168 P. 86 | Utah | 1917
Lead Opinion
Proceedings arising out of different phases of this case have been considered by us twice before. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 48 Utah, 214, 159 Pac. 541; Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court, 48 Utah, 342, 159 Pac. 737. In both of those proceedings merely preliminary questions were involved. After the preliminary questions had been settled by this court, the case was finally heard upon the merits by the district court of Carbon County, which granted the claims of the plaintiff as against the defendant Pleasant Valley Coal Company in part and as against said company denied them in part; and as against the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company plaintiff was denied all relief. The principal defendants in this action are the Pleasant Valley Coal Company, hereinafter called P. V. C. Co., and the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company, hereinafter designated Railroad Co. The other defendants are merely mortgagees and need not be further mentioned. The action was commenced by the plaintiff to condemn a certain strip of ground over certain lands belonging to the P. V. C. Co., and also to condemn a portion- of the right of way of the Railroad Co. We here insert a rough sketch which illustrates just what the plaintiff seeks to obtain in this action:
The sketch is supposed to cover precisely forty acres of land. North of and adjoining the forty acres shown on the plat the
On the hearing, the district court found the title to the whole 160 acres, not included within the Railroad Co. ’s right
Counsel for the defendants, however, cite a large number of cases in which they contend it has been held that the judgment in the case at bar is not a final and hence not an appeal-able judgment. Among other eases, they cite and rely on the following: Burlington & C. R. Co. v. Colo. E. R. Co., 45 Colo. 222, 100 Pac. 607, 16 Ann. Cas. 1002; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337, 13 Sup. Ct. 356, 37 L. Ed. 194; Traction Co. v. Schenk, 73 W. Va. 226, 80 S. E. 345; Ludlow v. City of Norfolk, 87 Va. 319, 12 S. E. 612; Hendrick v. Railroad, 98 N. C. 431, 4 S. E. 184; Forest Cemetery Ass’n v. Constans, 70 Minn. 436, 73 N. W. 153; Duluth Tr. Ry. Co. v. Duluth Terml. Ry. Co., 81 Minn. 62, 83 N. W. 497; Atley v. Commissioners, 77 Ohio St. 285, 82 N. E. 1079; In re Minn. & Wis. Ry Co., 103 Wis. 191, 78 N. W. 753; Crompton Carpet Co. v. Worcester, 119 Mass. 375; Matter of Grab, 157 N. Y. 69, 51 N. E. 398; Chicago Tr. Co. v. Preucil, 236 Ill. 491, 86 N. E. 117; Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 54 Wash. 292, 103 Pac. 49. We have given all of the cases referred to by counsel which directly refer to the proposition contended for by them. In not a single one of those cases is the question now under consideration passed on. The case which most nearly approaches the question is the one from Colorado, the first one cited. In that case, however, the court entered judg
A “judgment appointing commissioners to fix a just compensation for land proposed to be taken in condemnation proceedings is not final and appealable. ’ ’
It is only necessary to say that all the other eases are precisely to the same effect. What is said by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Hendrick v. Railroad, supra, is quite significant. In that case the court held that an order appointing commissioners to assess damages in a condemnation proceeding is not a final judgment. The court, however, said:
“The order appealed from (however) is very different from that in the similar ease of Chick v. The Railroad, Co. (98 N. C. 390, 4 S. E. 183), decided at the present term; in the latter the court denied the motion for an order appointing commissioners and dismissed the proceeding,*403 thus putting an end to the right of the plaintiff therein, and therefore an appeal lay in that case. ’ ’
In that case, therefore, the true distinction is recognized and pointed out. If the right to condemn is denied in toto, there can be no doubt respecting the condemner’s right to appeal, and if it is denied in a substantial and material part, so that what is allowed is not what the condemner seeks or requires, then again' there should be no doubt respecting his right of appeal. In either case what he seeks is denied him, and the denial is final and conclusive unless reversed on appeal. Moreover, in case the whole claim is denied no damages can be assessed, and in case it is only partly denied it results in splitting the case so far as assessment of damages is concerned, and, under' certain circumstances, might make it quite impracticable, if not impossible, to intelligently pass upon the question of damages.
