity.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 949, 127 S.Ct. 2842 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This includes the opportunity to submit expert evidence. Id. at 951, 127 S.Ct. 2842. However, nowhere does the Supreme Court hold that this opportunity requires the court or the state to provide the prisoner with funds to obtain this expert evidence. Nor has this circuit recognized that such an established federal right exists. See Morris v. Dretke, 413 F.3d 484, 501 (5th Cir.2005) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (“[T]he State was within its rights to deny [the petitioner] assistance in obtaining intellectual testing [in order to make out a prima facie case of mental retardation].“).
We have explained the due process rights due “under Ford[:] [o]nce a prisoner seeking a stay of execution has made a ‘substantial threshold showing of insanity,’ the protection afforded by procedural due process includes a ‘fair hearing’ in accord with fundamental fairness.” Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir.2007) (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Similarly, “[t]he lesson we draw from Panetti is that, where a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of retardation ... the state court‘s failure to provide him with the opportunity to develop his claim deprives the state court‘s decision of the deference normally due.” Id. Thus, the strictures of procedural due process associated with Ford and Panetti attach only after a prisoner has
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
Similarly, the state court‘s judgment did not violate
Contrary to the district court‘s ruling, the state court considered both the intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior prongs of Louisiana‘s test for mental retardation. The state court noted that of the two I.Q. tests, one returned a score of 75 and the other returned “a little bit higher I.Q.” The state court then properly considered the evidence of adaptive functioning that Brumfield presented. The state court concluded that Brumfield had not “demonstrated impairment in adaptive skills.” The district court criticized the state court for not analyzing each subfactor of the adaptive skills prong, but there is no requirement that the state court articulate all of its reasons. Notably, no one testified that Brumfield was mentally retarded. Indeed, the record showed that at least one doctor diagnosed him with attention-deficit disorder and an anti-social personality. There was also testimony that Brumfield was capable of daily life activities such as working and establishing relationships. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that the state court did not clearly err in determining that Brumfield failed to satisfy his burden under Louisiana law of placing his mental condition at issue. See State v. Tate, 851 So.2d 921, 942 (La.2003) (holding that the defendant failed “to establish reasonable grounds that [he] may be mentally retarded“). Thus, the state court‘s decision does not fall under the exceptions in
In sum, the district court erred when it failed to give the proper AEDPA deference to the state court‘s decision. Because the state court‘s judgment was entitled to AEDPA deference, “there was no reason for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.” Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647, 661 (5th Cir.2011). Accordingly, it was error for the district court to conduct such a hearing, and we therefore disregard the evidence adduced for the first time before the district court for purposes of our analysis under
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court‘s grant of habeas relief in favor of Brumfield.