Counsel for plaintiff have, however, also cited cases in which they contend it has been held that condemnation proceedings, under certain circumstances, are divisible, and that appeals will lie before the whole case is finally determined. They cite In re St. P. & N. W. Ry. Co., 34 Minn. 237, 25 N. W. 345; State v. Oshkosh, etc., Ry. Co., 100 Wis. 538, 77 N. W. 193; City of Bluefield v. Bailey, 62 W. Va. 304, 57 S. E. 805; Wheeling, etc., Co. v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 138 U. S. 287, 11 Sup. Ct. 301, 34 L. Ed. 967; McLean v. District Court, 24 Idaho, 441, 134 Pac. 536, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 542; Jackson v. Jackson, 175 Fed. 710, 99 C. C. A. 286; Potter v. Beal, 50 Fed. 860, 2 C. C. A. 60; 3 C. J. 356; 2 R. C. L. 42; 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain, 803. The case cited from Minnesota was expressly overruled by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the cases referred to in defendants’ citations from that state. While some of the other eases cited are more or less in point upon plaintiff’s contention, yet in none of them is the precise question here involved decided, in 3 C. J. 448, it is said:
“ There are many cases in which, it has been held that a decree may be final in the sense that it may be appealed from although not final in the strict technical sense of the term, and in which, where the court has finally adjudicated part of the merits, the judgment, order, or decree has been held quoad hoe final and appealable.”
"An exact definition of a final decree applicable to all cases possible to arise in practice is not easily given. It is not always necessary to dispose of the entire merits of the cause and all the parties before the court as a necessity to a final decree upon certain particular conceded or established rights. ’ ’
In that connection it is further said:
‘ ‘ The finality of a decree is not determined by the state of the suit at the time it is rendered, but upon whether it concludes a party in imposing on him a liberty or depriving him of a right.”
See, also, Tucker v. Yell, 25 Ark. 420-432, where an interesting discussion respecting what constitutes a final judgment for the purposes of appeal will be found. The excerpt quoted from 3 Words and Phrases is taken from that case. See, also, Alexander v. Bates, 127 Ala. 328, 28 South. 415-419.
In Sharon v. Sharon, 67 Cal. 196, 7 Pac. 463, it is said:
“A final judgment is not necessarily the last one in an action. A judgment that is conclusive of any question in a ease is final as to that question. ’ ’
The foregoing principle is illustrated and applied by this court in the cases of Bristol v. Brent, 35 Utah, 213, 99 Pac. 1000, and Parsons v. Parsons, 40 Utah, 602, 122 Pac. 907. We need not pause now to show that the principle announced in those two cases is clearly applicable here.
We are aware that in Re Kelsey, 12 Utah, 393, 43 Pac. 106, the Utah Territorial Supreme Court refused to follow the case of Sharon v. Sharon, supra, but that in no way affects the principle contained in the excerpt quoted from the Sharon Case; nor does it in the least affect the doctrine laid down by this court in the Bristol and the Parsons Cases.
It is not necessary to pursue the authorities further. We have no desire to depart from the wholesome and salutary rule constantly adhered to by this court that appeals will be permitted only from final judgments; yet neither do we desire to lay down a rule in that respect which would result in sacrificing substance for mere shadow. This case is an illustration that circumstances and conditions may arise where both common sense and justice unite in requiring that an appeal be allowed before every question that may be involved
It follows, therefore, that the motions to dismiss the appeal should be, and they are accordingly, denied.
We now proceed to a consideration of the merits, and in doing so we shall first discuss the question of title.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant P. Y. C. Co. claim title to the 160 acres of coal land in question from the same source. It is more convenient to consider the P. Y. C. Co.’s title first.
The following facts are found by the court and are not disputed. On May 14, 1888, the 160 acres in question were vacant, unoccupied coal lands of the United States, open to entry, exploration, and purchase. On that day one Stephen R. Marks, a citizen of the United States, of lawful age, filed his coal declaratory statement as provided by the United States statute (Act Cong. March 3,' 1873, c. 279, section 1, 17 Stat. 607 [U. S. Comp. St. 1916, section 4659]), and, in compliance therewith, on March 29,1889, made application to purchase said land. His application to purchase was protested by one Sprunt upon the ground that the application was made on behalf of the P. V. C. Co. Upon a hearing on the protest in the United States local land office, it was found that Sprunt’s protest was not well founded and therefore it was-not sustained. An appeal from the findings and decision of the local land office was taken to -the United States Commissioner of the General Land Office where the decision was affirmed. Thereafter, and pursuant to the application to purchase, Marks, on October 2, 1890, entered and paid the purchase price for said land to the United States government and received a receipt showing payment. Thereafter, on June 5, 1891, the government duly issued a patent to Marks for said land. Before Marks had made the application to purchase,
As stated at the commencement of this opinion, the Railroad Co. claims title to its right of way from the United States through an act of Congress. In view that the title to the right of way of the Railroad Co. is conceded by the plaintiff, further reference to the title thereof is unnecessary.
The^question therefore arises, Can plaintiff’s attack upon the title prevail 1 It would seem that merely to state the facts
“If any person shall hereafter convey any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have the legal estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors, or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance.”
Plaintiff’s counsel contend that the foregoing section does not apply in this case. Without pausing to discuss that question further, we can perceive of no good reason why the statute does not apply here if it applies in any case, and no claim is made that the statute is not a wholesome and proper one.
The company, however, also claims, and the district court found, that it had acquired title to the land by adverse possession under our statute. In view of what has been said respecting the paper title, it is, however, wholly unnecessary to discuss that phase of the case, and we refrain from doing so.
In view, therefore, that the title is in the P. V. C. Co., the plaintiff must acquire its right to the strip marked “A” on the plat by condemnation.
“It shall be unlawful for any person, for himself or any company, association, or corporation, to directly or indirectly procure any person to settle upon any lands open to settlement in the territory of Oklahoma, with intent thereafter of acquiring title thereto; and any title thus acquired shall be void; and the parties to such fraudulent settlement shall severally be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished upon indictment, by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. ’ ’
The statute seems to be limited to the territory of Oklahoma, and the case arose in that territory. Mr. Chief Justice White, in the course of the opinion, says:
‘ ‘ It cannot be seriously disputed that if the agreement was made by Fernow, the original applicant, that he would make the homestead entry not for himself, but for the benefit of another, would, during the time that he was apparently taking the steps to complete the entry, pay rent for the land to such other person, and when the patent was issued deed the land to such other person, such agreement caused that entry to be absolutely void for repugnancy to” the statute we have quoted.
We need not review that decision further. It is sufficient to say that the decision is based entirely upon,the fact that the person who made the homestead entry did so for the benefit of another, and he agreed that upon obtaining title he would convey the same to such other person. Any title based on the entry in that case would, therefore, of necessity, be void and of no force or effect. If it be assumed, therefore, that that case states the law generally applicable in all of the states of the Union, yet the case has no application to the facts in the ease at bar.
As we have before pointed out, however, counsel for plaintiff concede that'the patent in the case at bar is valid and that by it the title passed from the United States to Marks. They also concede that Marks, the grantee of the government, obtained the title without committing any fraud or deception on the government, and without violating any statute. The patent on which the title of the P. V. C. Co. is based is, therefore, valid and free from all defects. Moreover, the deed
The only claim remaining, therefore, is that the grantee of Marks was disqualified from acquiring title to coal lands. That, however, as we have pointed out before, cannot affect the title of the P. Y. C. Co. since the title necessarily passed from Marks to his immediate grantee, Williams, and from Williams to Goss, the immediate grantor of the P. V. C. Co. In the case last referred to the entry and every act based thereon were void and of no effect. Not so here. Marks’ entry and the patent based thereon were valid and without any legal flaw whatever. So long as the patent issued to Marks stands, therefore, we cannot see how plaintiff can assail the title of the P. V. G. Go., which claims title through Marks and through whom plaintiff also claims title, but by a subsequent deed. It is certainly an anomaly to say that although Marks intended to convey the lands, was legally qualified to do so, and was in no way deceived or- defrauded, and received full consideration therefor, he, nevertheless, retained the title until he conveyed the same in 1915 to Mr. Sweet — that he retained the title notwithstanding section 1979, supra, which we have quoted in full. We repeat that no case is cited by counsel sustaining such a claim, and certainly the last ease referred to by them, which we have specially reviewed, does not even intimate anything of the kind. After again going over the matter, we are still fully convinced that the conclusions announced are sound and should prevail.
We proceed now to a consideration of plaintiff’s contention that the district court erred in not condemning a portion of the right of.way of the Railroad Co. for a tipple site. As before stated, the Railroad Co., by an act of Congress passed in 1872 (Act Cong. June 8, 1872, c. 354, 17 Stat. 339), obtained a right of way over the land in question 200 feet in width. Early in the ’80’s it located its line of railroad on said strip. Plaintiff seeks to condemn a strip approximately 70 feet in width and 1,000 feet in length lying between the
“All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in section 3588, and any and all structures and improvements thereon, and the lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject to be connected with, crossed, or intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure thereon ; they shall also be subject to a limited use in common with the owners thereof, when necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections, and connections shall be made in the manner most compatible with the greatest public benefit and the least private injury.”,
By referring to the provision just quoted, it will be seen that every right of way, as it is expressed in the statute, is “subject to be connected with, crossed, or intersected by any other right of way.” And further: “They [the rights of way] shall also be subject to a limited use in common with the owners thereof, when necessary. ’ ’ The statute then prescribes the manner of use of the “crossings, intersections, and connections. ’ ’ The statute thus limits the interference with rights of way to “crossings, intersections, and connections” by other rights of way. True, it makes a right of way also subject “to
Nor does it affect the question that, by reason of lack of proper ground space, tipple sites are not readily obtainable by the plaintiff. As pointed out, whenever a railroad company enters into the business of a common carrier it must provide reasonable means of access to its lines, tracks, and cars, not only to one shipper and for one kind of freight, but for all shippers and for all kinds of freight. If it becomes necessary to construct more extensive spurs and side tracks in order to accommodate the shippers and to facilitate transportation, the spurs and the side tracks must be built. One shipper, whatever his supposed needs may be, may, however, not condemn a part of a right of way for his own needs and thus hamper the railroad company in discharging its duties to all other shippers.
Without pausing to discuss the question further, we are clearly of the opinion that the plaintiff niay not condemn any portion of the right of way for a tipple site, regardless of whether the location desired by it for that purpose on the right of way of the Railroad Co. would be most convenient, and would indirectly benefit the public by permitting the plaintiff to ship coal at a cost less than it otherwise can.
In this connection counsel for both sides have again cited á large number of authorities to which, in our judgment, it is not necessary to refer.
Nor is there anything contrary to the principles herein announced in the case of Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. O. S. L. R., 23 Utah, 474, 65 Pac. 735, 90 Am. St. Rep. 705. In that case a portion of the right of way was permitted to be condemned for another right of way. The right of way sought to be condemned was intended to be devoted to the business of a common carrier. It is well settled that the business of a telegraph company is that of a common carrier. Moreover, the space or area of the right of way condemned in that case was insignificant and could in no way interfere with or impede the business of the railroad company.
The district court, therefore, committed no error in denying plaintiff the right to condemn any portion of the right of way owned by the Railroad Co.
“And the court further finds that said track 4, mentioned in the pleadings and evidence herein, at the time of the commencement of this action, was, and long prior thereto had been, and now is, dedicated, appropriated, and devoted to a public use, together with a clearance space or strip of not less than five feet parallel to and from the outer edge of the north or northerly rail of said track 4. ’ ’
So far, therefore, as shippers are concerned, track No. 4, including the five-foot strip, must be regarded and treated as though it were actually located on the original right of way.
As we have hereinbefore pointed out, shippers are not required to condemn rights of way extending them onto railroad grounds. Nor are they required to approach nearer to the tracks than is necessary to load and unload their freight. It is apparent to any one that, in order to avoid danger to the railroad employees in operating trains and in switching cars, there must of necessity be a clearance space extending some distance beyond the outer rail of every railroad track. The court found that five feet clearance was necessary. It would seem that that space is a most reasonable one since the cars extend about two and one-half to three feet beyond the rail, and in addition to that there must be sufficient room for a man to pass between the cars and any structure that may be erected along the track. That room is also necessary for the safety of the railroad brakemen who may be required to stand on the ladders attached to the cars. Indeed, the necessity for such a space is so apparent and so general that a court could well take judicial notice of its necessity and extent. In view that every shipper must be given the right and afforded the opportunity to load his freight and the opportunity to unload the same
We have perhaps devoted more space to this assignment than was necessary, but we did so in order to make clear the want of merit to the contention that the district court deprived the plaintiff of any rights, and that neither the Railroad Co. nor the P. Y. C. Co. in any way can reap an advantage from the ruling and order of the court.
As before stated, all that we are called on to decide, and all that we do decide, is that the law does not authorize the plaintiff to condemn any portion of the right of way for a tipple site; and although the track may depart from the original right of way, yet the track, being used in legitimate traffic, cannot be devoted by the plaintiff to its exclusive right.
It is further contended by plaintiff that the court erred in admitting and in excluding evidence during the progress of the trial. In view of the foregoing conclusions, however, none of those assignments could affect the result, and it is therefore unnecessary for us to discuss any of them.
The defendant P. V. C. Co. has, however, assigned cross-errors, and now insists that the district court erred in condemning the sixty-foot strip down to within five feet of the outer rail of track No. 4. It is contended in that regard that the tramway that is to be used on the strip is to be constructed and operated on an incline of twenty-five per cent.; that the operation of the tramway on such an incline is dangerous, and that the plaintiffs at a cost which is great, but not prohibitive, could obtain tipple grounds and could transport its coal from its mine to the railroad tracks in a safer manner at least at two other points. The court has found the facts against the contention of the P. V. C. Co. in that regard, and there is no¡ contention that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the court’s findings. Indeed, there is ample evidence to sustain the findings of the court, not only in that particular but in all other particulars.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the result affirming the judgment of the district court, but in doing so I desire to say that, while I agree with the conclusions of the Chief Justice that the P. V. C. Co., merely as a corporate body, is and was authorized to take and hold title to coal land, yet I am unable to agree that such coal company was qualified to take title to the particular lands in question at the dates of the conveyances to it. From the undisputed facts that one of the original incorporators of the coal company (Wood), and that both Williams and Goss (Goss being a stockholder on the date of the conveyance to him) had exercised their right to select and file upon lands belonging to the government as coal lands, and each had subsequently acquired title to 160 acres of such lands, I am unable to arrive at any other conclusion, under R. S. U. S. 1875, section 2350 (U. S. Comp. St. 1916, section 4662), than that not .only Williams and Goss, but the coal company as wdl, were not qualified entrymen at the date of the Marks patent, or at the date the conveyance was made to either of them. I do not think, however, that the appellant should be adjudged to own the land sought to be condemned or to question the title of the coal company thereto. I base that conclusion on what appears to me from the record to be an undisputed fact, that — whether or not Marks at the date of his original entry, made the same in good faith to acquire the land for himself — from the subsequent acts of all the parties and the dates of the conveyances but one conclusion can be drawn, and that is that he, Marks, the original entryman, Williams and Goss, intermediary grantors, and the P. Y. C. Co. were all parties to the agreement or understanding that Marks should acquire title to these lands for the benefit of the coal company and not for himself.